<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch, branch v4.4.187</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/tm: Fix oops on sigreturn on systems without TM</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:35:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Neuling</name>
<email>mikey@neuling.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T05:05:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e67fd28f9ed887d0c8124bda96b66dab87823eac'/>
<id>e67fd28f9ed887d0c8124bda96b66dab87823eac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f16d80b75a096c52354c6e0a574993f3b0dfbdfe upstream.

On systems like P9 powernv where we have no TM (or P8 booted with
ppc_tm=off), userspace can construct a signal context which still has
the MSR TS bits set. The kernel tries to restore this context which
results in the following crash:

  Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c0000000000022fc (msr 0x8000000102a03031) tm_scratch=800000020280f033
  Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: sigfuz Not tainted 5.2.0-11043-g0a8ad0ffa4 #69
  NIP:  c0000000000022fc LR: 00007fffb2d67e48 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00000003fffbd70 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (5.2.0-11045-g7142b497d8)
  MSR:  8000000102a03031 &lt;SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[E]&gt;  CR: 42004242  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c0000000000022e0 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: 0000000000000072 00007fffb2b6e560 00007fffb2d87f00 0000000000000669
  GPR04: 00007fffb2b6e728 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00007fffb2b6f2a8
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007fffb2b76900 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 00007fffb2370000 00007fffb2d84390 00007fffea3a15ac 000001000a250420
  GPR20: 00007fffb2b6f260 0000000010001770 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR24: 00007fffb2d843a0 00007fffea3a14a0 0000000000010000 0000000000800000
  GPR28: 00007fffea3a14d8 00000000003d0f00 0000000000000000 00007fffb2b6e728
  NIP [c0000000000022fc] rfi_flush_fallback+0x7c/0x80
  LR [00007fffb2d67e48] 0x7fffb2d67e48
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  e96a0220 e96a02a8 e96a0330 e96a03b8 394a0400 4200ffdc 7d2903a6 e92d0c00
  e94d0c08 e96d0c10 e82d0c18 7db242a6 &lt;4c000024&gt; 7db243a6 7db142a6 f82d0c18

The problem is the signal code assumes TM is enabled when
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is enabled. This may not be the case as
with P9 powernv or if `ppc_tm=off` is used on P8.

This means any local user can crash the system.

Fix the problem by returning a bad stack frame to the user if they try
to set the MSR TS bits with sigreturn() on systems where TM is not
supported.

Found with sigfuz kernel selftest on P9.

This fixes CVE-2019-13648.

Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9
Reported-by: Praveen Pandey &lt;Praveen.Pandey@in.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling &lt;mikey@neuling.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190719050502.405-1-mikey@neuling.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f16d80b75a096c52354c6e0a574993f3b0dfbdfe upstream.

On systems like P9 powernv where we have no TM (or P8 booted with
ppc_tm=off), userspace can construct a signal context which still has
the MSR TS bits set. The kernel tries to restore this context which
results in the following crash:

  Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c0000000000022fc (msr 0x8000000102a03031) tm_scratch=800000020280f033
  Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: sigfuz Not tainted 5.2.0-11043-g0a8ad0ffa4 #69
  NIP:  c0000000000022fc LR: 00007fffb2d67e48 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00000003fffbd70 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (5.2.0-11045-g7142b497d8)
  MSR:  8000000102a03031 &lt;SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[E]&gt;  CR: 42004242  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c0000000000022e0 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: 0000000000000072 00007fffb2b6e560 00007fffb2d87f00 0000000000000669
  GPR04: 00007fffb2b6e728 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00007fffb2b6f2a8
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007fffb2b76900 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 00007fffb2370000 00007fffb2d84390 00007fffea3a15ac 000001000a250420
  GPR20: 00007fffb2b6f260 0000000010001770 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR24: 00007fffb2d843a0 00007fffea3a14a0 0000000000010000 0000000000800000
  GPR28: 00007fffea3a14d8 00000000003d0f00 0000000000000000 00007fffb2b6e728
  NIP [c0000000000022fc] rfi_flush_fallback+0x7c/0x80
  LR [00007fffb2d67e48] 0x7fffb2d67e48
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  e96a0220 e96a02a8 e96a0330 e96a03b8 394a0400 4200ffdc 7d2903a6 e92d0c00
  e94d0c08 e96d0c10 e82d0c18 7db242a6 &lt;4c000024&gt; 7db243a6 7db142a6 f82d0c18

The problem is the signal code assumes TM is enabled when
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is enabled. This may not be the case as
with P9 powernv or if `ppc_tm=off` is used on P8.

This means any local user can crash the system.

Fix the problem by returning a bad stack frame to the user if they try
to set the MSR TS bits with sigreturn() on systems where TM is not
supported.

Found with sigfuz kernel selftest on P9.

This fixes CVE-2019-13648.

Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9
Reported-by: Praveen Pandey &lt;Praveen.Pandey@in.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling &lt;mikey@neuling.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190719050502.405-1-mikey@neuling.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/mds: Apply more accurate check on hypervisor platform</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:35:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhenzhong Duan</name>
<email>zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-25T02:39:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=cef888755a349443079b5538e6a74b88b3264c55'/>
<id>cef888755a349443079b5538e6a74b88b3264c55</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 517c3ba00916383af6411aec99442c307c23f684 upstream.

X86_HYPER_NATIVE isn't accurate for checking if running on native platform,
e.g. CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST isn't set or "nopv" is enabled.

Checking the CPU feature bit X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR to determine if it's
running on native platform is more accurate.

This still doesn't cover the platforms on which X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is
unsupported, e.g. VMware, but there is nothing which can be done about this
scenario.

Fixes: 8a4b06d391b0 ("x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS")
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564022349-17338-1-git-send-email-zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 517c3ba00916383af6411aec99442c307c23f684 upstream.

X86_HYPER_NATIVE isn't accurate for checking if running on native platform,
e.g. CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST isn't set or "nopv" is enabled.

Checking the CPU feature bit X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR to determine if it's
running on native platform is more accurate.

This still doesn't cover the platforms on which X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is
unsupported, e.g. VMware, but there is nothing which can be done about this
scenario.

Fixes: 8a4b06d391b0 ("x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS")
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564022349-17338-1-git-send-email-zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sysfb_efi: Add quirks for some devices with swapped width and height</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:35:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hans de Goede</name>
<email>hdegoede@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-21T15:24:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=50b8699c6b44aa8389ba71a9fba2de5686a87c69'/>
<id>50b8699c6b44aa8389ba71a9fba2de5686a87c69</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d02f1aa39189e0619c3525d5cd03254e61bf606a upstream.

Some Lenovo 2-in-1s with a detachable keyboard have a portrait screen but
advertise a landscape resolution and pitch, resulting in a messed up
display if the kernel tries to show anything on the efifb (because of the
wrong pitch).

Fix this by adding a new DMI match table for devices which need to have
their width and height swapped.

At first it was tried to use the existing table for overriding some of the
efifb parameters, but some of the affected devices have variants with
different LCD resolutions which will not work with hardcoded override
values.

Reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1730783
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hdegoede@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721152418.11644-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d02f1aa39189e0619c3525d5cd03254e61bf606a upstream.

Some Lenovo 2-in-1s with a detachable keyboard have a portrait screen but
advertise a landscape resolution and pitch, resulting in a messed up
display if the kernel tries to show anything on the efifb (because of the
wrong pitch).

Fix this by adding a new DMI match table for devices which need to have
their width and height swapped.

At first it was tried to use the existing table for overriding some of the
efifb parameters, but some of the affected devices have variants with
different LCD resolutions which will not work with hardcoded override
values.

Reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1730783
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hdegoede@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721152418.11644-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sh: prevent warnings when using iounmap</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:34:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sam Ravnborg</name>
<email>sam@ravnborg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-12T03:52:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d7b26901d8048bed6ae2e9a2f69ad16914a9111c'/>
<id>d7b26901d8048bed6ae2e9a2f69ad16914a9111c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 733f0025f0fb43e382b84db0930ae502099b7e62 ]

When building drm/exynos for sh, as part of an allmodconfig build, the
following warning triggered:

  exynos7_drm_decon.c: In function `decon_remove':
  exynos7_drm_decon.c:769:24: warning: unused variable `ctx'
    struct decon_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(&amp;pdev-&gt;dev);

The ctx variable is only used as argument to iounmap().

In sh - allmodconfig CONFIG_MMU is not defined
so it ended up in:

\#define __iounmap(addr)	do { } while (0)
\#define iounmap		__iounmap

Fix the warning by introducing a static inline function for iounmap.

This is similar to several other architectures.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190622114208.24427-1-sam@ravnborg.org
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Inki Dae &lt;inki.dae@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 733f0025f0fb43e382b84db0930ae502099b7e62 ]

When building drm/exynos for sh, as part of an allmodconfig build, the
following warning triggered:

  exynos7_drm_decon.c: In function `decon_remove':
  exynos7_drm_decon.c:769:24: warning: unused variable `ctx'
    struct decon_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(&amp;pdev-&gt;dev);

The ctx variable is only used as argument to iounmap().

In sh - allmodconfig CONFIG_MMU is not defined
so it ended up in:

\#define __iounmap(addr)	do { } while (0)
\#define iounmap		__iounmap

Fix the warning by introducing a static inline function for iounmap.

This is similar to several other architectures.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190622114208.24427-1-sam@ravnborg.org
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Inki Dae &lt;inki.dae@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/eeh: Handle hugepages in ioremap space</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:34:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver O'Halloran</name>
<email>oohall@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-10T15:05:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=3cad2027c6e1ea2cd273f07a7a582f684e47d2b5'/>
<id>3cad2027c6e1ea2cd273f07a7a582f684e47d2b5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 33439620680be5225c1b8806579a291e0d761ca0 ]

In commit 4a7b06c157a2 ("powerpc/eeh: Handle hugepages in ioremap
space") support for using hugepages in the vmalloc and ioremap areas was
enabled for radix. Unfortunately this broke EEH MMIO error checking.

Detection works by inserting a hook which checks the results of the
ioreadXX() set of functions.  When a read returns a 0xFFs response we
need to check for an error which we do by mapping the (virtual) MMIO
address back to a physical address, then mapping physical address to a
PCI device via an interval tree.

When translating virt -&gt; phys we currently assume the ioremap space is
only populated by PAGE_SIZE mappings. If a hugepage mapping is found we
emit a WARN_ON(), but otherwise handles the check as though a normal
page was found. In pathalogical cases such as copying a buffer
containing a lot of 0xFFs from BAR memory this can result in the system
not booting because it's too busy printing WARN_ON()s.

There's no real reason to assume huge pages can't be present and we're
prefectly capable of handling them, so do that.

Fixes: 4a7b06c157a2 ("powerpc/eeh: Handle hugepages in ioremap space")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant &lt;sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sachin Sant &lt;sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190710150517.27114-1-oohall@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 33439620680be5225c1b8806579a291e0d761ca0 ]

In commit 4a7b06c157a2 ("powerpc/eeh: Handle hugepages in ioremap
space") support for using hugepages in the vmalloc and ioremap areas was
enabled for radix. Unfortunately this broke EEH MMIO error checking.

Detection works by inserting a hook which checks the results of the
ioreadXX() set of functions.  When a read returns a 0xFFs response we
need to check for an error which we do by mapping the (virtual) MMIO
address back to a physical address, then mapping physical address to a
PCI device via an interval tree.

When translating virt -&gt; phys we currently assume the ioremap space is
only populated by PAGE_SIZE mappings. If a hugepage mapping is found we
emit a WARN_ON(), but otherwise handles the check as though a normal
page was found. In pathalogical cases such as copying a buffer
containing a lot of 0xFFs from BAR memory this can result in the system
not booting because it's too busy printing WARN_ON()s.

There's no real reason to assume huge pages can't be present and we're
prefectly capable of handling them, so do that.

Fixes: 4a7b06c157a2 ("powerpc/eeh: Handle hugepages in ioremap space")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant &lt;sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sachin Sant &lt;sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190710150517.27114-1-oohall@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/4xx/uic: clear pending interrupt after irq type/pol change</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:34:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Lamparter</name>
<email>chunkeey@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-15T15:23:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7f06efe994032486db6e17138dca5224aa0f8b24'/>
<id>7f06efe994032486db6e17138dca5224aa0f8b24</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3ab3a0689e74e6aa5b41360bc18861040ddef5b1 ]

When testing out gpio-keys with a button, a spurious
interrupt (and therefore a key press or release event)
gets triggered as soon as the driver enables the irq
line for the first time.

This patch clears any potential bogus generated interrupt
that was caused by the switching of the associated irq's
type and polarity.

Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter &lt;chunkeey@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3ab3a0689e74e6aa5b41360bc18861040ddef5b1 ]

When testing out gpio-keys with a button, a spurious
interrupt (and therefore a key press or release event)
gets triggered as soon as the driver enables the irq
line for the first time.

This patch clears any potential bogus generated interrupt
that was caused by the switching of the associated irq's
type and polarity.

Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter &lt;chunkeey@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>um: Silence lockdep complaint about mmap_sem</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:34:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-24T19:54:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=12fcb801a57d4e4f8fc7e9343fe7860252ad2561'/>
<id>12fcb801a57d4e4f8fc7e9343fe7860252ad2561</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 80bf6ceaf9310b3f61934c69b382d4912deee049 ]

When we get into activate_mm(), lockdep complains that we're doing
something strange:

    WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
    5.1.0-10252-gb00152307319-dirty #121 Not tainted
    ------------------------------------------------------
    inside.sh/366 is trying to acquire lock:
    (____ptrval____) (&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock){+.+.}, at: flush_old_exec+0x703/0x8d7

    but task is already holding lock:
    (____ptrval____) (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem){++++}, at: flush_old_exec+0x6c5/0x8d7

    which lock already depends on the new lock.

    the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

    -&gt; #1 (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem){++++}:
           [...]
           __lock_acquire+0x12ab/0x139f
           lock_acquire+0x155/0x18e
           down_write+0x3f/0x98
           flush_old_exec+0x748/0x8d7
           load_elf_binary+0x2ca/0xddb
           [...]

    -&gt; #0 (&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock){+.+.}:
           [...]
           __lock_acquire+0x12ab/0x139f
           lock_acquire+0x155/0x18e
           _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x83
           flush_old_exec+0x703/0x8d7
           load_elf_binary+0x2ca/0xddb
           [...]

    other info that might help us debug this:

     Possible unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0                    CPU1
           ----                    ----
      lock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
                                   lock(&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock);
                                   lock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
      lock(&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

    2 locks held by inside.sh/366:
     #0: (____ptrval____) (&amp;sig-&gt;cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}, at: __do_execve_file+0x12d/0x869
     #1: (____ptrval____) (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem){++++}, at: flush_old_exec+0x6c5/0x8d7

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 0 PID: 366 Comm: inside.sh Not tainted 5.1.0-10252-gb00152307319-dirty #121
    Stack:
     [...]
    Call Trace:
     [&lt;600420de&gt;] show_stack+0x13b/0x155
     [&lt;6048906b&gt;] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2c
     [&lt;6009ae64&gt;] print_circular_bug+0x332/0x343
     [&lt;6009c5c6&gt;] check_prev_add+0x669/0xdad
     [&lt;600a06b4&gt;] __lock_acquire+0x12ab/0x139f
     [&lt;6009f3d0&gt;] lock_acquire+0x155/0x18e
     [&lt;604a07e0&gt;] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x83
     [&lt;60151e6a&gt;] flush_old_exec+0x703/0x8d7
     [&lt;601a8eb8&gt;] load_elf_binary+0x2ca/0xddb
     [...]

I think it's because in exec_mmap() we have

	down_read(&amp;old_mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
...
        task_lock(tsk);
...
	activate_mm(active_mm, mm);
	(which does down_write(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem))

I'm not really sure why lockdep throws in the whole knowledge
about the task lock, but it seems that old_mm and mm shouldn't
ever be the same (and it doesn't deadlock) so tell lockdep that
they're different.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 80bf6ceaf9310b3f61934c69b382d4912deee049 ]

When we get into activate_mm(), lockdep complains that we're doing
something strange:

    WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
    5.1.0-10252-gb00152307319-dirty #121 Not tainted
    ------------------------------------------------------
    inside.sh/366 is trying to acquire lock:
    (____ptrval____) (&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock){+.+.}, at: flush_old_exec+0x703/0x8d7

    but task is already holding lock:
    (____ptrval____) (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem){++++}, at: flush_old_exec+0x6c5/0x8d7

    which lock already depends on the new lock.

    the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

    -&gt; #1 (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem){++++}:
           [...]
           __lock_acquire+0x12ab/0x139f
           lock_acquire+0x155/0x18e
           down_write+0x3f/0x98
           flush_old_exec+0x748/0x8d7
           load_elf_binary+0x2ca/0xddb
           [...]

    -&gt; #0 (&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock){+.+.}:
           [...]
           __lock_acquire+0x12ab/0x139f
           lock_acquire+0x155/0x18e
           _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x83
           flush_old_exec+0x703/0x8d7
           load_elf_binary+0x2ca/0xddb
           [...]

    other info that might help us debug this:

     Possible unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0                    CPU1
           ----                    ----
      lock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
                                   lock(&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock);
                                   lock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
      lock(&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

    2 locks held by inside.sh/366:
     #0: (____ptrval____) (&amp;sig-&gt;cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}, at: __do_execve_file+0x12d/0x869
     #1: (____ptrval____) (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem){++++}, at: flush_old_exec+0x6c5/0x8d7

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 0 PID: 366 Comm: inside.sh Not tainted 5.1.0-10252-gb00152307319-dirty #121
    Stack:
     [...]
    Call Trace:
     [&lt;600420de&gt;] show_stack+0x13b/0x155
     [&lt;6048906b&gt;] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2c
     [&lt;6009ae64&gt;] print_circular_bug+0x332/0x343
     [&lt;6009c5c6&gt;] check_prev_add+0x669/0xdad
     [&lt;600a06b4&gt;] __lock_acquire+0x12ab/0x139f
     [&lt;6009f3d0&gt;] lock_acquire+0x155/0x18e
     [&lt;604a07e0&gt;] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x83
     [&lt;60151e6a&gt;] flush_old_exec+0x703/0x8d7
     [&lt;601a8eb8&gt;] load_elf_binary+0x2ca/0xddb
     [...]

I think it's because in exec_mmap() we have

	down_read(&amp;old_mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
...
        task_lock(tsk);
...
	activate_mm(active_mm, mm);
	(which does down_write(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem))

I'm not really sure why lockdep throws in the whole knowledge
about the task lock, but it seems that old_mm and mm shouldn't
ever be the same (and it doesn't deadlock) so tell lockdep that
they're different.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/pci/of: Fix OF flags parsing for 64bit BARs</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:34:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kardashevskiy</name>
<email>aik@ozlabs.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-05T03:38:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f2915d784b547bb09fe81734ec2c0e955539b99e'/>
<id>f2915d784b547bb09fe81734ec2c0e955539b99e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df5be5be8735ef2ae80d5ae1f2453cd81a035c4b ]

When the firmware does PCI BAR resource allocation, it passes the assigned
addresses and flags (prefetch/64bit/...) via the "reg" property of
a PCI device device tree node so the kernel does not need to do
resource allocation.

