<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/btrfs, branch v4.19.275</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: send: limit number of clones and allocated memory size</title>
<updated>2023-03-03T10:40:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Sterba</name>
<email>dsterba@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T19:32:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=09450e240a7a3de7cd0fbac13ce512dc2618d863'/>
<id>09450e240a7a3de7cd0fbac13ce512dc2618d863</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 33e17b3f5ab74af12aca58c515bc8424ff69a343 ]

The arg-&gt;clone_sources_count is u64 and can trigger a warning when a
huge value is passed from user space and a huge array is allocated.
Limit the allocated memory to 8MiB (can be increased if needed), which
in turn limits the number of clone sources to 8M / sizeof(struct
clone_root) = 8M / 40 = 209715.  Real world number of clones is from
tens to hundreds, so this is future proof.

Reported-by: syzbot+4376a9a073770c173269@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 33e17b3f5ab74af12aca58c515bc8424ff69a343 ]

The arg-&gt;clone_sources_count is u64 and can trigger a warning when a
huge value is passed from user space and a huge array is allocated.
Limit the allocated memory to 8MiB (can be increased if needed), which
in turn limits the number of clone sources to 8M / sizeof(struct
clone_root) = 8M / 40 = 209715.  Real world number of clones is from
tens to hundreds, so this is future proof.

Reported-by: syzbot+4376a9a073770c173269@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: limit device extents to the device size</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-18T21:35:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c089e2ece1d7a9981f5b55eaf44d6a3bb602ed2c'/>
<id>c089e2ece1d7a9981f5b55eaf44d6a3bb602ed2c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3c538de0f2a74d50aff7278c092f88ae59cee688 upstream.

There was a recent regression in btrfs/177 that started happening with
the size class patches ("btrfs: introduce size class to block group
allocator").  This however isn't a regression introduced by those
patches, but rather the bug was uncovered by a change in behavior in
these patches.  The patches triggered more chunk allocations in the
^free-space-tree case, which uncovered a race with device shrink.

The problem is we will set the device total size to the new size, and
use this to find a hole for a device extent.  However during shrink we
may have device extents allocated past this range, so we could
potentially find a hole in a range past our new shrink size.  We don't
actually limit our found extent to the device size anywhere, we assume
that we will not find a hole past our device size.  This isn't true with
shrink as we're relocating block groups and thus creating holes past the
device size.

Fix this by making sure we do not search past the new device size, and
if we wander into any device extents that start after our device size
simply break from the loop and use whatever hole we've already found.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3c538de0f2a74d50aff7278c092f88ae59cee688 upstream.

There was a recent regression in btrfs/177 that started happening with
the size class patches ("btrfs: introduce size class to block group
allocator").  This however isn't a regression introduced by those
patches, but rather the bug was uncovered by a change in behavior in
these patches.  The patches triggered more chunk allocations in the
^free-space-tree case, which uncovered a race with device shrink.

The problem is we will set the device total size to the new size, and
use this to find a hole for a device extent.  However during shrink we
may have device extents allocated past this range, so we could
potentially find a hole in a range past our new shrink size.  We don't
actually limit our found extent to the device size anywhere, we assume
that we will not find a hole past our device size.  This isn't true with
shrink as we're relocating block groups and thus creating holes past the
device size.

Fix this by making sure we do not search past the new device size, and
if we wander into any device extents that start after our device size
simply break from the loop and use whatever hole we've already found.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: replace strncpy() with strscpy()</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:30:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>sashal@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-04T16:14:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=659509b5de2ee07caf6893a3eb895fb6879e2c0d'/>
<id>659509b5de2ee07caf6893a3eb895fb6879e2c0d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 63d5429f68a3d4c4aa27e65a05196c17f86c41d6 ]

Using strncpy() on NUL-terminated strings are deprecated.  To avoid
possible forming of non-terminated string strscpy() should be used.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev &lt;artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 63d5429f68a3d4c4aa27e65a05196c17f86c41d6 ]

Using strncpy() on NUL-terminated strings are deprecated.  To avoid
possible forming of non-terminated string strscpy() should be used.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev &lt;artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: send: avoid unnecessary backref lookups when finding clone source</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:30:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-01T16:15:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=89e34bd14ee700fdcfc47ae340f4a96d02272a66'/>
<id>89e34bd14ee700fdcfc47ae340f4a96d02272a66</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 22a3c0ac8ed0043af209a15928ae4c4855b0a4c4 ]

At find_extent_clone(), unless we are given an inline extent, a file
extent item that represents hole or an extent that starts beyond the
i_size, we always do backref walking to look for clone sources, unless
if we have more than SEND_MAX_EXTENT_REFS (64) known references on the
extent.

However if we know we only have one reference in the extent item and only
one clone source (the send root), then it's pointless to do the backref
walking to search for clone sources, as we can't clone from any other
root. So skip the backref walking in that case.

The following test was run on a non-debug kernel (Debian's default kernel
config):

   $ cat test.sh
   #!/bin/bash

   DEV=/dev/sdi
   MNT=/mnt/sdi

   mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
   mount $DEV $MNT

   # Create an extent tree that's not too small and none of the
   # extents is shared.
   for ((i = 1; i &lt;= 50000; i++)); do
      xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 4K" $MNT/file_$i &gt; /dev/null
      echo -ne "\r$i files created..."
   done
   echo

   btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap

   start=$(date +%s%N)
   btrfs send $MNT/snap &gt; /dev/null
   end=$(date +%s%N)

   dur=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
   echo -e "\nsend took $dur milliseconds"

   umount $MNT

Before this change:

   send took 5389 milliseconds

After this change:

   send took 4519 milliseconds  (-16.1%)

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 63d5429f68a3 ("btrfs: replace strncpy() with strscpy()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 22a3c0ac8ed0043af209a15928ae4c4855b0a4c4 ]

At find_extent_clone(), unless we are given an inline extent, a file
extent item that represents hole or an extent that starts beyond the
i_size, we always do backref walking to look for clone sources, unless
if we have more than SEND_MAX_EXTENT_REFS (64) known references on the
extent.

However if we know we only have one reference in the extent item and only
one clone source (the send root), then it's pointless to do the backref
walking to search for clone sources, as we can't clone from any other
root. So skip the backref walking in that case.

The following test was run on a non-debug kernel (Debian's default kernel
config):

   $ cat test.sh
   #!/bin/bash

   DEV=/dev/sdi
   MNT=/mnt/sdi

   mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
   mount $DEV $MNT

   # Create an extent tree that's not too small and none of the
   # extents is shared.
   for ((i = 1; i &lt;= 50000; i++)); do
      xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 4K" $MNT/file_$i &gt; /dev/null
      echo -ne "\r$i files created..."
   done
   echo

   btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap

   start=$(date +%s%N)
   btrfs send $MNT/snap &gt; /dev/null
   end=$(date +%s%N)

   dur=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
   echo -e "\nsend took $dur milliseconds"

   umount $MNT

Before this change:

   send took 5389 milliseconds

After this change:

   send took 4519 milliseconds  (-16.1%)

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 63d5429f68a3 ("btrfs: replace strncpy() with strscpy()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: qgroup: fix sleep from invalid context bug in btrfs_qgroup_inherit()</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:18:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>ChenXiaoSong</name>
<email>chenxiaosong2@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-16T14:23:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f4b930a1602b05e77fee31f9616599b25e910a86'/>
<id>f4b930a1602b05e77fee31f9616599b25e910a86</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f7e942b5bb35d8e3af54053d19a6bf04143a3955 ]

Syzkaller reported BUG as follows:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
       include/linux/sched/mm.h:274
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
   __might_resched.cold+0x222/0x26b
   kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x3c0
   update_qgroup_limit_item+0xe1/0x390
   btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x147b/0x1ee0
   create_subvol+0x4eb/0x1710
   btrfs_mksubvol+0xfe5/0x13f0
   __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x2b0/0x430
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x25a/0x520
   btrfs_ioctl+0x2a1c/0x5ce0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200
   do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80

Fix this by calling qgroup_dirty() on @dstqgroup, and update limit item in
btrfs_run_qgroups() later outside of the spinlock context.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong &lt;chenxiaosong2@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f7e942b5bb35d8e3af54053d19a6bf04143a3955 ]

Syzkaller reported BUG as follows:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
       include/linux/sched/mm.h:274
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
   __might_resched.cold+0x222/0x26b
   kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x3c0
   update_qgroup_limit_item+0xe1/0x390
   btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x147b/0x1ee0
   create_subvol+0x4eb/0x1710
   btrfs_mksubvol+0xfe5/0x13f0
   __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x2b0/0x430
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x25a/0x520
   btrfs_ioctl+0x2a1c/0x5ce0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200
   do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80

Fix this by calling qgroup_dirty() on @dstqgroup, and update limit item in
btrfs_run_qgroups() later outside of the spinlock context.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong &lt;chenxiaosong2@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: free btrfs_path before copying inodes to userspace</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:18:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anand Jain</name>
<email>anand.jain@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-10T06:06:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=35a78cb2e54d7023e5a499b42dcc20932214fbfe'/>
<id>35a78cb2e54d7023e5a499b42dcc20932214fbfe</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 418ffb9e3cf6c4e2574d3a732b724916684bd133 ]

btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino() frees the search path after the userspace
copy from the temp buffer @inodes. Which potentially can lead to a lock
splat.

Fix this by freeing the path before we copy @inodes to userspace.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 418ffb9e3cf6c4e2574d3a732b724916684bd133 ]

btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino() frees the search path after the userspace
copy from the temp buffer @inodes. Which potentially can lead to a lock
splat.

Fix this by freeing the path before we copy @inodes to userspace.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: free btrfs_path before copying subvol info to userspace</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:18:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anand Jain</name>
<email>anand.jain@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-10T06:06:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=5400e33bda76b1890c3994e8d1eb3c2127018258'/>
<id>5400e33bda76b1890c3994e8d1eb3c2127018258</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 013c1c5585ebcfb19c88efe79063d0463b1b6159 upstream.

btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() frees the search path after the userspace
copy from the temp buffer @subvol_info. This can lead to a lock splat
warning.

Fix this by freeing the path before we copy it to userspace.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 013c1c5585ebcfb19c88efe79063d0463b1b6159 upstream.

btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() frees the search path after the userspace
copy from the temp buffer @subvol_info. This can lead to a lock splat
warning.

Fix this by freeing the path before we copy it to userspace.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: free btrfs_path before copying fspath to userspace</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:18:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anand Jain</name>
<email>anand.jain@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-10T06:06:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9f9980fa8bea0042aa9539b011daf47754f25936'/>
<id>9f9980fa8bea0042aa9539b011daf47754f25936</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8cf96b409d9b3946ece58ced13f92d0f775b0442 upstream.

btrfs_ioctl_ino_to_path() frees the search path after the userspace copy
from the temp buffer @ipath-&gt;fspath. Which potentially can lead to a lock
splat warning.

Fix this by freeing the path before we copy it to userspace.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8cf96b409d9b3946ece58ced13f92d0f775b0442 upstream.

btrfs_ioctl_ino_to_path() frees the search path after the userspace copy
from the temp buffer @ipath-&gt;fspath. Which potentially can lead to a lock
splat warning.

Fix this by freeing the path before we copy it to userspace.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: free btrfs_path before copying root refs to userspace</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:18:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-07T16:44:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=cf1789192c5b9824ab6b52ed5ddea85da85ceecf'/>
<id>cf1789192c5b9824ab6b52ed5ddea85da85ceecf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b740d806166979488e798e41743aaec051f2443f upstream.

Syzbot reported the following lockdep splat

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor307/3029 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff0000c02525d8 (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x54/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5576

but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #3 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}:
       down_read_nested+0x64/0x84 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1624
       __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
       btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
       btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279
       btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x74/0x338 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1637
       btrfs_search_slot+0x1b0/0xfd8 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1944
       btrfs_update_root+0x6c/0x5a0 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:132
       commit_fs_roots+0x1f0/0x33c fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1459
       btrfs_commit_transaction+0x89c/0x12d8 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2343
       flush_space+0x66c/0x738 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:786
       btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x43c/0x4e0 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1059
       process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
       worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
       kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376
       ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860

-&gt; #2 (&amp;fs_info-&gt;reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common+0xd4/0xca8 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
       __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
       mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x44 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
       btrfs_record_root_in_trans fs/btrfs/transaction.c:516 [inline]
       start_transaction+0x248/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:752
       btrfs_start_transaction+0x34/0x44 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:781
       btrfs_create_common+0xf0/0x1b4 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6651
       btrfs_create+0x8c/0xb0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6697
       lookup_open fs/namei.c:3413 [inline]
       open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline]
       path_openat+0x804/0x11c4 fs/namei.c:3688
       do_filp_open+0xdc/0x1b8 fs/namei.c:3718
       do_sys_openat2+0xb8/0x22c fs/open.c:1313
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1329 [inline]
       __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline]
       __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1340 [inline]
       __arm64_sys_openat+0xb0/0xe0 fs/open.c:1340
       __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
       invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
       el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
       do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
       el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
       el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

-&gt; #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
       percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
       __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1826 [inline]
       sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1948 [inline]
       start_transaction+0x360/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:683
       btrfs_join_transaction+0x30/0x40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:795
       btrfs_dirty_inode+0x50/0x140 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6103
       btrfs_update_time+0x1c0/0x1e8 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6145
       inode_update_time fs/inode.c:1872 [inline]
       touch_atime+0x1f0/0x4a8 fs/inode.c:1945
       file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2516 [inline]
       btrfs_file_mmap+0x50/0x88 fs/btrfs/file.c:2407
       call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2192 [inline]
       mmap_region+0x7fc/0xc14 mm/mmap.c:1752
       do_mmap+0x644/0x97c mm/mmap.c:1540
       vm_mmap_pgoff+0xe8/0x1d0 mm/util.c:552
       ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x1cc/0x278 mm/mmap.c:1586
       __do_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:28 [inline]
       __se_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21 [inline]
       __arm64_sys_mmap+0x58/0x6c arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21
       __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
       invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
       el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
       do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
       el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
       el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

-&gt; #0 (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053
       lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666
       __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577
       _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline]
       copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline]
       btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203
       btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556
       vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
       __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
       __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
       __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856
       __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
       invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
       el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
       do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
       el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
       el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock --&gt; &amp;fs_info-&gt;reloc_mutex --&gt; btrfs-root-00

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(btrfs-root-00);
                               lock(&amp;fs_info-&gt;reloc_mutex);
                               lock(btrfs-root-00);
  lock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor307/3029:
 #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
 #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
 #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 3029 Comm: syz-executor307 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x1c4/0x1f0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156
 show_stack+0x2c/0x54 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x16c lib/dump_stack.c:106
 dump_stack+0x1c/0x58 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_circular_bug+0x2c4/0x2c8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2053
 check_noncircular+0x14c/0x154 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053
 lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666
 __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577
 _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline]
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline]
 btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203
 btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
 el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

We do generally the right thing here, copying the references into a
temporary buffer, however we are still holding the path when we do
copy_to_user from the temporary buffer.  Fix this by freeing the path
before we copy to user space.

Reported-by: syzbot+4ef9e52e464c6ff47d9d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b740d806166979488e798e41743aaec051f2443f upstream.

Syzbot reported the following lockdep splat

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor307/3029 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff0000c02525d8 (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x54/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5576

but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #3 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}:
       down_read_nested+0x64/0x84 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1624
       __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
       btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
       btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279
       btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x74/0x338 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1637
       btrfs_search_slot+0x1b0/0xfd8 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1944
       btrfs_update_root+0x6c/0x5a0 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:132
       commit_fs_roots+0x1f0/0x33c fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1459
       btrfs_commit_transaction+0x89c/0x12d8 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2343
       flush_space+0x66c/0x738 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:786
       btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x43c/0x4e0 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1059
       process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
       worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
       kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376
       ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860

-&gt; #2 (&amp;fs_info-&gt;reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common+0xd4/0xca8 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
       __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
       mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x44 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
       btrfs_record_root_in_trans fs/btrfs/transaction.c:516 [inline]
       start_transaction+0x248/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:752
       btrfs_start_transaction+0x34/0x44 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:781
       btrfs_create_common+0xf0/0x1b4 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6651
       btrfs_create+0x8c/0xb0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6697
       lookup_open fs/namei.c:3413 [inline]
       open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline]
       path_openat+0x804/0x11c4 fs/namei.c:3688
       do_filp_open+0xdc/0x1b8 fs/namei.c:3718
       do_sys_openat2+0xb8/0x22c fs/open.c:1313
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1329 [inline]
       __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline]
       __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1340 [inline]
       __arm64_sys_openat+0xb0/0xe0 fs/open.c:1340
       __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
       invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
       el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
       do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
       el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
       el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

