linux.git/fs/exec.c, branch v3.9.8

exec: do not abuse ->cred_guard_mutex in threadgroup_lock()

2013-05-08T03:33:12+00:00

commit e56fb2874015370e3b7f8d85051f6dce26051df9 upstream.

threadgroup_lock() takes signal->cred_guard_mutex to ensure that
thread_group_leader() is stable.  This doesn't look nice, the scope of
this lock in do_execve() is huge.

And as Dave pointed out this can lead to deadlock, we have the
following dependencies:

	do_execve:		cred_guard_mutex -> i_mutex
	cgroup_mount:		i_mutex -> cgroup_mutex
	attach_task_by_pid:	cgroup_mutex -> cred_guard_mutex

Change de_thread() to take threadgroup_change_begin() around the
switch-the-leader code and change threadgroup_lock() to avoid
->cred_guard_mutex.

Note that de_thread() can't sleep with ->group_rwsem held, this can
obviously deadlock with the exiting leader if the writer is active, so it
does threadgroup_change_end() before schedule().

Reported-by: Dave Jones 
Acked-by: Tejun Heo 
Acked-by: Li Zefan 
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: allow arch code to control the user page table ceiling

2013-05-08T03:33:09+00:00

commit 6ee8630e02be6dd89926ca0fbc21af68b23dc087 upstream.

On architectures where a pgd entry may be shared between user and kernel
(e.g.  ARM+LPAE), freeing page tables needs a ceiling other than 0.
This patch introduces a generic USER_PGTABLES_CEILING that arch code can
override.  It is the responsibility of the arch code setting the ceiling
to ensure the complete freeing of the page tables (usually in
pgd_free()).

[catalin.marinas@arm.com: commit log; shift_arg_pages(), asm-generic/pgtables.h changes]
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

coredump: remove redundant defines for dumpable states

2013-02-28T03:10:11+00:00

The existing SUID_DUMP_* defines duplicate the newer SUID_DUMPABLE_*
defines introduced in 54b501992dd2 ("coredump: warn about unsafe
suid_dumpable / core_pattern combo").  Remove the new ones, and use the
prior values instead.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reported-by: Chen Gang 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Alan Cox 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Doug Ledford 
Cc: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/exec.c: make bprm_mm_init() static

2013-02-26T07:46:13+00:00

There is only one user of bprm_mm_init, and it's inside the same file.

Signed-off-by: Yuanhan Liu 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

new helper: file_inode(file)

2013-02-23T04:31:31+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

fs/exec.c: work around icc miscompilation

2013-01-11T22:54:55+00:00

The tricky problem is this check:

	if (i++ >= max)

icc (mis)optimizes this check as:

	if (++i > max)

The check now becomes a no-op since max is MAX_ARG_STRINGS (0x7FFFFFFF).

This is "allowed" by the C standard, assuming i++ never overflows,
because signed integer overflow is undefined behavior.  This
optimization effectively reverts the previous commit 362e6663ef23
("exec.c, compat.c: fix count(), compat_count() bounds checking") that
tries to fix the check.

This patch simply moves ++ after the check.

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang 
Cc: Jason Baron 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'akpm' (Andrew's patch-bomb)

2012-12-21T04:00:43+00:00

Merge the rest of Andrew's patches for -rc1:
 "A bunch of fixes and misc missed-out-on things.

  That'll do for -rc1.  I still have a batch of IPC patches which still
  have a possible bug report which I'm chasing down."

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton : (25 commits)
  keys: use keyring_alloc() to create module signing keyring
  keys: fix unreachable code
  sendfile: allows bypassing of notifier events
  SGI-XP: handle non-fatal traps
  fat: fix incorrect function comment
  Documentation: ABI: remove testing/sysfs-devices-node
  proc: fix inconsistent lock state
  linux/kernel.h: fix DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST with unsigned divisors
  memcg: don't register hotcpu notifier from ->css_alloc()
  checkpatch: warn on uapi #includes that #include 
  mm: cma: WARN if freed memory is still in use
  exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
  ...

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal

2012-12-21T02:05:28+00:00

Pull signal handling cleanups from Al Viro:
 "sigaltstack infrastructure + conversion for x86, alpha and um,
  COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE infrastructure.

  Note that there are several conflicts between "unify
  SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions" and UAPI patches in mainline;
  resolution is trivial - just remove definitions of SS_ONSTACK and
  SS_DISABLED from arch/*/uapi/asm/signal.h; they are all identical and
  include/uapi/linux/signal.h contains the unified variant."

Fixed up conflicts as per Al.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal:
  alpha: switch to generic sigaltstack
  new helpers: __save_altstack/__compat_save_altstack, switch x86 and um to those
  generic compat_sys_sigaltstack()
  introduce generic sys_sigaltstack(), switch x86 and um to it
  new helper: compat_user_stack_pointer()
  new helper: restore_altstack()
  unify SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions
  new helper: current_user_stack_pointer()
  missing user_stack_pointer() instances
  Bury the conditionals from kernel_thread/kernel_execve series
  COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE: infrastructure

exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack

2012-12-21T01:40:19+00:00

If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.

Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules.  Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted.  They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack.  This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.

After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules.  As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.

This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp.  To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is.  Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.

For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:

   http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: halfdog 
Cc: P J P 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Bury the conditionals from kernel_thread/kernel_execve series

2012-12-19T23:07:38+00:00

All architectures have
	CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_THREAD
	CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE
	__ARCH_WANT_SYS_EXECVE
None of them have __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE and there are only two callers
of kernel_execve() (which is a trivial wrapper for do_execve() now) left.
Kill the conditionals and make both callers use do_execve().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro