<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/arm64, branch v3.18.72</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arm64: fpsimd: Prevent registers leaking across exec</title>
<updated>2017-09-02T05:05:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Martin</name>
<email>Dave.Martin@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-18T15:57:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=67038f958ae0151cb2d2d6b452a1c0fcb5ba57a0'/>
<id>67038f958ae0151cb2d2d6b452a1c0fcb5ba57a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 096622104e14d8a1db4860bd557717067a0515d2 upstream.

There are some tricky dependencies between the different stages of
flushing the FPSIMD register state during exec, and these can race
with context switch in ways that can cause the old task's regs to
leak across.  In particular, a context switch during the memset() can
cause some of the task's old FPSIMD registers to reappear.

Disabling preemption for this small window would be no big deal for
performance: preemption is already disabled for similar scenarios
like updating the FPSIMD registers in sigreturn.

So, instead of rearranging things in ways that might swap existing
subtle bugs for new ones, this patch just disables preemption
around the FPSIMD state flushing so that races of this type can't
occur here.  This brings fpsimd_flush_thread() into line with other
code paths.

Fixes: 674c242c9323 ("arm64: flush FP/SIMD state correctly after execve()")
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 096622104e14d8a1db4860bd557717067a0515d2 upstream.

There are some tricky dependencies between the different stages of
flushing the FPSIMD register state during exec, and these can race
with context switch in ways that can cause the old task's regs to
leak across.  In particular, a context switch during the memset() can
cause some of the task's old FPSIMD registers to reappear.

Disabling preemption for this small window would be no big deal for
performance: preemption is already disabled for similar scenarios
like updating the FPSIMD registers in sigreturn.

So, instead of rearranging things in ways that might swap existing
subtle bugs for new ones, this patch just disables preemption
around the FPSIMD state flushing so that races of this type can't
occur here.  This brings fpsimd_flush_thread() into line with other
code paths.

Fixes: 674c242c9323 ("arm64: flush FP/SIMD state correctly after execve()")
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: flush FP/SIMD state correctly after execve()</title>
<updated>2017-09-02T05:05:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-27T06:12:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f5b150b99bf0aa09e0fabc36e599cae14eb5b66c'/>
<id>f5b150b99bf0aa09e0fabc36e599cae14eb5b66c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 674c242c9323d3c293fc4f9a3a3a619fe3063290 upstream.

When a task calls execve(), its FP/SIMD state is flushed so that
none of the original program state is observeable by the incoming
program.

However, since this flushing consists of setting the in-memory copy
of the FP/SIMD state to all zeroes, the CPU field is set to CPU 0 as
well, which indicates to the lazy FP/SIMD preserve/restore code that
the FP/SIMD state does not need to be reread from memory if the task
is scheduled again on CPU 0 without any other tasks having entered
userland (or used the FP/SIMD in kernel mode) on the same CPU in the
mean time. If this happens, the FP/SIMD state of the old program will
still be present in the registers when the new program starts.

So set the CPU field to the invalid value of NR_CPUS when performing
the flush, by calling fpsimd_flush_task_state().

Reported-by: Chunyan Zhang &lt;chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Reported-by: Janet Liu &lt;janet.liu@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 674c242c9323d3c293fc4f9a3a3a619fe3063290 upstream.

When a task calls execve(), its FP/SIMD state is flushed so that
none of the original program state is observeable by the incoming
program.

However, since this flushing consists of setting the in-memory copy
of the FP/SIMD state to all zeroes, the CPU field is set to CPU 0 as
well, which indicates to the lazy FP/SIMD preserve/restore code that
the FP/SIMD state does not need to be reread from memory if the task
is scheduled again on CPU 0 without any other tasks having entered
userland (or used the FP/SIMD in kernel mode) on the same CPU in the
mean time. If this happens, the FP/SIMD state of the old program will
still be present in the registers when the new program starts.

So set the CPU field to the invalid value of NR_CPUS when performing
the flush, by calling fpsimd_flush_task_state().

Reported-by: Chunyan Zhang &lt;chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Reported-by: Janet Liu &lt;janet.liu@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: mm: abort uaccess retries upon fatal signal</title>
<updated>2017-09-02T05:05:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-11T14:19:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9988d693927f6eaab2d4b763798839cca41a0ec8'/>
<id>9988d693927f6eaab2d4b763798839cca41a0ec8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 289d07a2dc6c6b6f3e4b8a62669320d99dbe6c3d upstream.

When there's a fatal signal pending, arm64's do_page_fault()
implementation returns 0. The intent is that we'll return to the
faulting userspace instruction, delivering the signal on the way.

However, if we take a fatal signal during fixing up a uaccess, this
results in a return to the faulting kernel instruction, which will be
instantly retried, resulting in the same fault being taken forever. As
the task never reaches userspace, the signal is not delivered, and the
task is left unkillable. While the task is stuck in this state, it can
inhibit the forward progress of the system.

To avoid this, we must ensure that when a fatal signal is pending, we
apply any necessary fixup for a faulting kernel instruction. Thus we
will return to an error path, and it is up to that code to make forward
progress towards delivering the fatal signal.

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 289d07a2dc6c6b6f3e4b8a62669320d99dbe6c3d upstream.

When there's a fatal signal pending, arm64's do_page_fault()
implementation returns 0. The intent is that we'll return to the
faulting userspace instruction, delivering the signal on the way.

However, if we take a fatal signal during fixing up a uaccess, this
results in a return to the faulting kernel instruction, which will be
instantly retried, resulting in the same fault being taken forever. As
the task never reaches userspace, the signal is not delivered, and the
task is left unkillable. While the task is stuck in this state, it can
inhibit the forward progress of the system.

To avoid this, we must ensure that when a fatal signal is pending, we
apply any necessary fixup for a faulting kernel instruction. Thus we
will return to an error path, and it is up to that code to make forward
progress towards delivering the fatal signal.

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: cpuinfo: Missing NULL terminator in compat_hwcap_str</title>
<updated>2017-07-05T12:35:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julien Grall</name>
<email>julien.grall@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-10T14:40:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8d87bf7c951d5822233142962493fb5cee7cabbd'/>
<id>8d87bf7c951d5822233142962493fb5cee7cabbd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f228b494e56d949be8d8ea09d4f973d1979201bf upstream.

The loop that browses the array compat_hwcap_str will stop when a NULL
is encountered, however NULL is missing at the end of array. This will
lead to overrun until a NULL is found somewhere in the following memory.
In reality, this works out because the compat_hwcap2_str array tends to
follow immediately in memory, and that *is* terminated correctly.
Furthermore, the unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap is checked before
printing each capability, so we end up doing the right thing because
the size of the two arrays is less than 32. Still, this is an obvious
mistake and should be fixed.

Note for backporting: commit 12d11817eaafa414 ("arm64: Move
/proc/cpuinfo handling code") moved this code in v4.4. Prior to that
commit, the same change should be made in arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c.

Fixes: 44b82b7700d0 "arm64: Fix up /proc/cpuinfo"
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien.grall@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f228b494e56d949be8d8ea09d4f973d1979201bf upstream.

The loop that browses the array compat_hwcap_str will stop when a NULL
is encountered, however NULL is missing at the end of array. This will
lead to overrun until a NULL is found somewhere in the following memory.
In reality, this works out because the compat_hwcap2_str array tends to
follow immediately in memory, and that *is* terminated correctly.
Furthermore, the unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap is checked before
printing each capability, so we end up doing the right thing because
the size of the two arrays is less than 32. Still, this is an obvious
mistake and should be fixed.

Note for backporting: commit 12d11817eaafa414 ("arm64: Move
/proc/cpuinfo handling code") moved this code in v4.4. Prior to that
commit, the same change should be made in arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c.

Fixes: 44b82b7700d0 "arm64: Fix up /proc/cpuinfo"
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien.grall@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: ensure extension of smp_store_release value</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-03T15:09:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=810afc5b6bb6a50e95b8b5c4d07113d07e54e06a'/>
<id>810afc5b6bb6a50e95b8b5c4d07113d07e54e06a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 994870bead4ab19087a79492400a5478e2906196 upstream.

When an inline assembly operand's type is narrower than the register it
is allocated to, the least significant bits of the register (up to the
operand type's width) are valid, and any other bits are permitted to
contain any arbitrary value. This aligns with the AAPCS64 parameter
passing rules.

Our __smp_store_release() implementation does not account for this, and
implicitly assumes that operands have been zero-extended to the width of
the type being stored to. Thus, we may store unknown values to memory
when the value type is narrower than the pointer type (e.g. when storing
a char to a long).

This patch fixes the issue by casting the value operand to the same
width as the pointer operand in all cases, which ensures that the value
is zero-extended as we expect. We use the same union trickery as
__smp_load_acquire and {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to avoid GCC complaining that
pointers are potentially cast to narrower width integers in unreachable
paths.

A whitespace issue at the top of __smp_store_release() is also
corrected.

No changes are necessary for __smp_load_acquire(). Load instructions
implicitly clear any upper bits of the register, and the compiler will
only consider the least significant bits of the register as valid
regardless.

Fixes: 47933ad41a86 ("arch: Introduce smp_load_acquire(), smp_store_release()")
Fixes: 878a84d5a8a1 ("arm64: add missing data types in smp_load_acquire/smp_store_release")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.14.x-
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 994870bead4ab19087a79492400a5478e2906196 upstream.

When an inline assembly operand's type is narrower than the register it
is allocated to, the least significant bits of the register (up to the
operand type's width) are valid, and any other bits are permitted to
contain any arbitrary value. This aligns with the AAPCS64 parameter
passing rules.

Our __smp_store_release() implementation does not account for this, and
implicitly assumes that operands have been zero-extended to the width of
the type being stored to. Thus, we may store unknown values to memory
when the value type is narrower than the pointer type (e.g. when storing
a char to a long).

This patch fixes the issue by casting the value operand to the same
width as the pointer operand in all cases, which ensures that the value
is zero-extended as we expect. We use the same union trickery as
__smp_load_acquire and {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to avoid GCC complaining that
pointers are potentially cast to narrower width integers in unreachable
paths.

A whitespace issue at the top of __smp_store_release() is also
corrected.

No changes are necessary for __smp_load_acquire(). Load instructions
implicitly clear any upper bits of the register, and the compiler will
only consider the least significant bits of the register as valid
regardless.

Fixes: 47933ad41a86 ("arch: Introduce smp_load_acquire(), smp_store_release()")
Fixes: 878a84d5a8a1 ("arm64: add missing data types in smp_load_acquire/smp_store_release")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.14.x-
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: entry: improve data abort handling of tagged pointers</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kristina Martsenko</name>
<email>kristina.martsenko@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-03T15:37:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ae91d1e46d2b3a1eb1d769303ec7f7b44528670b'/>
<id>ae91d1e46d2b3a1eb1d769303ec7f7b44528670b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 276e93279a630657fff4b086ba14c95955912dfa upstream.

When handling a data abort from EL0, we currently zero the top byte of
the faulting address, as we assume the address is a TTBR0 address, which
may contain a non-zero address tag. However, the address may be a TTBR1
address, in which case we should not zero the top byte. This patch fixes
that. The effect is that the full TTBR1 address is passed to the task's
signal handler (or printed out in the kernel log).

When handling a data abort from EL1, we leave the faulting address
intact, as we assume it's either a TTBR1 address or a TTBR0 address with
tag 0x00. This is true as far as I'm aware, we don't seem to access a
tagged TTBR0 address anywhere in the kernel. Regardless, it's easy to
forget about address tags, and code added in the future may not always
remember to remove tags from addresses before accessing them. So add tag
handling to the EL1 data abort handler as well. This also makes it
consistent with the EL0 data abort handler.

Fixes: d50240a5f6ce ("arm64: mm: permit use of tagged pointers at EL0")
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 276e93279a630657fff4b086ba14c95955912dfa upstream.

When handling a data abort from EL0, we currently zero the top byte of
the faulting address, as we assume the address is a TTBR0 address, which
may contain a non-zero address tag. However, the address may be a TTBR1
address, in which case we should not zero the top byte. This patch fixes
that. The effect is that the full TTBR1 address is passed to the task's
signal handler (or printed out in the kernel log).

When handling a data abort from EL1, we leave the faulting address
intact, as we assume it's either a TTBR1 address or a TTBR0 address with
tag 0x00. This is true as far as I'm aware, we don't seem to access a
tagged TTBR0 address anywhere in the kernel. Regardless, it's easy to
forget about address tags, and code added in the future may not always
remember to remove tags from addresses before accessing them. So add tag
handling to the EL1 data abort handler as well. This also makes it
consistent with the EL0 data abort handler.

Fixes: d50240a5f6ce ("arm64: mm: permit use of tagged pointers at EL0")
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: hw_breakpoint: fix watchpoint matching for tagged pointers</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kristina Martsenko</name>
<email>kristina.martsenko@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-03T15:37:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d8f0905a0d4347061291e2ce3fcd75196df5851a'/>
<id>d8f0905a0d4347061291e2ce3fcd75196df5851a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7dcd9dd8cebe9fa626af7e2358d03a37041a70fb upstream.

When we take a watchpoint exception, the address that triggered the
watchpoint is found in FAR_EL1. We compare it to the address of each
configured watchpoint to see which one was hit.

The configured watchpoint addresses are untagged, while the address in
FAR_EL1 will have an address tag if the data access was done using a
tagged address. The tag needs to be removed to compare the address to
the watchpoints.

