<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/drivers/infiniband, branch v5.0.9</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>IB/hfi1: Failed to drain send queue when QP is put into error state</title>
<updated>2019-04-20T07:17:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kaike Wan</name>
<email>kaike.wan@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-18T16:55:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b59d92ac8a328d9b0212ba5fcd3318cdf8a69409'/>
<id>b59d92ac8a328d9b0212ba5fcd3318cdf8a69409</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 662d66466637862ef955f7f6e78a286d8cf0ebef upstream.

When a QP is put into error state, all pending requests in the send work
queue should be drained. The following sequence of events could lead to a
failure, causing a request to hang:

(1) The QP builds a packet and tries to send through SDMA engine.
    However, PIO engine is still busy. Consequently, this packet is put on
    the QP's tx list and the QP is put on the PIO waiting list. The field
    qp-&gt;s_flags is set with HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN;

(2) The QP is put into error state by the user application and
    notify_error_qp() is called, which removes the QP from the PIO waiting
    list and the packet from the QP's tx list. In addition, qp-&gt;s_flags is
    cleared of RVT_S_ANY_WAIT_IO bits, which does not include
    HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN bit;

(3) The hfi1_schdule_send() function is called to drain the QP's send
    queue. Subsequently, hfi1_do_send() is called. Since the flag bit
    HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN is set in qp-&gt;s_flags, hfi1_send_ok() fails.  As
    a result, hfi1_do_send() bails out without draining any request from
    the send queue;

(4) The PIO engine completes the sending and tries to wake up any QP on
    its waiting list. But the QP has been removed from the PIO waiting
    list and therefore is kept in sleep forever.

The fix is to clear qp-&gt;s_flags of HFI1_S_ANY_WAIT_IO bits in step (2).
HFI1_S_ANY_WAIT_IO includes RVT_S_ANY_WAIT_IO and HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN.

Fixes: 2e2ba09e48b7 ("IB/rdmavt, IB/hfi1: Create device dependent s_flags")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19.x+
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Estrin &lt;alex.estrin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kaike Wan &lt;kaike.wan@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 662d66466637862ef955f7f6e78a286d8cf0ebef upstream.

When a QP is put into error state, all pending requests in the send work
queue should be drained. The following sequence of events could lead to a
failure, causing a request to hang:

(1) The QP builds a packet and tries to send through SDMA engine.
    However, PIO engine is still busy. Consequently, this packet is put on
    the QP's tx list and the QP is put on the PIO waiting list. The field
    qp-&gt;s_flags is set with HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN;

(2) The QP is put into error state by the user application and
    notify_error_qp() is called, which removes the QP from the PIO waiting
    list and the packet from the QP's tx list. In addition, qp-&gt;s_flags is
    cleared of RVT_S_ANY_WAIT_IO bits, which does not include
    HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN bit;

(3) The hfi1_schdule_send() function is called to drain the QP's send
    queue. Subsequently, hfi1_do_send() is called. Since the flag bit
    HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN is set in qp-&gt;s_flags, hfi1_send_ok() fails.  As
    a result, hfi1_do_send() bails out without draining any request from
    the send queue;

(4) The PIO engine completes the sending and tries to wake up any QP on
    its waiting list. But the QP has been removed from the PIO waiting
    list and therefore is kept in sleep forever.

The fix is to clear qp-&gt;s_flags of HFI1_S_ANY_WAIT_IO bits in step (2).
HFI1_S_ANY_WAIT_IO includes RVT_S_ANY_WAIT_IO and HFI1_S_WAIT_PIO_DRAIN.

Fixes: 2e2ba09e48b7 ("IB/rdmavt, IB/hfi1: Create device dependent s_flags")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19.x+
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Estrin &lt;alex.estrin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kaike Wan &lt;kaike.wan@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/hns: Fix the Oops during rmmod or insmod ko when reset occurs</title>
<updated>2019-04-20T07:17:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Hu (Xavier)</name>
<email>xavier.huwei@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-03T12:43:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=cf56bb03ffa3f595b6f2a305acdd2ade23c49a42'/>
<id>cf56bb03ffa3f595b6f2a305acdd2ade23c49a42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d061effc36f7bd38a12912977a37a50ac9140d11 ]

In the reset process, the hns3 NIC driver notifies the RoCE driver to
perform reset related processing by calling the .reset_notify() interface
registered by the RoCE driver in hip08 SoC.

In the current version, if a reset occurs simultaneously during the
execution of rmmod or insmod ko, there may be Oops error as below:

 Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in: hns_roce(O) hns3(O) hclge(O) hnae3(O) [last unloaded: hns_roce_hw_v2]
 CPU: 0 PID: 14 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G           O      4.19.0-ge00d540 #1
 Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
 Workqueue: events hclge_reset_service_task [hclge]
 pstate: 60c00009 (nZCv daif +PAN +UAO)
 pc : 0xffff00000100b0b8
 lr : 0xffff00000100aea0
 sp : ffff000009afbab0
 x29: ffff000009afbab0 x28: 0000000000000800
 x27: 0000000000007ff0 x26: ffff80002f90c004
 x25: 00000000000007ff x24: ffff000008f97000
 x23: ffff80003efee0a8 x22: 0000000000001000
 x21: ffff80002f917ff0 x20: ffff8000286ea070
 x19: 0000000000000800 x18: 0000000000000400
 x17: 00000000c4d3225d x16: 00000000000021b8
 x15: 0000000000000400 x14: 0000000000000400
 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff80003fac6e30
 x11: 0000800036303000 x10: 0000000000000001
 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff80003016d000
 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
 x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000
 x3 : 0000000000000004 x2 : 00000000000007ff
 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Process kworker/0:1 (pid: 14, stack limit = 0x00000000af8f0ad9)
 Call trace:
  0xffff00000100b0b8
  0xffff00000100b3a0
  hns_roce_init+0x624/0xc88 [hns_roce]
  0xffff000001002df8
  0xffff000001006960
  hclge_notify_roce_client+0x74/0xe0 [hclge]
  hclge_reset_service_task+0xa58/0xbc0 [hclge]
  process_one_work+0x1e4/0x458
  worker_thread+0x40/0x450
  kthread+0x12c/0x130
  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
 Code: bad PC value

In the reset process, we will release the resources firstly, and after the
hardware reset is completed, we will reapply resources and reconfigure the
hardware.

We can solve this problem by modifying both the NIC and the RoCE
driver. We can modify the concurrent processing in the NIC driver to avoid
calling the .reset_notify and .uninit_instance ops at the same time. And
we need to modify the RoCE driver to record the reset stage and the
driver's init/uninit state, and check the state in the .reset_notify,
.init_instance. and uninit_instance functions to avoid NULL pointer
operation.

Fixes: cb7a94c9c808 ("RDMA/hns: Add reset process for RoCE in hip08")
Signed-off-by: Wei Hu (Xavier) &lt;xavier.huwei@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d061effc36f7bd38a12912977a37a50ac9140d11 ]

In the reset process, the hns3 NIC driver notifies the RoCE driver to
perform reset related processing by calling the .reset_notify() interface
registered by the RoCE driver in hip08 SoC.

In the current version, if a reset occurs simultaneously during the
execution of rmmod or insmod ko, there may be Oops error as below:

 Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in: hns_roce(O) hns3(O) hclge(O) hnae3(O) [last unloaded: hns_roce_hw_v2]
 CPU: 0 PID: 14 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G           O      4.19.0-ge00d540 #1
 Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
 Workqueue: events hclge_reset_service_task [hclge]
 pstate: 60c00009 (nZCv daif +PAN +UAO)
 pc : 0xffff00000100b0b8
 lr : 0xffff00000100aea0
 sp : ffff000009afbab0
 x29: ffff000009afbab0 x28: 0000000000000800
 x27: 0000000000007ff0 x26: ffff80002f90c004
 x25: 00000000000007ff x24: ffff000008f97000
 x23: ffff80003efee0a8 x22: 0000000000001000
 x21: ffff80002f917ff0 x20: ffff8000286ea070
 x19: 0000000000000800 x18: 0000000000000400
 x17: 00000000c4d3225d x16: 00000000000021b8
 x15: 0000000000000400 x14: 0000000000000400
 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff80003fac6e30
 x11: 0000800036303000 x10: 0000000000000001
 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff80003016d000
 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
 x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000
 x3 : 0000000000000004 x2 : 00000000000007ff
 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Process kworker/0:1 (pid: 14, stack limit = 0x00000000af8f0ad9)
 Call trace:
  0xffff00000100b0b8
  0xffff00000100b3a0
  hns_roce_init+0x624/0xc88 [hns_roce]
  0xffff000001002df8
  0xffff000001006960
  hclge_notify_roce_client+0x74/0xe0 [hclge]
  hclge_reset_service_task+0xa58/0xbc0 [hclge]
  process_one_work+0x1e4/0x458
  worker_thread+0x40/0x450
  kthread+0x12c/0x130
  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
 Code: bad PC value

