This makes it harder for accidental or malicious changes to
ecryptfs_xattr_handlers at runtime.

Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230930050033.41174-8-wedsonaf@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Pull ecryptfs updates from Tyler Hicks:
 "Code cleanups and a bug fix

   - W=1 compiler warning cleanups

   - Mutex initialization simplification

   - Protect against NULL pointer exception during mount"

* tag 'ecryptfs-5.13-rc1-updates' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs:
  ecryptfs: fix kernel panic with null dev_name
  ecryptfs: remove unused helpers
  ecryptfs: Fix typo in message
  eCryptfs: Use DEFINE_MUTEX() for mutex lock
  ecryptfs: keystore: Fix some kernel-doc issues and demote non-conformant headers
  ecryptfs: inode: Help out nearly-there header and demote non-conformant ones
  ecryptfs: mmap: Help out one function header and demote other abuses
  ecryptfs: crypto: Supply some missing param descriptions and demote abuses
  ecryptfs: miscdev: File headers are not good kernel-doc candidates
  ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers
  ecryptfs: messaging: Add missing param descriptions and demote abuses
  ecryptfs: super: Fix formatting, naming and kernel-doc abuses
  ecryptfs: file: Demote kernel-doc abuses
  ecryptfs: kthread: Demote file header and provide description for 'cred'
  ecryptfs: dentry: File headers are not good candidates for kernel-doc
  ecryptfs: debug: Demote a couple of kernel-doc abuses
  ecryptfs: read_write: File headers do not make good candidates for kernel-doc
  ecryptfs: use DEFINE_MUTEX() for mutex lock
  eCryptfs: add a semicolon

Remove two helpers that are unused.

Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>

... and never had anything non-NULL stored into it.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Function like macros should have a semicolon.

Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
[tyhicks: Remove the trailing semicolin from the macro's definition, as
          suggested by Joe Perches]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>

Replace a recently deactived email address with one that I'll be able to
personally control and keep alive.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>

This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits

   7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
   2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

that the merge brought in).

It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].

The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.

 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
 "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
  based on an internal ACL by the following means:

   - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
     list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
     Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.

     ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
     on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
     additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
     tags/namespaces.

     Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
     include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
     permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
     a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
     to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
     stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
     acquiring use of possessor permits.

   - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
     permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
     granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"

* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
  keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL