<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/include/linux, branch v6.6.56</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: stmmac: move the EST lock to struct stmmac_priv</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:58:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiaolei Wang</name>
<email>xiaolei.wang@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-02T15:12:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b538fefeb1026aad9dcdcbb410c42b56dff8aae9'/>
<id>b538fefeb1026aad9dcdcbb410c42b56dff8aae9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 36ac9e7f2e5786bd37c5cd91132e1f39c29b8197 ]

Reinitialize the whole EST structure would also reset the mutex
lock which is embedded in the EST structure, and then trigger
the following warning. To address this, move the lock to struct
stmmac_priv. We also need to reacquire the mutex lock when doing
this initialization.

DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock-&gt;magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 505 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 3 PID: 505 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-00053-g0106679839f7-dirty #29
 Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 lr : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 sp : ffffffc0864e3570
 x29: ffffffc0864e3570 x28: ffffffc0817bdc78 x27: 0000000000000003
 x26: ffffff80c54f1808 x25: ffffff80c9164080 x24: ffffffc080d723ac
 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000
 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc083bc3000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
 x17: ffffffc08117b080 x16: 0000000000000002 x15: ffffff80d2d40000
 x14: 00000000000002da x13: ffffff80d2d404b8 x12: ffffffc082b5a5c8
 x11: ffffffc082bca680 x10: ffffffc082bb2640 x9 : ffffffc082bb2698
 x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
 x5 : ffffff8178fe0d48 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
 x2 : ffffff8178fe0d50 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Call trace:
  __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
  mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x34
  tc_setup_taprio+0x118/0x68c
  stmmac_setup_tc+0x50/0xf0
  taprio_change+0x868/0xc9c

Fixes: b2aae654a479 ("net: stmmac: add mutex lock to protect est parameters")
Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang &lt;xiaolei.wang@windriver.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Semin &lt;fancer.lancer@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Halaney &lt;ahalaney@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240513014346.1718740-2-xiaolei.wang@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 36ac9e7f2e5786bd37c5cd91132e1f39c29b8197)
[Harshit: CVE-2024-38594; resolved conflicts due to missing commit:
 5ca63ffdb94b ("net: stmmac: Report taprio offload status") in 6.6.y]
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli &lt;harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 36ac9e7f2e5786bd37c5cd91132e1f39c29b8197 ]

Reinitialize the whole EST structure would also reset the mutex
lock which is embedded in the EST structure, and then trigger
the following warning. To address this, move the lock to struct
stmmac_priv. We also need to reacquire the mutex lock when doing
this initialization.

DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock-&gt;magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 505 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 3 PID: 505 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-00053-g0106679839f7-dirty #29
 Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 lr : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 sp : ffffffc0864e3570
 x29: ffffffc0864e3570 x28: ffffffc0817bdc78 x27: 0000000000000003
 x26: ffffff80c54f1808 x25: ffffff80c9164080 x24: ffffffc080d723ac
 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000
 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc083bc3000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
 x17: ffffffc08117b080 x16: 0000000000000002 x15: ffffff80d2d40000
 x14: 00000000000002da x13: ffffff80d2d404b8 x12: ffffffc082b5a5c8
 x11: ffffffc082bca680 x10: ffffffc082bb2640 x9 : ffffffc082bb2698
 x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
 x5 : ffffff8178fe0d48 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
 x2 : ffffff8178fe0d50 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Call trace:
  __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
  mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x34
  tc_setup_taprio+0x118/0x68c
  stmmac_setup_tc+0x50/0xf0
  taprio_change+0x868/0xc9c

Fixes: b2aae654a479 ("net: stmmac: add mutex lock to protect est parameters")
Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang &lt;xiaolei.wang@windriver.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Semin &lt;fancer.lancer@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Halaney &lt;ahalaney@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240513014346.1718740-2-xiaolei.wang@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 36ac9e7f2e5786bd37c5cd91132e1f39c29b8197)
[Harshit: CVE-2024-38594; resolved conflicts due to missing commit:
 5ca63ffdb94b ("net: stmmac: Report taprio offload status") in 6.6.y]
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli &lt;harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>i2c: core: Lock address during client device instantiation</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:58:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Heiner Kallweit</name>
<email>hkallweit1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-15T19:44:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=316be4911f636adcbb6e0f10ca6204aca7b2c1fe'/>
<id>316be4911f636adcbb6e0f10ca6204aca7b2c1fe</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8d3cefaf659265aa82b0373a563fdb9d16a2b947 ]

Krzysztof reported an issue [0] which is caused by parallel attempts to
instantiate the same I2C client device. This can happen if driver
supports auto-detection, but certain devices are also instantiated
explicitly.
The original change isn't actually wrong, it just revealed that I2C core
isn't prepared yet to handle this scenario.
Calls to i2c_new_client_device() can be nested, therefore we can't use a
simple mutex here. Parallel instantiation of devices at different addresses
is ok, so we just have to prevent parallel instantiation at the same address.
We can use a bitmap with one bit per 7-bit I2C client address, and atomic
bit operations to set/check/clear bits.
Now a parallel attempt to instantiate a device at the same address will
result in -EBUSY being returned, avoiding the "sysfs: cannot create duplicate
filename" splash.

Note: This patch version includes small cosmetic changes to the Tested-by
      version, only functional change is that address locking is supported
      for slave addresses too.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-i2c/9479fe4e-eb0c-407e-84c0-bd60c15baf74@ans.pl/T/#m12706546e8e2414d8f1a0dc61c53393f731685cc

Fixes: caba40ec3531 ("eeprom: at24: Probe for DDR3 thermal sensor in the SPD case")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Krzysztof Piotr Oledzki &lt;ole@ans.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit &lt;hkallweit1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8d3cefaf659265aa82b0373a563fdb9d16a2b947 ]

Krzysztof reported an issue [0] which is caused by parallel attempts to
instantiate the same I2C client device. This can happen if driver
supports auto-detection, but certain devices are also instantiated
explicitly.
The original change isn't actually wrong, it just revealed that I2C core
isn't prepared yet to handle this scenario.
Calls to i2c_new_client_device() can be nested, therefore we can't use a
simple mutex here. Parallel instantiation of devices at different addresses
is ok, so we just have to prevent parallel instantiation at the same address.
We can use a bitmap with one bit per 7-bit I2C client address, and atomic
bit operations to set/check/clear bits.
Now a parallel attempt to instantiate a device at the same address will
result in -EBUSY being returned, avoiding the "sysfs: cannot create duplicate
filename" splash.

Note: This patch version includes small cosmetic changes to the Tested-by
      version, only functional change is that address locking is supported
      for slave addresses too.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-i2c/9479fe4e-eb0c-407e-84c0-bd60c15baf74@ans.pl/T/#m12706546e8e2414d8f1a0dc61c53393f731685cc

Fixes: caba40ec3531 ("eeprom: at24: Probe for DDR3 thermal sensor in the SPD case")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Krzysztof Piotr Oledzki &lt;ole@ans.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit &lt;hkallweit1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>i2c: create debugfs entry per adapter</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:58:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wolfram Sang</name>
<email>wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-12T22:54:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4a2be5a72865bdd219b2d8c327b9fa03e87a4a9e'/>
<id>4a2be5a72865bdd219b2d8c327b9fa03e87a4a9e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 73febd775bdbdb98c81255ff85773ac410ded5c4 ]

Two drivers already implement custom debugfs handling for their
i2c_adapter and more will come. So, let the core create a debugfs
directory per adapter and pass that to drivers for their debugfs files.

Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 8d3cefaf6592 ("i2c: core: Lock address during client device instantiation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 73febd775bdbdb98c81255ff85773ac410ded5c4 ]

Two drivers already implement custom debugfs handling for their
i2c_adapter and more will come. So, let the core create a debugfs
directory per adapter and pass that to drivers for their debugfs files.

Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 8d3cefaf6592 ("i2c: core: Lock address during client device instantiation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>close_range(): fix the logics in descriptor table trimming</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:58:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-16T19:17:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a8023f8b55988da64ce245f6bada754c806a834a'/>
<id>a8023f8b55988da64ce245f6bada754c806a834a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 678379e1d4f7443b170939525d3312cfc37bf86b upstream.

Cloning a descriptor table picks the size that would cover all currently
opened files.  That's fine for clone() and unshare(), but for close_range()
there's an additional twist - we clone before we close, and it would be
a shame to have
	close_range(3, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)
leave us with a huge descriptor table when we are not going to keep
anything past stderr, just because some large file descriptor used to
be open before our call has taken it out.

Unfortunately, it had been dealt with in an inherently racy way -
sane_fdtable_size() gets a "don't copy anything past that" argument
(passed via unshare_fd() and dup_fd()), close_range() decides how much
should be trimmed and passes that to unshare_fd().

The problem is, a range that used to extend to the end of descriptor
table back when close_range() had looked at it might very well have stuff
grown after it by the time dup_fd() has allocated a new files_struct
and started to figure out the capacity of fdtable to be attached to that.

That leads to interesting pathological cases; at the very least it's a
QoI issue, since unshare(CLONE_FILES) is atomic in a sense that it takes
a snapshot of descriptor table one might have observed at some point.
Since CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE close_range() is supposed to be a combination
of unshare(CLONE_FILES) with plain close_range(), ending up with a
weird state that would never occur with unshare(2) is confusing, to put
it mildly.

It's not hard to get rid of - all it takes is passing both ends of the
range down to sane_fdtable_size().  There we are under -&gt;files_lock,
so the race is trivially avoided.

So we do the following:
	* switch close_files() from calling unshare_fd() to calling
dup_fd().
	* undo the calling convention change done to unshare_fd() in
60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
	* introduce struct fd_range, pass a pointer to that to dup_fd()
and sane_fdtable_size() instead of "trim everything past that point"
they are currently getting.  NULL means "we are not going to be punching
any holes"; NR_OPEN_MAX is gone.
	* make sane_fdtable_size() use find_last_bit() instead of
open-coding it; it's easier to follow that way.
	* while we are at it, have dup_fd() report errors by returning
ERR_PTR(), no need to use a separate int *errorp argument.

Fixes: 60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 678379e1d4f7443b170939525d3312cfc37bf86b upstream.

Cloning a descriptor table picks the size that would cover all currently
opened files.  That's fine for clone() and unshare(), but for close_range()
there's an additional twist - we clone before we close, and it would be
a shame to have
	close_range(3, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)
leave us with a huge descriptor table when we are not going to keep
anything past stderr, just because some large file descriptor used to
be open before our call has taken it out.

Unfortunately, it had been dealt with in an inherently racy way -
sane_fdtable_size() gets a "don't copy anything past that" argument
(passed via unshare_fd() and dup_fd()), close_range() decides how much
should be trimmed and passes that to unshare_fd().

The problem is, a range that used to extend to the end of descriptor
table back when close_range() had looked at it might very well have stuff
grown after it by the time dup_fd() has allocated a new files_struct
and started to figure out the capacity of fdtable to be attached to that.

That leads to interesting pathological cases; at the very least it's a
QoI issue, since unshare(CLONE_FILES) is atomic in a sense that it takes
a snapshot of descriptor table one might have observed at some point.
Since CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE close_range() is supposed to be a combination
of unshare(CLONE_FILES) with plain close_range(), ending up with a
weird state that would never occur with unshare(2) is confusing, to put
it mildly.

It's not hard to get rid of - all it takes is passing both ends of the
range down to sane_fdtable_size().  There we are under -&gt;files_lock,
so the race is trivially avoided.

So we do the following:
	* switch close_files() from calling unshare_fd() to calling
dup_fd().
	* undo the calling convention change done to unshare_fd() in
60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
	* introduce struct fd_range, pass a pointer to that to dup_fd()
and sane_fdtable_size() instead of "trim everything past that point"
they are currently getting.  NULL means "we are not going to be punching
any holes"; NR_OPEN_MAX is gone.
	* make sane_fdtable_size() use find_last_bit() instead of
open-coding it; it's easier to follow that way.
	* while we are at it, have dup_fd() report errors by returning
ERR_PTR(), no need to use a separate int *errorp argument.

Fixes: 60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpufreq: Avoid a bad reference count on CPU node</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:57:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miquel Sabaté Solà</name>
<email>mikisabate@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-17T13:42:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0f41f383b5a61a2bf6429a449ebba7fb08179d81'/>
<id>0f41f383b5a61a2bf6429a449ebba7fb08179d81</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c0f02536fffbbec71aced36d52a765f8c4493dc2 upstream.

In the parse_perf_domain function, if the call to
of_parse_phandle_with_args returns an error, then the reference to the
CPU device node that was acquired at the start of the function would not
be properly decremented.

Address this by declaring the variable with the __free(device_node)
cleanup attribute.

Signed-off-by: Miquel Sabaté Solà &lt;mikisabate@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar &lt;viresh.kumar@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240917134246.584026-1-mikisabate@gmail.com
Cc: All applicable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c0f02536fffbbec71aced36d52a765f8c4493dc2 upstream.

In the parse_perf_domain function, if the call to
of_parse_phandle_with_args returns an error, then the reference to the
CPU device node that was acquired at the start of the function would not
be properly decremented.

Address this by declaring the variable with the __free(device_node)
cleanup attribute.

Signed-off-by: Miquel Sabaté Solà &lt;mikisabate@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar &lt;viresh.kumar@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240917134246.584026-1-mikisabate@gmail.com
Cc: All applicable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf,x86: avoid missing caller address in stack traces captured in uprobe</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:57:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andrii@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-29T17:52:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=adf290fe434c180f2fb702c53a5cc77fd432628b'/>
<id>adf290fe434c180f2fb702c53a5cc77fd432628b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cfa7f3d2c526c224a6271cc78a4a27a0de06f4f0 ]

When tracing user functions with uprobe functionality, it's common to
install the probe (e.g., a BPF program) at the first instruction of the
function. This is often going to be `push %rbp` instruction in function
preamble, which means that within that function frame pointer hasn't
been established yet. This leads to consistently missing an actual
caller of the traced function, because perf_callchain_user() only
records current IP (capturing traced function) and then following frame
pointer chain (which would be caller's frame, containing the address of
caller's caller).

So when we have target_1 -&gt; target_2 -&gt; target_3 call chain and we are
tracing an entry to target_3, captured stack trace will report
target_1 -&gt; target_3 call chain, which is wrong and confusing.

This patch proposes a x86-64-specific heuristic to detect `push %rbp`
(`push %ebp` on 32-bit architecture) instruction being traced. Given
entire kernel implementation of user space stack trace capturing works
under assumption that user space code was compiled with frame pointer
register (%rbp/%ebp) preservation, it seems pretty reasonable to use
this instruction as a strong indicator that this is the entry to the
function. In that case, return address is still pointed to by %rsp/%esp,
so we fetch it and add to stack trace before proceeding to unwind the
rest using frame pointer-based logic.

We also check for `endbr64` (for 64-bit modes) as another common pattern
for function entry, as suggested by Josh Poimboeuf. Even if we get this
wrong sometimes for uprobes attached not at the function entry, it's OK
because stack trace will still be overall meaningful, just with one
extra bogus entry. If we don't detect this, we end up with guaranteed to
be missing caller function entry in the stack trace, which is worse
overall.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240729175223.23914-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cfa7f3d2c526c224a6271cc78a4a27a0de06f4f0 ]

When tracing user functions with uprobe functionality, it's common to
install the probe (e.g., a BPF program) at the first instruction of the
function. This is often going to be `push %rbp` instruction in function
preamble, which means that within that function frame pointer hasn't
been established yet. This leads to consistently missing an actual
caller of the traced function, because perf_callchain_user() only
records current IP (capturing traced function) and then following frame
pointer chain (which would be caller's frame, containing the address of
caller's caller).

So when we have target_1 -&gt; target_2 -&gt; target_3 call chain and we are
tracing an entry to target_3, captured stack trace will report
target_1 -&gt; target_3 call chain, which is wrong and confusing.

This patch proposes a x86-64-specific heuristic to detect `push %rbp`
(`push %ebp` on 32-bit architecture) instruction being traced. Given
entire kernel implementation of user space stack trace capturing works
under assumption that user space code was compiled with frame pointer
register (%rbp/%ebp) preservation, it seems pretty reasonable to use
this instruction as a strong indicator that this is the entry to the
function. In that case, return address is still pointed to by %rsp/%esp,
so we fetch it and add to stack trace before proceeding to unwind the
rest using frame pointer-based logic.

We also check for `endbr64` (for 64-bit modes) as another common pattern
for function entry, as suggested by Josh Poimboeuf. Even if we get this
wrong sometimes for uprobes attached not at the function entry, it's OK
because stack trace will still be overall meaningful, just with one
extra bogus entry. If we don't detect this, we end up with guaranteed to
be missing caller function entry in the stack trace, which is worse
overall.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240729175223.23914-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/perf: arm_spe: Use perf_allow_kernel() for permissions</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:57:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Clark</name>
<email>james.clark@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-27T14:51:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b017f4f6709a16073f1a916da7f5ce46f9258180'/>
<id>b017f4f6709a16073f1a916da7f5ce46f9258180</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5e9629d0ae977d6f6916d7e519724804e95f0b07 ]

Use perf_allow_kernel() for 'pa_enable' (physical addresses),
'pct_enable' (physical timestamps) and context IDs. This means that
perf_event_paranoid is now taken into account and LSM hooks can be used,
which is more consistent with other perf_event_open calls. For example
PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR uses perf_allow_kernel() rather than just
perfmon_capable().

This also indirectly fixes the following error message which is
misleading because perf_event_paranoid is not taken into account by
perfmon_capable():

  $ perf record -e arm_spe/pa_enable/

  Error:
  Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is
  limited. Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
  setting ...

Suggested-by: Al Grant &lt;al.grant@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827145113.1224604-1-james.clark@linaro.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240807120039.GD37996@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5e9629d0ae977d6f6916d7e519724804e95f0b07 ]

Use perf_allow_kernel() for 'pa_enable' (physical addresses),
'pct_enable' (physical timestamps) and context IDs. This means that
perf_event_paranoid is now taken into account and LSM hooks can be used,
which is more consistent with other perf_event_open calls. For example
PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR uses perf_allow_kernel() rather than just
perfmon_capable().

This also indirectly fixes the following error message which is
misleading because perf_event_paranoid is not taken into account by
perfmon_capable():

  $ perf record -e arm_spe/pa_enable/

  Error:
  Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is
  limited. Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
  setting ...

Suggested-by: Al Grant &lt;al.grant@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827145113.1224604-1-james.clark@linaro.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240807120039.GD37996@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: test for not too small csum_start in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:57:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-26T16:58:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d9dfd41e32ccc5198033ddd1ff1516822dfefa5a'/>
<id>d9dfd41e32ccc5198033ddd1ff1516822dfefa5a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49d14b54a527289d09a9480f214b8c586322310a ]

syzbot was able to trigger this warning [1], after injecting a
malicious packet through af_packet, setting skb-&gt;csum_start and thus
the transport header to an incorrect value.

We can at least make sure the transport header is after
the end of the network header (with a estimated minimal size).

