<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/crypto, branch v3.10.100</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: user - lock crypto_alg_list on alg dump</title>
<updated>2016-02-19T22:22:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-01T13:27:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=471b81310d2198d0a9dfeddfffdac036b9c9cee7'/>
<id>471b81310d2198d0a9dfeddfffdac036b9c9cee7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 63e41ebc6630f39422d87f8a4bade1e793f37a01 upstream.

We miss to take the crypto_alg_sem semaphore when traversing the
crypto_alg_list for CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG dumps. This allows a race with
crypto_unregister_alg() removing algorithms from the list while we're
still traversing it, thereby leading to a use-after-free as show below:

[ 3482.071639] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 3482.075639] Modules linked in: aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw ablk_helper cryptd gf128mul ipv6 pcspkr serio_raw virtio_net microcode virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio sr_mod cdrom [last unloaded: aesni_intel]
[ 3482.075639] CPU: 1 PID: 11065 Comm: crconf Not tainted 4.3.4-grsec+ #126
[ 3482.075639] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 3482.075639] task: ffff88001cd41a40 ti: ffff88001cd422c8 task.ti: ffff88001cd422c8
[ 3482.075639] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff93722bd3&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff93722bd3&gt;] strncpy+0x13/0x30
[ 3482.075639] RSP: 0018:ffff88001f713b60  EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 3482.075639] RAX: ffff88001f6c4430 RBX: ffff88001f6c43a0 RCX: ffff88001f6c4430
[ 3482.075639] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: fefefefefefeff16 RDI: ffff88001f6c4430
[ 3482.075639] RBP: ffff88001f713b60 R08: ffff88001f6c4470 R09: ffff88001f6c4480
[ 3482.075639] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff88001ce2aa28
[ 3482.075639] R13: ffff880000093700 R14: ffff88001f5e4bf8 R15: 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639] FS:  0000033826fa2700(0000) GS:ffff88001e900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3482.075639] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3482.075639] CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000139ec000 CR4: 00000000001606f0
[ 3482.075639] Stack:
[ 3482.075639]  ffff88001f713bd8 ffffffff936ccd00 ffff88001e5c4200 ffff880000093700
[ 3482.075639]  ffff88001f713bd0 ffffffff938ef4bf 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639]  ffff88001f5e4bf8 ffff88001f5e4848 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639] Call Trace:
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936ccd00&gt;] crypto_report_alg+0xc0/0x3e0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff938ef4bf&gt;] ? __alloc_skb+0x16f/0x300
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cd08a&gt;] crypto_dump_report+0x6a/0x90
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93935707&gt;] netlink_dump+0x147/0x2e0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93935f99&gt;] __netlink_dump_start+0x159/0x190
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936ccb13&gt;] crypto_user_rcv_msg+0xc3/0x130
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cd020&gt;] ? crypto_report_alg+0x3e0/0x3e0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cc4b0&gt;] ? alg_test_crc32c+0x120/0x120
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93933145&gt;] ? __netlink_lookup+0xd5/0x120
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cca50&gt;] ? crypto_add_alg+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93938141&gt;] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe1/0x130
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cc4f8&gt;] crypto_netlink_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff939375a8&gt;] netlink_unicast+0x108/0x180
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93937c21&gt;] netlink_sendmsg+0x541/0x770
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff938e31e1&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x21/0x40
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff938e4763&gt;] SyS_sendto+0xf3/0x130
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93444203&gt;] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x13/0x20
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93444470&gt;] ? __do_page_fault+0x80/0x3a0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff939d80cb&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6e
[ 3482.075639] Code: 88 4a ff 75 ed 5d 48 0f ba 2c 24 3f c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 85 d2 48 89 f8 48 89 f9 4c 8d 04 17 48 89 e5 74 15 &lt;0f&gt; b6 16 80 fa 01 88 11 48 83 de ff 48 83 c1 01 4c 39 c1 75 eb
[ 3482.075639] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff93722bd3&gt;] strncpy+0x13/0x30

To trigger the race run the following loops simultaneously for a while:
  $ while : ; do modprobe aesni-intel; rmmod aesni-intel; done
  $ while : ; do crconf show all &gt; /dev/null; done

Fix the race by taking the crypto_alg_sem read lock, thereby preventing
crypto_unregister_alg() from modifying the algorithm list during the
dump.