-&gt; #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
       percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
       __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1826 [inline]
       sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1948 [inline]
       start_transaction+0x360/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:683
       btrfs_join_transaction+0x30/0x40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:795
       btrfs_dirty_inode+0x50/0x140 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6103
       btrfs_update_time+0x1c0/0x1e8 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6145
       inode_update_time fs/inode.c:1872 [inline]
       touch_atime+0x1f0/0x4a8 fs/inode.c:1945
       file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2516 [inline]
       btrfs_file_mmap+0x50/0x88 fs/btrfs/file.c:2407
       call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2192 [inline]
       mmap_region+0x7fc/0xc14 mm/mmap.c:1752
       do_mmap+0x644/0x97c mm/mmap.c:1540
       vm_mmap_pgoff+0xe8/0x1d0 mm/util.c:552
       ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x1cc/0x278 mm/mmap.c:1586
       __do_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:28 [inline]
       __se_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21 [inline]
       __arm64_sys_mmap+0x58/0x6c arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21
       __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
       invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
       el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
       do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
       el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
       el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

-&gt; #0 (&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053
       lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666
       __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577
       _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline]
       copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline]
       btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203
       btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556
       vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
       __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
       __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
       __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856
       __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
       invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
       el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
       do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
       el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
       el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock --&gt; &amp;fs_info-&gt;reloc_mutex --&gt; btrfs-root-00

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(btrfs-root-00);
                               lock(&amp;fs_info-&gt;reloc_mutex);
                               lock(btrfs-root-00);
  lock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor307/3029:
 #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
 #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
 #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 3029 Comm: syz-executor307 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x1c4/0x1f0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156
 show_stack+0x2c/0x54 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x16c lib/dump_stack.c:106
 dump_stack+0x1c/0x58 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_circular_bug+0x2c4/0x2c8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2053
 check_noncircular+0x14c/0x154 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053
 lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666
 __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577
 _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline]
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline]
 btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203
 btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
 el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581

We do generally the right thing here, copying the references into a
temporary buffer, however we are still holding the path when we do
copy_to_user from the temporary buffer.  Fix this by freeing the path
before we copy to user space.

Reported-by: syzbot+4ef9e52e464c6ff47d9d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: remove pointless and double ulist frees in error paths of qgroup tests</title>
<updated>2022-11-25T16:40:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-01T16:15:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=3c8673650fbef615ca999f9aad3273f8628cb141'/>
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[ Upstream commit d0ea17aec12ea0f7b9d2ed727d8ef8169d1e7699 ]

Several places in the qgroup self tests follow the pattern of freeing the
ulist pointer they passed to btrfs_find_all_roots() if the call to that
function returned an error. That is pointless because that function always
frees the ulist in case it returns an error.

Also In some places like at test_multiple_refs(), after a call to
btrfs_qgroup_account_extent() we also leave "old_roots" and "new_roots"
pointing to ulists that were freed, because btrfs_qgroup_account_extent()
has freed those ulists, and if after that the next call to
btrfs_find_all_roots() fails, we call ulist_free() on the "old_roots"
ulist again, resulting in a double free.

So remove those calls to reduce the code size and avoid double ulist
free in case of an error.

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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[ Upstream commit d0ea17aec12ea0f7b9d2ed727d8ef8169d1e7699 ]

Several places in the qgroup self tests follow the pattern of freeing the
ulist pointer they passed to btrfs_find_all_roots() if the call to that
function returned an error. That is pointless because that function always
frees the ulist in case it returns an error.

Also In some places like at test_multiple_refs(), after a call to
btrfs_qgroup_account_extent() we also leave "old_roots" and "new_roots"
pointing to ulists that were freed, because btrfs_qgroup_account_extent()
has freed those ulists, and if after that the next call to
btrfs_find_all_roots() fails, we call ulist_free() on the "old_roots"
ulist again, resulting in a double free.

So remove those calls to reduce the code size and avoid double ulist
free in case of an error.

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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