commit 578bdaabd015b9b164842c3e8ace9802f38e7ecc upstream.

These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit bb29648102335586e9a66289a1d98a0cb392b6e5 upstream.

syzbot reported a crash in vmac_final() when multiple threads
concurrently use the same "vmac(aes)" transform through AF_ALG.  The bug
is pretty fundamental: the VMAC template doesn't separate per-request
state from per-tfm (per-key) state like the other hash algorithms do,
but rather stores it all in the tfm context.  That's wrong.

Also, vmac_final() incorrectly zeroes most of the state including the
derived keys and cached pseudorandom pad.  Therefore, only the first
VMAC invocation with a given key calculates the correct digest.

Fix these bugs by splitting the per-tfm state from the per-request state
and using the proper init/update/final sequencing for requests.

Reproducer for the crash:

    #include <linux/if_alg.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>
    #include <unistd.h>

    int main()
    {
            int fd;
            struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
                    .salg_type = "hash",
                    .salg_name = "vmac(aes)",
            };
            char buf[256] = { 0 };

            fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
            bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
            setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buf, 16);
            fork();
            fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
            for (;;)
                    write(fd, buf, 256);
    }

The immediate cause of the crash is that vmac_ctx_t.partial_size exceeds
VMAC_NHBYTES, causing vmac_final() to memset() a negative length.

Reported-by: syzbot+264bca3a6e8d645550d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f1939f7c5645 ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.32+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The poll() changes were not well thought out, and completely
unexplained.  They also caused a huge performance regression, because
"->poll()" was no longer a trivial file operation that just called down
to the underlying file operations, but instead did at least two indirect
calls.

Indirect calls are sadly slow now with the Spectre mitigation, but the
performance problem could at least be largely mitigated by changing the
"->get_poll_head()" operation to just have a per-file-descriptor pointer
to the poll head instead.  That gets rid of one of the new indirections.

But that doesn't fix the new complexity that is completely unwarranted
for the regular case.  The (undocumented) reason for the poll() changes
was some alleged AIO poll race fixing, but we don't make the common case
slower and more complex for some uncommon special case, so this all
really needs way more explanations and most likely a fundamental
redesign.

[ This revert is a revert of about 30 different commits, not reverted
  individually because that would just be unnecessarily messy  - Linus ]

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
 "API:

   - Decryption test vectors are now automatically generated from
     encryption test vectors.

  Algorithms:

   - Fix unaligned access issues in crc32/crc32c.

   - Add zstd compression algorithm.

   - Add AEGIS.

   - Add MORUS.

  Drivers:

   - Add accelerated AEGIS/MORUS on x86.

   - Add accelerated SM4 on arm64.

   - Removed x86 assembly salsa implementation as it is slower than C.

   - Add authenc(hmac(sha*), cbc(aes)) support in inside-secure.

   - Add ctr(aes) support in crypto4xx.

   - Add hardware key support in ccree.

   - Add support for new Centaur CPU in via-rng"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (112 commits)
  crypto: chtls - free beyond end rspq_skb_cache
  crypto: chtls - kbuild warnings
  crypto: chtls - dereference null variable
  crypto: chtls - wait for memory sendmsg, sendpage
  crypto: chtls - key len correction
  crypto: salsa20 - Revert "crypto: salsa20 - export generic helpers"
  crypto: x86/salsa20 - remove x86 salsa20 implementations
  crypto: ccp - Add GET_ID SEV command
  crypto: ccp - Add DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE SEV command
  crypto: qat - Add MODULE_FIRMWARE for all qat drivers
  crypto: ccree - silence debug prints
  crypto: ccree - better clock handling
  crypto: ccree - correct host regs offset
  crypto: chelsio - Remove separate buffer used for DMA map B0 block in CCM
  crypt: chelsio - Send IV as Immediate for cipher algo
  crypto: chelsio - Return -ENOSPC for transient busy indication.
  crypto: caam/qi - fix warning in init_cgr()
  crypto: caam - fix rfc4543 descriptors
  crypto: caam - fix MC firmware detection
  crypto: clarify licensing of OpenSSL asm code
  ...

This reverts commit eb772f37ae8163a89e28a435f6a18742ae06653b, as now the
x86 Salsa20 implementation has been removed and the generic helpers are
no longer needed outside of salsa20_generic.c.

We could keep this just in case someone else wants to add a new
optimized Salsa20 implementation.  But given that we have ChaCha20 now
too, I think it's unlikely.  And this can always be reverted back.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

This patch adds a common glue code for optimized implementations of
MORUS AEAD algorithms.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch adds the generic implementation of the MORUS family of AEAD
algorithms (MORUS-640 and MORUS-1280). The original authors of MORUS
are Hongjun Wu and Tao Huang.

At the time of writing, MORUS is one of the finalists in CAESAR, an
open competition intended to select a portfolio of alternatives to
the problematic AES-GCM:

https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html
https://competitions.cr.yp.to/round3/morusv2.pdf

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In preparation of adding support for the SIMD based arm64 implementation
of arm64, which requires a fallback to non-SIMD code when invoked in
certain contexts, expose the generic SM4 encrypt and decrypt routines
to other drivers.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In preparation for the removal of VLAs[1] from crypto code.
We create 2 new compile-time constants: all ciphers implemented
in Linux have a block size less than or equal to 16 bytes and
the most demanding hw require 16 bytes alignment for the block
buffer.
We also enforce these limits in crypto_check_alg when a new
cipher is registered.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>