<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h, branch v2.6.29-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: filldir, lookup, and readlink</title>
<updated>2009-01-06T23:59:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-06T22:42:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=addd65ad8d19a7d7982130b16f957d5d01d3f8df'/>
<id>addd65ad8d19a7d7982130b16f957d5d01d3f8df</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(),
and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions.
Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to
inode crypt_stat.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(),
and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions.
Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to
inode crypt_stat.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Header updates</title>
<updated>2009-01-06T23:59:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-06T22:41:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a34f60f748c6fe5d791e9b54cffe442201428254'/>
<id>a34f60f748c6fe5d791e9b54cffe442201428254</id>
<content type='text'>
Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packets</title>
<updated>2009-01-06T23:59:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-06T22:41:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9c79f34f7ee71cd28272332b424ca64b2be006ab'/>
<id>9c79f34f7ee71cd28272332b424ca64b2be006ab</id>
<content type='text'>
This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived
mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter.
Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should
try to decrypt the filename.  When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it
decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet
contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename.
Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower
filesystem.

Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the
encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are
already near the maximum filename length.

In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match
against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given
a plaintext filename.  Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name
will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both
encrypted using the same FNEK.  This can be changed by finding a way to
replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random
characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible
to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and
encoded filename in the lower filesystem.  An implementation using random
characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in
any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to
determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the
decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that
directory.

Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development
of this patchset.

This patch:

A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK).  This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag
70 packets.  This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to
support filename encryption.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived
mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter.
Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should
try to decrypt the filename.  When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it
decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet
contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename.
Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower
filesystem.

Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the
encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are
already near the maximum filename length.

In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match
against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given
a plaintext filename.  Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name
will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both
encrypted using the same FNEK.  This can be changed by finding a way to
replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random
characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible
to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and
encoded filename in the lower filesystem.  An implementation using random
characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in
any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to
determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the
decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that
directory.

Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development
of this patchset.

This patch:

A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK).  This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag
70 packets.  This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to
support filename encryption.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tchicks@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()</title>
<updated>2008-11-13T23:39:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-11-13T23:39:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227'/>
<id>745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227</id>
<content type='text'>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: remove netlink transport</title>
<updated>2008-10-16T18:21:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-16T05:02:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=624ae5284516870657505103ada531c64dba2a9a'/>
<id>624ae5284516870657505103ada531c64dba2a9a</id>
<content type='text'>
The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
transport is a simpler solution.  This patch removes the netlink code and
makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
transport.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
transport is a simpler solution.  This patch removes the netlink code and
makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
transport.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dustin Kirkland &lt;kirkland@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Make all persistent file opens delayed</title>
<updated>2008-07-24T17:47:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-24T04:30:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=391b52f98cf2e9bff227dad8bf9ea206fec43fa4'/>
<id>391b52f98cf2e9bff227dad8bf9ea206fec43fa4</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no good reason to immediately open the lower file, and that can
cause problems with files that the user does not intend to immediately
open, such as device nodes.

This patch removes the persistent file open from the interpose step and
pushes that to the locations where eCryptfs really does need the lower
persistent file, such as just before reading or writing the metadata
stored in the lower file header.

Two functions are jumping to out_dput when they should just be jumping to
out on error paths.  This patch also fixes these.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is no good reason to immediately open the lower file, and that can
cause problems with files that the user does not intend to immediately
open, such as device nodes.

This patch removes the persistent file open from the interpose step and
pushes that to the locations where eCryptfs really does need the lower
persistent file, such as just before reading or writing the metadata
stored in the lower file header.

Two functions are jumping to out_dput when they should just be jumping to
out on error paths.  This patch also fixes these.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: do not try to open device files on mknod</title>
<updated>2008-07-24T17:47:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-24T04:30:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=72b55fffd631a89e5be6fe1b4f2565bc4cd90deb'/>
<id>72b55fffd631a89e5be6fe1b4f2565bc4cd90deb</id>
<content type='text'>
When creating device nodes, eCryptfs needs to delay actually opening the lower
persistent file until an application tries to open.  Device handles may not be
backed by anything when they first come into existence.

[Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu}
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When creating device nodes, eCryptfs needs to delay actually opening the lower
persistent file until an application tries to open.  Device handles may not be
backed by anything when they first come into existence.

[Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu}
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Privileged kthread for lower file opens</title>
<updated>2008-07-24T17:47:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-24T04:30:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=746f1e558bc52b9693c1a1ecdab60f8392e5ff18'/>
<id>746f1e558bc52b9693c1a1ecdab60f8392e5ff18</id>
<content type='text'>
eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the
lower filesystem.  Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened
read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails.  One way to keep
from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the
lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file;
this patch implements this functionality.

This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs
file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with
the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to
both read and write.  eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up
calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only.  This is fixed in
this patch.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@austin.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the
lower filesystem.  Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened
read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails.  One way to keep
from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the
lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file;
this patch implements this functionality.

This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs
file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with
the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to
both read and write.  eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up
calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only.  This is fixed in
this patch.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@austin.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: remove unnecessary page decrypt call</title>
<updated>2008-06-06T18:29:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-06T05:46:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d3e49afbb66109613c3474f2273f5830ac2dcb09'/>
<id>d3e49afbb66109613c3474f2273f5830ac2dcb09</id>
<content type='text'>
The page decrypt calls in ecryptfs_write() are both pointless and buggy.
Pointless because ecryptfs_get_locked_page() has already brought the page
up to date, and buggy because prior mmap writes will just be blown away by
the decrypt call.

This patch also removes the declaration of a now-nonexistent function
ecryptfs_write_zeros().

Thanks to Eric Sandeen and David Kleikamp for helping to track this
down.

Eric said:

   fsx w/ mmap dies quickly ( &lt; 100 ops) without this, and survives
   nicely (to millions of ops+) with it in place.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@austin.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The page decrypt calls in ecryptfs_write() are both pointless and buggy.
Pointless because ecryptfs_get_locked_page() has already brought the page
up to date, and buggy because prior mmap writes will just be blown away by
the decrypt call.

This patch also removes the declaration of a now-nonexistent function
ecryptfs_write_zeros().

Thanks to Eric Sandeen and David Kleikamp for helping to track this
down.

Eric said:

   fsx w/ mmap dies quickly ( &lt; 100 ops) without this, and survives
   nicely (to millions of ops+) with it in place.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@austin.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: make key module subsystem respect namespaces</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T07:59:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6a3fd92e73fffd9e583650c56ad9558afe51dc5c'/>
<id>6a3fd92e73fffd9e583650c56ad9558afe51dc5c</id>
<content type='text'>
Make eCryptfs key module subsystem respect namespaces.

Since I will be removing the netlink interface in a future patch, I just made
changes to the netlink.c code so that it will not break the build.  With my
recent patches, the kernel module currently defaults to the device handle
interface rather than the netlink interface.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export free_user_ns()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make eCryptfs key module subsystem respect namespaces.

Since I will be removing the netlink interface in a future patch, I just made
changes to the netlink.c code so that it will not break the build.  With my
recent patches, the kernel module currently defaults to the device handle
interface rather than the netlink interface.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export free_user_ns()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
