<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git, branch v6.6.51</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 6.6.51</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6d1dc55b5bab93ef868d223b740d527ee7501063'/>
<id>6d1dc55b5bab93ef868d223b740d527ee7501063</id>
<content type='text'>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240910092608.225137854@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli &lt;harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara &lt;takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com&gt;
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing &lt;lkft@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Kexy Biscuit &lt;kexybiscuit@aosc.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240910092608.225137854@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli &lt;harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;florian.fainelli@broadcom.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara &lt;takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com&gt;
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing &lt;lkft@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Kexy Biscuit &lt;kexybiscuit@aosc.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-16T20:29:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=611e4281117ab749b713723311de3ed8ed3ad031'/>
<id>611e4281117ab749b713723311de3ed8ed3ad031</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7453847fb22c7c45334c43cc6a02ea5df5b9961d upstream.

Fixes the following trace where hci_acl_create_conn_sync attempts to
call hci_abort_conn_sync after timeout:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_abort_conn_sync
(net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800322c032 by task kworker/u3:2/36

Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38
04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
dump_stack_lvl (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26
./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:67 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:127
lib/dump_stack.c:107)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488)
? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:5889)
? __virt_addr_valid (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:103 (discriminator 1)
./include/linux/rcupdate.h:865 (discriminator 1)
./include/linux/mmzone.h:2026 (discriminator 1)
arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:65 (discriminator 1))
? hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)
? hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
? __pfx_hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5433)
hci_acl_create_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6681)

Fixes: 45340097ce6e ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Only do ACL connections sequentially")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7453847fb22c7c45334c43cc6a02ea5df5b9961d upstream.

Fixes the following trace where hci_acl_create_conn_sync attempts to
call hci_abort_conn_sync after timeout:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_abort_conn_sync
(net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800322c032 by task kworker/u3:2/36

Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38
04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
dump_stack_lvl (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26
./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:67 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:127
lib/dump_stack.c:107)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488)
? preempt_count_sub (kernel/sched/core.c:5889)
? __virt_addr_valid (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:103 (discriminator 1)
./include/linux/rcupdate.h:865 (discriminator 1)
./include/linux/mmzone.h:2026 (discriminator 1)
arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:65 (discriminator 1))
? hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)
? hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5439)
? __pfx_hci_abort_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5433)
hci_acl_create_conn_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6681)

Fixes: 45340097ce6e ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Only do ACL connections sequentially")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on create_le_conn_complete</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-20T18:10:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4d6cf010d876a5ceb3db4ae845aa6fa3de34c766'/>
<id>4d6cf010d876a5ceb3db4ae845aa6fa3de34c766</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f7cbce60a38a6589f0dade720d4c2544959ecc0e upstream.

While waiting for hci_dev_lock the hci_conn object may be cleanup
causing the following trace:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888001a50a30 by task kworker/u3:1/111

CPU: 0 PID: 111 Comm: kworker/u3:1 Not tainted
6.8.0-rc2-00701-g8179b15ab3fd-dirty #6418
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38
04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x21/0x70
 print_report+0xce/0x620
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xc0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x15f/0x310
 ? hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
 kasan_report+0xdf/0x110
 ? hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
 hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
 create_le_conn_complete+0x25c/0x2c0

Fixes: 881559af5f5c ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Attempt to dequeue connection attempt")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f7cbce60a38a6589f0dade720d4c2544959ecc0e upstream.

While waiting for hci_dev_lock the hci_conn object may be cleanup
causing the following trace:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888001a50a30 by task kworker/u3:1/111

CPU: 0 PID: 111 Comm: kworker/u3:1 Not tainted
6.8.0-rc2-00701-g8179b15ab3fd-dirty #6418
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38
04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x21/0x70
 print_report+0xce/0x620
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xc0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x15f/0x310
 ? hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
 kasan_report+0xdf/0x110
 ? hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
 hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup+0x29/0x350
 create_le_conn_complete+0x25c/0x2c0

Fixes: 881559af5f5c ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Attempt to dequeue connection attempt")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF in hci_acl_create_conn_sync</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-08T16:02:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=78155f30beebe128b3512c54e4d108ea3cca547b'/>
<id>78155f30beebe128b3512c54e4d108ea3cca547b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3d1c16e920c88eb5e583e1b4a10b95a5dc97ec22 upstream.

This fixes the following error caused by hci_conn being freed while
hcy_acl_create_conn_sync is pending:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
Write of size 2 at addr ffff888002ae0036 by task kworker/u3:0/848

CPU: 0 PID: 848 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-g2ab3e8d67fc1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38
04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x21/0x70
 print_report+0xce/0x620
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xc0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x15f/0x310
 ? hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
 kasan_report+0xdf/0x110
 ? hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
 hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
 ? __pfx_hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x10/0x10
 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x138/0x1c0
 process_one_work+0x405/0x800
 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
 worker_thread+0x37b/0x670
 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
 kthread+0x19b/0x1e0
 ? kthread+0xfe/0x1e0
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 847:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
 hci_conn_add+0xc6/0x970
 hci_connect_acl+0x309/0x410
 pair_device+0x4fb/0x710
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x933/0xef0
 sock_write_iter+0x2c3/0x2d0
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x21a/0x2e0
 vfs_writev+0x21c/0x7b0
 do_writev+0x14a/0x180
 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x150
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

Freed by task 847:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0xfa/0x150
 kfree+0xcb/0x250
 device_release+0x58/0xf0
 kobject_put+0xbb/0x160
 hci_conn_del+0x281/0x570
 hci_conn_hash_flush+0xfc/0x130
 hci_dev_close_sync+0x336/0x960
 hci_dev_close+0x10e/0x140
 hci_sock_ioctl+0x14a/0x5c0
 sock_ioctl+0x58a/0x5d0
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x480/0xf60
 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x150
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

Fixes: 45340097ce6e ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Only do ACL connections sequentially")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3d1c16e920c88eb5e583e1b4a10b95a5dc97ec22 upstream.

This fixes the following error caused by hci_conn being freed while
hcy_acl_create_conn_sync is pending:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
Write of size 2 at addr ffff888002ae0036 by task kworker/u3:0/848

CPU: 0 PID: 848 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-g2ab3e8d67fc1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38
04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x21/0x70
 print_report+0xce/0x620
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xc0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x15f/0x310
 ? hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
 kasan_report+0xdf/0x110
 ? hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
 hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0xa7/0x2e0
 ? __pfx_hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x10/0x10
 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x138/0x1c0
 process_one_work+0x405/0x800
 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
 worker_thread+0x37b/0x670
 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
 kthread+0x19b/0x1e0
 ? kthread+0xfe/0x1e0
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 847:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
 hci_conn_add+0xc6/0x970
 hci_connect_acl+0x309/0x410
 pair_device+0x4fb/0x710
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x933/0xef0
 sock_write_iter+0x2c3/0x2d0
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x21a/0x2e0
 vfs_writev+0x21c/0x7b0
 do_writev+0x14a/0x180
 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x150
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

Freed by task 847:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0xfa/0x150
 kfree+0xcb/0x250
 device_release+0x58/0xf0
 kobject_put+0xbb/0x160
 hci_conn_del+0x281/0x570
 hci_conn_hash_flush+0xfc/0x130
 hci_dev_close_sync+0x336/0x960
 hci_dev_close+0x10e/0x140
 hci_sock_ioctl+0x14a/0x5c0
 sock_ioctl+0x58a/0x5d0
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x480/0xf60
 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x150
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74

Fixes: 45340097ce6e ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Only do ACL connections sequentially")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: Fix off-by-one in prescale max</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Wahren</name>
<email>wahrenst@gmx.net</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-05T11:15:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=50b6744c12fa49d7af51e37935c582efb41173f1'/>
<id>50b6744c12fa49d7af51e37935c582efb41173f1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ff949d981c775332be94be70397ee1df20bc68e5 upstream.

The commit 783bf5d09f86 ("spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: limit PRESCALE bit in
TCR register") doesn't implement the prescaler maximum as intended.
The maximum allowed value for i.MX93 should be 1 and for i.MX7ULP
it should be 7. So this needs also a adjustment of the comparison
in the scldiv calculation.

Fixes: 783bf5d09f86 ("spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: limit PRESCALE bit in TCR register")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren &lt;wahrenst@gmx.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240905111537.90389-1-wahrenst@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ff949d981c775332be94be70397ee1df20bc68e5 upstream.

The commit 783bf5d09f86 ("spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: limit PRESCALE bit in
TCR register") doesn't implement the prescaler maximum as intended.
The maximum allowed value for i.MX93 should be 1 and for i.MX7ULP
it should be 7. So this needs also a adjustment of the comparison
in the scldiv calculation.

Fixes: 783bf5d09f86 ("spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: limit PRESCALE bit in TCR register")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren &lt;wahrenst@gmx.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240905111537.90389-1-wahrenst@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-29T17:25:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7b5595f33c3c273613b590892a578d78186bb400'/>
<id>7b5595f33c3c273613b590892a578d78186bb400</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cd9253c23aedd61eb5ff11f37a36247cd46faf86 upstream.

If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of
them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a
race where we can end up either:

1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an
   assertion failures when assertions are enabled;

2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private
   points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be
   used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed.

The race happens like this:

1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT;

2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example;

3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes,
   while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor.

4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread
   doing fsyncs;

5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the
   file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member
   'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true;

6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private
   structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set
   to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock;

7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to
   NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated.
   Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock;

8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the
   assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B
   never locked it and task A has already unlocked it.

The stack trace produced is the following:

   assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&amp;inode-&gt;vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983!
   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
   CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G     U     OE      6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8
   Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020
   RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs]
   Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...)
   RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246
   RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800
   RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38
   R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800
   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24
    ? die+0x2e/0x50
    ? do_trap+0xca/0x110
    ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0
    __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90
    do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
    ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190
    ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0
    ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses
it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack
of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict
result.

This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by
two users in the Link tags below.

Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync
that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information
through a special value stored in current-&gt;journal_info. This is safe
because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not
holding a transaction handle, so current-&gt;journal_info is NULL.

The following C program triggers the issue:

   $ cat repro.c
   /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */
   #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
   #define _GNU_SOURCE
   #endif

   #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
   #include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
   #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
   #include &lt;stdint.h&gt;
   #include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
   #include &lt;errno.h&gt;
   #include &lt;string.h&gt;
   #include &lt;pthread.h&gt;

   static int fd;

   static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset)
   {
       while (count &gt; 0) {
           ssize_t ret;

           ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset);
           if (ret &lt; 0) {
               if (errno == EINTR)
                   continue;
               return ret;
           }
           count -= ret;
           buf += ret;
       }
       return 0;
   }

   static void *fsync_loop(void *arg)
   {
       while (1) {
           int ret;

           ret = fsync(fd);
           if (ret != 0) {
               perror("Fsync failed");
               exit(6);
           }
       }
   }

   int main(int argc, char *argv[])
   {
       long pagesize;
       void *write_buf;
       pthread_t fsyncer;
       int ret;

       if (argc != 2) {
           fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s &lt;file path&gt;\n", argv[0]);
           return 1;
       }

       fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666);
       if (fd == -1) {
           perror("Failed to open/create file");
           return 1;
       }

       pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
       if (pagesize == -1) {
           perror("Failed to get page size");
           return 2;
       }

       ret = posix_memalign(&amp;write_buf, pagesize, pagesize);
       if (ret) {
           perror("Failed to allocate buffer");
           return 3;
       }

       ret = pthread_create(&amp;fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL);
       if (ret != 0) {
           fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret);
           return 4;
       }

       while (1) {
           ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0);
           if (ret != 0) {
               perror("Write failed");
               exit(5);
           }
       }

       return 0;
   }

   $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi
   $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi
   $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo

Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for
fstests will follow soon.

Reported-by: Paulo Dias &lt;paulo.miguel.dias@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187
Reported-by: Andreas Jahn &lt;jahn-andi@web.de&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199
Reported-by: syzbot+4704b3cc972bd76024f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000044ff540620d7dee2@google.com/
Fixes: 939b656bc8ab ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cd9253c23aedd61eb5ff11f37a36247cd46faf86 upstream.

If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of
them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a
race where we can end up either:

1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an
   assertion failures when assertions are enabled;

2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private
   points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be
   used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed.

The race happens like this:

1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT;

2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example;

3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes,
   while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor.

4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread
   doing fsyncs;

5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the
   file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member
   'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true;

6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private
   structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set
   to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock;

7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to
   NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated.
   Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock;

8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the
   assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B
   never locked it and task A has already unlocked it.

The stack trace produced is the following:

   assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&amp;inode-&gt;vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983!
   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
   CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G     U     OE      6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8
   Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020
   RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs]
   Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...)
   RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246
   RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800
   RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38
   R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800
   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24
    ? die+0x2e/0x50
    ? do_trap+0xca/0x110
    ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0
    __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90
    do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
    ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190
    ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0
    ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses
it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack
of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict
result.

This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by
two users in the Link tags below.

Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync
that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information
through a special value stored in current-&gt;journal_info. This is safe
because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not
holding a transaction handle, so current-&gt;journal_info is NULL.

The following C program triggers the issue:

   $ cat repro.c
   /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */
   #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
   #define _GNU_SOURCE
   #endif

   #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
   #include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
   #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
   #include &lt;stdint.h&gt;
   #include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
   #include &lt;errno.h&gt;
   #include &lt;string.h&gt;
   #include &lt;pthread.h&gt;

   static int fd;

   static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset)
   {
       while (count &gt; 0) {
           ssize_t ret;

           ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset);
           if (ret &lt; 0) {
               if (errno == EINTR)
                   continue;
               return ret;
           }
           count -= ret;
           buf += ret;
       }
       return 0;
   }

   static void *fsync_loop(void *arg)
   {
       while (1) {
           int ret;

           ret = fsync(fd);
           if (ret != 0) {
               perror("Fsync failed");
               exit(6);
           }
       }
   }

   int main(int argc, char *argv[])
   {
       long pagesize;
       void *write_buf;
       pthread_t fsyncer;
       int ret;

       if (argc != 2) {
           fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s &lt;file path&gt;\n", argv[0]);
           return 1;
       }

       fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666);
       if (fd == -1) {
           perror("Failed to open/create file");
           return 1;
       }

       pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
       if (pagesize == -1) {
           perror("Failed to get page size");
           return 2;
       }

       ret = posix_memalign(&amp;write_buf, pagesize, pagesize);
       if (ret) {
           perror("Failed to allocate buffer");
           return 3;
       }

       ret = pthread_create(&amp;fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL);
       if (ret != 0) {
           fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret);
           return 4;
       }

       while (1) {
           ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0);
           if (ret != 0) {
               perror("Write failed");
               exit(5);
           }
       }

       return 0;
   }

   $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi
   $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi
   $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo

Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for
fstests will follow soon.

Reported-by: Paulo Dias &lt;paulo.miguel.dias@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187
Reported-by: Andreas Jahn &lt;jahn-andi@web.de&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199
Reported-by: syzbot+4704b3cc972bd76024f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000044ff540620d7dee2@google.com/
Fixes: 939b656bc8ab ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm: Fix PTI for i386 some more</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-06T18:48:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8eeda5fb5938a20b8dda767c629e29f867cc061d'/>
<id>8eeda5fb5938a20b8dda767c629e29f867cc061d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c48b5a4cf3125adb679e28ef093f66ff81368d05 upstream.

So it turns out that we have to do two passes of
pti_clone_entry_text(), once before initcalls, such that device and
late initcalls can use user-mode-helper / modprobe and once after
free_initmem() / mark_readonly().

Now obviously mark_readonly() can cause PMD splits, and
pti_clone_pgtable() doesn't like that much.

Allow the late clone to split PMDs so that pagetables stay in sync.

[peterz: Changelog and comments]
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240806184843.GX37996@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c48b5a4cf3125adb679e28ef093f66ff81368d05 upstream.

So it turns out that we have to do two passes of
pti_clone_entry_text(), once before initcalls, such that device and
late initcalls can use user-mode-helper / modprobe and once after
free_initmem() / mark_readonly().

Now obviously mark_readonly() can cause PMD splits, and
pti_clone_pgtable() doesn't like that much.

Allow the late clone to split PMDs so that pagetables stay in sync.

[peterz: Changelog and comments]
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240806184843.GX37996@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>membarrier: riscv: Add full memory barrier in switch_mm()</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrea Parri</name>
<email>parri.andrea@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-31T14:49:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a2977c0ca3e97dc4c1665f27117810902fdeb0a9'/>
<id>a2977c0ca3e97dc4c1665f27117810902fdeb0a9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d6cfd1770f20392d7009ae1fdb04733794514fa9 upstream.

The membarrier system call requires a full memory barrier after storing
to rq-&gt;curr, before going back to user-space.  The barrier is only
needed when switching between processes: the barrier is implied by
mmdrop() when switching from kernel to userspace, and it's not needed
when switching from userspace to kernel.

Rely on the feature/mechanism ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS and on the
primitive membarrier_arch_switch_mm(), already adopted by the PowerPC
architecture, to insert the required barrier.

Fixes: fab957c11efe2f ("RISC-V: Atomic and Locking Code")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri &lt;parri.andrea@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131144936.29190-2-parri.andrea@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@rivosinc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: WangYuli &lt;wangyuli@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d6cfd1770f20392d7009ae1fdb04733794514fa9 upstream.

The membarrier system call requires a full memory barrier after storing
to rq-&gt;curr, before going back to user-space.  The barrier is only
needed when switching between processes: the barrier is implied by
mmdrop() when switching from kernel to userspace, and it's not needed
when switching from userspace to kernel.

Rely on the feature/mechanism ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS and on the
primitive membarrier_arch_switch_mm(), already adopted by the PowerPC
architecture, to insert the required barrier.

Fixes: fab957c11efe2f ("RISC-V: Atomic and Locking Code")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri &lt;parri.andrea@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131144936.29190-2-parri.andrea@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@rivosinc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: WangYuli &lt;wangyuli@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ublk_drv: fix NULL pointer dereference in ublk_ctrl_start_recovery()</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Nan</name>
<email>linan122@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-04T03:13:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=136a29d8112df4ea0a57f9602ddf3579e04089dc'/>
<id>136a29d8112df4ea0a57f9602ddf3579e04089dc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e58f5142f88320a5b1449f96a146f2f24615c5c7 ]

When two UBLK_CMD_START_USER_RECOVERY commands are submitted, the
first one sets 'ubq-&gt;ubq_daemon' to NULL, and the second one triggers
WARN in ublk_queue_reinit() and subsequently a NULL pointer dereference
issue.

Fix it by adding the check in ublk_ctrl_start_recovery() and return
immediately in case of zero 'ub-&gt;nr_queues_ready'.

