<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c, branch v4.16.7</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-06-19T13:50:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T11:03:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb'/>
<id>1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb</id>
<content type='text'>
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving more code to &lt;linux/sched/mm.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-08T17:51:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=010426079ec1228a7f980d2eef766a84c0f9241a'/>
<id>010426079ec1228a7f980d2eef766a84c0f9241a</id>
<content type='text'>
We are going to split more MM APIs out of &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;, which
will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files.

The APIs that we are going to move are:

  arch_pick_mmap_layout()
  arch_get_unmapped_area()
  arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown()
  mm_update_next_owner()

Include the header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We are going to split more MM APIs out of &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;, which
will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files.

The APIs that we are going to move are:

  arch_pick_mmap_layout()
  arch_get_unmapped_area()
  arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown()
  mm_update_next_owner()

Include the header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-08T17:51:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=3f07c0144132e4f59d88055ac8ff3e691a5fa2b8'/>
<id>3f07c0144132e4f59d88055ac8ff3e691a5fa2b8</id>
<content type='text'>
We are going to split &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt; out of &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt; file that just
maps to &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We are going to split &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt; out of &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt; file that just
maps to &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Replace &lt;asm/uaccess.h&gt; with &lt;linux/uaccess.h&gt; globally</title>
<updated>2016-12-24T19:46:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-24T19:46:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7c0f6ba682b9c7632072ffbedf8d328c8f3c42ba'/>
<id>7c0f6ba682b9c7632072ffbedf8d328c8f3c42ba</id>
<content type='text'>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:

  PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*&lt;asm/uaccess.h&gt;'
  sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include &lt;linux/uaccess.h&gt;!" \
        $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)

to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.

Requested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:

  PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*&lt;asm/uaccess.h&gt;'
  sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include &lt;linux/uaccess.h&gt;!" \
        $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)

to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.

Requested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: Enable KASLR</title>
<updated>2016-12-12T21:21:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-15T22:02:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=18d98a79382cbe5a7569788d5b7b18e7015506f2'/>
<id>18d98a79382cbe5a7569788d5b7b18e7015506f2</id>
<content type='text'>
Add missing code for userspace executable address randomization, e.g.
applications compiled with the gcc -pie option.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add missing code for userspace executable address randomization, e.g.
applications compiled with the gcc -pie option.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: Drop alloc_hugepages and free_hugepages syscalls</title>
<updated>2016-03-23T14:42:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-20T11:20:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=56649be9e67c17b4030fcc91ed6e1accc8e6918d'/>
<id>56649be9e67c17b4030fcc91ed6e1accc8e6918d</id>
<content type='text'>
The system calls alloc_hugepages() and free_hugepages() were introduced
in Linux 2.5.36 and removed again in 2.5.54. They were never implemented
on parisc, so let's drop them now.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The system calls alloc_hugepages() and free_hugepages() were introduced
in Linux 2.5.36 and removed again in 2.5.54. They were never implemented
on parisc, so let's drop them now.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures</title>
<updated>2015-05-12T20:03:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-11T20:01:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d045c77c1a69703143a36169c224429c48b9eecd'/>
<id>d045c77c1a69703143a36169c224429c48b9eecd</id>
<content type='text'>
On architectures where the stack grows upwards (CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP=y,
currently parisc and metag only) stack randomization sometimes leads to crashes
when the stack ulimit is set to lower values than STACK_RND_MASK (which is 8 MB
by default if not defined in arch-specific headers).

The problem is, that when the stack vm_area_struct is set up in fs/exec.c, the
additional space needed for the stack randomization (as defined by the value of
STACK_RND_MASK) was not taken into account yet and as such, when the stack
randomization code added a random offset to the stack start, the stack
effectively got smaller than what the user defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK)
which then sometimes leads to out-of-stack situations and crashes.

This patch fixes it by adding the maximum possible amount of memory (based on
STACK_RND_MASK) which theoretically could be added by the stack randomization
code to the initial stack size. That way, the user-defined stack size is always
guaranteed to be at minimum what is defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK).

This bug is currently not visible on the metag architecture, because on metag
STACK_RND_MASK is defined to 0 which effectively disables stack randomization.

The changes to fs/exec.c are inside an "#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP"
section, so it does not affect other platformws beside those where the
stack grows upwards (parisc and metag).

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On architectures where the stack grows upwards (CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP=y,
currently parisc and metag only) stack randomization sometimes leads to crashes
when the stack ulimit is set to lower values than STACK_RND_MASK (which is 8 MB
by default if not defined in arch-specific headers).

The problem is, that when the stack vm_area_struct is set up in fs/exec.c, the
additional space needed for the stack randomization (as defined by the value of
STACK_RND_MASK) was not taken into account yet and as such, when the stack
randomization code added a random offset to the stack start, the stack
effectively got smaller than what the user defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK)
which then sometimes leads to out-of-stack situations and crashes.

This patch fixes it by adding the maximum possible amount of memory (based on
STACK_RND_MASK) which theoretically could be added by the stack randomization
code to the initial stack size. That way, the user-defined stack size is always
guaranteed to be at minimum what is defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK).

This bug is currently not visible on the metag architecture, because on metag
STACK_RND_MASK is defined to 0 which effectively disables stack randomization.

The changes to fs/exec.c are inside an "#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP"
section, so it does not affect other platformws beside those where the
stack grows upwards (parisc and metag).

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc,metag: Do not hardcode maximum userspace stack size</title>
<updated>2014-05-14T23:01:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-30T21:26:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=042d27acb64924a0e8a43e972485913a32407beb'/>
<id>042d27acb64924a0e8a43e972485913a32407beb</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch affects only architectures where the stack grows upwards
(currently parisc and metag only). On those do not hardcode the maximum
initial stack size to 1GB for 32-bit processes, but make it configurable
via a config option.

The main problem with the hardcoded stack size is, that we have two
memory regions which grow upwards: stack and heap. To keep most of the
memory available for heap in a flexmap memory layout, it makes no sense
to hard allocate up to 1GB of the memory for stack which can't be used
as heap then.

This patch makes the stack size for 32-bit processes configurable and
uses 80MB as default value which has been in use during the last few
years on parisc and which hasn't showed any problems yet.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@parisc-linux.org&gt;
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Cc: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch affects only architectures where the stack grows upwards
(currently parisc and metag only). On those do not hardcode the maximum
initial stack size to 1GB for 32-bit processes, but make it configurable
via a config option.

The main problem with the hardcoded stack size is, that we have two
memory regions which grow upwards: stack and heap. To keep most of the
memory available for heap in a flexmap memory layout, it makes no sense
to hard allocate up to 1GB of the memory for stack which can't be used
as heap then.

This patch makes the stack size for 32-bit processes configurable and
uses 80MB as default value which has been in use during the last few
years on parisc and which hasn't showed any problems yet.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@parisc-linux.org&gt;
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Cc: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: change value of SHMLBA from 0x00400000 to PAGE_SIZE</title>
<updated>2014-04-13T13:00:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-09T17:49:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0ef36bd2b37815719e31a72d2beecc28ca8ecd26'/>
<id>0ef36bd2b37815719e31a72d2beecc28ca8ecd26</id>
<content type='text'>
On parisc, SHMLBA was defined to 0x00400000 (4MB) to reflect that we need to
take care of our caches for shared mappings. But actually, we can map a file at
any multiple address of PAGE_SIZE, so let us correct that now with a value of
PAGE_SIZE for SHMLBA.  Instead we now take care of this cache colouring via the
constant SHM_COLOUR while we map shared pages.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
CC: Jeroen Roovers &lt;jer@gentoo.org&gt;
CC: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
CC: Carlos O'Donell &lt;carlos@systemhalted.org&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org [3.13+]
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On parisc, SHMLBA was defined to 0x00400000 (4MB) to reflect that we need to
take care of our caches for shared mappings. But actually, we can map a file at
any multiple address of PAGE_SIZE, so let us correct that now with a value of
PAGE_SIZE for SHMLBA.  Instead we now take care of this cache colouring via the
constant SHM_COLOUR while we map shared pages.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
CC: Jeroen Roovers &lt;jer@gentoo.org&gt;
CC: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
CC: Carlos O'Donell &lt;carlos@systemhalted.org&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org [3.13+]
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: add flexible mmap memory layout support</title>
<updated>2014-02-02T20:00:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-31T21:19:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9dabf60dc4abe6e06bebcc2ee46b4d76ec8741f2'/>
<id>9dabf60dc4abe6e06bebcc2ee46b4d76ec8741f2</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for the flexible mmap memory layout (as described in
http://lwn.net/Articles/91829). This is especially very interesting on
parisc since we currently only support 32bit userspace (even with a
64bit Linux kernel).

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add support for the flexible mmap memory layout (as described in
http://lwn.net/Articles/91829). This is especially very interesting on
parisc since we currently only support 32bit userspace (even with a
64bit Linux kernel).

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
