<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/crypto, branch v3.16.74</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: salsa20 - don't access already-freed walk.iv</title>
<updated>2019-09-23T20:11:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-10T06:46:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=db8028988b418caecb05cd63d1ef43d8133b4bd4'/>
<id>db8028988b418caecb05cd63d1ef43d8133b4bd4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit edaf28e996af69222b2cb40455dbb5459c2b875a upstream.

If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv.  But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.

salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv.  However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f73 ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").

Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req-&gt;iv instead of walk.iv.

Fixes: 2407d60872dd ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit edaf28e996af69222b2cb40455dbb5459c2b875a upstream.

If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv.  But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.

salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv.  However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f73 ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").

Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req-&gt;iv instead of walk.iv.

Fixes: 2407d60872dd ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: crct10dif-generic - fix use via crypto_shash_digest()</title>
<updated>2019-09-23T20:11:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-31T20:04:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=00c649ff2e87add15d293ca6c52180b215b8a4bd'/>
<id>00c649ff2e87add15d293ca6c52180b215b8a4bd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 307508d1072979f4435416f87936f87eaeb82054 upstream.

The -&gt;digest() method of crct10dif-generic reads the current CRC value
from the shash_desc context.  But this value is uninitialized, causing
crypto_shash_digest() to compute the wrong result.  Fix it.

Probably this wasn't noticed before because lib/crc-t10dif.c only uses
crypto_shash_update(), not crypto_shash_digest().  Likewise,
crypto_shash_digest() is not yet tested by the crypto self-tests because
those only test the ahash API which only uses shash init/update/final.

This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.

Fixes: 2d31e518a428 ("crypto: crct10dif - Wrap crc_t10dif function all to use crypto transform framework")
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 307508d1072979f4435416f87936f87eaeb82054 upstream.

The -&gt;digest() method of crct10dif-generic reads the current CRC value
from the shash_desc context.  But this value is uninitialized, causing
crypto_shash_digest() to compute the wrong result.  Fix it.

Probably this wasn't noticed before because lib/crc-t10dif.c only uses
crypto_shash_update(), not crypto_shash_digest().  Likewise,
crypto_shash_digest() is not yet tested by the crypto self-tests because
those only test the ahash API which only uses shash init/update/final.

This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.

Fixes: 2d31e518a428 ("crypto: crct10dif - Wrap crc_t10dif function all to use crypto transform framework")
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ahash - fix another early termination in hash walk</title>
<updated>2019-07-09T21:03:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-01T07:51:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d1bc1078ee8a282b3902ceef35484d8c3b01d4a0'/>
<id>d1bc1078ee8a282b3902ceef35484d8c3b01d4a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77568e535af7c4f97eaef1e555bf0af83772456c upstream.

Hash algorithms with an alignmask set, e.g. "xcbc(aes-aesni)" and
"michael_mic", fail the improved hash tests because they sometimes
produce the wrong digest.  The bug is that in the case where a
scatterlist element crosses pages, not all the data is actually hashed
because the scatterlist walk terminates too early.  This happens because
the 'nbytes' variable in crypto_hash_walk_done() is assigned the number
of bytes remaining in the page, then later interpreted as the number of
bytes remaining in the scatterlist element.  Fix it.

Fixes: 900a081f6912 ("crypto: ahash - Fix early termination in hash walk")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 77568e535af7c4f97eaef1e555bf0af83772456c upstream.

Hash algorithms with an alignmask set, e.g. "xcbc(aes-aesni)" and
"michael_mic", fail the improved hash tests because they sometimes
produce the wrong digest.  The bug is that in the case where a
scatterlist element crosses pages, not all the data is actually hashed
because the scatterlist walk terminates too early.  This happens because
the 'nbytes' variable in crypto_hash_walk_done() is assigned the number
of bytes remaining in the page, then later interpreted as the number of
bytes remaining in the scatterlist element.  Fix it.

Fixes: 900a081f6912 ("crypto: ahash - Fix early termination in hash walk")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: testmgr - skip crc32c context test for ahash algorithms</title>
<updated>2019-07-09T21:03:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-24T04:57:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a67f0130ead5b5678c6b5be30b22cc37befbe15f'/>
<id>a67f0130ead5b5678c6b5be30b22cc37befbe15f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eb5e6730db98fcc4b51148b4a819fa4bf864ae54 upstream.

Instantiating "cryptd(crc32c)" causes a crypto self-test failure because
the crypto_alloc_shash() in alg_test_crc32c() fails.  This is because
cryptd(crc32c) is an ahash algorithm, not a shash algorithm; so it can
only be accessed through the ahash API, unlike shash algorithms which
can be accessed through both the ahash and shash APIs.

As the test is testing the shash descriptor format which is only
applicable to shash algorithms, skip it for ahash algorithms.

(Note that it's still important to fix crypto self-test failures even
 for weird algorithm instantiations like cryptd(crc32c) that no one
 would really use; in fips_enabled mode unprivileged users can use them
 to panic the kernel, and also they prevent treating a crypto self-test
 failure as a bug when fuzzing the kernel.)

Fixes: 8e3ee85e68c5 ("crypto: crc32c - Test descriptor context format")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eb5e6730db98fcc4b51148b4a819fa4bf864ae54 upstream.

Instantiating "cryptd(crc32c)" causes a crypto self-test failure because
the crypto_alloc_shash() in alg_test_crc32c() fails.  This is because
cryptd(crc32c) is an ahash algorithm, not a shash algorithm; so it can
only be accessed through the ahash API, unlike shash algorithms which
can be accessed through both the ahash and shash APIs.

As the test is testing the shash descriptor format which is only
applicable to shash algorithms, skip it for ahash algorithms.

(Note that it's still important to fix crypto self-test failures even
 for weird algorithm instantiations like cryptd(crc32c) that no one
 would really use; in fips_enabled mode unprivileged users can use them
 to panic the kernel, and also they prevent treating a crypto self-test
 failure as a bug when fuzzing the kernel.)

Fixes: 8e3ee85e68c5 ("crypto: crc32c - Test descriptor context format")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: tgr192 - fix unaligned memory access</title>
<updated>2019-07-09T21:03:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-10T20:17:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7eadb226baa9915d46e40d934e6e0ca788ca15f0'/>
<id>7eadb226baa9915d46e40d934e6e0ca788ca15f0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f990f7fb58ac8ac9a43316f09a48cff1a49dda42 upstream.

Fix an unaligned memory access in tgr192_transform() by using the
unaligned access helpers.

Fixes: 06ace7a9bafe ("[CRYPTO] Use standard byte order macros wherever possible")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f990f7fb58ac8ac9a43316f09a48cff1a49dda42 upstream.

Fix an unaligned memory access in tgr192_transform() by using the
unaligned access helpers.

Fixes: 06ace7a9bafe ("[CRYPTO] Use standard byte order macros wherever possible")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: hash - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if -&gt;setkey() fails</title>
<updated>2019-07-09T21:03:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-07T02:47:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9aa2d96df4fa4f3c875c580aff3bb4d31229003d'/>
<id>9aa2d96df4fa4f3c875c580aff3bb4d31229003d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894 upstream.

Some algorithms have a -&gt;setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context.  In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.

It's not feasible to make all -&gt;setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms.  Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if -&gt;setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a
key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.

Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so
-&gt;setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic.  That's fine for now
since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's
not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much.

[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
 AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
 previously didn't have this problem.  So these "incompletely keyed"
 states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
 opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]

Fixes: 9fa68f620041 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894 upstream.

Some algorithms have a -&gt;setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context.  In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.

It's not feasible to make all -&gt;setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms.  Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if -&gt;setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a
key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.

Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so
-&gt;setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic.  That's fine for now
since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's
not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much.

[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
 AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
 previously didn't have this problem.  So these "incompletely keyed"
 states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
 opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]

Fixes: 9fa68f620041 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: pcbc - remove bogus memcpy()s with src == dest</title>
<updated>2019-07-09T21:03:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-04T04:16:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ddc56620045e44327933d04f27457ebe916cf15d'/>
<id>ddc56620045e44327933d04f27457ebe916cf15d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 251b7aea34ba3c4d4fdfa9447695642eb8b8b098 upstream.

The memcpy()s in the PCBC implementation use walk-&gt;iv as both the source
and destination, which has undefined behavior.  These memcpy()'s are
actually unneeded, because walk-&gt;iv is already used to hold the previous
plaintext block XOR'd with the previous ciphertext block.  Thus,
walk-&gt;iv is already updated to its final value.

So remove the broken and unnecessary memcpy()s.

Fixes: 91652be5d1b9 ("[CRYPTO] pcbc: Add Propagated CBC template")
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 251b7aea34ba3c4d4fdfa9447695642eb8b8b098 upstream.

The memcpy()s in the PCBC implementation use walk-&gt;iv as both the source
and destination, which has undefined behavior.  These memcpy()'s are
actually unneeded, because walk-&gt;iv is already used to hold the previous
plaintext block XOR'd with the previous ciphertext block.  Thus,
walk-&gt;iv is already updated to its final value.

So remove the broken and unnecessary memcpy()s.

Fixes: 91652be5d1b9 ("[CRYPTO] pcbc: Add Propagated CBC template")
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - fix parsing key with misaligned rta_len</title>
<updated>2019-05-02T20:41:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-17T07:23:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ccd67cd15b3e3b2f3d1b03fd4336ea7ab5d35211'/>
<id>ccd67cd15b3e3b2f3d1b03fd4336ea7ab5d35211</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8f9c469348487844328e162db57112f7d347c49f upstream.

Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte
'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key.
crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.

However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends
before the next 4-byte aligned boundary.  In this case, 'keylen -=
RTA_ALIGN(rta-&gt;rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX.  This
causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().

Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.

Reproducer using AF_ALG:

	#include &lt;linux/if_alg.h&gt;
	#include &lt;linux/rtnetlink.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		int fd;
		struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
			.salg_type = "aead",
			.salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
		};
		struct {
			struct rtattr attr;
			__be32 enckeylen;
			char keys[1];
		} __attribute__((packed)) key = {
			.attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
			.attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
		};

		fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
		bind(fd, (void *)&amp;addr, sizeof(addr));
		setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &amp;key, sizeof(key));
	}

It caused:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
	PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0
	Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
	CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
	RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
	[...]
	Call Trace:
	 sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321
	 crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
	 shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186
	 crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202
	 hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66
	 crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66
	 shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223
	 crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202
	 crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96
	 crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62
	 aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526
	 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline]
	 alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256
	 __sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902
	 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
	 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
	 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910
	 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: e236d4a89a2f ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8f9c469348487844328e162db57112f7d347c49f upstream.

Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte
'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key.
crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.

However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends
before the next 4-byte aligned boundary.  In this case, 'keylen -=
RTA_ALIGN(rta-&gt;rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX.  This
causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().

Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.

Reproducer using AF_ALG:

	#include &lt;linux/if_alg.h&gt;
	#include &lt;linux/rtnetlink.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		int fd;
		struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
			.salg_type = "aead",
			.salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
		};
		struct {
			struct rtattr attr;
			__be32 enckeylen;
			char keys[1];
		} __attribute__((packed)) key = {
			.attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
			.attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
		};

		fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
		bind(fd, (void *)&amp;addr, sizeof(addr));
		setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &amp;key, sizeof(key));
	}

It caused:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
	PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0
	Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
	CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
	RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
	[...]
	Call Trace:
	 sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321
	 crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
	 shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186
	 crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202
	 hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66
	 crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66
	 shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223
	 crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202
	 crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96
	 crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62
	 aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526
	 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline]
	 alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256
	 __sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902
	 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
	 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
	 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910
	 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: e236d4a89a2f ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: user - support incremental algorithm dumps</title>
<updated>2019-04-04T15:13:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-06T23:55:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e6f592986433f9b3ef79ab5c2197b9badac370f4'/>
<id>e6f592986433f9b3ef79ab5c2197b9badac370f4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0ac6b8fb23c724b015d9ca70a89126e8d1563166 upstream.

CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG in NLM_F_DUMP mode sometimes doesn't return all
registered crypto algorithms, because it doesn't support incremental
dumps.  crypto_dump_report() only permits itself to be called once, yet
the netlink subsystem allocates at most ~64 KiB for the skb being dumped
to.  Thus only the first recvmsg() returns data, and it may only include
a subset of the crypto algorithms even if the user buffer passed to
recvmsg() is large enough to hold all of them.

Fix this by using one of the arguments in the netlink_callback structure
to keep track of the current position in the algorithm list.  Then
userspace can do multiple recvmsg() on the socket after sending the dump
request.  This is the way netlink dumps work elsewhere in the kernel;
it's unclear why this was different (probably just an oversight).

Also fix an integer overflow when calculating the dump buffer size hint.

Fixes: a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0ac6b8fb23c724b015d9ca70a89126e8d1563166 upstream.

CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG in NLM_F_DUMP mode sometimes doesn't return all
registered crypto algorithms, because it doesn't support incremental
dumps.  crypto_dump_report() only permits itself to be called once, yet
the netlink subsystem allocates at most ~64 KiB for the skb being dumped
to.  Thus only the first recvmsg() returns data, and it may only include
a subset of the crypto algorithms even if the user buffer passed to
recvmsg() is large enough to hold all of them.

Fix this by using one of the arguments in the netlink_callback structure
to keep track of the current position in the algorithm list.  Then
userspace can do multiple recvmsg() on the socket after sending the dump
request.  This is the way netlink dumps work elsewhere in the kernel;
it's unclear why this was different (probably just an oversight).

Also fix an integer overflow when calculating the dump buffer size hint.

Fixes: a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pcrypt: use format specifier in kobject_add</title>
<updated>2019-04-04T15:13:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-27T14:49:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8c9874721f886bb11464ba1d132a9cc0efe8536e'/>
<id>8c9874721f886bb11464ba1d132a9cc0efe8536e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b1e3874c75ab15288f573b3532e507c37e8e7656 upstream.

Passing string 'name' as the format specifier is potentially hazardous
because name could (although very unlikely to) have a format specifier
embedded in it causing issues when parsing the non-existent arguments
to these.  Follow best practice by using the "%s" format string for
the string 'name'.

Cleans up clang warning:
crypto/pcrypt.c:397:40: warning: format string is not a string literal
(potentially insecure) [-Wformat-security]

Fixes: a3fb1e330dd2 ("pcrypt: Added sysfs interface to pcrypt")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b1e3874c75ab15288f573b3532e507c37e8e7656 upstream.

Passing string 'name' as the format specifier is potentially hazardous
because name could (although very unlikely to) have a format specifier
embedded in it causing issues when parsing the non-existent arguments
to these.  Follow best practice by using the "%s" format string for
the string 'name'.

Cleans up clang warning:
crypto/pcrypt.c:397:40: warning: format string is not a string literal
(potentially insecure) [-Wformat-security]

Fixes: a3fb1e330dd2 ("pcrypt: Added sysfs interface to pcrypt")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