The flags are stored in resource::flags - the lower byte stores
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE/etc bits and the other bytes are IORESOURCE_IO/etc.
Some flags from PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_xxx and IORESOURCE_xxx are duplicated,
such as PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_PREFETCH/PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64/etc.
When parsing the "reg" property, we copy the prefetch flag but we skip
on PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64 which leaves the flags out of sync.

The missing IORESOURCE_MEM_64 flag comes into play under 2 conditions:
1. we remove PCI_PROBE_ONLY for pseries (by hacking pSeries_setup_arch()
or by passing "/chosen/linux,pci-probe-only");
2. we request resource alignment (by passing pci=resource_alignment=
via the kernel cmd line to request PAGE_SIZE alignment or defining
ppc_md.pcibios_default_alignment which returns anything but 0). Note that
the alignment requests are ignored if PCI_PROBE_ONLY is enabled.

With 1) and 2), the generic PCI code in the kernel unconditionally
decides to:
- reassign the BARs in pci_specified_resource_alignment() (works fine)
- write new BARs to the device - this fails for 64bit BARs as the generic
code looks at IORESOURCE_MEM_64 (not set) and writes only lower 32bits
of the BAR and leaves the upper 32bit unmodified which breaks BAR mapping
in the hypervisor.

This fixes the issue by copying the flag. This is useful if we want to
enforce certain BAR alignment per platform as handling subpage sized BARs
is proven to cause problems with hotplug (SLOF already aligns BARs to 64k).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@ozlabs.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sam Bobroff &lt;sbobroff@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shawn Anastasio &lt;shawn@anastas.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit df5be5be8735ef2ae80d5ae1f2453cd81a035c4b ]

When the firmware does PCI BAR resource allocation, it passes the assigned
addresses and flags (prefetch/64bit/...) via the "reg" property of
a PCI device device tree node so the kernel does not need to do
resource allocation.

The flags are stored in resource::flags - the lower byte stores
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE/etc bits and the other bytes are IORESOURCE_IO/etc.
Some flags from PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_xxx and IORESOURCE_xxx are duplicated,
such as PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_PREFETCH/PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64/etc.
When parsing the "reg" property, we copy the prefetch flag but we skip
on PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64 which leaves the flags out of sync.

The missing IORESOURCE_MEM_64 flag comes into play under 2 conditions:
1. we remove PCI_PROBE_ONLY for pseries (by hacking pSeries_setup_arch()
or by passing "/chosen/linux,pci-probe-only");
2. we request resource alignment (by passing pci=resource_alignment=
via the kernel cmd line to request PAGE_SIZE alignment or defining
ppc_md.pcibios_default_alignment which returns anything but 0). Note that
the alignment requests are ignored if PCI_PROBE_ONLY is enabled.

With 1) and 2), the generic PCI code in the kernel unconditionally
decides to:
- reassign the BARs in pci_specified_resource_alignment() (works fine)
- write new BARs to the device - this fails for 64bit BARs as the generic
code looks at IORESOURCE_MEM_64 (not set) and writes only lower 32bits
of the BAR and leaves the upper 32bit unmodified which breaks BAR mapping
in the hypervisor.

This fixes the issue by copying the flag. This is useful if we want to
enforce certain BAR alignment per platform as handling subpage sized BARs
is proven to cause problems with hotplug (SLOF already aligns BARs to 64k).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@ozlabs.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sam Bobroff &lt;sbobroff@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shawn Anastasio &lt;shawn@anastas.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/watchpoint: Restore NV GPRs while returning from exception</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:34:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ravi Bangoria</name>
<email>ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T03:30:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=91071a5a4636b450d12bc4bd693c2acd70c11705'/>
<id>91071a5a4636b450d12bc4bd693c2acd70c11705</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f474c28fbcbe42faca4eb415172c07d76adcb819 upstream.