[1]
[   67.873027] skb len=4096 headroom=16 headlen=14 tailroom=0
mac=(-1,-1) mac_len=0 net=(16,-6) trans=10
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0))
csum(0xa start=10 offset=0 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0)
hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0800 pkttype=0 iif=0
priority=0x0 mark=0x0 alloc_cpu=10 vlan_all=0x0
encapsulation=0 inner(proto=0x0000, mac=0, net=0, trans=0)
[   67.877172] dev name=veth0_vlan feat=0x000061164fdd09e9
[   67.877764] sk family=17 type=3 proto=0
[   67.878279] skb linear:   00000000: 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 08 00
[   67.879128] skb frag:     00000000: 0e 00 07 00 00 00 28 00 08 80 1c 00 04 00 00 02
[   67.879877] skb frag:     00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.880647] skb frag:     00000020: 00 00 02 00 00 00 08 00 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.881156] skb frag:     00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.881753] skb frag:     00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.882173] skb frag:     00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.882790] skb frag:     00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.883171] skb frag:     00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.883733] skb frag:     00000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.884206] skb frag:     00000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 70 76 6c 61 6e
[   67.884704] skb frag:     000000a0: 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2b 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.885139] skb frag:     000000b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.885677] skb frag:     000000c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.886042] skb frag:     000000d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.886408] skb frag:     000000e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.887020] skb frag:     000000f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.887384] skb frag:     00000100: 00 00
[   67.887878] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   67.887908] offset (-6) &gt;= skb_headlen() (14)
[   67.888445] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2088 at net/core/dev.c:3332 skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.889353] Modules linked in: macsec macvtap macvlan hsr wireguard curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic libchacha20poly1305 chacha_x86_64 libchacha poly1305_x86_64 dummy bridge sr_mod cdrom evdev pcspkr i2c_piix4 9pnet_virtio 9p 9pnet netfs
[   67.890111] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 2088 Comm: b363492833 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #1011
[   67.890183] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   67.890309] RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891043] Call Trace:
[   67.891173]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   67.891274] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:741)
[   67.891320] ? skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891333] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219)
[   67.891348] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239)
[   67.891363] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891372] ? asm_exc_invalid_op (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621)
[   67.891388] ? skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891399] ? skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891416] ip_do_fragment (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:777 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891448] ? __ip_local_out (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1146 ./include/net/l3mdev.h:196 ./include/net/l3mdev.h:213 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:113)
[   67.891459] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2 (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:200)
[   67.891470] ? ip_route_output_flow (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:96 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:871 (discriminator 13) net/ipv4/route.c:2625 (discriminator 13) ./include/net/route.h:141 (discriminator 13) net/ipv4/route.c:2852 (discriminator 13))
[   67.891484] ipvlan_process_v4_outbound (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:445 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891581] ipvlan_queue_xmit (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:542 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:604 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:670)
[   67.891596] ipvlan_start_xmit (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:227)
[   67.891607] dev_hard_start_xmit (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4916 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4925 net/core/dev.c:3588 net/core/dev.c:3604)
[   67.891620] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.h:168 (discriminator 25) net/core/dev.c:4425 (discriminator 25))
[   67.891630] ? skb_copy_bits (./include/linux/uaccess.h:233 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/uaccess.h:260 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/highmem-internal.h:230 (discriminator 1) net/core/skbuff.c:3018 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891645] ? __pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2848 (discriminator 4))
[   67.891655] ? skb_partial_csum_set (net/core/skbuff.c:5657)
[   67.891666] ? virtio_net_hdr_to_skb.constprop.0 (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2791 (discriminator 3) ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2799 (discriminator 3) ./include/linux/virtio_net.h:109 (discriminator 3))
[   67.891684] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3145 (discriminator 1) net/packet/af_packet.c:3177 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891700] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 (discriminator 4) ./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock.h:187 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:127 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 (discriminator 4))
[   67.891716] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:745 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2210 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891734] ? do_sock_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2335)
[   67.891747] ? __sys_setsockopt (./include/linux/file.h:34 net/socket.c:2355)
[   67.891761] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2222 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891772] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891785] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

Fixes: 9181d6f8a2bb ("net: add more sanity check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240926165836.3797406-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 49d14b54a527289d09a9480f214b8c586322310a ]

syzbot was able to trigger this warning [1], after injecting a
malicious packet through af_packet, setting skb-&gt;csum_start and thus
the transport header to an incorrect value.

We can at least make sure the transport header is after
the end of the network header (with a estimated minimal size).

