<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/jffs2, branch v5.12.5</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>jffs2: Hook up splice_write callback</title>
<updated>2021-05-12T06:39:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Stanley</name>
<email>joel@jms.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-30T13:45:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a72354b22114e35427bcbdd54427928302ced0f2'/>
<id>a72354b22114e35427bcbdd54427928302ced0f2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42984af09afc414d540fcc8247f42894b0378a91 upstream.

overlayfs using jffs2 as the upper filesystem would fail in some cases
since moving to v5.10. The test case used was to run 'touch' on a file
that exists in the lower fs, causing the modification time to be
updated. It returns EINVAL when the bug is triggered.

A bisection showed this was introduced in v5.9-rc1, with commit
36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops").
Reverting that commit restores the expected behaviour.

Some digging showed that this was due to jffs2 lacking an implementation
of splice_write. (For unknown reasons the warn_unsupported that should
trigger was not displaying any output).

Adding this patch resolved the issue and the test now passes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops")
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Tested-by: Lei YU &lt;yulei.sh@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42984af09afc414d540fcc8247f42894b0378a91 upstream.

overlayfs using jffs2 as the upper filesystem would fail in some cases
since moving to v5.10. The test case used was to run 'touch' on a file
that exists in the lower fs, causing the modification time to be
updated. It returns EINVAL when the bug is triggered.

A bisection showed this was introduced in v5.9-rc1, with commit
36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops").
Reverting that commit restores the expected behaviour.

Some digging showed that this was due to jffs2 lacking an implementation
of splice_write. (For unknown reasons the warn_unsupported that should
trigger was not displaying any output).

Adding this patch resolved the issue and the test now passes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops")
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Tested-by: Lei YU &lt;yulei.sh@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jffs2: Fix kasan slab-out-of-bounds problem</title>
<updated>2021-05-12T06:39:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>lizhe</name>
<email>lizhe67@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T03:06:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=58db0dd22decdb97f44cf126999562c88de67dcf'/>
<id>58db0dd22decdb97f44cf126999562c88de67dcf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 960b9a8a7676b9054d8b46a2c7db52a0c8766b56 upstream.

KASAN report a slab-out-of-bounds problem. The logs are listed below.
It is because in function jffs2_scan_dirent_node, we alloc "checkedlen+1"
bytes for fd-&gt;name and we check crc with length rd-&gt;nsize. If checkedlen
is less than rd-&gt;nsize, it will cause the slab-out-of-bounds problem.

jffs2: Dirent at *** has zeroes in name. Truncating to %d char
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260 at addr ffff8800842cf2d1
Read of size 1 by task test_JFFS2/915
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: G    B      O   ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40 age=0 cpu=1 pid=915
	___slab_alloc+0x580/0x5f0
	__slab_alloc.isra.24+0x4e/0x64
	__kmalloc+0x170/0x300
	jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40
	jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x1ca4/0x3b64
	jffs2_scan_medium+0x285/0xfe0
	jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x5fb/0x1bbc
	jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
	jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
	mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
	mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
	jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
	mount_fs+0x63/0x230
	vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
	do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
	SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
INFO: Freed in jffs2_free_full_dirent+0x22/0x40 age=27 cpu=1 pid=915
	__slab_free+0x372/0x4e4
	kfree+0x1d4/0x20c
	jffs2_free_full_dirent+0x22/0x40
	jffs2_build_remove_unlinked_inode+0x17a/0x1e4
	jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x1646/0x1bbc
	jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
	jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
	mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
	mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
	jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
	mount_fs+0x63/0x230
	vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
	do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
	SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x97
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff815befef&gt;] dump_stack+0x59/0x7e
 [&lt;ffffffff812d1d65&gt;] print_trailer+0x125/0x1b0
 [&lt;ffffffff812d82c8&gt;] object_err+0x34/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff812dadef&gt;] kasan_report.part.1+0x21f/0x534
 [&lt;ffffffff81132401&gt;] ? vprintk+0x2d/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff815f1ee2&gt;] ? crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260
 [&lt;ffffffff812db41a&gt;] kasan_report+0x26/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff812d9fc1&gt;] __asan_load1+0x3d/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff815f1ee2&gt;] crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260
 [&lt;ffffffff814764ae&gt;] ? jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff81485cec&gt;] jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x1d0c/0x3b64
 [&lt;ffffffff81488813&gt;] ? jffs2_scan_medium+0xccf/0xfe0
 [&lt;ffffffff81483fe0&gt;] ? jffs2_scan_make_ino_cache+0x14c/0x14c
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff812d5d90&gt;] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10c/0x2cc
 [&lt;ffffffff818169fb&gt;] ? mtd_point+0xf7/0x130
 [&lt;ffffffff81487dc9&gt;] jffs2_scan_medium+0x285/0xfe0
 [&lt;ffffffff81487b44&gt;] ? jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x3b64/0x3b64
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff812d57df&gt;] ? __kmalloc+0x12b/0x300
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff814a2753&gt;] ? jffs2_sum_init+0x9f/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff8148b2ff&gt;] jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x5fb/0x1bbc
 [&lt;ffffffff8148ad04&gt;] ? jffs2_del_noinode_dirent+0x640/0x640
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff81127c5b&gt;] ? __init_rwsem+0x97/0xac
 [&lt;ffffffff81492349&gt;] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
 [&lt;ffffffff81493c5b&gt;] jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
 [&lt;ffffffff814939d4&gt;] ? jffs2_parse_options+0x594/0x594
 [&lt;ffffffff81819bea&gt;] mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
 [&lt;ffffffff81819eb6&gt;] mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
 [&lt;ffffffff814939d4&gt;] ? jffs2_parse_options+0x594/0x594
 [&lt;ffffffff81819c94&gt;] ? mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x144/0x144
 [&lt;ffffffff81258757&gt;] ? free_pages+0x13/0x1c
 [&lt;ffffffff814fa0ac&gt;] ? selinux_sb_copy_data+0x278/0x2e0
 [&lt;ffffffff81492b35&gt;] jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
 [&lt;ffffffff81302fb7&gt;] mount_fs+0x63/0x230
 [&lt;ffffffff8133755f&gt;] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x32f/0x3b0
 [&lt;ffffffff81337f2c&gt;] vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
 [&lt;ffffffff8133ceec&gt;] do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
 [&lt;ffffffff811b94e0&gt;] ? audit_filter_rules.constprop.6+0x1d10/0x1d10
 [&lt;ffffffff8133c404&gt;] ? copy_mount_string+0x40/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff812cbf78&gt;] ? alloc_pages_current+0xa4/0x1bc
 [&lt;ffffffff81253a89&gt;] ? __get_free_pages+0x25/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff81338993&gt;] ? copy_mount_options.part.17+0x183/0x264
 [&lt;ffffffff8133e3a9&gt;] SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
 [&lt;ffffffff8133e2a4&gt;] ? copy_mnt_ns+0x560/0x560
 [&lt;ffffffff810e8391&gt;] ? msa_space_switch_handler+0x13d/0x190
 [&lt;ffffffff81be184a&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x97
 [&lt;ffffffff810e9274&gt;] ? msa_space_switch+0xb0/0xe0
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800842cf180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800842cf200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff8800842cf280: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc
                                                 ^
 ffff8800842cf300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800842cf380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kunkun Xu &lt;xukunkun1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: lizhe &lt;lizhe67@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 960b9a8a7676b9054d8b46a2c7db52a0c8766b56 upstream.

KASAN report a slab-out-of-bounds problem. The logs are listed below.
It is because in function jffs2_scan_dirent_node, we alloc "checkedlen+1"
bytes for fd-&gt;name and we check crc with length rd-&gt;nsize. If checkedlen
is less than rd-&gt;nsize, it will cause the slab-out-of-bounds problem.

jffs2: Dirent at *** has zeroes in name. Truncating to %d char
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260 at addr ffff8800842cf2d1
Read of size 1 by task test_JFFS2/915
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: G    B      O   ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40 age=0 cpu=1 pid=915
	___slab_alloc+0x580/0x5f0
	__slab_alloc.isra.24+0x4e/0x64
	__kmalloc+0x170/0x300
	jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40
	jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x1ca4/0x3b64
	jffs2_scan_medium+0x285/0xfe0
	jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x5fb/0x1bbc
	jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
	jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
	mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
	mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
	jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
	mount_fs+0x63/0x230
	vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
	do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
	SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
INFO: Freed in jffs2_free_full_dirent+0x22/0x40 age=27 cpu=1 pid=915
	__slab_free+0x372/0x4e4
	kfree+0x1d4/0x20c
	jffs2_free_full_dirent+0x22/0x40
	jffs2_build_remove_unlinked_inode+0x17a/0x1e4
	jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x1646/0x1bbc
	jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
	jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
	mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
	mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
	jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
	mount_fs+0x63/0x230
	vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
	do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
	SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x97
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff815befef&gt;] dump_stack+0x59/0x7e
 [&lt;ffffffff812d1d65&gt;] print_trailer+0x125/0x1b0
 [&lt;ffffffff812d82c8&gt;] object_err+0x34/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff812dadef&gt;] kasan_report.part.1+0x21f/0x534
 [&lt;ffffffff81132401&gt;] ? vprintk+0x2d/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff815f1ee2&gt;] ? crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260
 [&lt;ffffffff812db41a&gt;] kasan_report+0x26/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff812d9fc1&gt;] __asan_load1+0x3d/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff815f1ee2&gt;] crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260
 [&lt;ffffffff814764ae&gt;] ? jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff81485cec&gt;] jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x1d0c/0x3b64
 [&lt;ffffffff81488813&gt;] ? jffs2_scan_medium+0xccf/0xfe0
 [&lt;ffffffff81483fe0&gt;] ? jffs2_scan_make_ino_cache+0x14c/0x14c
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff812d5d90&gt;] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10c/0x2cc
 [&lt;ffffffff818169fb&gt;] ? mtd_point+0xf7/0x130
 [&lt;ffffffff81487dc9&gt;] jffs2_scan_medium+0x285/0xfe0
 [&lt;ffffffff81487b44&gt;] ? jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x3b64/0x3b64
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da3e9&gt;] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff812d57df&gt;] ? __kmalloc+0x12b/0x300
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff814a2753&gt;] ? jffs2_sum_init+0x9f/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff8148b2ff&gt;] jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x5fb/0x1bbc
 [&lt;ffffffff8148ad04&gt;] ? jffs2_del_noinode_dirent+0x640/0x640
 [&lt;ffffffff812da462&gt;] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff81127c5b&gt;] ? __init_rwsem+0x97/0xac
 [&lt;ffffffff81492349&gt;] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
 [&lt;ffffffff81493c5b&gt;] jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
 [&lt;ffffffff814939d4&gt;] ? jffs2_parse_options+0x594/0x594
 [&lt;ffffffff81819bea&gt;] mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
 [&lt;ffffffff81819eb6&gt;] mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
 [&lt;ffffffff814939d4&gt;] ? jffs2_parse_options+0x594/0x594
 [&lt;ffffffff81819c94&gt;] ? mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x144/0x144
 [&lt;ffffffff81258757&gt;] ? free_pages+0x13/0x1c
 [&lt;ffffffff814fa0ac&gt;] ? selinux_sb_copy_data+0x278/0x2e0
 [&lt;ffffffff81492b35&gt;] jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
 [&lt;ffffffff81302fb7&gt;] mount_fs+0x63/0x230
 [&lt;ffffffff8133755f&gt;] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x32f/0x3b0
 [&lt;ffffffff81337f2c&gt;] vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
 [&lt;ffffffff8133ceec&gt;] do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
 [&lt;ffffffff811b94e0&gt;] ? audit_filter_rules.constprop.6+0x1d10/0x1d10
 [&lt;ffffffff8133c404&gt;] ? copy_mount_string+0x40/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff812cbf78&gt;] ? alloc_pages_current+0xa4/0x1bc
 [&lt;ffffffff81253a89&gt;] ? __get_free_pages+0x25/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff81338993&gt;] ? copy_mount_options.part.17+0x183/0x264
 [&lt;ffffffff8133e3a9&gt;] SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
 [&lt;ffffffff8133e2a4&gt;] ? copy_mnt_ns+0x560/0x560
 [&lt;ffffffff810e8391&gt;] ? msa_space_switch_handler+0x13d/0x190
 [&lt;ffffffff81be184a&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x97
 [&lt;ffffffff810e9274&gt;] ? msa_space_switch+0xb0/0xe0
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800842cf180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800842cf200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff8800842cf280: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc
                                                 ^
 ffff8800842cf300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800842cf380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kunkun Xu &lt;xukunkun1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: lizhe &lt;lizhe67@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T21:39:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-23T21:39:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7d6beb71da3cc033649d641e1e608713b8220290'/>
<id>7d6beb71da3cc033649d641e1e608713b8220290</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jffs2: check the validity of dstlen in jffs2_zlib_compress()</title>
<updated>2021-02-12T20:53:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yang Yang</name>
<email>yang.yang29@zte.com.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-28T10:55:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=90ada91f4610c5ef11bc52576516d96c496fc3f1'/>
<id>90ada91f4610c5ef11bc52576516d96c496fc3f1</id>
<content type='text'>
KASAN reports a BUG when download file in jffs2 filesystem.It is
because when dstlen == 1, cpage_out will write array out of bounds.
Actually, data will not be compressed in jffs2_zlib_compress() if
data's length less than 4.

[  393.799778] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0 at addr ffff800062e3b281
[  393.809166] Write of size 1 by task tftp/2918
[  393.813526] CPU: 3 PID: 2918 Comm: tftp Tainted: G    B           4.9.115-rt93-EMBSYS-CGEL-6.1.R6-dirty #1
[  393.823173] Hardware name: LS1043A RDB Board (DT)
[  393.827870] Call trace:
[  393.830322] [&lt;ffff20000808c700&gt;] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2f0
[  393.835721] [&lt;ffff20000808ca04&gt;] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[  393.840774] [&lt;ffff2000086ef700&gt;] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0
[  393.845829] [&lt;ffff20000827b19c&gt;] kasan_object_err+0x24/0x80
[  393.851402] [&lt;ffff20000827b404&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x1b4/0x4d8
[  393.857323] [&lt;ffff20000827bae8&gt;] kasan_report+0x38/0x40
[  393.862548] [&lt;ffff200008279d44&gt;] __asan_store1+0x4c/0x58
[  393.867859] [&lt;ffff2000084ce2ec&gt;] jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0
[  393.873955] [&lt;ffff2000084bb3b0&gt;] jffs2_selected_compress+0x178/0x2a0
[  393.880308] [&lt;ffff2000084bb530&gt;] jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478
[  393.885796] [&lt;ffff2000084c5b34&gt;] jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450
[  393.892150] [&lt;ffff2000084be0b8&gt;] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[  393.897811] [&lt;ffff2000081f3008&gt;] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[  393.903990] [&lt;ffff2000081f5074&gt;] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[  393.910517] [&lt;ffff2000081f5210&gt;] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[  393.916870] [&lt;ffff20000829ec1c&gt;] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[  393.922181] [&lt;ffff20000829ff00&gt;] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[  393.927232] [&lt;ffff2000082a1ba8&gt;] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[  393.932283] [&lt;ffff20000808429c&gt;] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[  393.937851] Object at ffff800062e3b280, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
[  393.944197] Allocated:
[  393.946552] PID = 2918
[  393.948913]  save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220
[  393.953096]  save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20
[  393.956932]  kasan_kmalloc+0xd8/0x188
[  393.960594]  __kmalloc+0x144/0x238
[  393.963994]  jffs2_selected_compress+0x48/0x2a0
[  393.968524]  jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478
[  393.972273]  jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450
[  393.976889]  jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[  393.980810]  generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[  393.985251]  __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[  393.990040]  generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[  393.994655]  __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[  393.998228]  vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[  394.001543]  SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[  394.004856]  __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[  394.008684] Freed:
[  394.010691] PID = 2918
[  394.013051]  save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220
[  394.017233]  save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20
[  394.021069]  kasan_slab_free+0x88/0x188
[  394.024902]  kfree+0x6c/0x1d8
[  394.027868]  jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0x2c4/0x880
[  394.032486]  jffs2_do_reserve_space+0x198/0x598
[  394.037016]  jffs2_reserve_space+0x3f8/0x4d8
[  394.041286]  jffs2_write_inode_range+0xf0/0x450
[  394.045816]  jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[  394.049737]  generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[  394.054179]  __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[  394.058968]  generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[  394.063583]  __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[  394.067157]  vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[  394.070470]  SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[  394.073783]  __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[  394.077612] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  394.082404]  ffff800062e3b180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.089623]  ffff800062e3b200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.096842] &gt;ffff800062e3b280: 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.104056]                    ^
[  394.107283]  ffff800062e3b300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.114502]  ffff800062e3b380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.121718] ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Yang Yang &lt;yang.yang29@zte.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
KASAN reports a BUG when download file in jffs2 filesystem.It is
because when dstlen == 1, cpage_out will write array out of bounds.
Actually, data will not be compressed in jffs2_zlib_compress() if
data's length less than 4.