powerpc hardware triggers watchpoint before executing the instruction.
To make trigger-after-execute behavior, kernel emulates the
instruction. If the instruction is 'load something into non-volatile
register', exception handler should restore emulated register state
while returning back, otherwise there will be register state
corruption. eg, adding a watchpoint on a list can corrput the list:

  # cat /proc/kallsyms | grep kthread_create_list
  c00000000121c8b8 d kthread_create_list

Add watchpoint on kthread_create_list-&gt;prev:

  # perf record -e mem:0xc00000000121c8c0

Run some workload such that new kthread gets invoked. eg, I just
logged out from console:

  list_add corruption. next-&gt;prev should be prev (c000000001214e00), \
	but was c00000000121c8b8. (next=c00000000121c8b8).
  WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 309 at lib/list_debug.c:25 __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
  CPU: 59 PID: 309 Comm: kworker/59:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #69
  ...
  NIP __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
  LR __list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0
  Call Trace:
  __list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0 (unreliable)
  __kthread_create_on_node+0xe0/0x260
  kthread_create_on_node+0x34/0x50
  create_worker+0xe8/0x260
  worker_thread+0x444/0x560
  kthread+0x160/0x1a0
  ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70

List corruption happened because it uses 'load into non-volatile
register' instruction:

Snippet from __kthread_create_on_node:

  c000000000136be8:     addis   r29,r2,-19
  c000000000136bec:     ld      r29,31424(r29)
        if (!__list_add_valid(new, prev, next))
  c000000000136bf0:     mr      r3,r30
  c000000000136bf4:     mr      r5,r28
  c000000000136bf8:     mr      r4,r29
  c000000000136bfc:     bl      c00000000059a2f8 &lt;__list_add_valid+0x8&gt;

Register state from WARN_ON():

  GPR00: c00000000059a3a0 c000007ff23afb50 c000000001344e00 0000000000000075
  GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000001852af8bc1 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000007 0000000000000006 00000000000004aa
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000007ffffeb080 c000000000137038 c000005ff62aaa00
  GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000007fffbe7600 c000007fffbe7370
  GPR20: c000007fffbe7320 c000007fffbe7300 c000000001373a00 0000000000000000
  GPR24: fffffffffffffef7 c00000000012e320 c000007ff23afcb0 c000000000cb8628
  GPR28: c00000000121c8b8 c000000001214e00 c000007fef5b17e8 c000007fef5b17c0

Watchpoint hit at 0xc000000000136bec.

  addis   r29,r2,-19
   =&gt; r29 = 0xc000000001344e00 + (-19 &lt;&lt; 16)
   =&gt; r29 = 0xc000000001214e00

  ld      r29,31424(r29)
   =&gt; r29 = *(0xc000000001214e00 + 31424)
   =&gt; r29 = *(0xc00000000121c8c0)

0xc00000000121c8c0 is where we placed a watchpoint and thus this
instruction was emulated by emulate_step. But because handle_dabr_fault
did not restore emulated register state, r29 still contains stale
value in above register state.

Fixes: 5aae8a5370802 ("powerpc, hw_breakpoints: Implement hw_breakpoints for 64-bit server processors")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.36+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f474c28fbcbe42faca4eb415172c07d76adcb819 upstream.

powerpc hardware triggers watchpoint before executing the instruction.
To make trigger-after-execute behavior, kernel emulates the
instruction. If the instruction is 'load something into non-volatile
register', exception handler should restore emulated register state
while returning back, otherwise there will be register state
corruption. eg, adding a watchpoint on a list can corrput the list:

  # cat /proc/kallsyms | grep kthread_create_list
  c00000000121c8b8 d kthread_create_list

Add watchpoint on kthread_create_list-&gt;prev:

  # perf record -e mem:0xc00000000121c8c0

Run some workload such that new kthread gets invoked. eg, I just
logged out from console:

  list_add corruption. next-&gt;prev should be prev (c000000001214e00), \
	but was c00000000121c8b8. (next=c00000000121c8b8).
  WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 309 at lib/list_debug.c:25 __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
  CPU: 59 PID: 309 Comm: kworker/59:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #69
  ...
  NIP __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
  LR __list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0
  Call Trace:
  __list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0 (unreliable)
  __kthread_create_on_node+0xe0/0x260
  kthread_create_on_node+0x34/0x50
  create_worker+0xe8/0x260
  worker_thread+0x444/0x560
  kthread+0x160/0x1a0
  ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70

List corruption happened because it uses 'load into non-volatile
register' instruction:

Snippet from __kthread_create_on_node:

  c000000000136be8:     addis   r29,r2,-19
  c000000000136bec:     ld      r29,31424(r29)
        if (!__list_add_valid(new, prev, next))
  c000000000136bf0:     mr      r3,r30
  c000000000136bf4:     mr      r5,r28
  c000000000136bf8:     mr      r4,r29
  c000000000136bfc:     bl      c00000000059a2f8 &lt;__list_add_valid+0x8&gt;

Register state from WARN_ON():

  GPR00: c00000000059a3a0 c000007ff23afb50 c000000001344e00 0000000000000075
  GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000001852af8bc1 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000007 0000000000000006 00000000000004aa
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000007ffffeb080 c000000000137038 c000005ff62aaa00
  GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000007fffbe7600 c000007fffbe7370
  GPR20: c000007fffbe7320 c000007fffbe7300 c000000001373a00 0000000000000000
  GPR24: fffffffffffffef7 c00000000012e320 c000007ff23afcb0 c000000000cb8628
  GPR28: c00000000121c8b8 c000000001214e00 c000007fef5b17e8 c000007fef5b17c0

Watchpoint hit at 0xc000000000136bec.

  addis   r29,r2,-19
   =&gt; r29 = 0xc000000001344e00 + (-19 &lt;&lt; 16)
   =&gt; r29 = 0xc000000001214e00

  ld      r29,31424(r29)
   =&gt; r29 = *(0xc000000001214e00 + 31424)
   =&gt; r29 = *(0xc00000000121c8c0)

0xc00000000121c8c0 is where we placed a watchpoint and thus this
instruction was emulated by emulate_step. But because handle_dabr_fault
did not restore emulated register state, r29 still contains stale
value in above register state.

Fixes: 5aae8a5370802 ("powerpc, hw_breakpoints: Implement hw_breakpoints for 64-bit server processors")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.36+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/32s: fix suspend/resume when IBATs 4-7 are used</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:34:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@c-s.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-17T21:42:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0e13274bcb81c06f537ba2c13e7fce3ba46a780c'/>
<id>0e13274bcb81c06f537ba2c13e7fce3ba46a780c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ecb78ef56e08d2119d337ae23cb951a640dc52d upstream.

Previously, only IBAT1 and IBAT2 were used to map kernel linear mem.
Since commit 63b2bc619565 ("powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for
STRICT_KERNEL_RWX"), we may have all 8 BATs used for mapping
kernel text. But the suspend/restore functions only save/restore
BATs 0 to 3, and clears BATs 4 to 7.

Make suspend and restore functions respectively save and reload
the 8 BATs on CPUs having MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS feature.

Reported-by: Andreas Schwab &lt;schwab@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ecb78ef56e08d2119d337ae23cb951a640dc52d upstream.

Previously, only IBAT1 and IBAT2 were used to map kernel linear mem.
Since commit 63b2bc619565 ("powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for
STRICT_KERNEL_RWX"), we may have all 8 BATs used for mapping
kernel text. But the suspend/restore functions only save/restore
BATs 0 to 3, and clears BATs 4 to 7.

Make suspend and restore functions respectively save and reload
the 8 BATs on CPUs having MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS feature.

Reported-by: Andreas Schwab &lt;schwab@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