This bug has been detected by the PaX memory sanitize feature.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: PaX Team &lt;pageexec@freemail.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 63e41ebc6630f39422d87f8a4bade1e793f37a01 upstream.

We miss to take the crypto_alg_sem semaphore when traversing the
crypto_alg_list for CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG dumps. This allows a race with
crypto_unregister_alg() removing algorithms from the list while we're
still traversing it, thereby leading to a use-after-free as show below:

[ 3482.071639] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 3482.075639] Modules linked in: aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw ablk_helper cryptd gf128mul ipv6 pcspkr serio_raw virtio_net microcode virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio sr_mod cdrom [last unloaded: aesni_intel]
[ 3482.075639] CPU: 1 PID: 11065 Comm: crconf Not tainted 4.3.4-grsec+ #126
[ 3482.075639] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 3482.075639] task: ffff88001cd41a40 ti: ffff88001cd422c8 task.ti: ffff88001cd422c8
[ 3482.075639] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff93722bd3&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff93722bd3&gt;] strncpy+0x13/0x30
[ 3482.075639] RSP: 0018:ffff88001f713b60  EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 3482.075639] RAX: ffff88001f6c4430 RBX: ffff88001f6c43a0 RCX: ffff88001f6c4430
[ 3482.075639] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: fefefefefefeff16 RDI: ffff88001f6c4430
[ 3482.075639] RBP: ffff88001f713b60 R08: ffff88001f6c4470 R09: ffff88001f6c4480
[ 3482.075639] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff88001ce2aa28
[ 3482.075639] R13: ffff880000093700 R14: ffff88001f5e4bf8 R15: 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639] FS:  0000033826fa2700(0000) GS:ffff88001e900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3482.075639] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3482.075639] CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000139ec000 CR4: 00000000001606f0
[ 3482.075639] Stack:
[ 3482.075639]  ffff88001f713bd8 ffffffff936ccd00 ffff88001e5c4200 ffff880000093700
[ 3482.075639]  ffff88001f713bd0 ffffffff938ef4bf 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639]  ffff88001f5e4bf8 ffff88001f5e4848 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639] Call Trace:
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936ccd00&gt;] crypto_report_alg+0xc0/0x3e0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff938ef4bf&gt;] ? __alloc_skb+0x16f/0x300
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cd08a&gt;] crypto_dump_report+0x6a/0x90
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93935707&gt;] netlink_dump+0x147/0x2e0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93935f99&gt;] __netlink_dump_start+0x159/0x190
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936ccb13&gt;] crypto_user_rcv_msg+0xc3/0x130
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cd020&gt;] ? crypto_report_alg+0x3e0/0x3e0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cc4b0&gt;] ? alg_test_crc32c+0x120/0x120
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93933145&gt;] ? __netlink_lookup+0xd5/0x120
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cca50&gt;] ? crypto_add_alg+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93938141&gt;] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe1/0x130
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff936cc4f8&gt;] crypto_netlink_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff939375a8&gt;] netlink_unicast+0x108/0x180
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93937c21&gt;] netlink_sendmsg+0x541/0x770
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff938e31e1&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x21/0x40
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff938e4763&gt;] SyS_sendto+0xf3/0x130
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93444203&gt;] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x13/0x20
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff93444470&gt;] ? __do_page_fault+0x80/0x3a0
[ 3482.075639]  [&lt;ffffffff939d80cb&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6e
[ 3482.075639] Code: 88 4a ff 75 ed 5d 48 0f ba 2c 24 3f c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 85 d2 48 89 f8 48 89 f9 4c 8d 04 17 48 89 e5 74 15 &lt;0f&gt; b6 16 80 fa 01 88 11 48 83 de ff 48 83 c1 01 4c 39 c1 75 eb
[ 3482.075639] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff93722bd3&gt;] strncpy+0x13/0x30

To trigger the race run the following loops simultaneously for a while:
  $ while : ; do modprobe aesni-intel; rmmod aesni-intel; done
  $ while : ; do crconf show all &gt; /dev/null; done

Fix the race by taking the crypto_alg_sem read lock, thereby preventing
crypto_unregister_alg() from modifying the algorithm list during the
dump.

This bug has been detected by the PaX memory sanitize feature.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: PaX Team &lt;pageexec@freemail.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algif_hash - wait for crypto_ahash_init() to complete</title>
<updated>2016-02-19T22:22:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang, Rui Y</name>
<email>rui.y.wang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-27T09:08:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9250afa47650e39ee56511b86450dd11b3217c3a'/>
<id>9250afa47650e39ee56511b86450dd11b3217c3a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fe09786178f9df713a4b2dd6b93c0a722346bf5e upstream.

hash_sendmsg/sendpage() need to wait for the completion
of crypto_ahash_init() otherwise it can cause panic.

Signed-off-by: Rui Wang &lt;rui.y.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fe09786178f9df713a4b2dd6b93c0a722346bf5e upstream.

hash_sendmsg/sendpage() need to wait for the completion
of crypto_ahash_init() otherwise it can cause panic.

Signed-off-by: Rui Wang &lt;rui.y.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: af_alg - Fix socket double-free when accept fails</title>
<updated>2016-02-19T22:22:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-30T12:24:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f77597b2ef65757d6e24daf96eb58446dfb83491'/>
<id>f77597b2ef65757d6e24daf96eb58446dfb83491</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a383292c86663bbc31ac62cc0c04fc77504636a6 upstream.

When we fail an accept(2) call we will end up freeing the socket
twice, once due to the direct sk_free call and once again through
newsock.

This patch fixes this by removing the sk_free call.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a383292c86663bbc31ac62cc0c04fc77504636a6 upstream.

When we fail an accept(2) call we will end up freeing the socket
twice, once due to the direct sk_free call and once again through
newsock.

This patch fixes this by removing the sk_free call.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: af_alg - Disallow bind/setkey/... after accept(2)</title>
<updated>2016-02-19T22:22:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-30T03:47:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=5a707f0972e1c9d8a4a921ddae79d0f9dc36a341'/>
<id>5a707f0972e1c9d8a4a921ddae79d0f9dc36a341</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c840ac6af3f8713a71b4d2363419145760bd6044 upstream.

Each af_alg parent socket obtained by socket(2) corresponds to a
tfm object once bind(2) has succeeded.  An accept(2) call on that
parent socket creates a context which then uses the tfm object.

Therefore as long as any child sockets created by accept(2) exist
the parent socket must not be modified or freed.

This patch guarantees this by using locks and a reference count
on the parent socket.  Any attempt to modify the parent socket will
fail with EBUSY.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c840ac6af3f8713a71b4d2363419145760bd6044 upstream.

Each af_alg parent socket obtained by socket(2) corresponds to a
tfm object once bind(2) has succeeded.  An accept(2) call on that
parent socket creates a context which then uses the tfm object.

Therefore as long as any child sockets created by accept(2) exist
the parent socket must not be modified or freed.

This patch guarantees this by using locks and a reference count
on the parent socket.  Any attempt to modify the parent socket will
fail with EBUSY.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with data</title>
<updated>2016-02-19T22:22:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-01T09:11:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=daaf3fd914414d67fd656a39c0f1575c07f02985'/>
<id>daaf3fd914414d67fd656a39c0f1575c07f02985</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4afa5f9617927453ac04b24b584f6c718dfb4f45 upstream.

The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received
any data.  For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes.

This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on
sockets that have received data.

Reported-by: Harsh Jain &lt;harshjain.prof@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4afa5f9617927453ac04b24b584f6c718dfb4f45 upstream.

The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received
any data.  For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes.

This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on
sockets that have received data.

Reported-by: Harsh Jain &lt;harshjain.prof@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Only abort operations on fatal signal</title>
<updated>2015-11-09T18:12:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-19T10:23:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=3f933c5504a19c782b5833037f908e0b38dbc9ae'/>
<id>3f933c5504a19c782b5833037f908e0b38dbc9ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3fc89adb9fa4beff31374a4bf50b3d099d88ae83 upstream.

Currently a number of Crypto API operations may fail when a signal
occurs.  This causes nasty problems as the caller of those operations
are often not in a good position to restart the operation.

In fact there is currently no need for those operations to be
interrupted by user signals at all.  All we need is for them to
be killable.

This patch replaces the relevant calls of signal_pending with
fatal_signal_pending, and wait_for_completion_interruptible with
wait_for_completion_killable, respectively.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3fc89adb9fa4beff31374a4bf50b3d099d88ae83 upstream.

Currently a number of Crypto API operations may fail when a signal
occurs.  This causes nasty problems as the caller of those operations
are often not in a good position to restart the operation.

In fact there is currently no need for those operations to be
interrupted by user signals at all.  All we need is for them to
be killable.

This patch replaces the relevant calls of signal_pending with
fatal_signal_pending, and wait_for_completion_interruptible with
wait_for_completion_killable, respectively.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ahash - ensure statesize is non-zero</title>
<updated>2015-10-27T00:44:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-09T19:43:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2aafe811b0d734f1dc743ce23bc9bec94dec26cb'/>
<id>2aafe811b0d734f1dc743ce23bc9bec94dec26cb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8996eafdcbad149ac0f772fb1649fbb75c482a6a upstream.

Unlike shash algorithms, ahash drivers must implement export
and import as their descriptors may contain hardware state and
cannot be exported as is.  Unfortunately some ahash drivers did
not provide them and end up causing crashes with algif_hash.

This patch adds a check to prevent these drivers from registering
ahash algorithms until they are fixed.

Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8996eafdcbad149ac0f772fb1649fbb75c482a6a upstream.

Unlike shash algorithms, ahash drivers must implement export
and import as their descriptors may contain hardware state and
cannot be exported as is.  Unfortunately some ahash drivers did
not provide them and end up causing crashes with algif_hash.

This patch adds a check to prevent these drivers from registering
ahash algorithms until they are fixed.

Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: crc32c - add missing crypto module alias</title>
<updated>2015-02-11T06:48:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-10T00:14:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=967d2ebb7c8d8a3903fc7da303390178a63bb2af'/>
<id>967d2ebb7c8d8a3903fc7da303390178a63bb2af</id>
<content type='text'>
The backport of commit 5d26a105b5a7 ("crypto: prefix module autoloading
with "crypto-"") lost the MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO() annotation of crc32c.c.
Add it to fix the reported filesystem related regressions.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Philip Müller &lt;philm@manjaro.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Rob McCathie &lt;rob@manjaro.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kamal Mostafa &lt;kamal@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The backport of commit 5d26a105b5a7 ("crypto: prefix module autoloading
with "crypto-"") lost the MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO() annotation of crc32c.c.
Add it to fix the reported filesystem related regressions.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Philip Müller &lt;philm@manjaro.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Rob McCathie &lt;rob@manjaro.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kamal Mostafa &lt;kamal@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: add missing crypto module aliases</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-11T17:17:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a659ea97f77630a07aa9d6a64d4d2b56e6949371'/>
<id>a659ea97f77630a07aa9d6a64d4d2b56e6949371</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e14dcf7cb80b34a1f38b55bc96f02d23fdaaaaf upstream.

Commit 5d26a105b5a7 ("crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"")
changed the automatic module loading when requesting crypto algorithms
to prefix all module requests with "crypto-". This requires all crypto
modules to have a crypto specific module alias even if their file name
would otherwise match the requested crypto algorithm.

Even though commit 5d26a105b5a7 added those aliases for a vast amount of
modules, it was missing a few. Add the required MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO
annotations to those files to make them get loaded automatically, again.
This fixes, e.g., requesting 'ecb(blowfish-generic)', which used to work
with kernels v3.18 and below.

Also change MODULE_ALIAS() lines to MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO(). The former
won't work for crypto modules any more.

Fixes: 5d26a105b5a7 ("crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"")
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3e14dcf7cb80b34a1f38b55bc96f02d23fdaaaaf upstream.

Commit 5d26a105b5a7 ("crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"")
changed the automatic module loading when requesting crypto algorithms
to prefix all module requests with "crypto-". This requires all crypto
modules to have a crypto specific module alias even if their file name
would otherwise match the requested crypto algorithm.

Even though commit 5d26a105b5a7 added those aliases for a vast amount of
modules, it was missing a few. Add the required MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO
annotations to those files to make them get loaded automatically, again.
This fixes, e.g., requesting 'ecb(blowfish-generic)', which used to work
with kernels v3.18 and below.

Also change MODULE_ALIAS() lines to MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO(). The former
won't work for crypto modules any more.

Fixes: 5d26a105b5a7 ("crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"")
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-25T00:32:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f2175543cf0d029fe789850499d903c8e3f0d24b'/>
<id>f2175543cf0d029fe789850499d903c8e3f0d24b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560 upstream.

This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.

For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":

	net-pf-38
	algif-hash
	crypto-vfat(blowfish)
	crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
	crypto-vfat

Reported-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560 upstream.

This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.

For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":

	net-pf-38
	algif-hash
	crypto-vfat(blowfish)
	crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
	crypto-vfat

Reported-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
