commit edeb304f659792fb5bab90d7d6f3408b4c7301fb upstream.

Within cxl module, iteration over array 'adapter->afu' may be racy
at few points as it might be simultaneously read during an EEH and its
contents being set to NULL while driver is being unloaded or unbound
from the adapter. This might result in a NULL pointer to 'struct afu'
being de-referenced during an EEH thereby causing a kernel oops.

This patch fixes this by making sure that all access to the array
'adapter->afu' is wrapped within the context of spin-lock
'adapter->afu_list_lock'.

Fixes: 9e8df8a21963 ("cxl: EEH support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.3+
Acked-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Lombard <clombard@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d04071a5d6413b65f17f7bd6e2bdb22e22e4ace7 upstream.

We added some locking to this function but forgot to drop the lock on
these two error paths.  This bug would lead to an immediate deadlock.

Fixes: c7b3690fb152 ("vmw_balloon: stats rework")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b5958faa34e2f99f3475ad89c52d98dfea079d33 upstream.

Fix unbalanced module reference counting during internal reset, which
prevents the drivers unloading.
Tracking mei_me/txe modules on mei client bus via
mei_cldev_enable/disable is error prone due to possible internal
reset flow, where clients are disconnected underneath.
Moving reference counting to probe and release of mei bus client
driver solves this issue in simplest way, as each client provides only
a single connection to a client bus driver.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 37fd0b623023484ef6df79ed46f21f06ecc611ff upstream.

The list of supported functions can be altered upon link reset,
clean the flags to allow correct selections of supported
features.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The remove path contains a hack which depends on internal structures in
other source files, similar to the one which was recently removed from
the registration path.  Since commit 1ce9e6055fa0 ("virtio_ring:
introduce packed ring support"), this leads to a crash when vop devices
are removed.

The structure in question is only examined to get the virtual address of
the allocated used page.  Store that pointer locally instead to fix the
crash.

Fixes: 1ce9e6055fa0 ("virtio_ring: introduce packed ring support")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

KASAN detects a use-after-free when vop devices are removed.

This problem was introduced by commit 0063e8bbd2b62d136 ("virtio_vop:
don't kfree device on register failure").  That patch moved the freeing
of the struct _vop_vdev to the release function, but failed to ensure
that vop holds a reference to the device when it doesn't want it to go
away.  A kfree() was replaced with a put_device() in the unregistration
path, but the last reference to the device is already dropped in
unregister_virtio_device() so the struct is freed before vop is done
with it.

Fix it by holding a reference until cleanup is done.  This is similar to
the fix in virtio_pci in commit 2989be09a8a9d6 ("virtio_pci: fix use
after free on release").

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vop_scan_devices+0xc6c/0xe50 [vop]
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800da18580 by task kworker/0:1/12

 CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc4+ #53
 Workqueue: events vop_hotplug_devices [vop]
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x74/0xbb
  print_address_description+0x5d/0x2b0
  ? vop_scan_devices+0xc6c/0xe50 [vop]
  kasan_report+0x152/0x1aa
  ? vop_scan_devices+0xc6c/0xe50 [vop]
  ? vop_scan_devices+0xc6c/0xe50 [vop]
  vop_scan_devices+0xc6c/0xe50 [vop]
  ? vop_loopback_free_irq+0x160/0x160 [vop_loopback]
  process_one_work+0x7c0/0x14b0
  ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2d0/0x2d0
  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x120/0x280
  worker_thread+0x8f/0xbf0
  ? __kthread_parkme+0x78/0xf0
  ? process_one_work+0x14b0/0x14b0
  kthread+0x2ae/0x3a0
  ? kthread_park+0x120/0x120
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

 Allocated by task 12:
  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13a/0x2a0
  vop_scan_devices+0x473/0xe50 [vop]
  process_one_work+0x7c0/0x14b0
  worker_thread+0x8f/0xbf0
  kthread+0x2ae/0x3a0
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

 Freed by task 12:
  kfree+0x104/0x310
  device_release+0x73/0x1d0
  kobject_put+0x14f/0x420
  unregister_virtio_device+0x32/0x50
  vop_scan_devices+0x19d/0xe50 [vop]
  process_one_work+0x7c0/0x14b0
  worker_thread+0x8f/0xbf0
  kthread+0x2ae/0x3a0
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800da18008
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
 The buggy address is located 1400 bytes inside of
  2048-byte region [ffff88800da18008, ffff88800da18808)
 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:ffffea0000368600 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88801440dbc0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head)
 raw: 4000000000010200 ffffea0000378608 ffffea000037a008 ffff88801440dbc0
 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000d000d 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff88800da18480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff88800da18500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 >ffff88800da18580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                    ^
  ffff88800da18600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff88800da18680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ==================================================================

Fixes: 0063e8bbd2b62d136 ("virtio_vop: don't kfree device on register failure")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

VOP is broken in mainline since commit 1ce9e6055fa0a9043 ("virtio_ring:
introduce packed ring support"); attempting to use the virtqueues leads
to various kernel crashes.  I'm testing it with my not-yet-merged
loopback patches, but even the in-tree MIC hardware cannot work.

The problem is not in the referenced commit per se, but is due to the
following hack in vop_find_vq() which depends on the layout of private
structures in other source files, which that commit happened to change:

  /*
   * To reassign the used ring here we are directly accessing
   * struct vring_virtqueue which is a private data structure
   * in virtio_ring.c. At the minimum, a BUILD_BUG_ON() in
   * vring_new_virtqueue() would ensure that
   *  (&vq->vring == (struct vring *) (&vq->vq + 1));
   */
  vr = (struct vring *)(vq + 1);
  vr->used = used;

Fix vop by using __vring_new_virtqueue() to create the needed vring
layout from the start, instead of attempting to patch in the used ring
later.  __vring_new_virtqueue() was added way back in commit
2a2d1382fe9dcc ("virtio: Add improved queue allocation API") in order to
address mic's usecase, according to the commit message.

Fixes: 1ce9e6055fa0 ("virtio_ring: introduce packed ring support")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

There is a little window during disconnection flow
when read cb is moved between lists and may be not freed.
Remove moving read cbs explicitly during flash fixes this memory
leak.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Add icelake mei device id.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Pull char/misc driver fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some small char and misc driver fixes to resolve some
  reported issues, as well as a number of binderfs fixups that were
  found after auditing the filesystem code by Al Viro. As binderfs
  hasn't been in a previous release yet, it's good to get these in now
  before the first users show up.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a bit with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'char-misc-5.0-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (26 commits)
  i3c: master: Fix an error checking typo in 'cdns_i3c_master_probe()'
  binderfs: switch from d_add() to d_instantiate()
  binderfs: drop lock in binderfs_binder_ctl_create
  binderfs: kill_litter_super() before cleanup
  binderfs: rework binderfs_binder_device_create()
  binderfs: rework binderfs_fill_super()
  binderfs: prevent renaming the control dentry
  binderfs: remove outdated comment
  binderfs: use __u32 for device numbers
  binderfs: use correct include guards in header
  misc: pvpanic: fix warning implicit declaration
  char/mwave: fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
  misc: ibmvsm: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
  binderfs: fix error return code in binderfs_fill_super()
  mei: me: add denverton innovation engine device IDs
  mei: me: mark LBG devices as having dma support
  mei: dma: silent the reject message
  binderfs: handle !CONFIG_IPC_NS builds
  binderfs: reserve devices for initial mount
  binderfs: rename header to binderfs.h
  ...