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<title>linux.git/crypto/authenc.c, branch v2.6.35-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Fix cryptlen calculation</title>
<updated>2010-05-20T09:40:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shikhar Khattar</name>
<email>shikhark@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-05-20T09:40:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=921bae54693f26d01fb8e10ee6968b5cd8184551'/>
<id>921bae54693f26d01fb8e10ee6968b5cd8184551</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch (applied against 2.6.34) fixes the calculation of the
length of the ABLKCIPHER decrypt request ("cryptlen") after an
asynchronous hash request has been completed in the AUTHENC interface.

Signed-off-by: Shikhar Khattar &lt;shikhark@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
This patch (applied against 2.6.34) fixes the calculation of the
length of the ABLKCIPHER decrypt request ("cryptlen") after an
asynchronous hash request has been completed in the AUTHENC interface.

Signed-off-by: Shikhar Khattar &lt;shikhark@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Add EINPROGRESS check</title>
<updated>2010-04-26T01:14:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2010-04-26T01:14:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=180ce7e81030e1ef763d58f97f9ab840ff57d848'/>
<id>180ce7e81030e1ef763d58f97f9ab840ff57d848</id>
<content type='text'>
When Steffen originally wrote the authenc async hash patch, he
correctly had EINPROGRESS checks in place so that we did not invoke
the original completion handler with it.

Unfortuantely I told him to remove it before the patch was applied.

As only MAY_BACKLOG request completion handlers are required to
handle EINPROGRESS completions, those checks are really needed.

This patch restores them.

Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;sebastian@breakpoint.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
When Steffen originally wrote the authenc async hash patch, he
correctly had EINPROGRESS checks in place so that we did not invoke
the original completion handler with it.

Unfortuantely I told him to remove it before the patch was applied.

As only MAY_BACKLOG request completion handlers are required to
handle EINPROGRESS completions, those checks are really needed.

This patch restores them.

Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;sebastian@breakpoint.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Move saved IV in front of the ablkcipher request</title>
<updated>2010-03-03T14:41:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steffen Klassert</name>
<email>steffen.klassert@secunet.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-03-03T14:41:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=50beceba7fdf5f10a04d8a053e62d40b742099ad'/>
<id>50beceba7fdf5f10a04d8a053e62d40b742099ad</id>
<content type='text'>
In crypto_authenc_encrypt() we save the IV behind the ablkcipher
request. To save space on the request, we overwrite the ablkcipher
request with a ahash request after encryption. So the IV may be
overwritten by the ahash request. This patch fixes this by placing
the IV in front of the ablkcipher/ahash request.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
In crypto_authenc_encrypt() we save the IV behind the ablkcipher
request. To save space on the request, we overwrite the ablkcipher
request with a ahash request after encryption. So the IV may be
overwritten by the ahash request. This patch fixes this by placing
the IV in front of the ablkcipher/ahash request.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Use correct ahash complete functions</title>
<updated>2010-03-02T13:59:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steffen Klassert</name>
<email>steffen.klassert@secunet.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-03-02T13:59:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=77ba115c478d442024964b217f9f12192018cc77'/>
<id>77ba115c478d442024964b217f9f12192018cc77</id>
<content type='text'>
We accidentally assigned the ahash update complete function to
the wrong function pointer in crypto_authenc_verify.
This patch fixes this.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
We accidentally assigned the ahash update complete function to
the wrong function pointer in crypto_authenc_verify.
This patch fixes this.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Fix checkpatch errors</title>
<updated>2010-02-16T12:27:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Hartmann</name>
<email>richih.mailinglist@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-16T12:27:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f3542e6d7b246e88b038e608358606ddd1f09870'/>
<id>f3542e6d7b246e88b038e608358606ddd1f09870</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Richard Hartmann &lt;richih.mailinglist@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Signed-off-by: Richard Hartmann &lt;richih.mailinglist@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Convert to ahash</title>
<updated>2009-08-05T09:35:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steffen Klassert</name>
<email>steffen.klassert@secunet.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-08-05T09:35:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=cbdcf80d8b9486ddb699a044c6f87f25821708cb'/>
<id>cbdcf80d8b9486ddb699a044c6f87f25821708cb</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch converts authenc to the new ahash interface.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
This patch converts authenc to the new ahash interface.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Remove reference to crypto_hash</title>
<updated>2009-07-14T04:58:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-07-12T04:50:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9ef074fa9b525f7fc7a35d0761f3d4ed01fe8252'/>
<id>9ef074fa9b525f7fc7a35d0761f3d4ed01fe8252</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that there are no more legacy hash implementations we can
remove the reference to crypto_hash.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that there are no more legacy hash implementations we can
remove the reference to crypto_hash.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Fix zero-length IV crash</title>
<updated>2009-01-15T04:33:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-13T00:26:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=29b37f42127f7da511560a40ea74f5047da40c13'/>
<id>29b37f42127f7da511560a40ea74f5047da40c13</id>
<content type='text'>
As it is if an algorithm with a zero-length IV is used (e.g.,
NULL encryption) with authenc, authenc may generate an SG entry
of length zero, which will trigger a BUG check in the hash layer.

This patch fixes it by skipping the IV SG generation if the IV
size is zero.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As it is if an algorithm with a zero-length IV is used (e.g.,
NULL encryption) with authenc, authenc may generate an SG entry
of length zero, which will trigger a BUG check in the hash layer.

This patch fixes it by skipping the IV SG generation if the IV
size is zero.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: hash - Export shash through hash</title>
<updated>2008-12-25T00:01:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-31T12:21:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=5f7082ed4f482f05db01d84dbf58190492ebf0ad'/>
<id>5f7082ed4f482f05db01d84dbf58190492ebf0ad</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch allows shash algorithms to be used through the old hash
interface.  This is a transitional measure so we can convert the
underlying algorithms to shash before converting the users across.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch allows shash algorithms to be used through the old hash
interface.  This is a transitional measure so we can convert the
underlying algorithms to shash before converting the users across.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Avoid using clobbered request pointer</title>
<updated>2008-08-22T15:04:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-22T15:04:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a697690bece75d4ba424c1318eb25c37d41d5829'/>
<id>a697690bece75d4ba424c1318eb25c37d41d5829</id>
<content type='text'>
Authenc works in two stages for encryption, it first encrypts and
then computes an ICV.  The context memory of the request is used
by both operations.  The problem is that when an asynchronous
encryption completes, we will compute the ICV and then reread the
context memory of the encryption to get the original request.

It just happens that we have a buffer of 16 bytes in front of the
request pointer, so ICVs of 16 bytes (such as SHA1) do not trigger
the bug.  However, any attempt to uses a larger ICV instantly kills
the machine when the first asynchronous encryption is completed.

This patch fixes this by saving the request pointer before we start
the ICV computation.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Authenc works in two stages for encryption, it first encrypts and
then computes an ICV.  The context memory of the request is used
by both operations.  The problem is that when an asynchronous
encryption completes, we will compute the ICV and then reread the
context memory of the encryption to get the original request.

It just happens that we have a buffer of 16 bytes in front of the
request pointer, so ICVs of 16 bytes (such as SHA1) do not trigger
the bug.  However, any attempt to uses a larger ICV instantly kills
the machine when the first asynchronous encryption is completed.

This patch fixes this by saving the request pointer before we start
the ICV computation.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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