[ Upstream commit 65c66047259fad1b868d4454bc5af95b46a5f954 ]

proc_mem_open() can return an errno, NULL, or mm_struct*.  If it fails to
acquire mm, it returns NULL, but the caller does not check for the case
when the return value is NULL.

The following conditions lead to failure in acquiring mm:

  - The task is a kernel thread (PF_KTHREAD)
  - The task is exiting (PF_EXITING)

Changes:

  - Add documentation comments for the return value of proc_mem_open().
  - Add checks in the caller to return -ESRCH when proc_mem_open()
    returns NULL.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250404063357.78891-1-superman.xpt@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+f9238a0a31f9b5603fef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000f52642060d4e3750@google.com
Signed-off-by: Penglei Jiang <superman.xpt@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Felix Moessbauer <felix.moessbauer@siemens.com>
Cc: Jeff layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xu xin <xu.xin16@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ acsjakub: applied cleanly ]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6287fbad1cd91f0c25cdc3a580499060828a8f30 ]

proc_pid_wchan() used to report kernel addresses to user space but that is
no longer the case today.  Bring the comment above proc_pid_wchan() in
sync with the implementation.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250319210222.1518771-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Fixes: b2f73922d119 ("fs/proc, core/debug: Don't expose absolute kernel addresses via wchan")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Implement the SCHED_DEADLINE server infrastructure - Daniel Bristot
   de Oliveira's last major contribution to the kernel:

     "SCHED_DEADLINE servers can help fixing starvation issues of low
      priority tasks (e.g., SCHED_OTHER) when higher priority tasks
      monopolize CPU cycles. Today we have RT Throttling; DEADLINE
      servers should be able to replace and improve that."

   (Daniel Bristot de Oliveira, Peter Zijlstra, Joel Fernandes, Youssef
   Esmat, Huang Shijie)

 - Preparatory changes for sched_ext integration:
     - Use set_next_task(.first) where required
     - Fix up set_next_task() implementations
     - Clean up DL server vs. core sched
     - Split up put_prev_task_balance()
     - Rework pick_next_task()
     - Combine the last put_prev_task() and the first set_next_task()
     - Rework dl_server
     - Add put_prev_task(.next)

   (Peter Zijlstra, with a fix by Tejun Heo)

 - Complete the EEVDF transition and refine EEVDF scheduling:
     - Implement delayed dequeue
     - Allow shorter slices to wakeup-preempt
     - Use sched_attr::sched_runtime to set request/slice suggestion
     - Document the new feature flags
     - Remove unused and duplicate-functionality fields
     - Simplify & unify pick_next_task_fair()
     - Misc debuggability enhancements

   (Peter Zijlstra, with fixes/cleanups by Dietmar Eggemann, Valentin
   Schneider and Chuyi Zhou)

 - Initialize the vruntime of a new task when it is first enqueued,
   resulting in significant decrease in latency of newly woken tasks
   (Zhang Qiao)

 - Introduce SM_IDLE and an idle re-entry fast-path in __schedule()
   (K Prateek Nayak, Peter Zijlstra)

 - Clean up and clarify the usage of Clean up usage of rt_task()
   (Qais Yousef)

 - Preempt SCHED_IDLE entities in strict cgroup hierarchies
   (Tianchen Ding)

 - Clarify the documentation of time units for deadline scheduler
   parameters (Christian Loehle)

 - Remove the HZ_BW chicken-bit feature flag introduced a year ago,
   the original change seems to be working fine (Phil Auld)

 - Misc fixes and cleanups (Chen Yu, Dan Carpenter, Huang Shijie,
   Peilin He, Qais Yousefm and Vincent Guittot)

* tag 'sched-core-2024-09-19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (64 commits)
  sched/cpufreq: Use NSEC_PER_MSEC for deadline task
  cpufreq/cppc: Use NSEC_PER_MSEC for deadline task
  sched/deadline: Clarify nanoseconds in uapi
  sched/deadline: Convert schedtool example to chrt
  sched/debug: Fix the runnable tasks output
  sched: Fix sched_delayed vs sched_core
  kernel/sched: Fix util_est accounting for DELAY_DEQUEUE
  kthread: Fix task state in kthread worker if being frozen
  sched/pelt: Use rq_clock_task() for hw_pressure
  sched/fair: Move effective_cpu_util() and effective_cpu_util() in fair.c
  sched/core: Introduce SM_IDLE and an idle re-entry fast-path in __schedule()
  sched: Add put_prev_task(.next)
  sched: Rework dl_server
  sched: Combine the last put_prev_task() and the first set_next_task()
  sched: Rework pick_next_task()
  sched: Split up put_prev_task_balance()
  sched: Clean up DL server vs core sched
  sched: Fixup set_next_task() implementations
  sched: Use set_next_task(.first) where required
  sched/fair: Properly deactivate sched_delayed task upon class change
  ...

Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Core:

   - Overhaul of posix-timers in preparation of removing the workaround
     for periodic timers which have signal delivery ignored.

   - Remove the historical extra jiffie in msleep()

     msleep() adds an extra jiffie to the timeout value to ensure
     minimal sleep time. The timer wheel ensures minimal sleep time
     since the large rewrite to a non-cascading wheel, but the extra
     jiffie in msleep() remained unnoticed. Remove it.

   - Make the timer slack handling correct for realtime tasks.

     The procfs interface is inconsistent and does neither reflect
     reality nor conforms to the man page. Show the correct 0 slack for
     real time tasks and enforce it at the core level instead of having
     inconsistent individual checks in various timer setup functions.

   - The usual set of updates and enhancements all over the place.

  Drivers:

   - Allow the ACPI PM timer to be turned off during suspend

   - No new drivers

   - The usual updates and enhancements in various drivers"

* tag 'timers-core-2024-09-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (43 commits)
  ntp: Make sure RTC is synchronized when time goes backwards
  treewide: Fix wrong singular form of jiffies in comments
  cpu: Use already existing usleep_range()
  timers: Rename next_expiry_recalc() to be unique
  platform/x86:intel/pmc: Fix comment for the pmc_core_acpi_pm_timer_suspend_resume function
  clocksource/drivers/jcore: Use request_percpu_irq()
  clocksource/drivers/cadence-ttc: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in ttc_setup_clockevent
  clocksource/drivers/asm9260: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in asm9260_timer_init
  clocksource/drivers/qcom: Add missing iounmap() on errors in msm_dt_timer_init()
  clocksource/drivers/ingenic: Use devm_clk_get_enabled() helpers
  platform/x86:intel/pmc: Enable the ACPI PM Timer to be turned off when suspended
  clocksource: acpi_pm: Add external callback for suspend/resume
  clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Using for_each_available_child_of_node_scoped()
  dt-bindings: timer: rockchip: Add rk3576 compatible
  timers: Annotate possible non critical data race of next_expiry
  timers: Remove historical extra jiffie for timeout in msleep()
  hrtimer: Use and report correct timerslack values for realtime tasks
  hrtimer: Annotate hrtimer_cpu_base_.*_expiry() for sparse.
  timers: Add sparse annotation for timer_sync_wait_running().
  signal: Replace BUG_ON()s
  ...

Pull procfs updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the following changes for procfs:

   - Add config options and parameters to block forcing memory writes.

     This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing the
     FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/<pid>/mem write calls as this can be
     used in various attacks.

     The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because it can
     break GDB and some other use cases.

     This is the simpler version that you had requested.

   - Restrict overmounting of ephemeral entities.

     It is currently possible to mount on top of various ephemeral
     entities in procfs. This specifically includes magic links. To
     recap, magic links are links of the form /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr>. They
     serve as references to a target file and during path lookup they
     cause a jump to the target path. Such magic links disappear if the
     corresponding file descriptor is closed.

     Currently it is possible to overmount such magic links. This is
     mostly interesting for an attacker that wants to somehow trick a
     process into e.g., reopening something that it didn't intend to
     reopen or to hide a malicious file descriptor.

     But also it risks leaking mounts for long-running processes. When
     overmounting a magic link like above, the mount will not be
     detached when the file descriptor is closed. Only the target
     mountpoint will disappear. Which has the consequence of making it
     impossible to unmount that mount afterwards. So the mount will
     stick around until the process exits and the /proc/<pid>/ directory
     is cleaned up during proc_flush_pid() when the dentries are pruned
     and invalidated.

     That in turn means it's possible for a program to accidentally leak
     mounts and it's also possible to make a task leak mounts without
     it's knowledge if the attacker just keeps overmounting things under
     /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr>.

     Disallow overmounting of such ephemeral entities.

   - Cleanup the readdir method naming in some procfs file operations.

   - Replace kmalloc() and strcpy() with a simple kmemdup() call"

* tag 'vfs-6.12.procfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  proc: fold kmalloc() + strcpy() into kmemdup()
  proc: block mounting on top of /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/*
  proc: block mounting on top of /proc/<pid>/fd/*
  proc: block mounting on top of /proc/<pid>/map_files/*
  proc: add proc_splice_unmountable()
  proc: proc_readfdinfo() -> proc_fdinfo_iterate()
  proc: proc_readfd() -> proc_fd_iterate()
  proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes

Pull vfs file updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This is the work to cleanup and shrink struct file significantly.

  Right now, (focusing on x86) struct file is 232 bytes. After this
  series struct file will be 184 bytes aka 3 cacheline and a spare 8
  bytes for future extensions at the end of the struct.

  With struct file being as ubiquitous as it is this should make a
  difference for file heavy workloads and allow further optimizations in
  the future.

   - struct fown_struct was embedded into struct file letting it take up
     32 bytes in total when really it shouldn't even be embedded in
     struct file in the first place. Instead, actual users of struct
     fown_struct now allocate the struct on demand. This frees up 24
     bytes.

   - Move struct file_ra_state into the union containg the cleanup hooks
     and move f_iocb_flags out of the union. This closes a 4 byte hole
     we created earlier and brings struct file to 192 bytes. Which means
     struct file is 3 cachelines and we managed to shrink it by 40
     bytes.

   - Reorder struct file so that nothing crosses a cacheline.

     I suspect that in the future we will end up reordering some members
     to mitigate false sharing issues or just because someone does
     actually provide really good perf data.

   - Shrinking struct file to 192 bytes is only part of the work.

     Files use a slab that is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and when a kmem cache
     is created with SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU the free pointer must be
     located outside of the object because the cache doesn't know what
     part of the memory can safely be overwritten as it may be needed to
     prevent object recycling.

     That has the consequence that SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU may end up
     adding a new cacheline.

     So this also contains work to add a new kmem_cache_create_rcu()
     function that allows the caller to specify an offset where the
     freelist pointer is supposed to be placed. Thus avoiding the
     implicit addition of a fourth cacheline.

   - And finally this removes the f_version member in struct file.

     The f_version member isn't particularly well-defined. It is mainly
     used as a cookie to detect concurrent seeks when iterating
     directories. But it is also abused by some subsystems for
     completely unrelated things.

     It is mostly a directory and filesystem specific thing that doesn't
     really need to live in struct file and with its wonky semantics it
     really lacks a specific function.

     For pipes, f_version is (ab)used to defer poll notifications until
     a write has happened. And struct pipe_inode_info is used by
     multiple struct files in their ->private_data so there's no chance
     of pushing that down into file->private_data without introducing
     another pointer indirection.

     But pipes don't rely on f_pos_lock so this adds a union into struct
     file encompassing f_pos_lock and a pipe specific f_pipe member that
     pipes can use. This union of course can be extended to other file
     types and is similar to what we do in struct inode already"

* tag 'vfs-6.12.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (26 commits)
  fs: remove f_version
  pipe: use f_pipe
  fs: add f_pipe
  ubifs: store cookie in private data
  ufs: store cookie in private data
  udf: store cookie in private data
  proc: store cookie in private data
  ocfs2: store cookie in private data
  input: remove f_version abuse
  ext4: store cookie in private data
  ext2: store cookie in private data
  affs: store cookie in private data
  fs: add generic_llseek_cookie()
  fs: use must_set_pos()
  fs: add must_set_pos()
  fs: add vfs_setpos_cookie()
  s390: remove unused f_version
  ceph: remove unused f_version
  adi: remove unused f_version
  mm: Removed @freeptr_offset to prevent doc warning
  ...

Store the cookie to detect concurrent seeks on directories in
file->private_data.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240830-vfs-file-f_version-v1-14-6d3e4816aa7b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

This is another flag that is statically set and doesn't need to use up
an FMODE_* bit. Move it to ->fop_flags and free up another FMODE_* bit.

(1) mem_open() used from proc_mem_operations
(2) adi_open() used from adi_fops
(3) drm_open_helper():
    (3.1) accel_open() used from DRM_ACCEL_FOPS
    (3.2) drm_open() used from
    (3.2.1) amdgpu_driver_kms_fops
    (3.2.2) psb_gem_fops
    (3.2.3) i915_driver_fops
    (3.2.4) nouveau_driver_fops
    (3.2.5) panthor_drm_driver_fops
    (3.2.6) radeon_driver_kms_fops
    (3.2.7) tegra_drm_fops
    (3.2.8) vmwgfx_driver_fops
    (3.2.9) xe_driver_fops
    (3.2.10) DRM_GEM_FOPS
    (3.2.11) DEFINE_DRM_GEM_DMA_FOPS
(4) struct memdev sets fmode flags based on type of device opened. For
    devices using struct mem_fops unsigned offset is used.

Mark all these file operations as FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET and add asserts
into the open helper to ensure that the flag is always set.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240809-work-fop_unsigned-v1-1-658e054d893e@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> says:

It is currently possible to mount on top of various ephemeral entities
in procfs. This specifically includes magic links. To recap, magic links
are links of the form /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr>. They serve as references to
a target file and during path lookup they cause a jump to the target
path. Such magic links disappear if the corresponding file descriptor is
closed.

Currently it is possible to overmount such magic links:

int fd = open("/mnt/foo", O_RDONLY);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/fd/%d", getpid(), fd);
int fd2 = openat(AT_FDCWD, path, O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);
mount("/mnt/bar", path, "", MS_BIND, 0);

Arguably, this is nonsensical and is mostly interesting for an attacker
that wants to somehow trick a process into e.g., reopening something
that they didn't intend to reopen or to hide a malicious file
descriptor.

But also it risks leaking mounts for long-running processes. When
overmounting a magic link like above, the mount will not be detached
when the file descriptor is closed. Only the target mountpoint will
disappear. Which has the consequence of making it impossible to unmount
that mount afterwards. So the mount will stick around until the process
exits and the /proc/<pid>/ directory is cleaned up during
proc_flush_pid() when the dentries are pruned and invalidated.

That in turn means it's possible for a program to accidentally leak
mounts and it's also possible to make a task leak mounts without it's
knowledge if the attacker just keeps overmounting things under
/proc/<pid>/fd/<nr>.

I think it's wrong to try and fix this by us starting to play games with
close() or somewhere else to undo these mounts when the file descriptor
is closed. The fact that we allow overmounting of such magic links is
simply a bug and one that we need to fix.

Similar things can be said about entries under fdinfo/ and map_files/ so
those are restricted as well.

I have a further more aggressive patch that gets out the big hammer and
makes everything under /proc/<pid>/*, as well as immediate symlinks such
as /proc/self, /proc/thread-self, /proc/mounts, /proc/net that point
into /proc/<pid>/ not overmountable. Imho, all of this should be blocked
if we can get away with it. It's only useful to hide exploits such as in [1].

And again, overmounting of any global procfs files remains unaffected
and is an existing and supported use-case.

Link: https://righteousit.com/2024/07/24/hiding-linux-processes-with-bind-mounts [1]

// Note that repro uses the traditional way of just mounting over
// /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr>. This could also all be achieved just based on
// file descriptors using move_mount(). So /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr> isn't the
// only entry vector here. It's also possible to e.g., mount directly
// onto /proc/<pid>/map_files/* without going over /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr>.
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        char path[PATH_MAX];

        creat("/mnt/foo", 0777);
        creat("/mnt/bar", 0777);

        /*
         * For illustration use a bunch of file descriptors in the upper
         * range that are unused.
         */
        for (int i = 10000; i >= 256; i--) {
                printf("I'm: /proc/%d/\n", getpid());

                int fd2 = open("/mnt/foo", O_RDONLY);
                if (fd2 < 0) {
                        printf("%m - Failed to open\n");
                        _exit(1);
                }

                int newfd = dup2(fd2, i);
                if (newfd < 0) {
                        printf("%m - Failed to dup\n");
                        _exit(1);
                }
                close(fd2);

                sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/fd/%d", getpid(), newfd);
                int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, path, O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);
                if (fd < 0) {
                        printf("%m - Failed to open\n");
                        _exit(3);
                }

                sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/fd/%d", getpid(), fd);
                printf("Mounting on top of %s\n", path);
                if (mount("/mnt/bar", path, "", MS_BIND, 0)) {
                        printf("%m - Failed to mount\n");
                        _exit(4);
                }

                close(newfd);
                close(fd2);
        }

        /*
         * Give some time to look at things. The mounts now linger until
         * the process exits.
         */
        sleep(10000);
        _exit(0);
}

* patches from https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240806-work-procfs-v1-0-fb04e1d09f0c@kernel.org:
  proc: block mounting on top of /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/*
  proc: block mounting on top of /proc/<pid>/fd/*
  proc: block mounting on top of /proc/<pid>/map_files/*
  proc: add proc_splice_unmountable()
  proc: proc_readfdinfo() -> proc_fdinfo_iterate()
  proc: proc_readfd() -> proc_fd_iterate()

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240806-work-procfs-v1-0-fb04e1d09f0c@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Entries under /proc/<pid>/map_files/* are ephemeral and may go away
before the process dies. As such allowing them to be used as mount
points creates the ability to leak mounts that linger until the process
dies with no ability to unmount them until then. Don't allow using them
as mountpoints.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240806-work-procfs-v1-4-fb04e1d09f0c@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>