<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch v3.18.72</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KVM: async_pf: make rcu irq exit if not triggered from idle task</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:30:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>wanpeng.li@hotmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-01T12:20:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4110ee7ebb2bc8120f7bf767bc6bd29a30b60912'/>
<id>4110ee7ebb2bc8120f7bf767bc6bd29a30b60912</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 337c017ccdf2653d0040099433fc1a2b1beb5926 upstream.

 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1242 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:323 rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 CPU: 5 PID: 1242 Comm: unity-settings- Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2+ #1
 RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0xda/0xba0
  ? kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1b2/0x270
  schedule+0x40/0x90
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
  ? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
  do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  ? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup_rcu+0x90/0x1e0

I encounter this when trying to stress the async page fault in L1 guest w/
L2 guests running.

Commit 9b132fbe5419 (Add rcu user eqs exception hooks for async page
fault) adds rcu_irq_enter/exit() to kvm_async_pf_task_wait() to exit cpu
idle eqs when needed, to protect the code that needs use rcu.  However,
we need to call the pair even if the function calls schedule(), as seen
from the above backtrace.

This patch fixes it by informing the RCU subsystem exit/enter the irq
towards/away from idle for both n.halted and !n.halted.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 337c017ccdf2653d0040099433fc1a2b1beb5926 upstream.

 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1242 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:323 rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 CPU: 5 PID: 1242 Comm: unity-settings- Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2+ #1
 RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0xda/0xba0
  ? kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1b2/0x270
  schedule+0x40/0x90
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
  ? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
  do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  ? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup_rcu+0x90/0x1e0

I encounter this when trying to stress the async page fault in L1 guest w/
L2 guests running.

Commit 9b132fbe5419 (Add rcu user eqs exception hooks for async page
fault) adds rcu_irq_enter/exit() to kvm_async_pf_task_wait() to exit cpu
idle eqs when needed, to protect the code that needs use rcu.  However,
we need to call the pair even if the function calls schedule(), as seen
from the above backtrace.

This patch fixes it by informing the RCU subsystem exit/enter the irq
towards/away from idle for both n.halted and !n.halted.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mce/AMD: Make the init code more robust</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:30:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-26T21:58:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=73f7545a039e01842d1b164d1bf985ede2786386'/>
<id>73f7545a039e01842d1b164d1bf985ede2786386</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0dad3a3014a0b9e72521ff44f17e0054f43dcdea ]

If mce_device_init() fails then the mce device pointer is NULL and the
AMD mce code happily dereferences it.

Add a sanity check.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf &lt;markus@trippelsdorf.de&gt;
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0dad3a3014a0b9e72521ff44f17e0054f43dcdea ]

If mce_device_init() fails then the mce device pointer is NULL and the
AMD mce code happily dereferences it.

Add a sanity check.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf &lt;markus@trippelsdorf.de&gt;
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/acpi: Prevent out of bound access caused by broken ACPI tables</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:03:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Seunghun Han</name>
<email>kkamagui@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-18T11:03:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7f377fc4008980278edbfd9d70ef9aa91ffa8448'/>
<id>7f377fc4008980278edbfd9d70ef9aa91ffa8448</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dad5ab0db8deac535d03e3fe3d8f2892173fa6a4 upstream.

The bus_irq argument of mp_override_legacy_irq() is used as the index into
the isa_irq_to_gsi[] array. The bus_irq argument originates from
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC and ACPI_MADT_TYPE_INTERRUPT items in the ACPI
tables, but is nowhere sanity checked.

That allows broken or malicious ACPI tables to overwrite memory, which
might cause malfunction, panic or arbitrary code execution.

Add a sanity check and emit a warning when that triggers.

[ tglx: Added warning and rewrote changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dad5ab0db8deac535d03e3fe3d8f2892173fa6a4 upstream.

The bus_irq argument of mp_override_legacy_irq() is used as the index into
the isa_irq_to_gsi[] array. The bus_irq argument originates from
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC and ACPI_MADT_TYPE_INTERRUPT items in the ACPI
tables, but is nowhere sanity checked.

That allows broken or malicious ACPI tables to overwrite memory, which
might cause malfunction, panic or arbitrary code execution.

Add a sanity check and emit a warning when that triggers.

[ tglx: Added warning and rewrote changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/rtc: Remove duplicate const specifier</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:03:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-14T14:07:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c392029da52e98d2d2a7bd70874c135b49b45d63'/>
<id>c392029da52e98d2d2a7bd70874c135b49b45d63</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d505ad1d66c9cd31db5ab0d2c7bcb2a47e5bb29e upstream.

Building with clang:

  CC      arch/x86/kernel/rtc.o
arch/x86/kernel/rtc.c:173:29: warning: duplicate 'const' declaration
  specifier [-Wduplicate-decl-specifier]
        static const char * const  const ids[] __initconst =

Remove the duplicate const, it is not needed and causes a warning.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1421244475-313-1-git-send-email-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d505ad1d66c9cd31db5ab0d2c7bcb2a47e5bb29e upstream.

Building with clang:

  CC      arch/x86/kernel/rtc.o
arch/x86/kernel/rtc.c:173:29: warning: duplicate 'const' declaration
  specifier [-Wduplicate-decl-specifier]
        static const char * const  const ids[] __initconst =

Remove the duplicate const, it is not needed and causes a warning.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1421244475-313-1-git-send-email-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-06-26T05:10:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T11:03:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d4712eb79b17d85c9e354efa2d3156ce50736128'/>
<id>d4712eb79b17d85c9e354efa2d3156ce50736128</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
[wt: backport to 3.18: adjust context ; no FOLL_POPULATE ;
     s390 uses generic arch_get_unmapped_area()]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 3.18]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
[wt: backport to 3.18: adjust context ; no FOLL_POPULATE ;
     s390 uses generic arch_get_unmapped_area()]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 3.18]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: async_pf: fix rcu_irq_enter() with irqs enabled</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-26T14:56:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1173e90e46e4421c6b8d74d9d0fc6ac0f00a68f8'/>
<id>1173e90e46e4421c6b8d74d9d0fc6ac0f00a68f8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bbaf0e2b1c1b4f88abd6ef49576f0efb1734eae5 upstream.

native_safe_halt enables interrupts, and you just shouldn't
call rcu_irq_enter() with interrupts enabled.  Reorder the
call with the following local_irq_disable() to respect the
invariant.

Reported-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bbaf0e2b1c1b4f88abd6ef49576f0efb1734eae5 upstream.

native_safe_halt enables interrupts, and you just shouldn't
call rcu_irq_enter() with interrupts enabled.  Reorder the
call with the following local_irq_disable() to respect the
invariant.

Reported-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes/x86: Fix kernel panic when certain exception-handling addresses are probed</title>
<updated>2017-05-15T07:19:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-28T16:23:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a4b3fc13402189a6cb7813ec12cabda87070b293'/>
<id>a4b3fc13402189a6cb7813ec12cabda87070b293</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 75013fb16f8484898eaa8d0b08fed942d790f029 upstream.

Fix to the exception table entry check by using probed address
instead of the address of copied instruction.

This bug may cause unexpected kernel panic if user probe an address
where an exception can happen which should be fixup by __ex_table
(e.g. copy_from_user.)

Unless user puts a kprobe on such address, this doesn't
cause any problem.

This bug has been introduced years ago, by commit:

  464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently").

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148829899399.28855.12581062400757221722.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 75013fb16f8484898eaa8d0b08fed942d790f029 upstream.

Fix to the exception table entry check by using probed address
instead of the address of copied instruction.

This bug may cause unexpected kernel panic if user probe an address
where an exception can happen which should be fixup by __ex_table
(e.g. copy_from_user.)

Unless user puts a kprobe on such address, this doesn't
cause any problem.

This bug has been introduced years ago, by commit:

  464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently").

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148829899399.28855.12581062400757221722.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/pci-calgary: Fix iommu_free() comparison of unsigned expression &gt;= 0</title>
<updated>2017-05-15T07:19:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikola Pajkovsky</name>
<email>npajkovsky@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-15T08:47:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8c9c9d5acd83f47622424809d782a1c6cd7ce380'/>
<id>8c9c9d5acd83f47622424809d782a1c6cd7ce380</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 68dee8e2f2cacc54d038394e70d22411dee89da2 upstream.

commit 8fd524b355da ("x86: Kill bad_dma_address variable") has killed
bad_dma_address variable and used instead of macro DMA_ERROR_CODE
which is always zero. Since dma_addr is unsigned, the statement

   dma_addr &gt;= DMA_ERROR_CODE

is always true, and not needed.

arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c: In function ‘iommu_free’:
arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c:299:2: warning: comparison of unsigned expression &gt;= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits]
  if (unlikely((dma_addr &gt;= DMA_ERROR_CODE) &amp;&amp; (dma_addr &lt; badend))) {

Fixes: 8fd524b355da ("x86: Kill bad_dma_address variable")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;npajkovsky@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: Jon Mason &lt;jdmason@kudzu.us&gt;
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda &lt;mulix@mulix.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7612c0f9dd7c1290407dbf8e809def922006920b.1479161177.git.npajkovsky@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 68dee8e2f2cacc54d038394e70d22411dee89da2 upstream.

commit 8fd524b355da ("x86: Kill bad_dma_address variable") has killed
bad_dma_address variable and used instead of macro DMA_ERROR_CODE
which is always zero. Since dma_addr is unsigned, the statement

   dma_addr &gt;= DMA_ERROR_CODE

is always true, and not needed.

arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c: In function ‘iommu_free’:
arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c:299:2: warning: comparison of unsigned expression &gt;= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits]
  if (unlikely((dma_addr &gt;= DMA_ERROR_CODE) &amp;&amp; (dma_addr &lt; badend))) {

Fixes: 8fd524b355da ("x86: Kill bad_dma_address variable")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;npajkovsky@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: Jon Mason &lt;jdmason@kudzu.us&gt;
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda &lt;mulix@mulix.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7612c0f9dd7c1290407dbf8e809def922006920b.1479161177.git.npajkovsky@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace/x86: Fix triple fault with graph tracing and suspend-to-ram</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:44:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-13T22:53:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ef6173b2edf33404c218539efe601b489cee1d12'/>
<id>ef6173b2edf33404c218539efe601b489cee1d12</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream.

On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function
graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when
it resumes.

The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU:

startup_32_smp()
  load_ucode_ap()
    prepare_ftrace_return()
      ftrace_graph_is_dead()
        (accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph')

The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an
ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls
ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global
'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault
because the CPU is still in real mode.

The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's
running in protected mode before continuing.  The check makes sure the
stack pointer is a virtual kernel address.  It's a bit of a hack, but
it's not very intrusive and it works well enough.

For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could
have potentially been fixed:

- Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging
  is enabled.  (No idea what that would break.)

- Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the
  functions 'notrace'.  (Probably not realistic.)

- Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu()
  or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from
  real mode.

Reported-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Len Brown &lt;lenb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream.

On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function
graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when
it resumes.

The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU:

startup_32_smp()
  load_ucode_ap()
    prepare_ftrace_return()
      ftrace_graph_is_dead()
        (accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph')

The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an
ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls
ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global
'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault
because the CPU is still in real mode.

The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's
running in protected mode before continuing.  The check makes sure the
stack pointer is a virtual kernel address.  It's a bit of a hack, but
it's not very intrusive and it works well enough.

For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could
have potentially been fixed:

- Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging
  is enabled.  (No idea what that would break.)

- Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the
  functions 'notrace'.  (Probably not realistic.)

- Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu()
  or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from
  real mode.

Reported-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Len Brown &lt;lenb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mce/AMD: Give a name to MCA bank 3 when accessed with legacy MSRs</title>
<updated>2017-04-30T03:49:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yazen Ghannam</name>
<email>yazen.ghannam@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-30T11:17:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0420e5585687bc1713dbaea4f4a2348c4bb43b60'/>
<id>0420e5585687bc1713dbaea4f4a2348c4bb43b60</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 29f72ce3e4d18066ec75c79c857bee0618a3504b upstream.

MCA bank 3 is reserved on systems pre-Fam17h, so it didn't have a name.
However, MCA bank 3 is defined on Fam17h systems and can be accessed
using legacy MSRs. Without a name we get a stack trace on Fam17h systems
when trying to register sysfs files for bank 3 on kernels that don't
recognize Scalable MCA.

Call MCA bank 3 "decode_unit" since this is what it represents on
Fam17h. This will allow kernels without SMCA support to see this bank on
Fam17h+ and prevent the stack trace. This will not affect older systems
since this bank is reserved on them, i.e. it'll be ignored.

Tested on AMD Fam15h and Fam17h systems.

  WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 1 at lib/kobject.c:210 kobject_add_internal
  kobject: (ffff88085bb256c0): attempted to be registered with empty name!
  ...
  Call Trace:
   kobject_add_internal
   kobject_add
   kobject_create_and_add
   threshold_create_device
   threshold_init_device

Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam &lt;yazen.ghannam@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490102285-3659-1-git-send-email-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 29f72ce3e4d18066ec75c79c857bee0618a3504b upstream.

MCA bank 3 is reserved on systems pre-Fam17h, so it didn't have a name.
However, MCA bank 3 is defined on Fam17h systems and can be accessed
using legacy MSRs. Without a name we get a stack trace on Fam17h systems
when trying to register sysfs files for bank 3 on kernels that don't
recognize Scalable MCA.

Call MCA bank 3 "decode_unit" since this is what it represents on
Fam17h. This will allow kernels without SMCA support to see this bank on
Fam17h+ and prevent the stack trace. This will not affect older systems
since this bank is reserved on them, i.e. it'll be ignored.

Tested on AMD Fam15h and Fam17h systems.

  WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 1 at lib/kobject.c:210 kobject_add_internal
  kobject: (ffff88085bb256c0): attempted to be registered with empty name!
  ...
  Call Trace:
   kobject_add_internal
   kobject_add
   kobject_create_and_add
   threshold_create_device
   threshold_init_device

Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam &lt;yazen.ghannam@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490102285-3659-1-git-send-email-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
