linux.git/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S, branch v5.4.211

powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch

2019-11-29T09:10:31+00:00

commit 39e72bf96f5847ba87cc5bd7a3ce0fed813dc9ad upstream.

In commit ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count
cache flush"), I added support for software to flush the count
cache (indirect branch cache) on context switch if firmware told us
that was the required mitigation for Spectre v2.

As part of that code we also added a software flush of the link
stack (return address stack), which protects against Spectre-RSB
between user processes.

That is all correct for CPUs that activate that mitigation, which is
currently Power9 Nimbus DD2.3.

What I got wrong is that on older CPUs, where firmware has disabled
the count cache, we also need to flush the link stack on context
switch.

To fix it we create a new feature bit which is not set by firmware,
which tells us we need to flush the link stack. We set that when
firmware tells us that either of the existing Spectre v2 mitigations
are enabled.

Then we adjust the patching code so that if we see that feature bit we
enable the link stack flush. If we're also told to flush the count
cache in software then we fall through and do that also.

On the older CPUs we don't need to do do the software count cache
flush, firmware has disabled it, so in that case we patch in an early
return after the link stack flush.

The naming of some of the functions is awkward after this patch,
because they're called "count cache" but they also do link stack. But
we'll fix that up in a later commit to ease backporting.

This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660.

Reported-by: Anthony Steinhauser 
Fixes: ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64: remove support for kernel-mode syscalls

2019-08-28T13:19:34+00:00

There is support for the kernel to execute the 'sc 0' instruction and
make a system call to itself. This is a relic that is unused in the
tree, therefore untested. It's also highly questionable for modules to
be doing this.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827033010.28090-3-npiggin@gmail.com

powerpc: Wire up clone3 syscall

2019-07-28T23:34:27+00:00

Wire up the new clone3 syscall added in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork:
add clone3").

This requires a ppc_clone3 wrapper, in order to save the non-volatile
GPRs before calling into the generic syscall code. Otherwise we hit
the BUG_ON in CHECK_FULL_REGS in copy_thread().

Lightly tested using Christian's test code on a Power8 LE VM.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Acked-by: Christian Brauner 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190724140259.23554-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152

2019-05-30T18:26:32+00:00

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal 
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/entry: Remove unneeded need_resched() loop

2019-05-02T16:54:57+00:00

Since the enabling and disabling of IRQs within preempt_schedule_irq()
is contained in a need_resched() loop, we don't need the outer arch
code loop.

Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider 
[mpe: Rebase since CURRENT_THREAD_INFO() removal]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc/64s: Implement KUAP for Radix MMU

2019-04-21T13:06:02+00:00

Kernel Userspace Access Prevention utilises a feature of the Radix MMU
which disallows read and write access to userspace addresses. By
utilising this, the kernel is prevented from accessing user data from
outside of trusted paths that perform proper safety checks, such as
copy_{to/from}_user() and friends.

Userspace access is disabled from early boot and is only enabled when
performing an operation like copy_{to/from}_user(). The register that
controls this (AMR) does not prevent userspace from accessing itself,
so there is no need to save and restore when entering and exiting
userspace.

When entering the kernel from the kernel we save AMR and if it is not
blocking user access (because eg. we faulted doing a user access) we
reblock user access for the duration of the exception (ie. the page
fault) and then restore the AMR when returning back to the kernel.

This feature can be tested by using the lkdtm driver (CONFIG_LKDTM=y)
and performing the following:

  # (echo ACCESS_USERSPACE) > [debugfs]/provoke-crash/DIRECT

If enabled, this should send SIGSEGV to the thread.

We also add paranoid checking of AMR in switch and syscall return
under CONFIG_PPC_KUAP_DEBUG.

Co-authored-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc/64: Replace CURRENT_THREAD_INFO with PACA_THREAD_INFO

2019-02-23T11:31:40+00:00

Now that current_thread_info is located at the beginning of 'current'
task struct, CURRENT_THREAD_INFO macro is not really needed any more.

This patch replaces it by loads of the value at PACA_THREAD_INFO(r13).

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
[mpe: Add PACA_THREAD_INFO rather than using PACACURRENT]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc: Don't use CURRENT_THREAD_INFO to find the stack

2019-02-23T11:31:40+00:00

A few places use CURRENT_THREAD_INFO, or the C version, to find the
stack. This will no longer work with THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK so change
them to find the stack in other ways.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin 
[mpe: Split out of larger patch]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc/64s: Remove MSR_RI optimisation in system_call_exit()

2019-02-23T11:31:39+00:00

Currently in system_call_exit() we have an optimisation where we
disable MSR_RI (recoverable interrupt) and MSR_EE (external interrupt
enable) in a single mtmsrd instruction.

Unfortunately this will no longer work with THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK,
because then the load of TI_FLAGS might fault and faulting with MSR_RI
clear is treated as an unrecoverable exception which leads to a
panic().

So change the code to only clear MSR_EE prior to loading TI_FLAGS,
leaving the clear of MSR_RI until later. We have some latitude in
where do the clear of MSR_RI. A bit of experimentation has shown that
this location gives the least slow down.

This still causes a noticeable slow down in our null_syscall
performance. On a Power9 DD2.2:

  Before        After         Delta     Delta %
  955 cycles    999 cycles    -44	-4.6%

On the plus side this does simplify the code somewhat, because we
don't have to reenable MSR_RI on the restore_math() or
syscall_exit_work() paths which was necessitated previously by the
optimisation.

Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc/64s: Clear on-stack exception marker upon exception return

2019-01-31T05:40:25+00:00

The ppc64 specific implementation of the reliable stacktracer,
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(), bails out and reports an "unreliable
trace" whenever it finds an exception frame on the stack. Stack frames
are classified as exception frames if the STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER
magic, as written by exception prologues, is found at a particular
location.

However, as observed by Joe Lawrence, it is possible in practice that
non-exception stack frames can alias with prior exception frames and
thus, that the reliable stacktracer can find a stale
STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER on the stack. It in turn falsely reports an
unreliable stacktrace and blocks any live patching transition to
finish. Said condition lasts until the stack frame is
overwritten/initialized by function call or other means.

In principle, we could mitigate this by making the exception frame
classification condition in save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() stronger:
in addition to testing for STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER, we could also take
into account that for all exceptions executing on the kernel stack
- their stack frames's backlink pointers always match what is saved
in their pt_regs instance's ->gpr[1] slot and that
- their exception frame size equals STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE, a value
uncommonly large for non-exception frames.

However, while these are currently true, relying on them would make
the reliable stacktrace implementation more sensitive towards future
changes in the exception entry code. Note that false negatives, i.e.
not detecting exception frames, would silently break the live patching
consistency model.

Furthermore, certain other places (diagnostic stacktraces, perf, xmon)
rely on STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER as well.

Make the exception exit code clear the on-stack
STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER for those exceptions running on the "normal"
kernel stack and returning to kernelspace: because the topmost frame
is ignored by the reliable stack tracer anyway, returns to userspace
don't need to take care of clearing the marker.

Furthermore, as I don't have the ability to test this on Book 3E or 32
bits, limit the change to Book 3S and 64 bits.

Fixes: df78d3f61480 ("powerpc/livepatch: Implement reliable stack tracing for the consistency model")
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange
Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman