commit a6e2f029ae34f41adb6ae3812c32c5d326e1abd2 upstream.

Added the x86 implementation of word-at-a-time to the
generic version, which previously only supported big-endian.

Omitted the x86-specific load_unaligned_zeropad(), which in
any case is also not present for the existing BE-only
implementation of a word-at-a-time, and is only used under
CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS.

Added as a "generic-y" to the Kbuilds of all architectures
that didn't previously have it.

Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop change in arch/nios2
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 22f9bf3950f20d24198791685f2dccac2c4ef38a upstream.

We've replaced remap_file_pages(2) implementation with emulation.  Nobody
creates non-linear mapping anymore.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 3a158a62da0673db918b53ac1440845a5b64fd90 upstream.

The metag implementation of strncpy_from_user() doesn't validate the src
pointer, which could allow reading of arbitrary kernel memory. Add a
short access_ok() check to prevent that.

Its still possible for it to read across the user/kernel boundary, but
it will invariably reach a NUL character after only 9 bytes, leaking
only a static kernel address being loaded into D0Re0 at the beginning of
__start, which is acceptable for the immediate fix.

Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 8a8b56638bcac4e64cccc88bf95a0f9f4b19a2fb upstream.

The __user_bad() macro used by access_ok() has a few corner cases
noticed by Al Viro where it doesn't behave correctly:

 - The kernel range check has off by 1 errors which permit access to the
   first and last byte of the kernel mapped range.

 - The kernel range check ends at LINCORE_BASE rather than
   META_MEMORY_LIMIT, which is ineffective when the kernel is in global
   space (an extremely uncommon configuration).

There are a couple of other shortcomings here too:

 - Access to the whole of the other address space is permitted (i.e. the
   global half of the address space when the kernel is in local space).
   This isn't ideal as it could theoretically still contain privileged
   mappings set up by the bootloader.

 - The size argument is unused, permitting user copies which start on
   valid pages at the end of the user address range and cross the
   boundary into the kernel address space (e.g. addr = 0x3ffffff0, size
   > 0x10).

It isn't very convenient to add size checks when disallowing certain
regions, and it seems far safer to be sure and explicit about what
userland is able to access, so invert the logic to allow certain regions
instead, and fix the off by 1 errors and missing size checks. This also
allows the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS check to be more easily optimised into
the user address range case.

We now have 3 such allowed regions:

 - The user address range (incorporating the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS
   check).

 - NULL (some kernel code expects this to work, and we'll always catch
   the fault anyway).

 - The core code memory region.

Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit b884a190afcecdbef34ca508ea5ee88bb7c77861 upstream.

The rapf copy loops in the Meta usercopy code is missing some extable
entries for HTP cores with unaligned access checking enabled, where
faults occur on the instruction immediately after the faulting access.

Add the fixup labels and extable entries for these cases so that corner
case user copy failures don't cause kernel crashes.

Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 2c0b1df88b987a12d95ea1d6beaf01894f3cc725 upstream.

The fixup code to rewind the source pointer in
__asm_copy_from_user_{32,64}bit_rapf_loop() always rewound the source by
a single unit (4 or 8 bytes), however this is insufficient if the fault
didn't occur on the first load in the loop, as the source pointer will
have been incremented but nothing will have been stored until all 4
register [pairs] are loaded.

Read the LSM_STEP field of TXSTATUS (which is already loaded into a
register), a bit like the copy_to_user versions, to determine how many
iterations of MGET[DL] have taken place, all of which need rewinding.

Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit fd40eee1290ad7add7aa665e3ce6b0f9fe9734b4 upstream.

The fixup code for the copy_to_user rapf loops reads TXStatus.LSM_STEP
to decide how far to rewind the source pointer. There is a special case
for the last execution of an MGETL/MGETD, since it leaves LSM_STEP=0
even though the number of MGETLs/MGETDs attempted was 4. This uses ADDZ
which is conditional upon the Z condition flag, but the AND instruction
which masked the TXStatus.LSM_STEP field didn't set the condition flags
based on the result.

Fix that now by using ANDS which does set the flags, and also marking
the condition codes as clobbered by the inline assembly.

Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 563ddc1076109f2b3f88e6d355eab7b6fd4662cb upstream.

Currently we try to zero the destination for a failed read from userland
in fixup code in the usercopy.c macros. The rest of the destination
buffer is then zeroed from __copy_user_zeroing(), which is used for both
copy_from_user() and __copy_from_user().

Unfortunately we fail to zero in the fixup code as D1Ar1 is set to 0
before the fixup code entry labels, and __copy_from_user() shouldn't even
be zeroing the rest of the buffer.

Move the zeroing out into copy_from_user() and rename
__copy_user_zeroing() to raw_copy_from_user() since it no longer does
any zeroing. This also conveniently matches the name needed for
RAW_COPY_USER support in a later patch.

Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit fb8ea062a8f2e85256e13f55696c5c5f0dfdcc8b upstream.

When copying to userland on Meta, if any faults are encountered
immediately abort the copy instead of continuing on and repeatedly
faulting, and worse potentially copying further bytes successfully to
subsequent valid pages.

Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 2257211942bbbf6c798ab70b487d7e62f7835a1a upstream.

Fix the error checking of the alignment adjustment code in
raw_copy_from_user(), which mistakenly considers it safe to skip the
error check when aligning the source buffer on a 2 or 4 byte boundary.

If the destination buffer was unaligned it may have started to copy
using byte or word accesses, which could well be at the start of a new
(valid) source page. This would result in it appearing to have copied 1
or 2 bytes at the end of the first (invalid) page rather than none at
all.

Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>