linux.git/block, branch v4.19.192

blk-mq: Swap two calls in blk_mq_exit_queue()

2021-05-22T08:59:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit 630ef623ed26c18a457cdc070cf24014e50129c2 ]

If a tag set is shared across request queues (e.g. SCSI LUNs) then the
block layer core keeps track of the number of active request queues in
tags->active_queues. blk_mq_tag_busy() and blk_mq_tag_idle() update that
atomic counter if the hctx flag BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED is set. Make
sure that blk_mq_exit_queue() calls blk_mq_tag_idle() before that flag is
cleared by blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set().

Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Ming Lei 
Cc: Hannes Reinecke 
Fixes: 0d2602ca30e4 ("blk-mq: improve support for shared tags maps")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche 
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513171529.7977-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

block: only update parent bi_status when bio fail

2021-04-16T09:49:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3edf5346e4f2ce2fa0c94651a90a8dda169565ee ]

For multiple split bios, if one of the bio is fail, the whole
should return error to application. But we found there is a race
between bio_integrity_verify_fn and bio complete, which return
io success to application after one of the bio fail. The race as
following:

split bio(READ)          kworker

nvme_complete_rq
blk_update_request //split error=0
  bio_endio
    bio_integrity_endio
      queue_work(kintegrityd_wq, &bip->bip_work);

                         bio_integrity_verify_fn
                         bio_endio //split bio
                          __bio_chain_endio
                             if (!parent->bi_status)

                               
                               nvme_irq
                                 blk_update_request //parent error=7
                                 req_bio_endio
                                    bio->bi_status = 7 //parent bio
                               

                               parent->bi_status = 0
                        parent->bi_end_io() // return bi_status=0

The bio has been split as two: split and parent. When split
bio completed, it depends on kworker to do endio, while
bio_integrity_verify_fn have been interrupted by parent bio
complete irq handler. Then, parent bio->bi_status which have
been set in irq handler will overwrite by kworker.

In fact, even without the above race, we also need to conside
the concurrency beteen mulitple split bio complete and update
the same parent bi_status. Normally, multiple split bios will
be issued to the same hctx and complete from the same irq
vector. But if we have updated queue map between multiple split
bios, these bios may complete on different hw queue and different
irq vector. Then the concurrency update parent bi_status may
cause the final status error.

Suggested-by: Keith Busch 
Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu 
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210331115359.1125679-1-yuyufen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

block: Suppress uevent for hidden device when removed

2021-03-30T12:36:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9ec491447b90ad6a4056a9656b13f0b3a1e83043 ]

register_disk() suppress uevents for devices with the GENHD_FL_HIDDEN
but enables uevents at the end again in order to announce disk after
possible partitions are created.

When the device is removed the uevents are still on and user land sees
'remove' messages for devices which were never 'add'ed to the system.

  KERNEL[95481.571887] remove   /devices/virtual/nvme-fabrics/ctl/nvme5/nvme0c5n1 (block)

Let's suppress the uevents for GENHD_FL_HIDDEN by not enabling the
uevents at all.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Reviewed-by: Martin Wilck 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311151917.136091-1-dwagner@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

block: genhd: add 'groups' argument to device_add_disk

2021-03-11T13:04:59+00:00

commit fef912bf860e8e7e48a2bfb978a356bba743a8b7 upstream.

Update device_add_disk() to take an 'groups' argument so that
individual drivers can register a device with additional sysfs
attributes.
This avoids race condition the driver would otherwise have if these
groups were to be created with sysfs_add_groups().

Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Jeffle Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

blk-settings: align max_sectors on "logical_block_size" boundary

2021-03-04T08:39:51+00:00

commit 97f433c3601a24d3513d06f575a389a2ca4e11e4 upstream.

We get I/O errors when we run md-raid1 on the top of dm-integrity on the
top of ramdisk.
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0xff00, 0xff
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0xff00, 0xff
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0xffff, 0x1
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0xffff, 0x1
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0x8048, 0xff
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0x8147, 0xff
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0x8246, 0xff
device-mapper: integrity: Bio not aligned on 8 sectors: 0x8345, 0xbb

The ramdisk device has logical_block_size 512 and max_sectors 255. The
dm-integrity device uses logical_block_size 4096 and it doesn't affect the
"max_sectors" value - thus, it inherits 255 from the ramdisk. So, we have
a device with max_sectors not aligned on logical_block_size.

The md-raid device sees that the underlying leg has max_sectors 255 and it
will split the bios on 255-sector boundary, making the bios unaligned on
logical_block_size.

In order to fix the bug, we round down max_sectors to logical_block_size.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei 
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bfq: Avoid false bfq queue merging

2021-03-04T08:39:31+00:00

commit 41e76c85660c022c6bf5713bfb6c21e64a487cec upstream.

bfq_setup_cooperator() uses bfqd->in_serv_last_pos so detect whether it
makes sense to merge current bfq queue with the in-service queue.
However if the in-service queue is freshly scheduled and didn't dispatch
any requests yet, bfqd->in_serv_last_pos is stale and contains value
from the previously scheduled bfq queue which can thus result in a bogus
decision that the two queues should be merged. This bug can be observed
for example with the following fio jobfile:

[global]
direct=0
ioengine=sync
invalidate=1
size=1g
rw=read

[reader]
numjobs=4
directory=/mnt

where the 4 processes will end up in the one shared bfq queue although
they do IO to physically very distant files (for some reason I was able to
observe this only with slice_idle=1ms setting).

Fix the problem by invalidating bfqd->in_serv_last_pos when switching
in-service queue.

Fixes: 058fdecc6de7 ("block, bfq: fix in-service-queue check for queue merging")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Acked-by: Paolo Valente 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

block: don't release queue's sysfs lock during switching elevator

2021-03-04T08:39:30+00:00

commit b89f625e28d44552083f43752f62d8621ded0a04 upstream.

cecf5d87ff20 ("block: split .sysfs_lock into two locks") starts to
release & acquire sysfs_lock before registering/un-registering elevator
queue during switching elevator for avoiding potential deadlock from
showing & storing 'queue/iosched' attributes and removing elevator's
kobject.

Turns out there isn't such deadlock because 'q->sysfs_lock' isn't
required in .show & .store of queue/iosched's attributes, and just
elevator's sysfs lock is acquired in elv_iosched_store() and
elv_iosched_show(). So it is safe to hold queue's sysfs lock when
registering/un-registering elevator queue.

The biggest issue is that commit cecf5d87ff20 assumes that concurrent
write on 'queue/scheduler' can't happen. However, this assumption isn't
true, because kernfs_fop_write() only guarantees that concurrent write
aren't called on the same open file, but the write could be from
different open on the file. So we can't release & re-acquire queue's
sysfs lock during switching elevator, otherwise use-after-free on
elevator could be triggered.

Fixes the issue by not releasing queue's sysfs lock during switching
elevator.

Fixes: cecf5d87ff20 ("block: split .sysfs_lock into two locks")
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Hannes Reinecke 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Mike Snitzer 
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche 
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
(jwang: adjust ctx for 4.19)
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

block: fix race between switching elevator and removing queues

2021-03-04T08:39:30+00:00

commit 0a67b5a926e63ff5492c3c675eab5900580d056d upstream.

cecf5d87ff20 ("block: split .sysfs_lock into two locks") starts to
release & actuire sysfs_lock again during switching elevator. So it
isn't enough to prevent switching elevator from happening by simply
clearing QUEUE_FLAG_REGISTERED with holding sysfs_lock, because
in-progress switch still can move on after re-acquiring the lock,
meantime the flag of QUEUE_FLAG_REGISTERED won't get checked.

Fixes this issue by checking 'q->elevator' directly & locklessly after
q->kobj is removed in blk_unregister_queue(), this way is safe because
q->elevator can't be changed at that time.

Fixes: cecf5d87ff20 ("block: split .sysfs_lock into two locks")
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Hannes Reinecke 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Mike Snitzer 
Cc: Bart Van Assche 
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

block: split .sysfs_lock into two locks

2021-03-04T08:39:30+00:00

commit cecf5d87ff2035127bb5a9ee054d0023a4a7cad3 upstream.

The kernfs built-in lock of 'kn->count' is held in sysfs .show/.store
path. Meantime, inside block's .show/.store callback, q->sysfs_lock is
required.

However, when mq & iosched kobjects are removed via
blk_mq_unregister_dev() & elv_unregister_queue(), q->sysfs_lock is held
too. This way causes AB-BA lock because the kernfs built-in lock of
'kn-count' is required inside kobject_del() too, see the lockdep warning[1].

On the other hand, it isn't necessary to acquire q->sysfs_lock for
both blk_mq_unregister_dev() & elv_unregister_queue() because
clearing REGISTERED flag prevents storing to 'queue/scheduler'
from being happened. Also sysfs write(store) is exclusive, so no
necessary to hold the lock for elv_unregister_queue() when it is
called in switching elevator path.

So split .sysfs_lock into two: one is still named as .sysfs_lock for
covering sync .store, the other one is named as .sysfs_dir_lock
for covering kobjects and related status change.

sysfs itself can handle the race between add/remove kobjects and
showing/storing attributes under kobjects. For switching scheduler
via storing to 'queue/scheduler', we use the queue flag of
QUEUE_FLAG_REGISTERED with .sysfs_lock for avoiding the race, then
we can avoid to hold .sysfs_lock during removing/adding kobjects.

[1]  lockdep warning
    ======================================================
    WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
    5.3.0-rc3-00044-g73277fc75ea0 #1380 Not tainted
    ------------------------------------------------------
    rmmod/777 is trying to acquire lock:
    00000000ac50e981 (kn->count#202){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x59/0x72

    but task is already holding lock:
    00000000fb16ae21 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x78/0x10b

    which lock already depends on the new lock.

    the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

    -> #1 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}:
           __lock_acquire+0x95f/0xa2f
           lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x1e8
           __mutex_lock+0x14a/0xa9b
           blk_mq_hw_sysfs_show+0x63/0xb6
           sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x11f/0x196
           seq_read+0x2cd/0x5f2
           vfs_read+0xc7/0x18c
           ksys_read+0xc4/0x13e
           do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x295
           entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

    -> #0 (kn->count#202){++++}:
           check_prev_add+0x5d2/0xc45
           validate_chain+0xed3/0xf94
           __lock_acquire+0x95f/0xa2f
           lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x1e8
           __kernfs_remove+0x237/0x40b
           kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x59/0x72
           remove_files+0x61/0x96
           sysfs_remove_group+0x81/0xa4
           sysfs_remove_groups+0x3b/0x44
           kobject_del+0x44/0x94
           blk_mq_unregister_dev+0x83/0xdd
           blk_unregister_queue+0xa0/0x10b
           del_gendisk+0x259/0x3fa
           null_del_dev+0x8b/0x1c3 [null_blk]
           null_exit+0x5c/0x95 [null_blk]
           __se_sys_delete_module+0x204/0x337
           do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x295
           entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

    other info that might help us debug this:

     Possible unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0                    CPU1
           ----                    ----
      lock(&q->sysfs_lock);
                                   lock(kn->count#202);
                                   lock(&q->sysfs_lock);
      lock(kn->count#202);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

    2 locks held by rmmod/777:
     #0: 00000000e69bd9de (&lock){+.+.}, at: null_exit+0x2e/0x95 [null_blk]
     #1: 00000000fb16ae21 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x78/0x10b

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 0 PID: 777 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.3.0-rc3-00044-g73277fc75ea0 #1380
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS ?-20180724_192412-buildhw-07.phx4
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0x9a/0xe6
     check_noncircular+0x207/0x251
     ? print_circular_bug+0x32a/0x32a
     ? find_usage_backwards+0x84/0xb0
     check_prev_add+0x5d2/0xc45
     validate_chain+0xed3/0xf94
     ? check_prev_add+0xc45/0xc45
     ? mark_lock+0x11b/0x804
     ? check_usage_forwards+0x1ca/0x1ca
     __lock_acquire+0x95f/0xa2f
     lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x1e8
     ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x59/0x72
     __kernfs_remove+0x237/0x40b
     ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x59/0x72
     ? kernfs_next_descendant_post+0x7d/0x7d
     ? strlen+0x10/0x23
     ? strcmp+0x22/0x44
     kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x59/0x72
     remove_files+0x61/0x96
     sysfs_remove_group+0x81/0xa4
     sysfs_remove_groups+0x3b/0x44
     kobject_del+0x44/0x94
     blk_mq_unregister_dev+0x83/0xdd
     blk_unregister_queue+0xa0/0x10b
     del_gendisk+0x259/0x3fa
     ? disk_events_poll_msecs_store+0x12b/0x12b
     ? check_flags+0x1ea/0x204
     ? mark_held_locks+0x1f/0x7a
     null_del_dev+0x8b/0x1c3 [null_blk]
     null_exit+0x5c/0x95 [null_blk]
     __se_sys_delete_module+0x204/0x337
     ? free_module+0x39f/0x39f
     ? blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x8a/0x718
     ? rwlock_bug+0x62/0x62
     ? __blkcg_punt_bio_submit+0xd0/0xd0
     ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x20
     ? mark_held_locks+0x1f/0x7a
     ? do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x295
     do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x295
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x7fb696cdbe6b
    Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1d 20 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 008
    RSP: 002b:00007ffec9588788 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559e589137c0 RCX: 00007fb696cdbe6b
    RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559e58913828
    RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffec9587701 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 00007fb696d4eae0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffec95889b0
    R13: 00007ffec95896b3 R14: 0000559e58913260 R15: 0000559e589137c0

Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Hannes Reinecke 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Mike Snitzer 
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche 
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
(jwang:cherry picked from commit cecf5d87ff2035127bb5a9ee054d0023a4a7cad3,
adjust ctx for 4,19)
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

block: add helper for checking if queue is registered

2021-03-04T08:39:29+00:00

commit 58c898ba370e68d39470cd0d932b524682c1f9be upstream.

There are 4 users which check if queue is registered, so add one helper
to check it.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Hannes Reinecke 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Mike Snitzer 
Cc: Bart Van Assche 
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche 
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman