linux.git, branch v4.9.117

Linux 4.9.117

2018-08-03T05:55:27+00:00

net: dsa: qca8k: Allow overwriting CPU port setting

2018-08-03T05:55:27+00:00

commit 9bb2289f90e671bdb78e306974187424ac19ff8e upstream.

Implement adjust_link function that allows to overwrite default CPU port
setting using fixed-link device tree subnode.

Signed-off-by: Michal Vokáč 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn 
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: dsa: qca8k: Add QCA8334 binding documentation

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit 218bbea11a777c156eb7bcbdc72867b32ae10985 upstream.

Add support for the four-port variant of the Qualcomm QCA833x switch.

The CPU port default link settings can be reconfigured using
a fixed-link sub-node.

Signed-off-by: Michal Vokáč 
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn 
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: dsa: qca8k: Enable RXMAC when bringing up a port

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit eee1fe64765c562d8bcaf95e5631a8ea2f760f34 upstream.

When a port is brought up/down do not enable/disable only the TXMAC
but the RXMAC as well. This is essential for the CPU port to work.

Fixes: 6b93fb46480a ("net-next: dsa: add new driver for qca8xxx family")
Signed-off-by: Michal Vokáč 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn 
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: dsa: qca8k: Force CPU port to its highest bandwidth

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit 79a4ed4f0f93fc65e48a0fc5247ffa5645f7b0cc upstream.

By default autonegotiation is enabled to configure MAC on all ports.
For the CPU port autonegotiation can not be used so we need to set
some sensible defaults manually.

This patch forces the default setting of the CPU port to 1000Mbps/full
duplex which is the chip maximum capability.

Also correct size of the bit field used to configure link speed.

Fixes: 6b93fb46480a ("net-next: dsa: add new driver for qca8xxx family")
Signed-off-by: Michal Vokáč 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn 
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

RDMA/uverbs: Protect from attempts to create flows on unsupported QP

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit 940efcc8889f0d15567eb07fc9fd69b06e366aa5 upstream.

Flows can be created on UD and RAW_PACKET QP types. Attempts to provide
other QP types as an input causes to various unpredictable failures.

The reason is that in order to support all various types (e.g. XRC), we
are supposed to use real_qp handle and not qp handle and expect to
driver/FW to fail such (XRC) flows. The simpler and safer variant is to
ban all QP types except UD and RAW_PACKET, instead of relying on
driver/FW.

Cc:  # 3.11
Fixes: 436f2ad05a0b ("IB/core: Export ib_create/destroy_flow through uverbs")
Cc: syzkaller 
Reported-by: Noa Osherovich 
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky 
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe 
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: check for allocation block validity with block group locked

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit 8d5a803c6a6ce4ec258e31f76059ea5153ba46ef upstream.

With commit 044e6e3d74a3: "ext4: don't update checksum of new
initialized bitmaps" the buffer valid bit will get set without
actually setting up the checksum for the allocation bitmap, since the
checksum will get calculated once we actually allocate an inode or
block.

If we are doing this, then we need to (re-)check the verified bit
after we take the block group lock.  Otherwise, we could race with
another process reading and verifying the bitmap, which would then
complain about the checksum being invalid.

https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1780137

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: fix inline data updates with checksums enabled

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit 362eca70b53389bddf3143fe20f53dcce2cfdf61 upstream.

The inline data code was updating the raw inode directly; this is
problematic since if metadata checksums are enabled,
ext4_mark_inode_dirty() must be called to update the inode's checksum.
In addition, the jbd2 layer requires that get_write_access() be called
before the metadata buffer is modified.  Fix both of these problems.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200443

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

squashfs: be more careful about metadata corruption

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit 01cfb7937a9af2abb1136c7e89fbf3fd92952956 upstream.

Anatoly Trosinenko reports that a corrupted squashfs image can cause a
kernel oops.  It turns out that squashfs can end up being confused about
negative fragment lengths.

The regular squashfs_read_data() does check for negative lengths, but
squashfs_read_metadata() did not, and the fragment size code just
blindly trusted the on-disk value.  Fix both the fragment parsing and
the metadata reading code.

Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Phillip Lougher 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

random: mix rdrand with entropy sent in from userspace

2018-08-03T05:55:26+00:00

commit 81e69df38e2911b642ec121dec319fad2a4782f3 upstream.

Fedora has integrated the jitter entropy daemon to work around slow
boot problems, especially on VM's that don't support virtio-rng:

    https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572944

It's understandable why they did this, but the Jitter entropy daemon
works fundamentally on the principle: "the CPU microarchitecture is
**so** complicated and we can't figure it out, so it *must* be
random".  Yes, it uses statistical tests to "prove" it is secure, but
AES_ENCRYPT(NSA_KEY, COUNTER++) will also pass statistical tests with
flying colors.

So if RDRAND is available, mix it into entropy submitted from
userspace.  It can't hurt, and if you believe the NSA has backdoored
RDRAND, then they probably have enough details about the Intel
microarchitecture that they can reverse engineer how the Jitter
entropy daemon affects the microarchitecture, and attack its output
stream.  And if RDRAND is in fact an honest DRNG, it will immeasurably
improve on what the Jitter entropy daemon might produce.

This also provides some protection against someone who is able to read
or set the entropy seed file.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman