<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git, branch v4.4.227</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.4.227</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-11T07:21:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f17c881e4c8899900a5a77e87fb064158d32b05c'/>
<id>f17c881e4c8899900a5a77e87fb064158d32b05c</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uprobes: ensure that uprobe-&gt;offset and -&gt;ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-04T16:47:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1c66189c16f1213a71310440d0eca9468ed6c246'/>
<id>1c66189c16f1213a71310440d0eca9468ed6c246</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream.

uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe()
relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but
some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this.

We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the
offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches
the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures,
so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE.

Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very
beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is
aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju &lt;srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ check for ref_ctr_offset removed for backport - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream.

uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe()
relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but
some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this.

We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the
offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches
the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures,
so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE.

Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very
beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is
aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju &lt;srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ check for ref_ctr_offset removed for backport - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathieu Othacehe</name>
<email>m.othacehe@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-03T09:29:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=dc3f4c14d92760b5abdefe0bcd6c7cb28533f88b'/>
<id>dc3f4c14d92760b5abdefe0bcd6c7cb28533f88b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 ]

The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped
unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be
returned.

Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while
and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up.

Fixes: 62a1efb9f868 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Othacehe &lt;m.othacehe@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 ]

The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped
unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be
returned.

Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while
and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up.

Fixes: 62a1efb9f868 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Othacehe &lt;m.othacehe@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T18:46:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8a782408e080b4129bd2c14b08a6b921afa2669a'/>
<id>8a782408e080b4129bd2c14b08a6b921afa2669a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream

Make the docs match the code.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream

Make the docs match the code.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Gross</name>
<email>mgross@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T14:58:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7c4a0a19590ac80744f6037c86df340f9b098339'/>
<id>7c4a0a19590ac80744f6037c86df340f9b098339</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

 [ bp: Massage.
   jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

 [ bp: Massage.
   jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Gross</name>
<email>mgross@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T14:58:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7180c930dcedb3f33efe992ea4a077f420524e6e'/>
<id>7180c930dcedb3f33efe992ea4a077f420524e6e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Gross</name>
<email>mgross@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T14:58:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4ebffa4b0a198d8671ee68742ba6d3f56164301f'/>
<id>4ebffa4b0a198d8671ee68742ba6d3f56164301f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Gross</name>
<email>mgross@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T14:58:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ebb9e39670740e99a1d4aeb9aacd69b98c7f0418'/>
<id>ebb9e39670740e99a1d4aeb9aacd69b98c7f0418</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream

Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.

On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.

 [ bp: Massage.
   tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream

Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.

On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.

 [ bp: Massage.
   tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jia Zhang</name>
<email>qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T14:58:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=00bbe36fb9c2a41c87f4775ee985c882ca54b3f3'/>
<id>00bbe36fb9c2a41c87f4775ee985c882ca54b3f3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b399151cb48db30ad1e0e93dd40d68c6d007b637 upstream.

x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the
processor's stepping.

Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c.

[ Backport by Mark Gross to simplify the SRBDS backport ]

Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang &lt;qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
[ Updated it to more recent kernels. ]
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b399151cb48db30ad1e0e93dd40d68c6d007b637 upstream.

x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the
processor's stepping.

Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c.

[ Backport by Mark Gross to simplify the SRBDS backport ]

Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang &lt;qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
[ Updated it to more recent kernels. ]
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pascal Terjan</name>
<email>pterjan@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-23T21:12:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8f5b7c0f7843dff129998b5ff86a81ecf977e67b'/>
<id>8f5b7c0f7843dff129998b5ff86a81ecf977e67b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 15ea976a1f12b5fd76b1bd6ff3eb5132fd28047f upstream.

The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e462d
("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and
while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants
I noticed this driver uses the old value.

The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the
second definition.

Signed-off-by: Pascal Terjan &lt;pterjan@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200523211247.23262-1-pterjan@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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commit 15ea976a1f12b5fd76b1bd6ff3eb5132fd28047f upstream.

The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e462d
("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and
while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants
I noticed this driver uses the old value.

The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the
second definition.

Signed-off-by: Pascal Terjan &lt;pterjan@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200523211247.23262-1-pterjan@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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