Currently we don't remove it, and as a result can report the wrong
watchpoint as being hit (specifically, always either the highest TTBR0
watchpoint or lowest TTBR1 watchpoint). This patch removes the tag.

Fixes: d50240a5f6ce ("arm64: mm: permit use of tagged pointers at EL0")
Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7dcd9dd8cebe9fa626af7e2358d03a37041a70fb upstream.

When we take a watchpoint exception, the address that triggered the
watchpoint is found in FAR_EL1. We compare it to the address of each
configured watchpoint to see which one was hit.

The configured watchpoint addresses are untagged, while the address in
FAR_EL1 will have an address tag if the data access was done using a
tagged address. The tag needs to be removed to compare the address to
the watchpoints.

Currently we don't remove it, and as a result can report the wrong
watchpoint as being hit (specifically, always either the highest TTBR0
watchpoint or lowest TTBR1 watchpoint). This patch removes the tag.

Fixes: d50240a5f6ce ("arm64: mm: permit use of tagged pointers at EL0")
Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: uaccess: ensure extension of access_ok() addr</title>
<updated>2017-05-25T12:18:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-03T15:09:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=033ed44aa118ba8998ee4e3240fc40d4d5ca8d90'/>
<id>033ed44aa118ba8998ee4e3240fc40d4d5ca8d90</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a06040d7a791a9177581dcf7293941bd92400856 upstream.

Our access_ok() simply hands its arguments over to __range_ok(), which
implicitly assummes that the addr parameter is 64 bits wide. This isn't
necessarily true for compat code, which might pass down a 32-bit address
parameter.

In these cases, we don't have a guarantee that the address has been zero
extended to 64 bits, and the upper bits of the register may contain
unknown values, potentially resulting in a suprious failure.

Avoid this by explicitly casting the addr parameter to an unsigned long
(as is done on other architectures), ensuring that the parameter is
widened appropriately.

Fixes: 0aea86a2176c ("arm64: User access library functions")
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a06040d7a791a9177581dcf7293941bd92400856 upstream.

Our access_ok() simply hands its arguments over to __range_ok(), which
implicitly assummes that the addr parameter is 64 bits wide. This isn't
necessarily true for compat code, which might pass down a 32-bit address
parameter.

In these cases, we don't have a guarantee that the address has been zero
extended to 64 bits, and the upper bits of the register may contain
unknown values, potentially resulting in a suprious failure.

Avoid this by explicitly casting the addr parameter to an unsigned long
(as is done on other architectures), ensuring that the parameter is
widened appropriately.

Fixes: 0aea86a2176c ("arm64: User access library functions")
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:18:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suzuki K. Poulose</name>
<email>suzuki.poulose@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T18:14:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e00f6efe21bd34a7dd1cc3520f6155180e3d8125'/>
<id>e00f6efe21bd34a7dd1cc3520f6155180e3d8125</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071 upstream.

The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event-&gt;ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.

The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event-&gt;pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.

This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:

Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [&lt;0000000000000000&gt;] lr : [&lt;ffffffc000090228&gt;] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0

[&lt;          (null)&gt;]           (null)
[&lt;ffffffc0000907d8&gt;] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[&lt;ffffffc00015d870&gt;] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[&lt;ffffffc000164094&gt;] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[&lt;ffffffc000164348&gt;] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[&lt;ffffffc000164c5c&gt;] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value

Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.

Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071 upstream.

The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event-&gt;ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.

The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event-&gt;pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.

This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:

Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [&lt;0000000000000000&gt;] lr : [&lt;ffffffc000090228&gt;] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0

[&lt;          (null)&gt;]           (null)
[&lt;ffffffc0000907d8&gt;] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[&lt;ffffffc00015d870&gt;] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[&lt;ffffffc000164094&gt;] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[&lt;ffffffc000164348&gt;] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[&lt;ffffffc000164c5c&gt;] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value

Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.

Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: make sys_call_table const</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:18:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-08T11:42:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c8f417a2d6af99b2735709cb60562e0a7c8ddf62'/>
<id>c8f417a2d6af99b2735709cb60562e0a7c8ddf62</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c623b33b4e9599c6ac5076f7db7369eb9869aa04 upstream.

As with x86, mark the sys_call_table const such that it will be placed
in the .rodata section. This will cause attempts to modify the table
(accidental or deliberate) to fail when strict page permissions are in
place. In the absence of strict page permissions, there should be no
functional change.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c623b33b4e9599c6ac5076f7db7369eb9869aa04 upstream.

As with x86, mark the sys_call_table const such that it will be placed
in the .rodata section. This will cause attempts to modify the table
(accidental or deliberate) to fail when strict page permissions are in
place. In the absence of strict page permissions, there should be no
functional change.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