In the reset process, we will release the resources firstly, and after the
hardware reset is completed, we will reapply resources and reconfigure the
hardware.

We can solve this problem by modifying both the NIC and the RoCE
driver. We can modify the concurrent processing in the NIC driver to avoid
calling the .reset_notify and .uninit_instance ops at the same time. And
we need to modify the RoCE driver to record the reset stage and the
driver's init/uninit state, and check the state in the .reset_notify,
.init_instance. and uninit_instance functions to avoid NULL pointer
operation.

Fixes: cb7a94c9c808 ("RDMA/hns: Add reset process for RoCE in hip08")
Signed-off-by: Wei Hu (Xavier) &lt;xavier.huwei@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>i40iw: Avoid panic when handling the inetdev event</title>
<updated>2019-04-20T07:16:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Feng Tang</name>
<email>feng.tang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-14T10:37:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e52431f7547cd3d208b270fdf845bdb54e051543'/>
<id>e52431f7547cd3d208b270fdf845bdb54e051543</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ec4fe4bcc584b55e24e8d1768f5510a62c0fd619 ]

There is a panic reported that on a system with x722 ethernet, when doing
the operations like:

	# ip link add br0 type bridge
	# ip link set eno1 master br0
	# systemctl restart systemd-networkd

The system will panic "BUG: unable to handle kernel null pointer
dereference at 0000000000000034", with call chain:

	i40iw_inetaddr_event
	notifier_call_chain
	blocking_notifier_call_chain
	notifier_call_chain
	__inet_del_ifa
	inet_rtm_deladdr
	rtnetlink_rcv_msg
	netlink_rcv_skb
	rtnetlink_rcv
	netlink_unicast
	netlink_sendmsg
	sock_sendmsg
	__sys_sendto

It is caused by "local_ipaddr = ntohl(in-&gt;ifa_list-&gt;ifa_address)", while
the in-&gt;ifa_list is NULL.

So add a check for the "in-&gt;ifa_list == NULL" case, and skip the ARP
operation accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ec4fe4bcc584b55e24e8d1768f5510a62c0fd619 ]

There is a panic reported that on a system with x722 ethernet, when doing
the operations like:

	# ip link add br0 type bridge
	# ip link set eno1 master br0
	# systemctl restart systemd-networkd

The system will panic "BUG: unable to handle kernel null pointer
dereference at 0000000000000034", with call chain:

	i40iw_inetaddr_event
	notifier_call_chain
	blocking_notifier_call_chain
	notifier_call_chain
	__inet_del_ifa
	inet_rtm_deladdr
	rtnetlink_rcv_msg
	netlink_rcv_skb
	rtnetlink_rcv
	netlink_unicast
	netlink_sendmsg
	sock_sendmsg
	__sys_sendto

It is caused by "local_ipaddr = ntohl(in-&gt;ifa_list-&gt;ifa_address)", while
the in-&gt;ifa_list is NULL.

So add a check for the "in-&gt;ifa_list == NULL" case, and skip the ARP
operation accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/mlx4: Fix race condition between catas error reset and aliasguid flows</title>
<updated>2019-04-20T07:16:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jack Morgenstein</name>
<email>jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-06T17:17:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=221b45319d05ce2be91aba36c398f3e2efde4591'/>
<id>221b45319d05ce2be91aba36c398f3e2efde4591</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 587443e7773e150ae29e643ee8f41a1eed226565 ]

Code review revealed a race condition which could allow the catas error
flow to interrupt the alias guid query post mechanism at random points.
Thiis is fixed by doing cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead of
cancel_delayed_work() during the alias guid mechanism destroy flow.

Fixes: a0c64a17aba8 ("mlx4: Add alias_guid mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 587443e7773e150ae29e643ee8f41a1eed226565 ]

Code review revealed a race condition which could allow the catas error
flow to interrupt the alias guid query post mechanism at random points.
Thiis is fixed by doing cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead of
cancel_delayed_work() during the alias guid mechanism destroy flow.

Fixes: a0c64a17aba8 ("mlx4: Add alias_guid mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/mlx5: Reset access mask when looping inside page fault handler</title>
<updated>2019-04-17T06:39:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Moni Shoua</name>
<email>monis@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-19T09:24:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e0e77b23a73d07d5cb9ad1ba970c420e7883e9d0'/>
<id>e0e77b23a73d07d5cb9ad1ba970c420e7883e9d0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1abe186ed8a6593069bc122da55fc684383fdc1c upstream.

If page-fault handler spans multiple MRs then the access mask needs to
be reset before each MR handling or otherwise write access will be
granted to mapped pages instead of read-only.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.19
Fixes: 7bdf65d411c1 ("IB/mlx5: Handle page faults")
Reported-by: Jerome Glisse &lt;jglisse@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua &lt;monis@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1abe186ed8a6593069bc122da55fc684383fdc1c upstream.

If page-fault handler spans multiple MRs then the access mask needs to
be reset before each MR handling or otherwise write access will be
granted to mapped pages instead of read-only.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.19
Fixes: 7bdf65d411c1 ("IB/mlx5: Handle page faults")
Reported-by: Jerome Glisse &lt;jglisse@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua &lt;monis@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iw_cxgb4: fix srqidx leak during connection abort</title>
<updated>2019-04-05T20:34:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Raju Rangoju</name>
<email>rajur@chelsio.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-06T17:24:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c230484a376754802038f8650b1d5c2951831bd1'/>
<id>c230484a376754802038f8650b1d5c2951831bd1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f368ff188ae4b3ef6f740a15999ea0373261b619 ]

When an application aborts the connection by moving QP from RTS to ERROR,
then iw_cxgb4's modify_rc_qp() RTS-&gt;ERROR logic sets the
*srqidxp to 0 via t4_set_wq_in_error(&amp;qhp-&gt;wq, 0), and aborts the
connection by calling c4iw_ep_disconnect().

c4iw_ep_disconnect() does the following:
 1. sends up a close_complete_upcall(ep, -ECONNRESET) to libcxgb4.
 2. sends abort request CPL to hw.

But, since the close_complete_upcall() is sent before sending the
ABORT_REQ to hw, libcxgb4 would fail to release the srqidx if the
connection holds one. Because, the srqidx is passed up to libcxgb4 only
after corresponding ABORT_RPL is processed by kernel in abort_rpl().

This patch handle the corner-case by moving the call to
close_complete_upcall() from c4iw_ep_disconnect() to abort_rpl().  So that
libcxgb4 is notified about the -ECONNRESET only after abort_rpl(), and
libcxgb4 can relinquish the srqidx properly.

Signed-off-by: Raju Rangoju &lt;rajur@chelsio.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f368ff188ae4b3ef6f740a15999ea0373261b619 ]

When an application aborts the connection by moving QP from RTS to ERROR,
then iw_cxgb4's modify_rc_qp() RTS-&gt;ERROR logic sets the
*srqidxp to 0 via t4_set_wq_in_error(&amp;qhp-&gt;wq, 0), and aborts the
connection by calling c4iw_ep_disconnect().

c4iw_ep_disconnect() does the following:
 1. sends up a close_complete_upcall(ep, -ECONNRESET) to libcxgb4.
 2. sends abort request CPL to hw.

But, since the close_complete_upcall() is sent before sending the
ABORT_REQ to hw, libcxgb4 would fail to release the srqidx if the
connection holds one. Because, the srqidx is passed up to libcxgb4 only
after corresponding ABORT_RPL is processed by kernel in abort_rpl().

This patch handle the corner-case by moving the call to
close_complete_upcall() from c4iw_ep_disconnect() to abort_rpl().  So that
libcxgb4 is notified about the -ECONNRESET only after abort_rpl(), and
libcxgb4 can relinquish the srqidx properly.

Signed-off-by: Raju Rangoju &lt;rajur@chelsio.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/mlx4: Increase the timeout for CM cache</title>
<updated>2019-04-05T20:34:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Håkon Bugge</name>
<email>haakon.bugge@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-17T14:45:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=869a72e08b8688f730e717d71d8d01869bca6e64'/>
<id>869a72e08b8688f730e717d71d8d01869bca6e64</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2612d723aadcf8281f9bf8305657129bd9f3cd57 ]

Using CX-3 virtual functions, either from a bare-metal machine or
pass-through from a VM, MAD packets are proxied through the PF driver.

Since the VF drivers have separate name spaces for MAD Transaction Ids
(TIDs), the PF driver has to re-map the TIDs and keep the book keeping
in a cache.

Following the RDMA Connection Manager (CM) protocol, it is clear when
an entry has to evicted form the cache. But life is not perfect,
remote peers may die or be rebooted. Hence, it's a timeout to wipe out
a cache entry, when the PF driver assumes the remote peer has gone.

During workloads where a high number of QPs are destroyed concurrently,
excessive amount of CM DREQ retries has been observed

The problem can be demonstrated in a bare-metal environment, where two
nodes have instantiated 8 VFs each. This using dual ported HCAs, so we
have 16 vPorts per physical server.

64 processes are associated with each vPort and creates and destroys
one QP for each of the remote 64 processes. That is, 1024 QPs per
vPort, all in all 16K QPs. The QPs are created/destroyed using the
CM.

When tearing down these 16K QPs, excessive CM DREQ retries (and
duplicates) are observed. With some cat/paste/awk wizardry on the
infiniband_cm sysfs, we observe as sum of the 16 vPorts on one of the
nodes:

cm_rx_duplicates:
      dreq  2102
cm_rx_msgs:
      drep  1989
      dreq  6195
       rep  3968
       req  4224
       rtu  4224
cm_tx_msgs:
      drep  4093
      dreq 27568
       rep  4224
       req  3968
       rtu  3968
cm_tx_retries:
      dreq 23469

Note that the active/passive side is equally distributed between the
two nodes.

Enabling pr_debug in cm.c gives tons of:

[171778.814239] &lt;mlx4_ib&gt; mlx4_ib_multiplex_cm_handler: id{slave:
1,sl_cm_id: 0xd393089f} is NULL!

By increasing the CM_CLEANUP_CACHE_TIMEOUT from 5 to 30 seconds, the
tear-down phase of the application is reduced from approximately 90 to
50 seconds. Retries/duplicates are also significantly reduced:

cm_rx_duplicates:
      dreq  2460
[]
cm_tx_retries:
      dreq  3010
       req    47

Increasing the timeout further didn't help, as these duplicates and
retries stems from a too short CMA timeout, which was 20 (~4 seconds)
on the systems. By increasing the CMA timeout to 22 (~17 seconds), the
numbers fell down to about 10 for both of them.

Adjustment of the CMA timeout is not part of this commit.

Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge &lt;haakon.bugge@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2612d723aadcf8281f9bf8305657129bd9f3cd57 ]

Using CX-3 virtual functions, either from a bare-metal machine or
pass-through from a VM, MAD packets are proxied through the PF driver.

Since the VF drivers have separate name spaces for MAD Transaction Ids
(TIDs), the PF driver has to re-map the TIDs and keep the book keeping
in a cache.

Following the RDMA Connection Manager (CM) protocol, it is clear when
an entry has to evicted form the cache. But life is not perfect,
remote peers may die or be rebooted. Hence, it's a timeout to wipe out
a cache entry, when the PF driver assumes the remote peer has gone.

During workloads where a high number of QPs are destroyed concurrently,
excessive amount of CM DREQ retries has been observed

The problem can be demonstrated in a bare-metal environment, where two
nodes have instantiated 8 VFs each. This using dual ported HCAs, so we
have 16 vPorts per physical server.

64 processes are associated with each vPort and creates and destroys
one QP for each of the remote 64 processes. That is, 1024 QPs per
vPort, all in all 16K QPs. The QPs are created/destroyed using the
CM.

When tearing down these 16K QPs, excessive CM DREQ retries (and
duplicates) are observed. With some cat/paste/awk wizardry on the
infiniband_cm sysfs, we observe as sum of the 16 vPorts on one of the
nodes:

cm_rx_duplicates:
      dreq  2102
cm_rx_msgs:
      drep  1989
      dreq  6195
       rep  3968
       req  4224
       rtu  4224
cm_tx_msgs:
      drep  4093
      dreq 27568
       rep  4224
       req  3968
       rtu  3968
cm_tx_retries:
      dreq 23469

Note that the active/passive side is equally distributed between the
two nodes.

Enabling pr_debug in cm.c gives tons of:

[171778.814239] &lt;mlx4_ib&gt; mlx4_ib_multiplex_cm_handler: id{slave:
1,sl_cm_id: 0xd393089f} is NULL!

By increasing the CM_CLEANUP_CACHE_TIMEOUT from 5 to 30 seconds, the
tear-down phase of the application is reduced from approximately 90 to
50 seconds. Retries/duplicates are also significantly reduced:

cm_rx_duplicates:
      dreq  2460
[]
cm_tx_retries:
      dreq  3010
       req    47

Increasing the timeout further didn't help, as these duplicates and
retries stems from a too short CMA timeout, which was 20 (~4 seconds)
on the systems. By increasing the CMA timeout to 22 (~17 seconds), the
numbers fell down to about 10 for both of them.

Adjustment of the CMA timeout is not part of this commit.

Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge &lt;haakon.bugge@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/cma: Rollback source IP address if failing to acquire device</title>
<updated>2019-03-27T05:17:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Myungho Jung</name>
<email>mhjungk@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-10T06:27:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=648562c0a9583ec4927c7d5eba5259fe7785d314'/>
<id>648562c0a9583ec4927c7d5eba5259fe7785d314</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5fc01fb846bce8fa6d5f95e2625b8ce0f8e86810 upstream.

If cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() returns error in addr_handler(), the
device state changes back to RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND but the resolved source
IP address is still left. After that, if rdma_destroy_id() is called
after rdma_listen(), the device is freed without removed from
listen_any_list in cma_cancel_operation(). Revert to the previous IP
address if acquiring device fails.

Reported-by: syzbot+f3ce716af730c8f96637@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung &lt;mhjungk@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5fc01fb846bce8fa6d5f95e2625b8ce0f8e86810 upstream.

If cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() returns error in addr_handler(), the
device state changes back to RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND but the resolved source
IP address is still left. After that, if rdma_destroy_id() is called
after rdma_listen(), the device is freed without removed from
listen_any_list in cma_cancel_operation(). Revert to the previous IP
address if acquiring device fails.

Reported-by: syzbot+f3ce716af730c8f96637@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung &lt;mhjungk@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/rdmavt: Fix concurrency panics in QP post_send and modify to error</title>
<updated>2019-03-23T19:11:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael J. Ruhl</name>
<email>michael.j.ruhl@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T16:45:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=25636de95557a95d54ac30be94af3748345a0a90'/>
<id>25636de95557a95d54ac30be94af3748345a0a90</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d757c60eca9b22f4d108929a24401e0fdecda0b1 upstream.

The RC/UC code path can go through a software loopback. In this code path
the receive side QP is manipulated.

If two threads are working on the QP receive side (i.e. post_send, and
modify_qp to an error state), QP information can be corrupted.

(post_send via loopback)
  set r_sge
  loop
     update r_sge
(modify_qp)
     take r_lock
     update r_sge &lt;---- r_sge is now incorrect
(post_send)
     update r_sge &lt;---- crash, etc.
     ...

This can lead to one of the two following crashes:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
  IP:  hfi1_copy_sge+0xf1/0x2e0 [hfi1]
  PGD 8000001fe6a57067 PUD 1fd9e0c067 PMD 0
 Call Trace:
  ruc_loopback+0x49b/0xbc0 [hfi1]
  hfi1_do_send+0x38e/0x3e0 [hfi1]
  _hfi1_do_send+0x1e/0x20 [hfi1]
  process_one_work+0x17f/0x440
  worker_thread+0x126/0x3c0
  kthread+0xd1/0xe0
  ret_from_fork_nospec_begin+0x21/0x21

or:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048
  IP:  rvt_clear_mr_refs+0x45/0x370 [rdmavt]
  PGD 80000006ae5eb067 PUD ef15d0067 PMD 0
 Call Trace:
  rvt_error_qp+0xaa/0x240 [rdmavt]
  rvt_modify_qp+0x47f/0xaa0 [rdmavt]
  ib_security_modify_qp+0x8f/0x400 [ib_core]
  ib_modify_qp_with_udata+0x44/0x70 [ib_core]
  modify_qp.isra.23+0x1eb/0x2b0 [ib_uverbs]
  ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xaa/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
  ib_uverbs_write+0x272/0x430 [ib_uverbs]
  vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
  SyS_write+0x7f/0xf0
  system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21

Fix by using the appropriate locking on the receiving QP.

Fixes: 15703461533a ("IB/{hfi1, qib, rdmavt}: Move ruc_loopback to rdmavt")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; #v4.9+
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d757c60eca9b22f4d108929a24401e0fdecda0b1 upstream.

The RC/UC code path can go through a software loopback. In this code path
the receive side QP is manipulated.

If two threads are working on the QP receive side (i.e. post_send, and
modify_qp to an error state), QP information can be corrupted.

(post_send via loopback)
  set r_sge
  loop
     update r_sge
(modify_qp)
     take r_lock
     update r_sge &lt;---- r_sge is now incorrect
(post_send)
     update r_sge &lt;---- crash, etc.
     ...

This can lead to one of the two following crashes:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
  IP:  hfi1_copy_sge+0xf1/0x2e0 [hfi1]
  PGD 8000001fe6a57067 PUD 1fd9e0c067 PMD 0
 Call Trace:
  ruc_loopback+0x49b/0xbc0 [hfi1]
  hfi1_do_send+0x38e/0x3e0 [hfi1]
  _hfi1_do_send+0x1e/0x20 [hfi1]
  process_one_work+0x17f/0x440
  worker_thread+0x126/0x3c0
  kthread+0xd1/0xe0
  ret_from_fork_nospec_begin+0x21/0x21

or:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048
  IP:  rvt_clear_mr_refs+0x45/0x370 [rdmavt]
  PGD 80000006ae5eb067 PUD ef15d0067 PMD 0
 Call Trace:
  rvt_error_qp+0xaa/0x240 [rdmavt]
  rvt_modify_qp+0x47f/0xaa0 [rdmavt]
  ib_security_modify_qp+0x8f/0x400 [ib_core]
  ib_modify_qp_with_udata+0x44/0x70 [ib_core]
  modify_qp.isra.23+0x1eb/0x2b0 [ib_uverbs]
  ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xaa/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
  ib_uverbs_write+0x272/0x430 [ib_uverbs]
  vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
  SyS_write+0x7f/0xf0
  system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21

Fix by using the appropriate locking on the receiving QP.

Fixes: 15703461533a ("IB/{hfi1, qib, rdmavt}: Move ruc_loopback to rdmavt")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; #v4.9+
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/rdmavt: Fix loopback send with invalidate ordering</title>
<updated>2019-03-23T19:11:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Marciniszyn</name>
<email>mike.marciniszyn@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T16:45:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ada60723d7cd01d811d20144db50da96e633e8c2'/>
<id>ada60723d7cd01d811d20144db50da96e633e8c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 38bbc9f0381550d1d227fc57afa08436e36b32fc upstream.

The IBTA spec notes:

o9-5.2.1: For any HCA which supports SEND with Invalidate, upon receiving
an IETH, the Invalidate operation must not take place until after the
normal transport header validation checks have been successfully
completed.

The rdmavt loopback code does the validation after the invalidate.

Fix by relocating the operation specific logic for all SEND variants until
after the validity checks.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; #v4.20+
Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 38bbc9f0381550d1d227fc57afa08436e36b32fc upstream.

The IBTA spec notes:

o9-5.2.1: For any HCA which supports SEND with Invalidate, upon receiving
an IETH, the Invalidate operation must not take place until after the
normal transport header validation checks have been successfully
completed.

The rdmavt loopback code does the validation after the invalidate.

Fix by relocating the operation specific logic for all SEND variants until
after the validity checks.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; #v4.20+
Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
