<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/crypto, branch v4.13.13</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccm - preserve the IV buffer</title>
<updated>2017-11-15T09:09:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Romain Izard</name>
<email>romain.izard.pro@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-31T14:42:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7014c9e0d0a8176ffdaebaef47450ef1302cafd7'/>
<id>7014c9e0d0a8176ffdaebaef47450ef1302cafd7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 441f99c90497e15aa3ad1dbabd56187e29614348 upstream.

The IV buffer used during CCM operations is used twice, during both the
hashing step and the ciphering step.

When using a hardware accelerator that updates the contents of the IV
buffer at the end of ciphering operations, the value will be modified.
In the decryption case, the subsequent setup of the hashing algorithm
will interpret the updated IV instead of the original value, which can
lead to out-of-bounds writes.

Reuse the idata buffer, only used in the hashing step, to preserve the
IV's value during the ciphering step in the decryption case.

Signed-off-by: Romain Izard &lt;romain.izard.pro@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus &lt;tudor.ambarus@microchip.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 441f99c90497e15aa3ad1dbabd56187e29614348 upstream.

The IV buffer used during CCM operations is used twice, during both the
hashing step and the ciphering step.

When using a hardware accelerator that updates the contents of the IV
buffer at the end of ciphering operations, the value will be modified.
In the decryption case, the subsequent setup of the hashing algorithm
will interpret the updated IV instead of the original value, which can
lead to out-of-bounds writes.

Reuse the idata buffer, only used in the hashing step, to preserve the
IV's value during the ciphering step in the decryption case.

Signed-off-by: Romain Izard &lt;romain.izard.pro@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus &lt;tudor.ambarus@microchip.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pkcs7: Prevent NULL pointer dereference, since sinfo is not always set.</title>
<updated>2017-10-27T08:39:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Sesterhenn</name>
<email>eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-08T18:02:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7610595830bbec52079a40e8d3928f6261c02dcc'/>
<id>7610595830bbec52079a40e8d3928f6261c02dcc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 68a1fdbbf8bd3378325e45c19e167a165f9ffc3a upstream.

The ASN.1 parser does not necessarily set the sinfo field,
this patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference on broken
input.

Fixes: 99db44350672 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn &lt;eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 68a1fdbbf8bd3378325e45c19e167a165f9ffc3a upstream.

The ASN.1 parser does not necessarily set the sinfo field,
this patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference on broken
input.

Fixes: 99db44350672 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn &lt;eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: shash - Fix zero-length shash ahash digest crash</title>
<updated>2017-10-18T07:38:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-09T15:30:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=05f9b8bfea4fd91c76eac398f407a2bc0920e547'/>
<id>05f9b8bfea4fd91c76eac398f407a2bc0920e547</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b61907bb42409adf9b3120f741af7c57dd7e3db2 upstream.

The shash ahash digest adaptor function may crash if given a
zero-length input together with a null SG list.  This is because
it tries to read the SG list before looking at the length.

This patch fixes it by checking the length first.

Reported-by: Stephan Müller&lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b61907bb42409adf9b3120f741af7c57dd7e3db2 upstream.

The shash ahash digest adaptor function may crash if given a
zero-length input together with a null SG list.  This is because
it tries to read the SG list before looking at the length.

This patch fixes it by checking the length first.

Reported-by: Stephan Müller&lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Fix crash on zero-length input</title>
<updated>2017-10-18T07:38:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-07T03:29:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9ace51c5b4796927909be31e231fd7780c988382'/>
<id>9ace51c5b4796927909be31e231fd7780c988382</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0cabf2af6f5ac3c88cb106c4e06087a5a39b8e1e upstream.

The skcipher walk interface doesn't handle zero-length input
properly as the old blkcipher walk interface did.  This is due
to the fact that the length check is done too late.

This patch moves the length check forward so that it does the
right thing.

Fixes: b286d8b1a690 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk...")
Reported-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0cabf2af6f5ac3c88cb106c4e06087a5a39b8e1e upstream.

The skcipher walk interface doesn't handle zero-length input
properly as the old blkcipher walk interface did.  This is due
to the fact that the length check is done too late.

This patch moves the length check forward so that it does the
right thing.

Fixes: b286d8b1a690 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk...")
Reported-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: drbg - fix freeing of resources</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:47:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-14T15:10:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ccf363f3e786d8fa40dcf625c2b08d22cb8d669c'/>
<id>ccf363f3e786d8fa40dcf625c2b08d22cb8d669c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bd6227a150fdb56e7bb734976ef6e53a2c1cb334 upstream.

During the change to use aligned buffers, the deallocation code path was
not updated correctly. The current code tries to free the aligned buffer
pointer and not the original buffer pointer as it is supposed to.

Thus, the code is updated to free the original buffer pointer and set
the aligned buffer pointer that is used throughout the code to NULL.

Fixes: 3cfc3b9721123 ("crypto: drbg - use aligned buffers")
CC: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bd6227a150fdb56e7bb734976ef6e53a2c1cb334 upstream.

During the change to use aligned buffers, the deallocation code path was
not updated correctly. The current code tries to free the aligned buffer
pointer and not the original buffer pointer as it is supposed to.

Thus, the code is updated to free the original buffer pointer and set
the aligned buffer pointer that is used throughout the code to NULL.

Fixes: 3cfc3b9721123 ("crypto: drbg - use aligned buffers")
CC: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: AF_ALG - remove SGL terminator indicator when chaining</title>
<updated>2017-09-27T12:43:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-21T08:16:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1e1dfb8b19fd405f6dd05fedf5c9622c64410d8d'/>
<id>1e1dfb8b19fd405f6dd05fedf5c9622c64410d8d</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixed differently upstream as commit 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code")

The SGL is MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1 in size. The last SG entry is used for the
chaining and is properly updated with the sg_chain invocation. During
the filling-in of the initial SG entries, sg_mark_end is called for each
SG entry. This is appropriate as long as no additional SGL is chained
with the current SGL. However, when a new SGL is chained and the last
SG entry is updated with sg_chain, the last but one entry still contains
the end marker from the sg_mark_end. This end marker must be removed as
otherwise a walk of the chained SGLs will cause a NULL pointer
dereference at the last but one SG entry, because sg_next will return
NULL.

The patch only applies to all kernels up to and including 4.13. The
patch 2d97591ef43d0587be22ad1b0d758d6df4999a0b added to 4.14-rc1
introduced a complete new code base which addresses this bug in
a different way. Yet, that patch is too invasive for stable kernels
and was therefore not marked for stable.

Fixes: 8ff590903d5fc ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations")
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fixed differently upstream as commit 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code")

The SGL is MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1 in size. The last SG entry is used for the
chaining and is properly updated with the sg_chain invocation. During
the filling-in of the initial SG entries, sg_mark_end is called for each
SG entry. This is appropriate as long as no additional SGL is chained
with the current SGL. However, when a new SGL is chained and the last
SG entry is updated with sg_chain, the last but one entry still contains
the end marker from the sg_mark_end. This end marker must be removed as
otherwise a walk of the chained SGLs will cause a NULL pointer
dereference at the last but one SG entry, because sg_next will return
NULL.

The patch only applies to all kernels up to and including 4.13. The
patch 2d97591ef43d0587be22ad1b0d758d6df4999a0b added to 4.14-rc1
introduced a complete new code base which addresses this bug in
a different way. Yet, that patch is too invasive for stable kernels
and was therefore not marked for stable.

Fixes: 8ff590903d5fc ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations")
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: scompress - don't sleep with preemption disabled</title>
<updated>2017-09-27T12:43:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-21T15:42:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2b72d8231e5fe355a85e51f522bbf0227106731f'/>
<id>2b72d8231e5fe355a85e51f522bbf0227106731f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3c08377262880afc1621ab9cb6dbe7df47a6033d upstream.

Due to the use of per-CPU buffers, scomp_acomp_comp_decomp() executes
with preemption disabled, and so whether the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
flag is set is irrelevant, since we cannot sleep anyway. So disregard
the flag, and use GFP_ATOMIC unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3c08377262880afc1621ab9cb6dbe7df47a6033d upstream.

Due to the use of per-CPU buffers, scomp_acomp_comp_decomp() executes
with preemption disabled, and so whether the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
flag is set is irrelevant, since we cannot sleep anyway. So disregard
the flag, and use GFP_ATOMIC unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algif_skcipher - only call put_page on referenced and used pages</title>
<updated>2017-08-22T06:45:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-16T09:56:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=445a582738de6802669aeed9c33ca406c23c3b1f'/>
<id>445a582738de6802669aeed9c33ca406c23c3b1f</id>
<content type='text'>
For asynchronous operation, SGs are allocated without a page mapped to
them or with a page that is not used (ref-counted). If the SGL is freed,
the code must only call put_page for an SG if there was a page assigned
and ref-counted in the first place.

This fixes a kernel crash when using io_submit with more than one iocb
using the sendmsg and sendpage (vmsplice/splice) interface.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For asynchronous operation, SGs are allocated without a page mapped to
them or with a page that is not used (ref-counted). If the SGL is freed,
the code must only call put_page for an SG if there was a page assigned
and ref-counted in the first place.

This fixes a kernel crash when using io_submit with more than one iocb
using the sendmsg and sendpage (vmsplice/splice) interface.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: testmgr - add chunked test cases for chacha20</title>
<updated>2017-08-22T06:45:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-14T13:28:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=549f64153c354e69fc19534f7d7e867de1992f95'/>
<id>549f64153c354e69fc19534f7d7e867de1992f95</id>
<content type='text'>
We failed to catch a bug in the chacha20 code after porting it to the
skcipher API. We would have caught it if any chunked tests had been
defined, so define some now so we will catch future regressions.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We failed to catch a bug in the chacha20 code after porting it to the
skcipher API. We would have caught it if any chunked tests had been
defined, so define some now so we will catch future regressions.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: chacha20 - fix handling of chunked input</title>
<updated>2017-08-22T06:45:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-14T13:28:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4de437265eaac18f880d827f8e105b10de9b87a3'/>
<id>4de437265eaac18f880d827f8e105b10de9b87a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 9ae433bc79f9 ("crypto: chacha20 - convert generic and x86 versions
to skcipher") ported the existing chacha20 code to use the new skcipher
API, and introduced a bug along the way. Unfortunately, the tcrypt tests
did not catch the error, and it was only found recently by Tobias.

Stefan kindly diagnosed the error, and proposed a fix which is similar
to the one below, with the exception that 'walk.stride' is used rather
than the hardcoded block size. This does not actually matter in this
case, but it's a better example of how to use the skcipher walk API.

Fixes: 9ae433bc79f9 ("crypto: chacha20 - convert generic and x86 ...")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.11+
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner &lt;tobias@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 9ae433bc79f9 ("crypto: chacha20 - convert generic and x86 versions
to skcipher") ported the existing chacha20 code to use the new skcipher
API, and introduced a bug along the way. Unfortunately, the tcrypt tests
did not catch the error, and it was only found recently by Tobias.

Stefan kindly diagnosed the error, and proposed a fix which is similar
to the one below, with the exception that 'walk.stride' is used rather
than the hardcoded block size. This does not actually matter in this
case, but it's a better example of how to use the skcipher walk API.

Fixes: 9ae433bc79f9 ("crypto: chacha20 - convert generic and x86 ...")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.11+
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner &lt;tobias@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