[  393.799778] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0 at addr ffff800062e3b281
[  393.809166] Write of size 1 by task tftp/2918
[  393.813526] CPU: 3 PID: 2918 Comm: tftp Tainted: G    B           4.9.115-rt93-EMBSYS-CGEL-6.1.R6-dirty #1
[  393.823173] Hardware name: LS1043A RDB Board (DT)
[  393.827870] Call trace:
[  393.830322] [&lt;ffff20000808c700&gt;] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2f0
[  393.835721] [&lt;ffff20000808ca04&gt;] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[  393.840774] [&lt;ffff2000086ef700&gt;] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0
[  393.845829] [&lt;ffff20000827b19c&gt;] kasan_object_err+0x24/0x80
[  393.851402] [&lt;ffff20000827b404&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x1b4/0x4d8
[  393.857323] [&lt;ffff20000827bae8&gt;] kasan_report+0x38/0x40
[  393.862548] [&lt;ffff200008279d44&gt;] __asan_store1+0x4c/0x58
[  393.867859] [&lt;ffff2000084ce2ec&gt;] jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0
[  393.873955] [&lt;ffff2000084bb3b0&gt;] jffs2_selected_compress+0x178/0x2a0
[  393.880308] [&lt;ffff2000084bb530&gt;] jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478
[  393.885796] [&lt;ffff2000084c5b34&gt;] jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450
[  393.892150] [&lt;ffff2000084be0b8&gt;] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[  393.897811] [&lt;ffff2000081f3008&gt;] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[  393.903990] [&lt;ffff2000081f5074&gt;] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[  393.910517] [&lt;ffff2000081f5210&gt;] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[  393.916870] [&lt;ffff20000829ec1c&gt;] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[  393.922181] [&lt;ffff20000829ff00&gt;] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[  393.927232] [&lt;ffff2000082a1ba8&gt;] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[  393.932283] [&lt;ffff20000808429c&gt;] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[  393.937851] Object at ffff800062e3b280, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
[  393.944197] Allocated:
[  393.946552] PID = 2918
[  393.948913]  save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220
[  393.953096]  save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20
[  393.956932]  kasan_kmalloc+0xd8/0x188
[  393.960594]  __kmalloc+0x144/0x238
[  393.963994]  jffs2_selected_compress+0x48/0x2a0
[  393.968524]  jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478
[  393.972273]  jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450
[  393.976889]  jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[  393.980810]  generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[  393.985251]  __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[  393.990040]  generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[  393.994655]  __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[  393.998228]  vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[  394.001543]  SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[  394.004856]  __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[  394.008684] Freed:
[  394.010691] PID = 2918
[  394.013051]  save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220
[  394.017233]  save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20
[  394.021069]  kasan_slab_free+0x88/0x188
[  394.024902]  kfree+0x6c/0x1d8
[  394.027868]  jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0x2c4/0x880
[  394.032486]  jffs2_do_reserve_space+0x198/0x598
[  394.037016]  jffs2_reserve_space+0x3f8/0x4d8
[  394.041286]  jffs2_write_inode_range+0xf0/0x450
[  394.045816]  jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0
[  394.049737]  generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280
[  394.054179]  __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228
[  394.058968]  generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288
[  394.063583]  __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238
[  394.067157]  vfs_write+0xd0/0x238
[  394.070470]  SyS_write+0xa0/0x110
[  394.073783]  __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[  394.077612] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  394.082404]  ffff800062e3b180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.089623]  ffff800062e3b200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.096842] &gt;ffff800062e3b280: 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.104056]                    ^
[  394.107283]  ffff800062e3b300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.114502]  ffff800062e3b380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  394.121718] ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Yang Yang &lt;yang.yang29@zte.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jffs2: fix use after free in jffs2_sum_write_data()</title>
<updated>2021-02-12T20:53:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
<email>trix@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-30T14:56:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=19646447ad3a680d2ab08c097585b7d96a66126b'/>
<id>19646447ad3a680d2ab08c097585b7d96a66126b</id>
<content type='text'>
clang static analysis reports this problem

fs/jffs2/summary.c:794:31: warning: Use of memory after it is freed
                c-&gt;summary-&gt;sum_list_head = temp-&gt;u.next;
                                            ^~~~~~~~~~~~

In jffs2_sum_write_data(), in a loop summary data is handles a node at
a time.  When it has written out the node it is removed the summary list,
and the node is deleted.  In the corner case when a
JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY is seen, a call is made to
jffs2_sum_disable_collecting().  jffs2_sum_disable_collecting() deletes
the whole list which conflicts with the loop's deleting the list by parts.

To preserve the old behavior of stopping the write midway, bail out of
the loop after disabling summary collection.

Fixes: 6171586a7ae5 ("[JFFS2] Correct handling of JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY nodes.")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
clang static analysis reports this problem

fs/jffs2/summary.c:794:31: warning: Use of memory after it is freed
                c-&gt;summary-&gt;sum_list_head = temp-&gt;u.next;
                                            ^~~~~~~~~~~~

In jffs2_sum_write_data(), in a loop summary data is handles a node at
a time.  When it has written out the node it is removed the summary list,
and the node is deleted.  In the corner case when a
JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY is seen, a call is made to
jffs2_sum_disable_collecting().  jffs2_sum_disable_collecting() deletes
the whole list which conflicts with the loop's deleting the list by parts.

To preserve the old behavior of stopping the write midway, bail out of
the loop after disabling summary collection.

Fixes: 6171586a7ae5 ("[JFFS2] Correct handling of JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY nodes.")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: make helpers idmap mount aware</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=549c7297717c32ee53f156cd949e055e601f67bb'/>
<id>549c7297717c32ee53f156cd949e055e601f67bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.

As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.

As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>acl: handle idmapped mounts</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e65ce2a50cf6af216bea6fd80d771fcbb4c0aaa1'/>
<id>e65ce2a50cf6af216bea6fd80d771fcbb4c0aaa1</id>
<content type='text'>
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.

The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.

In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the -&gt;set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.

The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.

In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the -&gt;set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>attr: handle idmapped mounts</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:27:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2f221d6f7b881d95de1f356a3097d755ab1e47d4'/>
<id>2f221d6f7b881d95de1f356a3097d755ab1e47d4</id>
<content type='text'>
When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jffs2: Fix NULL pointer dereference in rp_size fs option parsing</title>
<updated>2020-12-13T20:57:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jamie Iles</name>
<email>jamie@nuviainc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-12T13:12:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a61df3c413e49b0042f9caf774c58512d1cc71b7'/>
<id>a61df3c413e49b0042f9caf774c58512d1cc71b7</id>
<content type='text'>
syzkaller found the following JFFS2 splat:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffa00000000001
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x96000004
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
    CM = 0, WnR = 0
  [dfffa00000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges
  Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 12745 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G S                5.9.0-rc8+ #98
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
  pc : jffs2_parse_param+0x138/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:206
  lr : jffs2_parse_param+0x108/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:205
  sp : ffff000022a57910
  x29: ffff000022a57910 x28: 0000000000000000
  x27: ffff000057634008 x26: 000000000000d800
  x25: 000000000000d800 x24: ffff0000271a9000
  x23: ffffa0001adb5dc0 x22: ffff000023fdcf00
  x21: 1fffe0000454af2c x20: ffff000024cc9400
  x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa000102dbdd0
  x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffffa000109e44bc
  x13: ffffa00010a3a26c x12: ffff80000476e0b3
  x11: 1fffe0000476e0b2 x10: ffff80000476e0b2
  x9 : ffffa00010a3ad60 x8 : ffff000023b70593
  x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 00000000f1f1f1f1
  x5 : ffff000023fdcf00 x4 : 0000000000000002
  x3 : ffffa00010000000 x2 : 0000000000000001
  x1 : dfffa00000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008
  Call trace:
   jffs2_parse_param+0x138/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:206
   vfs_parse_fs_param+0x234/0x4e8 fs/fs_context.c:117
   vfs_parse_fs_string+0xe8/0x148 fs/fs_context.c:161
   generic_parse_monolithic+0x17c/0x208 fs/fs_context.c:201
   parse_monolithic_mount_data+0x7c/0xa8 fs/fs_context.c:649
   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2871 [inline]
   path_mount+0x548/0x1da8 fs/namespace.c:3192
   do_mount+0x124/0x138 fs/namespace.c:3205
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline]
   __arm64_sys_mount+0x164/0x238 fs/namespace.c:3390
   __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
   invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
   el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x15c/0x598 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:149
   do_el0_svc+0x60/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:195
   el0_svc+0x34/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:226
   el0_sync_handler+0xc8/0x5b4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:236
   el0_sync+0x15c/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:663
  Code: d2d40001 f2fbffe1 91002260 d343fc02 (38e16841)
  ---[ end trace 4edf690313deda44 ]---

This is because since ec10a24f10c8, the option parsing happens before
fill_super and so the MTD device isn't associated with the filesystem.
Defer the size check until there is a valid association.

Fixes: ec10a24f10c8 ("vfs: Convert jffs2 to use the new mount API")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie@nuviainc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
syzkaller found the following JFFS2 splat:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffa00000000001
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x96000004
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
    CM = 0, WnR = 0
  [dfffa00000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges
  Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 12745 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G S                5.9.0-rc8+ #98
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
  pc : jffs2_parse_param+0x138/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:206
  lr : jffs2_parse_param+0x108/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:205
  sp : ffff000022a57910
  x29: ffff000022a57910 x28: 0000000000000000
  x27: ffff000057634008 x26: 000000000000d800
  x25: 000000000000d800 x24: ffff0000271a9000
  x23: ffffa0001adb5dc0 x22: ffff000023fdcf00
  x21: 1fffe0000454af2c x20: ffff000024cc9400
  x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa000102dbdd0
  x15