<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/Documentation, branch v5.4.8</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>dt-bindings: Improve validation build error handling</title>
<updated>2020-01-04T18:18:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rob Herring</name>
<email>robh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-13T15:46:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c3f76584cafe0e7d26923db3277f3f506841da7a'/>
<id>c3f76584cafe0e7d26923db3277f3f506841da7a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 93512dad334deb444619505f1fbb761156f7471b ]

Schema errors can cause make to exit before useful information is
printed. This leaves developers wondering what's wrong. It can be
overcome passing '-k' to make, but that's not an obvious solution.
There's 2 scenarios where this happens.

When using DT_SCHEMA_FILES to validate with a single schema, any error
in the schema results in processed-schema.yaml being empty causing a
make error. The result is the specific errors in the schema are never
shown because processed-schema.yaml is the first target built. Simply
making processed-schema.yaml last in extra-y ensures the full schema
validation with detailed error messages happen first.

The 2nd problem is while schema errors are ignored for
processed-schema.yaml, full validation of the schema still runs in
parallel and any schema validation errors will still stop the build when
running validation of dts files. The fix is to not add the schema
examples to extra-y in this case. This means 'dtbs_check' is no longer a
superset of 'dt_binding_check'. Update the documentation to make this
clear.

Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jeffrey Hugo &lt;jhugo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 93512dad334deb444619505f1fbb761156f7471b ]

Schema errors can cause make to exit before useful information is
printed. This leaves developers wondering what's wrong. It can be
overcome passing '-k' to make, but that's not an obvious solution.
There's 2 scenarios where this happens.

When using DT_SCHEMA_FILES to validate with a single schema, any error
in the schema results in processed-schema.yaml being empty causing a
make error. The result is the specific errors in the schema are never
shown because processed-schema.yaml is the first target built. Simply
making processed-schema.yaml last in extra-y ensures the full schema
validation with detailed error messages happen first.

The 2nd problem is while schema errors are ignored for
processed-schema.yaml, full validation of the schema still runs in
parallel and any schema validation errors will still stop the build when
running validation of dts files. The fix is to not add the schema
examples to extra-y in this case. This means 'dtbs_check' is no longer a
superset of 'dt_binding_check'. Update the documentation to make this
clear.

Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jeffrey Hugo &lt;jhugo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: documentation: flags on usb-storage versus UAS</title>
<updated>2019-12-17T18:55:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Neukum</name>
<email>oneukum@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-14T11:27:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d8fc2266c40fef226f3f0f6e5d839a75e2748c98'/>
<id>d8fc2266c40fef226f3f0f6e5d839a75e2748c98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65cc8bf99349f651a0a2cee69333525fe581f306 upstream.

Document which flags work storage, UAS or both

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oneukum@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191114112758.32747-4-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 65cc8bf99349f651a0a2cee69333525fe581f306 upstream.

Document which flags work storage, UAS or both

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oneukum@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191114112758.32747-4-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status</title>
<updated>2019-11-29T09:09:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-15T16:14:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=75cad94d032b9ef500bc12004a3c695a9e85c729'/>
<id>75cad94d032b9ef500bc12004a3c695a9e85c729</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 64870ed1b12e235cfca3f6c6da75b542c973ff78 upstream.

For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: x86-ml &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 64870ed1b12e235cfca3f6c6da75b542c973ff78 upstream.

For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: x86-ml &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ath10k: Fix HOST capability QMI incompatibility</title>
<updated>2019-11-29T09:09:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjorn Andersson</name>
<email>bjorn.andersson@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-25T06:31:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2a807b1b4e7e401bdc9be0b66eb979fe4bba434d'/>
<id>2a807b1b4e7e401bdc9be0b66eb979fe4bba434d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7165ef890a4c44cf16db66b82fd78448f4bde6ba upstream.

The introduction of 768ec4c012ac ("ath10k: update HOST capability QMI
message") served the purpose of supporting the new and extended HOST
capability QMI message.

But while the new message adds a slew of optional members it changes the
data type of the "daemon_support" member, which means that older
versions of the firmware will fail to decode the incoming request
message.

There is no way to detect this breakage from Linux and there's no way to
recover from sending the wrong message (i.e. we can't just try one
format and then fallback to the other), so a quirk is introduced in
DeviceTree to indicate to the driver that the firmware requires the 8bit
version of this message.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 768ec4c012ac ("ath10k: update HOST capability qmi message")
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson &lt;bjorn.andersson@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo &lt;kvalo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7165ef890a4c44cf16db66b82fd78448f4bde6ba upstream.

The introduction of 768ec4c012ac ("ath10k: update HOST capability QMI
message") served the purpose of supporting the new and extended HOST
capability QMI message.

But while the new message adds a slew of optional members it changes the
data type of the "daemon_support" member, which means that older
versions of the firmware will fail to decode the incoming request
message.

There is no way to detect this breakage from Linux and there's no way to
recover from sending the wrong message (i.e. we can't just try one
format and then fallback to the other), so a quirk is introduced in
DeviceTree to indicate to the driver that the firmware requires the 8bit
version of this message.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 768ec4c012ac ("ath10k: update HOST capability qmi message")
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson &lt;bjorn.andersson@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo &lt;kvalo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:53:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-12T18:53:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=eb094f06963bb0fd8134c6a9b805d4ad0002a7d4'/>
<id>eb094f06963bb0fd8134c6a9b805d4ad0002a7d4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 TSX Async Abort and iTLB Multihit mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The performance deterioration departement is not proud at all of
  presenting the seventh installment of speculation mitigations and
  hardware misfeature workarounds:

   1) TSX Async Abort (TAA) - 'The Annoying Affair'

      TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged
      speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
      internal buffers by using asynchronous aborts within an Intel TSX
      transactional region.

      The mitigation depends on a microcode update providing a new MSR
      which allows to disable TSX in the CPU. CPUs which have no
      microcode update can be mitigated by disabling TSX in the BIOS if
      the BIOS provides a tunable.

      Newer CPUs will have a bit set which indicates that the CPU is not
      vulnerable, but the MSR to disable TSX will be available
      nevertheless as it is an architected MSR. That means the kernel
      provides the ability to disable TSX on the kernel command line,
      which is useful as TSX is a truly useful mechanism to accelerate
      side channel attacks of all sorts.

   2) iITLB Multihit (NX) - 'No eXcuses'

      iTLB Multihit is an erratum where some Intel processors may incur
      a machine check error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU
      lockup, when an instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the
      instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is changed
      along with either the physical address or cache type. A malicious
      guest running on a virtualized system can exploit this erratum to
      perform a denial of service attack.

      The workaround is that KVM marks huge pages in the extended page
      tables as not executable (NX). If the guest attempts to execute in
      such a page, the page is broken down into 4k pages which are
      marked executable. The workaround comes with a mechanism to
      recover these shattered huge pages over time.

  Both issues come with full documentation in the hardware
  vulnerabilities section of the Linux kernel user's and administrator's
  guide.

  Thanks to all patch authors and reviewers who had the extraordinary
  priviledge to be exposed to this nuisance.

  Special thanks to Borislav Petkov for polishing the final TAA patch
  set and to Paolo Bonzini for shepherding the KVM iTLB workarounds and
  providing also the backports to stable kernels for those!"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation/taa: Fix printing of TAA_MSG_SMT on IBRS_ALL CPUs
  Documentation: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation
  kvm: x86: mmu: Recovery of shattered NX large pages
  kvm: Add helper function for creating VM worker threads
  kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation
  cpu/speculation: Uninline and export CPU mitigations helpers
  x86/cpu: Add Tremont to the cpu vulnerability whitelist
  x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure
  x86/tsx: Add config options to set tsx=on|off|auto
  x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort
  x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter
  kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled
  x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort
  x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort
  x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default
  x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
  x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 TSX Async Abort and iTLB Multihit mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The performance deterioration departement is not proud at all of
  presenting the seventh installment of speculation mitigations and
  hardware misfeature workarounds:

   1) TSX Async Abort (TAA) - 'The Annoying Affair'

      TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged
      speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
      internal buffers by using asynchronous aborts within an Intel TSX
      transactional region.

      The mitigation depends on a microcode update providing a new MSR
      which allows to disable TSX in the CPU. CPUs which have no
      microcode update can be mitigated by disabling TSX in the BIOS if
      the BIOS provides a tunable.

      Newer CPUs will have a bit set which indicates that the CPU is not
      vulnerable, but the MSR to disable TSX will be available
      nevertheless as it is an architected MSR. That means the kernel
      provides the ability to disable TSX on the kernel command line,
      which is useful as TSX is a truly useful mechanism to accelerate
      side channel attacks of all sorts.

   2) iITLB Multihit (NX) - 'No eXcuses'

      iTLB Multihit is an erratum where some Intel processors may incur
      a machine check error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU
      lockup, when an instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the
      instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is changed
      along with either the physical address or cache type. A malicious
      guest running on a virtualized system can exploit this erratum to
      perform a denial of service attack.

      The workaround is that KVM marks huge pages in the extended page
      tables as not executable (NX). If the guest attempts to execute in
      such a page, the page is broken down into 4k pages which are
      marked executable. The workaround comes with a mechanism to
      recover these shattered huge pages over time.

  Both issues come with full documentation in the hardware
  vulnerabilities section of the Linux kernel user's and administrator's
  guide.

  Thanks to all patch authors and reviewers who had the extraordinary
  priviledge to be exposed to this nuisance.

  Special thanks to Borislav Petkov for polishing the final TAA patch
  set and to Paolo Bonzini for shepherding the KVM iTLB workarounds and
  providing also the backports to stable kernels for those!"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation/taa: Fix printing of TAA_MSG_SMT on IBRS_ALL CPUs
  Documentation: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation
  kvm: x86: mmu: Recovery of shattered NX large pages
  kvm: Add helper function for creating VM worker threads
  kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation
  cpu/speculation: Uninline and export CPU mitigations helpers
  x86/cpu: Add Tremont to the cpu vulnerability whitelist
  x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure
  x86/tsx: Add config options to set tsx=on|off|auto
  x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort
  x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter
  kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled
  x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort
  x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort
  x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default
  x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
  x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: TLS: Add missing counter description</title>
<updated>2019-11-06T02:34:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tariq Toukan</name>
<email>tariqt@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-05T12:13:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2836654a2735d3bc0479edd3ca7457d909b007ed'/>
<id>2836654a2735d3bc0479edd3ca7457d909b007ed</id>
<content type='text'>
Add TLS TX counter description for the handshake retransmitted
packets that triggers the resync procedure then skip it, going
into the regular transmit flow.

Fixes: 46a3ea98074e ("net/mlx5e: kTLS, Enhance TX resync flow")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed &lt;saeedm@mellanox.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add TLS TX counter description for the handshake retransmitted
packets that triggers the resync procedure then skip it, going
into the regular transmit flow.

Fixes: 46a3ea98074e ("net/mlx5e: kTLS, Enhance TX resync flow")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed &lt;saeedm@mellanox.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation</title>
<updated>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gomez Iglesias, Antonio</name>
<email>antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7f00cc8d4a51074eb0ad4c3f16c15757b1ddfb7d'/>
<id>7f00cc8d4a51074eb0ad4c3f16c15757b1ddfb7d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the initial ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation.

[ tglx: Add it to the index so it gets actually built. ]

Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nelson D'Souza &lt;nelson.dsouza@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the initial ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation.

[ tglx: Add it to the index so it gets actually built. ]

Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias &lt;antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nelson D'Souza &lt;nelson.dsouza@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: x86: mmu: Recovery of shattered NX large pages</title>
<updated>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junaid Shahid</name>
<email>junaids@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T19:26:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1aa9b9572b10529c2e64e2b8f44025d86e124308'/>
<id>1aa9b9572b10529c2e64e2b8f44025d86e124308</id>
<content type='text'>
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution.  This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.

By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution.  This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.

By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation</title>
<updated>2019-11-04T11:22:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T11:22:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b8e8c8303ff28c61046a4d0f6ea99aea609a7dc0'/>
<id>b8e8c8303ff28c61046a4d0f6ea99aea609a7dc0</id>
<content type='text'>
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.

Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.

Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.

This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.

[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]

Originally-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.

Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.

Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.

This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.

[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]

Originally-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure</title>
<updated>2019-11-04T11:22:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineela Tummalapalli</name>
<email>vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T11:22:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae'/>
<id>db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae</id>
<content type='text'>
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli &lt;vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli &lt;vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
