linux.git/arch/mips, branch v4.1.10

lib/decompressors: use real out buf size for gunzip with kernel

2015-09-29T17:26:19+00:00

commit 2d3862d26e67a59340ba1cf1748196c76c5787de upstream.

When loading x86 64bit kernel above 4GiB with patched grub2, got kernel
gunzip error.

| early console in decompress_kernel
| decompress_kernel:
|       input: [0x807f2143b4-0x807ff61aee]
|      output: [0x807cc00000-0x807f3ea29b] 0x027ea29c: output_len
| boot via startup_64
| KASLR using RDTSC...
|  new output: [0x46fe000000-0x470138cfff] 0x0338d000: output_run_size
|  decompress: [0x46fe000000-0x47007ea29b] <=== [0x807f2143b4-0x807ff61aee]
|
| Decompressing Linux... gz...
|
| uncompression error
|
| -- System halted

the new buffer is at 0x46fe000000ULL, decompressor_gzip is using
0xffffffb901ffffff as out_len.  gunzip in lib/zlib_inflate/inflate.c cap
that len to 0x01ffffff and decompress fails later.

We could hit this problem with crashkernel booting that uses kexec loading
kernel above 4GiB.

We have decompress_* support:
    1. inbuf[]/outbuf[] for kernel preboot.
    2. inbuf[]/flush() for initramfs
    3. fill()/flush() for initrd.
This bug only affect kernel preboot path that use outbuf[].

Add __decompress and take real out_buf_len for gunzip instead of guessing
wrong buf size.

Fixes: 1431574a1c4 (lib/decompressors: fix "no limit" output buffer length)
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu 
Cc: Alexandre Courbot 
Cc: Jon Medhurst 
Cc: Stephen Warren 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MIPS: math-emu: Emulate missing BC1{EQ,NE}Z instructions

2015-09-29T17:25:57+00:00

commit c909ca718e8f50cf484ef06a8dd935e738e8e53d upstream.

Commit c8a34581ec09 ("MIPS: Emulate the BC1{EQ,NE}Z FPU instructions")
added support for emulating the new R6 BC1{EQ,NE}Z branches but it missed
the case where the instruction that caused the exception was not on a DS.

Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras 
Fixes: c8a34581ec09 ("MIPS: Emulate the BC1{EQ,NE}Z FPU instructions")
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10738/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MIPS: math-emu: Allow m{f,t}hc emulation on MIPS R6

2015-09-29T17:25:56+00:00

commit e8f80cc1a6d80587136b015e989a12827e1fcfe5 upstream.

The mfhc/mthc instructions are supported on MIPS R6 so emulate
them if needed.

Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras 
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10737/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MIPS: Fix seccomp syscall argument for MIPS64

2015-09-13T16:07:45+00:00

commit 9f161439e4104b641a7bfb9b89581d801159fec8 upstream.

Commit 4c21b8fd8f14 ("MIPS: seccomp: Handle indirect system calls (o32)")
fixed indirect system calls on O32 but it also introduced a bug for MIPS64
where it erroneously modified the v0 (syscall) register with the assumption
that the sycall offset hasn't been taken into consideration. This breaks
seccomp on MIPS64 n64 and n32 ABIs. We fix this by replacing the addition
with a move instruction.

Fixes: 4c21b8fd8f14 ("MIPS: seccomp: Handle indirect system calls (o32)")
Reviewed-by: James Hogan 
Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras 
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10951/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_from_user32

2015-08-17T03:52:26+00:00

commit 3c00cb5e68dc719f2fc73a33b1b230aadfcb1309 upstream.

This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a
positive si_code value.  The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields
in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently
between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and
copy_siginfo_to_user.

copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits
of si_code.

This fixes the following information leaks:
x86:   8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32.
       (si_code = __SI_CHLD)
x86:   100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1)
sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a
       64-bit process. (si_code = any)

parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because
rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code
to a different process.  These bugs are also fixed for consistency.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Chris Metcalf 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MIPS: Make set_pte() SMP safe.

2015-08-17T03:52:08+00:00

commit 46011e6ea39235e4aca656673c500eac81a07a17 upstream.

On MIPS the GLOBAL bit of the PTE must have the same value in any
aligned pair of PTEs.  These pairs of PTEs are referred to as
"buddies".  In a SMP system is is possible for two CPUs to be calling
set_pte() on adjacent PTEs at the same time.  There is a race between
setting the PTE and a different CPU setting the GLOBAL bit in its
buddy PTE.

This race can be observed when multiple CPUs are executing
vmap()/vfree() at the same time.

Make setting the buddy PTE's GLOBAL bit an atomic operation to close
the race condition.

The case of CONFIG_64BIT_PHYS_ADDR && CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32 is *not*
handled.

Signed-off-by: David Daney 
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10835/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MIPS: Flush RPS on kernel entry with EVA

2015-08-17T03:52:08+00:00

commit 3aff47c062b944a5e1f9af56a37a23f5295628fc upstream.

When EVA is enabled, flush the Return Prediction Stack (RPS) present on
some MIPS cores on entry to the kernel from user mode.

This is important specifically for interAptiv with EVA enabled,
otherwise kernel mode RPS mispredicts may trigger speculative fetches of
user return addresses, which may be sensitive in the kernel address
space due to EVA's overlapping user/kernel address spaces.

Signed-off-by: James Hogan 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Markos Chandras 
Cc: Leonid Yegoshin 
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10812/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "MIPS: BCM63xx: Provide a plat_post_dma_flush hook"

2015-08-17T03:52:08+00:00

commit 247bfb65d731350093f5d1a0a8b3d65e49c17baa upstream.

This reverts commit 3cf29543413207d3ab1c3f62a88c09bb46f2264e ("MIPS:
BCM63xx: Provide a plat_post_dma_flush hook") since this commit was
found to prevent BCM6358 (early BMIPS4350 cores) and some BCM6368
(BMIPS4380 cores) from booting reliably.

Alvaro was able to track this down to an issue specifically located to
devices that use the second thread (TP1) when booting. Since BCM63xx did
not have a need for plat_post_dma_flush() hook before, let's just keep
things the way they were.

Reported-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas 
Reported-by: Jonas Gorski 
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli 
Cc: Kevin Cernekee 
Cc: Nicolas Schichan 
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: blogic@openwrt.org
Cc: noltari@gmail.com
Cc: jogo@openwrt.org
Cc: Florian Fainelli 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10804/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MIPS: show_stack: Fix stack trace with EVA

2015-08-17T03:52:08+00:00

commit 1e77863a51698c4319587df34171bd823691a66a upstream.

The show_stack() function deals exclusively with kernel contexts, but if
it gets called in user context with EVA enabled, show_stacktrace() will
attempt to access the stack using EVA accesses, which will either read
other user mapped data, or more likely cause an exception which will be
handled by __get_user().

This is easily reproduced using SysRq t to show all task states, which
results in the following stack dump output:

 Stack : (Bad stack address)

Fix by setting the current user access mode to kernel around the call to
show_stacktrace(). This causes __get_user() to use normal loads to read
the kernel stack.

Now we get the correct output, like this:

 Stack : 00000000 80168960 00000000 004a0000 00000000 00000000 8060016c 1f3abd0c
           1f172cd8 8056f09c 7ff1e450 8014fc3c 00000001 806dd0b0 0000001d 00000002
           1f17c6a0 1f17c804 1f17c6a0 8066f6e0 00000000 0000000a 00000000 00000000
           00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
           00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0110e800 1f3abd6c 1f17c6a0
           ...

Signed-off-by: James Hogan 
Cc: Markos Chandras 
Cc: Leonid Yegoshin 
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10778/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MIPS: do_mcheck: Fix kernel code dump with EVA

2015-08-17T03:52:07+00:00

commit 55c723e181ccec30fb5c672397fe69ec35967d97 upstream.

If a machine check exception is raised in kernel mode, user context,
with EVA enabled, then the do_mcheck handler will attempt to read the
code around the EPC using EVA load instructions, i.e. as if the reads
were from user mode. This will either read random user data if the
process has anything mapped at the same address, or it will cause an
exception which is handled by __get_user, resulting in this output:

 Code: (Bad address in epc)

Fix by setting the current user access mode to kernel if the saved
register context indicates the exception was taken in kernel mode. This
causes __get_user to use normal loads to read the kernel code.

Signed-off-by: James Hogan 
Cc: Markos Chandras 
Cc: Leonid Yegoshin 
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10777/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman