<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/include/linux, branch v4.19.59</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>VMCI: Fix integer overflow in VMCI handle arrays</title>
<updated>2019-07-14T06:11:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vishnu DASA</name>
<email>vdasa@vmware.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-24T15:13:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d202b5adccfb093c4859d67ec74d5f3fb9fcfc54'/>
<id>d202b5adccfb093c4859d67ec74d5f3fb9fcfc54</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c2eb5b2853c9f513690ba6b71072d8eb65da16a upstream.

The VMCI handle array has an integer overflow in
vmci_handle_arr_append_entry when it tries to expand the array. This can be
triggered from a guest, since the doorbell link hypercall doesn't impose a
limit on the number of doorbell handles that a VM can create in the
hypervisor, and these handles are stored in a handle array.

In this change, we introduce a mandatory max capacity for handle
arrays/lists to avoid excessive memory usage.

Signed-off-by: Vishnu Dasa &lt;vdasa@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Adit Ranadive &lt;aditr@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen &lt;jhansen@vmware.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1c2eb5b2853c9f513690ba6b71072d8eb65da16a upstream.

The VMCI handle array has an integer overflow in
vmci_handle_arr_append_entry when it tries to expand the array. This can be
triggered from a guest, since the doorbell link hypercall doesn't impose a
limit on the number of doorbell handles that a VM can create in the
hypervisor, and these handles are stored in a handle array.

In this change, we introduce a mandatory max capacity for handle
arrays/lists to avoid excessive memory usage.

Signed-off-by: Vishnu Dasa &lt;vdasa@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Adit Ranadive &lt;aditr@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen &lt;jhansen@vmware.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE &gt;= 64K</title>
<updated>2019-07-10T07:53:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-11T11:14:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=54e8cf41b20b9e9952c7e563794efcbc5d47e891'/>
<id>54e8cf41b20b9e9952c7e563794efcbc5d47e891</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fdadd04931c2d7cd294dc5b2b342863f94be53a3 ]

Michael and Sandipan report:

  Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF
  JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000,
  and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined.

  For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with
  the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when
  using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit
  value:

  root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit
  -1673527296

  and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network
  stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported:

  setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8},
             16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524)

  and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't
  always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent
  failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9
  host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC
  with no noticeable errors in the logs.

Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like
arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should
get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For
4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec()
so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper
function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving
the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init().

Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new
bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default
JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom
module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for
vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}.

Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change
the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions
in future.

Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Reported-by: Sandipan Das &lt;sandipan@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Michael Roth &lt;mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Roth &lt;mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fdadd04931c2d7cd294dc5b2b342863f94be53a3 ]

Michael and Sandipan report:

  Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF
  JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000,
  and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined.

  For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with
  the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when
  using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit
  value:

  root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit
  -1673527296

  and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network
  stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported:

  setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8},
             16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524)

  and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't
  always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent
  failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9
  host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC
  with no noticeable errors in the logs.

Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like
arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should
get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For
4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec()
so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper
function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving
the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init().

Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new
bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default
JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom
module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for
vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}.

Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change
the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions
in future.

Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Reported-by: Sandipan Das &lt;sandipan@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Michael Roth &lt;mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Roth &lt;mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix unconnected udp hooks</title>
<updated>2019-07-03T11:14:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-06T23:48:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=613bc37f74c9b2249acbe1a5a80867547f13611a'/>
<id>613bc37f74c9b2249acbe1a5a80867547f13611a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 983695fa676568fc0fe5ddd995c7267aabc24632 upstream.

Intention of cgroup bind/connect/sendmsg BPF hooks is to act transparently
to applications as also stated in original motivation in 7828f20e3779 ("Merge
branch 'bpf-cgroup-bind-connect'"). When recently integrating the latter
two hooks into Cilium to enable host based load-balancing with Kubernetes,
I ran into the issue that pods couldn't start up as DNS got broken. Kubernetes
typically sets up DNS as a service and is thus subject to load-balancing.

Upon further debugging, it turns out that the cgroupv2 sendmsg BPF hooks API
is currently insufficient and thus not usable as-is for standard applications
shipped with most distros. To break down the issue we ran into with a simple
example:

  # cat /etc/resolv.conf
  nameserver 147.75.207.207
  nameserver 147.75.207.208

For the purpose of a simple test, we set up above IPs as service IPs and
transparently redirect traffic to a different DNS backend server for that
node:

  # cilium service list
  ID   Frontend            Backend
  1    147.75.207.207:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53
  2    147.75.207.208:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53

The attached BPF program is basically selecting one of the backends if the
service IP/port matches on the cgroup hook. DNS breaks here, because the
hooks are not transparent enough to applications which have built-in msg_name
address checks:

  # nslookup 1.1.1.1
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  [...]
  ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached

  # dig 1.1.1.1
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  [...]

  ; &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; 1.1.1.1
  ;; global options: +cmd
  ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached

For comparison, if none of the service IPs is used, and we tell nslookup
to use 8.8.8.8 directly it works just fine, of course:

  # nslookup 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8
  1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa	name = one.one.one.one.

In order to fix this and thus act more transparent to the application,
this needs reverse translation on recvmsg() side. A minimal fix for this
API is to add similar recvmsg() hooks behind the BPF cgroups static key
such that the program can track state and replace the current sockaddr_in{,6}
with the original service IP. From BPF side, this basically tracks the
service tuple plus socket cookie in an LRU map where the reverse NAT can
then be retrieved via map value as one example. Side-note: the BPF cgroups
static key should be converted to a per-hook static key in future.

Same example after this fix:

  # cilium service list
  ID   Frontend            Backend
  1    147.75.207.207:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53
  2    147.75.207.208:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53

Lookups work fine now:

  # nslookup 1.1.1.1
  1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa    name = one.one.one.one.

  Authoritative answers can be found from:

  # dig 1.1.1.1

  ; &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; 1.1.1.1
  ;; global options: +cmd
  ;; Got answer:
  ;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 51550
  ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1

  ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
  ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 512
  ;; QUESTION SECTION:
  ;1.1.1.1.                       IN      A

  ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
  .                       23426   IN      SOA     a.root-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2019052001 1800 900 604800 86400

  ;; Query time: 17 msec
  ;; SERVER: 147.75.207.207#53(147.75.207.207)
  ;; WHEN: Tue May 21 12:59:38 UTC 2019
  ;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 111

And from an actual packet level it shows that we're using the back end
server when talking via 147.75.207.20{7,8} front end:

  # tcpdump -i any udp
  [...]
  12:59:52.698732 IP foo.42011 &gt; google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
  12:59:52.698735 IP foo.42011 &gt; google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
  12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain &gt; foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
  12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain &gt; foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
  [...]

In order to be flexible and to have same semantics as in sendmsg BPF
programs, we only allow return codes in [1,1] range. In the sendmsg case
the program is called if msg-&gt;msg_name is present which can be the case
in both, connected and unconnected UDP.

The former only relies on the sockaddr_in{,6} passed via connect(2) if
passed msg-&gt;msg_name was NULL. Therefore, on recvmsg side, we act in similar
way to call into the BPF program whenever a non-NULL msg-&gt;msg_name was
passed independent of sk-&gt;sk_state being TCP_ESTABLISHED or not. Note
that for TCP case, the msg-&gt;msg_name is ignored in the regular recvmsg
path and therefore not relevant.

For the case of ip{,v6}_recv_error() paths, picked up via MSG_ERRQUEUE,
the hook is not called. This is intentional as it aligns with the same
semantics as in case of TCP cgroup BPF hooks right now. This might be
better addressed in future through a different bpf_attach_type such
that this case can be distinguished from the regular recvmsg paths,
for example.

Fixes: 1cedee13d25a ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov &lt;rdna@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martynas Pumputis &lt;m@lambda.lt&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 983695fa676568fc0fe5ddd995c7267aabc24632 upstream.

Intention of cgroup bind/connect/sendmsg BPF hooks is to act transparently
to applications as also stated in original motivation in 7828f20e3779 ("Merge
branch 'bpf-cgroup-bind-connect'"). When recently integrating the latter
two hooks into Cilium to enable host based load-balancing with Kubernetes,
I ran into the issue that pods couldn't start up as DNS got broken. Kubernetes
typically sets up DNS as a service and is thus subject to load-balancing.

Upon further debugging, it turns out that the cgroupv2 sendmsg BPF hooks API
is currently insufficient and thus not usable as-is for standard applications
shipped with most distros. To break down the issue we ran into with a simple
example:

  # cat /etc/resolv.conf
  nameserver 147.75.207.207
  nameserver 147.75.207.208

For the purpose of a simple test, we set up above IPs as service IPs and
transparently redirect traffic to a different DNS backend server for that
node:

  # cilium service list
  ID   Frontend            Backend
  1    147.75.207.207:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53
  2    147.75.207.208:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53

The attached BPF program is basically selecting one of the backends if the
service IP/port matches on the cgroup hook. DNS breaks here, because the
hooks are not transparent enough to applications which have built-in msg_name
address checks:

  # nslookup 1.1.1.1
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  [...]
  ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached

  # dig 1.1.1.1
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
  ;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
  [...]

  ; &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; 1.1.1.1
  ;; global options: +cmd
  ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached

For comparison, if none of the service IPs is used, and we tell nslookup
to use 8.8.8.8 directly it works just fine, of course:

  # nslookup 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8
  1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa	name = one.one.one.one.

In order to fix this and thus act more transparent to the application,
this needs reverse translation on recvmsg() side. A minimal fix for this
API is to add similar recvmsg() hooks behind the BPF cgroups static key
such that the program can track state and replace the current sockaddr_in{,6}
with the original service IP. From BPF side, this basically tracks the
service tuple plus socket cookie in an LRU map where the reverse NAT can
then be retrieved via map value as one example. Side-note: the BPF cgroups
static key should be converted to a per-hook static key in future.

Same example after this fix:

  # cilium service list
  ID   Frontend            Backend
  1    147.75.207.207:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53
  2    147.75.207.208:53   1 =&gt; 8.8.8.8:53

Lookups work fine now:

  # nslookup 1.1.1.1
  1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa    name = one.one.one.one.

  Authoritative answers can be found from:

  # dig 1.1.1.1

  ; &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; 1.1.1.1
  ;; global options: +cmd
  ;; Got answer:
  ;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 51550
  ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1

  ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
  ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 512
  ;; QUESTION SECTION:
  ;1.1.1.1.                       IN      A

  ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
  .                       23426   IN      SOA     a.root-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2019052001 1800 900 604800 86400

  ;; Query time: 17 msec
  ;; SERVER: 147.75.207.207#53(147.75.207.207)
  ;; WHEN: Tue May 21 12:59:38 UTC 2019
  ;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 111

And from an actual packet level it shows that we're using the back end
server when talking via 147.75.207.20{7,8} front end:

  # tcpdump -i any udp
  [...]
  12:59:52.698732 IP foo.42011 &gt; google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
  12:59:52.698735 IP foo.42011 &gt; google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
  12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain &gt; foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
  12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain &gt; foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
  [...]

In order to be flexible and to have same semantics as in sendmsg BPF
programs, we only allow return codes in [1,1] range. In the sendmsg case
the program is called if msg-&gt;msg_name is present which can be the case
in both, connected and unconnected UDP.

The former only relies on the sockaddr_in{,6} passed via connect(2) if
passed msg-&gt;msg_name was NULL. Therefore, on recvmsg side, we act in similar
way to call into the BPF program whenever a non-NULL msg-&gt;msg_name was
passed independent of sk-&gt;sk_state being TCP_ESTABLISHED or not. Note
that for TCP case, the msg-&gt;msg_name is ignored in the regular recvmsg
path and therefore not relevant.

For the case of ip{,v6}_recv_error() paths, picked up via MSG_ERRQUEUE,
the hook is not called. This is intentional as it aligns with the same
semantics as in case of TCP cgroup BPF hooks right now. This might be
better addressed in future through a different bpf_attach_type such
that this case can be distinguished from the regular recvmsg paths,
for example.

Fixes: 1cedee13d25a ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov &lt;rdna@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martynas Pumputis &lt;m@lambda.lt&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SUNRPC: Clean up initialisation of the struct rpc_rqst</title>
<updated>2019-07-03T11:14:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T18:24:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=dd9f2fb59e0134b5759857d24d223ee1e1ef3d1a'/>
<id>dd9f2fb59e0134b5759857d24d223ee1e1ef3d1a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9dc6edcf676fe188430e8b119f91280bbf285163 upstream.

Move the initialisation back into xprt.c.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Cc: Yihao Wu &lt;wuyihao@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Caspar Zhang &lt;caspar@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9dc6edcf676fe188430e8b119f91280bbf285163 upstream.

Move the initialisation back into xprt.c.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Cc: Yihao Wu &lt;wuyihao@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Caspar Zhang &lt;caspar@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mmc: core: Add sdio_retune_hold_now() and sdio_retune_release()</title>
<updated>2019-06-25T03:35:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Douglas Anderson</name>
<email>dianders@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-17T17:56:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0349dbebbb0becda11953b3f633528d68780bc7e'/>
<id>0349dbebbb0becda11953b3f633528d68780bc7e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b4c9f938d542d5f88c501744d2d12fad4fd2915f upstream.

We want SDIO drivers to be able to temporarily stop retuning when the
driver knows that the SDIO card is not in a state where retuning will
work (maybe because the card is asleep).  We'll move the relevant
functions to a place where drivers can call them.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kalle Valo &lt;kvalo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b4c9f938d542d5f88c501744d2d12fad4fd2915f upstream.

We want SDIO drivers to be able to temporarily stop retuning when the
driver knows that the SDIO card is not in a state where retuning will
work (maybe because the card is asleep).  We'll move the relevant
functions to a place where drivers can call them.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kalle Valo &lt;kvalo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mmc: core: API to temporarily disable retuning for SDIO CRC errors</title>
<updated>2019-06-25T03:35:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Douglas Anderson</name>
<email>dianders@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-17T17:56:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7ed49e1bf5b398940137ba4e13fea0f03994dc84'/>
<id>7ed49e1bf5b398940137ba4e13fea0f03994dc84</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a55f4ab9678413a01e740c86e9367ba0c612b36 upstream.

Normally when the MMC core sees an "-EILSEQ" error returned by a host
controller then it will trigger a retuning of the card.  This is
generally a good idea.

However, if a command is expected to sometimes cause transfer errors
then these transfer errors shouldn't cause a re-tuning.  This
re-tuning will be a needless waste of time.  One example case where a
transfer is expected to cause errors is when transitioning between
idle (sometimes referred to as "sleep" in Broadcom code) and active
state on certain Broadcom WiFi SDIO cards.  Specifically if the card
was already transitioning between states when the command was sent it
could cause an error on the SDIO bus.

Let's add an API that the SDIO function drivers can call that will
temporarily disable the auto-tuning functionality.  Then we can add a
call to this in the Broadcom WiFi driver and any other driver that
might have similar needs.

NOTE: this makes the assumption that the card is already tuned well
enough that it's OK to disable the auto-retuning during one of these
error-prone situations.  Presumably the driver code performing the
error-prone transfer knows how to recover / retry from errors.  ...and
after we can get back to a state where transfers are no longer
error-prone then we can enable the auto-retuning again.  If we truly
find ourselves in a case where the card needs to be retuned sometimes
to handle one of these error-prone transfers then we can always try a
few transfers first without auto-retuning and then re-try with
auto-retuning if the first few fail.

Without this change on rk3288-veyron-minnie I periodically see this in
the logs of a machine just sitting there idle:
  dwmmc_rockchip ff0d0000.dwmmc: Successfully tuned phase to XYZ

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kalle Valo &lt;kvalo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0a55f4ab9678413a01e740c86e9367ba0c612b36 upstream.

Normally when the MMC core sees an "-EILSEQ" error returned by a host
controller then it will trigger a retuning of the card.  This is
generally a good idea.

However, if a command is expected to sometimes cause transfer errors
then these transfer errors shouldn't cause a re-tuning.  This
re-tuning will be a needless waste of time.  One example case where a
transfer is expected to cause errors is when transitioning between
idle (sometimes referred to as "sleep" in Broadcom code) and active
state on certain Broadcom WiFi SDIO cards.  Specifically if the card
was already transitioning between states when the command was sent it
could cause an error on the SDIO bus.

Let's add an API that the SDIO function drivers can call that will
temporarily disable the auto-tuning functionality.  Then we can add a
call to this in the Broadcom WiFi driver and any other driver that
might have similar needs.

NOTE: this makes the assumption that the card is already tuned well
enough that it's OK to disable the auto-retuning during one of these
error-prone situations.  Presumably the driver code performing the
error-prone transfer knows how to recover / retry from errors.  ...and
after we can get back to a state where transfers are no longer
error-prone then we can enable the auto-retuning again.  If we truly
find ourselves in a case where the card needs to be retuned sometimes
to handle one of these error-prone transfers then we can always try a
few transfers first without auto-retuning and then re-try with
auto-retuning if the first few fail.

Without this change on rk3288-veyron-minnie I periodically see this in
the logs of a machine just sitting there idle:
  dwmmc_rockchip ff0d0000.dwmmc: Successfully tuned phase to XYZ

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kalle Valo &lt;kvalo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>coredump: fix race condition between collapse_huge_page() and core dumping</title>
<updated>2019-06-22T06:15:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrea Arcangeli</name>
<email>aarcange@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T22:56:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=465ce9a50f8a4e2fcd257ce37e11db3104a83ebb'/>
<id>465ce9a50f8a4e2fcd257ce37e11db3104a83ebb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 59ea6d06cfa9247b586a695c21f94afa7183af74 upstream.

When fixing the race conditions between the coredump and the mmap_sem
holders outside the context of the process, we focused on
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() callers in 04f5866e41fb70 ("coredump: fix
race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core
dumping"), but those aren't the only cases where the mmap_sem can be
taken outside of the context of the process as Michal Hocko noticed
while backporting that commit to older -stable kernels.

If mmgrab() is called in the context of the process, but then the
mm_count reference is transferred outside the context of the process,
that can also be a problem if the mmap_sem has to be taken for writing
through that mm_count reference.

khugepaged registration calls mmgrab() in the context of the process,
but the mmap_sem for writing is taken later in the context of the
khugepaged kernel thread.

collapse_huge_page() after taking the mmap_sem for writing doesn't
modify any vma, so it's not obvious that it could cause a problem to the
coredump, but it happens to modify the pmd in a way that breaks an
invariant that pmd_trans_huge_lock() relies upon.  collapse_huge_page()
needs the mmap_sem for writing just to block concurrent page faults that
call pmd_trans_huge_lock().

Specifically the invariant that "!pmd_trans_huge()" cannot become a
"pmd_trans_huge()" doesn't hold while collapse_huge_page() runs.

The coredump will call __get_user_pages() without mmap_sem for reading,
which eventually can invoke a lockless page fault which will need a
functional pmd_trans_huge_lock().

So collapse_huge_page() needs to use mmget_still_valid() to check it's
not running concurrently with the coredump...  as long as the coredump
can invoke page faults without holding the mmap_sem for reading.

This has "Fixes: khugepaged" to facilitate backporting, but in my view
it's more a bug in the coredump code that will eventually have to be
rewritten to stop invoking page faults without the mmap_sem for reading.
So the long term plan is still to drop all mmget_still_valid().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190607161558.32104-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ba76149f47d8 ("thp: khugepaged")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 59ea6d06cfa9247b586a695c21f94afa7183af74 upstream.

When fixing the race conditions between the coredump and the mmap_sem
holders outside the context of the process, we focused on
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() callers in 04f5866e41fb70 ("coredump: fix
race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core
dumping"), but those aren't the only cases where the mmap_sem can be
taken outside of the context of the process as Michal Hocko noticed
while backporting that commit to older -stable kernels.

If mmgrab() is called in the context of the process, but then the
mm_count reference is transferred outside the context of the process,
that can also be a problem if the mmap_sem has to be taken for writing
through that mm_count reference.

khugepaged registration calls mmgrab() in the context of the process,
but the mmap_sem for writing is taken later in the context of the
khugepaged kernel thread.

collapse_huge_page() after taking the mmap_sem for writing doesn't
modify any vma, so it's not obvious that it could cause a problem to the
coredump, but it happens to modify the pmd in a way that breaks an
invariant that pmd_trans_huge_lock() relies upon.  collapse_huge_page()
needs the mmap_sem for writing just to block concurrent page faults that
call pmd_trans_huge_lock().

Specifically the invariant that "!pmd_trans_huge()" cannot become a
"pmd_trans_huge()" doesn't hold while collapse_huge_page() runs.

The coredump will call __get_user_pages() without mmap_sem for reading,
which eventually can invoke a lockless page fault which will need a
functional pmd_trans_huge_lock().

So collapse_huge_page() needs to use mmget_still_valid() to check it's
not running concurrently with the coredump...  as long as the coredump
can invoke page faults without holding the mmap_sem for reading.

This has "Fixes: khugepaged" to facilitate backporting, but in my view
it's more a bug in the coredump code that will eventually have to be
rewritten to stop invoking page faults without the mmap_sem for reading.
So the long term plan is still to drop all mmget_still_valid().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190607161558.32104-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ba76149f47d8 ("thp: khugepaged")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callback</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T13:49:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ecec31ce4f33c927997f179f5d8f1bc4efdd68b5'/>
<id>ecec31ce4f33c927997f179f5d8f1bc4efdd68b5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 78f4e932f7760d965fb1569025d1576ab77557c5 upstream.

Adric Blake reported the following warning during suspend-resume:

  Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
  x86: Booting SMP configuration:
  smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2
  unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x10f (tried to write 0x0000000000000000) \
   at rIP: 0xffffffff8d267924 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
  Call Trace:
   intel_set_tfa
   intel_pmu_cpu_starting
   ? x86_pmu_dead_cpu
   x86_pmu_starting_cpu
   cpuhp_invoke_callback
   ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave
   notify_cpu_starting
   start_secondary
   secondary_startup_64
  microcode: sig=0x806ea, pf=0x80, revision=0x96
  microcode: updated to revision 0xb4, date = 2019-04-01
  CPU1 is up

The MSR in question is MSR_TFA_RTM_FORCE_ABORT and that MSR is emulated
by microcode. The log above shows that the microcode loader callback
happens after the PMU restoration, leading to the conjecture that
because the microcode hasn't been updated yet, that MSR is not present
yet, leading to the #GP.

Add a microcode loader-specific hotplug vector which comes before
the PERF vectors and thus executes earlier and makes sure the MSR is
present.

Fixes: 400816f60c54 ("perf/x86/intel: Implement support for TSX Force Abort")
Reported-by: Adric Blake &lt;promarbler14@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203637
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 78f4e932f7760d965fb1569025d1576ab77557c5 upstream.

Adric Blake reported the following warning during suspend-resume:

  Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
  x86: Booting SMP configuration:
  smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2
  unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x10f (tried to write 0x0000000000000000) \
   at rIP: 0xffffffff8d267924 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
  Call Trace:
   intel_set_tfa
   intel_pmu_cpu_starting
   ? x86_pmu_dead_cpu
   x86_pmu_starting_cpu
   cpuhp_invoke_callback
   ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave
   notify_cpu_starting
   start_secondary
   secondary_startup_64
  microcode: sig=0x806ea, pf=0x80, revision=0x96
  microcode: updated to revision 0xb4, date = 2019-04-01
  CPU1 is up

The MSR in question is MSR_TFA_RTM_FORCE_ABORT and that MSR is emulated
by microcode. The log above shows that the microcode loader callback
happens after the PMU restoration, leading to the conjecture that
because the microcode hasn't been updated yet, that MSR is not present
yet, leading to the #GP.

Add a microcode loader-specific hotplug vector which comes before
the PERF vectors and thus executes earlier and makes sure the MSR is
present.

Fixes: 400816f60c54 ("perf/x86/intel: Implement support for TSX Force Abort")
Reported-by: Adric Blake &lt;promarbler14@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203637
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cgroup: Use css_tryget() instead of css_tryget_online() in task_get_css()</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T20:46:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c3b85bda41f0a8c00b7492cbc9042b612dad2162'/>
<id>c3b85bda41f0a8c00b7492cbc9042b612dad2162</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 18fa84a2db0e15b02baa5d94bdb5bd509175d2f6 upstream.

A PF_EXITING task can stay associated with an offline css.  If such
task calls task_get_css(), it can get stuck indefinitely.  This can be
triggered by BSD process accounting which writes to a file with
PF_EXITING set when racing against memcg disable as in the backtrace
at the end.

After this change, task_get_css() may return a css which was already
offline when the function was called.  None of the existing users are
affected by this change.

  INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
  INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  ...
  NMI backtrace for cpu 0
  ...
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;
   dump_stack+0x46/0x68
   nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.2+0x13/0x57
   nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xba/0xca
   rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x9e/0xce
   rcu_check_callbacks.cold.74+0x2af/0x433
   update_process_times+0x28/0x60
   tick_sched_timer+0x34/0x70
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0xee/0x250
   hrtimer_interrupt+0xf4/0x210
   smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x110
   apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
   &lt;/IRQ&gt;
  RIP: 0010:balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x28f/0x3d0
  ...
   btrfs_file_write_iter+0x31b/0x563
   __vfs_write+0xfa/0x140
   __kernel_write+0x4f/0x100
   do_acct_process+0x495/0x580
   acct_process+0xb9/0xdb
   do_exit+0x748/0xa00
   do_group_exit+0x3a/0xa0
   get_signal+0x254/0x560
   do_signal+0x23/0x5c0
   exit_to_usermode_loop+0x5d/0xa0
   prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x53/0x80
   retint_user+0x8/0x8

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Fixes: ec438699a9ae ("cgroup, block: implement task_get_css() and use it in bio_associate_current()")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 18fa84a2db0e15b02baa5d94bdb5bd509175d2f6 upstream.

A PF_EXITING task can stay associated with an offline css.  If such
task calls task_get_css(), it can get stuck indefinitely.  This can be
triggered by BSD process accounting which writes to a file with
PF_EXITING set when racing against memcg disable as in the backtrace
at the end.

After this change, task_get_css() may return a css which was already
offline when the function was called.  None of the existing users are
affected by this change.

  INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
  INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  ...
  NMI backtrace for cpu 0
  ...
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;
   dump_stack+0x46/0x68
   nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.2+0x13/0x57
   nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xba/0xca
   rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x9e/0xce
   rcu_check_callbacks.cold.74+0x2af/0x433
   update_process_times+0x28/0x60
   tick_sched_timer+0x34/0x70
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0xee/0x250
   hrtimer_interrupt+0xf4/0x210
   smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x110
   apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
   &lt;/IRQ&gt;
  RIP: 0010:balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x28f/0x3d0
  ...
   btrfs_file_write_iter+0x31b/0x563
   __vfs_write+0xfa/0x140
   __kernel_write+0x4f/0x100
   do_acct_process+0x495/0x580
   acct_process+0xb9/0xdb
   do_exit+0x748/0xa00
   do_group_exit+0x3a/0xa0
   get_signal+0x254/0x560
   do_signal+0x23/0x5c0
   exit_to_usermode_loop+0x5d/0xa0
   prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x53/0x80
   retint_user+0x8/0x8

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Fixes: ec438699a9ae ("cgroup, block: implement task_get_css() and use it in bio_associate_current()")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:51:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-18T00:17:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c09be31461ed140976c60a87364415454a2c3d42'/>
<id>c09be31461ed140976c60a87364415454a2c3d42</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) &lt; pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs

Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) &lt; pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs

Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
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