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
  RIP: 0010:ublk_ctrl_start_recovery.constprop.0+0x82/0x180
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   ? __die+0x20/0x70
   ? page_fault_oops+0x75/0x170
   ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140
   ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
   ? ublk_ctrl_start_recovery.constprop.0+0x82/0x180
   ublk_ctrl_uring_cmd+0x4f7/0x6c0
   ? pick_next_task_idle+0x26/0x40
   io_uring_cmd+0x9a/0x1b0
   io_issue_sqe+0x193/0x3f0
   io_wq_submit_work+0x9b/0x390
   io_worker_handle_work+0x165/0x360
   io_wq_worker+0xcb/0x2f0
   ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x203/0x290
   ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x203/0x290
   ? __pfx_io_wq_worker+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
   ? __pfx_io_wq_worker+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: c732a852b419 ("ublk_drv: add START_USER_RECOVERY and END_USER_RECOVERY support")
Reported-and-tested-by: Changhui Zhong &lt;czhong@redhat.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGVVp+UvLiS+bhNXV-h2icwX1dyybbYHeQUuH7RYqUvMQf6N3w@mail.gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Li Nan &lt;linan122@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240904031348.4139545-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e58f5142f88320a5b1449f96a146f2f24615c5c7 ]

When two UBLK_CMD_START_USER_RECOVERY commands are submitted, the
first one sets 'ubq-&gt;ubq_daemon' to NULL, and the second one triggers
WARN in ublk_queue_reinit() and subsequently a NULL pointer dereference
issue.

Fix it by adding the check in ublk_ctrl_start_recovery() and return
immediately in case of zero 'ub-&gt;nr_queues_ready'.

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
  RIP: 0010:ublk_ctrl_start_recovery.constprop.0+0x82/0x180
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   ? __die+0x20/0x70
   ? page_fault_oops+0x75/0x170
   ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140
   ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
   ? ublk_ctrl_start_recovery.constprop.0+0x82/0x180
   ublk_ctrl_uring_cmd+0x4f7/0x6c0
   ? pick_next_task_idle+0x26/0x40
   io_uring_cmd+0x9a/0x1b0
   io_issue_sqe+0x193/0x3f0
   io_wq_submit_work+0x9b/0x390
   io_worker_handle_work+0x165/0x360
   io_wq_worker+0xcb/0x2f0
   ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x203/0x290
   ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x203/0x290
   ? __pfx_io_wq_worker+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
   ? __pfx_io_wq_worker+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: c732a852b419 ("ublk_drv: add START_USER_RECOVERY and END_USER_RECOVERY support")
Reported-and-tested-by: Changhui Zhong &lt;czhong@redhat.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGVVp+UvLiS+bhNXV-h2icwX1dyybbYHeQUuH7RYqUvMQf6N3w@mail.gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Li Nan &lt;linan122@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240904031348.4139545-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>riscv: Do not restrict memory size because of linear mapping on nommu</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexandre Ghiti</name>
<email>alexghiti@rivosinc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-27T06:52:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=bd29d8452079085a1d91427ac81ceeddf7940279'/>
<id>bd29d8452079085a1d91427ac81ceeddf7940279</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5f771088a2b5edd6f2c5c9f34484ca18dc389f3e ]

It makes no sense to restrict physical memory size because of linear
mapping size constraints when there is no linear mapping, so only do
that when mmu is enabled.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CAMuHMdW0bnJt5GMRtOZGkTiM7GK4UaLJCDMF_Ouq++fnDKi3_A@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 3b6564427aea ("riscv: Fix linear mapping checks for non-contiguous memory regions")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alexghiti@rivosinc.com&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827065230.145021-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@rivosinc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5f771088a2b5edd6f2c5c9f34484ca18dc389f3e ]

It makes no sense to restrict physical memory size because of linear
mapping size constraints when there is no linear mapping, so only do
that when mmu is enabled.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CAMuHMdW0bnJt5GMRtOZGkTiM7GK4UaLJCDMF_Ouq++fnDKi3_A@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 3b6564427aea ("riscv: Fix linear mapping checks for non-contiguous memory regions")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alexghiti@rivosinc.com&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827065230.145021-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@rivosinc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