[1]
[   67.873027] skb len=4096 headroom=16 headlen=14 tailroom=0
mac=(-1,-1) mac_len=0 net=(16,-6) trans=10
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0))
csum(0xa start=10 offset=0 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0)
hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0800 pkttype=0 iif=0
priority=0x0 mark=0x0 alloc_cpu=10 vlan_all=0x0
encapsulation=0 inner(proto=0x0000, mac=0, net=0, trans=0)
[   67.877172] dev name=veth0_vlan feat=0x000061164fdd09e9
[   67.877764] sk family=17 type=3 proto=0
[   67.878279] skb linear:   00000000: 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 08 00
[   67.879128] skb frag:     00000000: 0e 00 07 00 00 00 28 00 08 80 1c 00 04 00 00 02
[   67.879877] skb frag:     00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.880647] skb frag:     00000020: 00 00 02 00 00 00 08 00 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.881156] skb frag:     00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.881753] skb frag:     00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.882173] skb frag:     00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.882790] skb frag:     00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.883171] skb frag:     00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.883733] skb frag:     00000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.884206] skb frag:     00000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 70 76 6c 61 6e
[   67.884704] skb frag:     000000a0: 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2b 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.885139] skb frag:     000000b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.885677] skb frag:     000000c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.886042] skb frag:     000000d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.886408] skb frag:     000000e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.887020] skb frag:     000000f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   67.887384] skb frag:     00000100: 00 00
[   67.887878] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   67.887908] offset (-6) &gt;= skb_headlen() (14)
[   67.888445] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2088 at net/core/dev.c:3332 skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.889353] Modules linked in: macsec macvtap macvlan hsr wireguard curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic libchacha20poly1305 chacha_x86_64 libchacha poly1305_x86_64 dummy bridge sr_mod cdrom evdev pcspkr i2c_piix4 9pnet_virtio 9p 9pnet netfs
[   67.890111] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 2088 Comm: b363492833 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #1011
[   67.890183] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   67.890309] RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891043] Call Trace:
[   67.891173]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   67.891274] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:741)
[   67.891320] ? skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891333] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219)
[   67.891348] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239)
[   67.891363] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891372] ? asm_exc_invalid_op (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621)
[   67.891388] ? skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891399] ? skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2))
[   67.891416] ip_do_fragment (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:777 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891448] ? __ip_local_out (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1146 ./include/net/l3mdev.h:196 ./include/net/l3mdev.h:213 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:113)
[   67.891459] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2 (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:200)
[   67.891470] ? ip_route_output_flow (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:96 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:871 (discriminator 13) net/ipv4/route.c:2625 (discriminator 13) ./include/net/route.h:141 (discriminator 13) net/ipv4/route.c:2852 (discriminator 13))
[   67.891484] ipvlan_process_v4_outbound (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:445 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891581] ipvlan_queue_xmit (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:542 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:604 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:670)
[   67.891596] ipvlan_start_xmit (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:227)
[   67.891607] dev_hard_start_xmit (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4916 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4925 net/core/dev.c:3588 net/core/dev.c:3604)
[   67.891620] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.h:168 (discriminator 25) net/core/dev.c:4425 (discriminator 25))
[   67.891630] ? skb_copy_bits (./include/linux/uaccess.h:233 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/uaccess.h:260 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/highmem-internal.h:230 (discriminator 1) net/core/skbuff.c:3018 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891645] ? __pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2848 (discriminator 4))
[   67.891655] ? skb_partial_csum_set (net/core/skbuff.c:5657)
[   67.891666] ? virtio_net_hdr_to_skb.constprop.0 (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2791 (discriminator 3) ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2799 (discriminator 3) ./include/linux/virtio_net.h:109 (discriminator 3))
[   67.891684] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3145 (discriminator 1) net/packet/af_packet.c:3177 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891700] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 (discriminator 4) ./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock.h:187 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:127 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 (discriminator 4))
[   67.891716] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:745 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2210 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891734] ? do_sock_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2335)
[   67.891747] ? __sys_setsockopt (./include/linux/file.h:34 net/socket.c:2355)
[   67.891761] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2222 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891772] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
[   67.891785] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

Fixes: 9181d6f8a2bb ("net: add more sanity check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240926165836.3797406-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Fix gso_features_check to check for both dev-&gt;gso_{ipv4_,}max_size</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:57:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-23T21:22:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=718b66340364b097b38b72437f6f5cb7edc046aa'/>
<id>718b66340364b097b38b72437f6f5cb7edc046aa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e609c959a939660c7519895f853dfa5624c6827a ]

Commit 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev-&gt;gso_max_size in gso_features_check()")
added a dev-&gt;gso_max_size test to gso_features_check() in order to fall
back to GSO when needed.

This was added as it was noticed that some drivers could misbehave if TSO
packets get too big. However, the check doesn't respect dev-&gt;gso_ipv4_max_size
limit. For instance, a device could be configured with BIG TCP for IPv4,
but not IPv6.

Therefore, add a netif_get_gso_max_size() equivalent to netif_get_gro_max_size()
and use the helper to respect both limits before falling back to GSO engine.

Fixes: 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev-&gt;gso_max_size in gso_features_check()")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240923212242.15669-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit e609c959a939660c7519895f853dfa5624c6827a ]

Commit 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev-&gt;gso_max_size in gso_features_check()")
added a dev-&gt;gso_max_size test to gso_features_check() in order to fall
back to GSO when needed.

This was added as it was noticed that some drivers could misbehave if TSO
packets get too big. However, the check doesn't respect dev-&gt;gso_ipv4_max_size
limit. For instance, a device could be configured with BIG TCP for IPv4,
but not IPv6.

Therefore, add a netif_get_gso_max_size() equivalent to netif_get_gro_max_size()
and use the helper to respect both limits before falling back to GSO engine.

Fixes: 24ab059d2ebd ("net: check dev-&gt;gso_max_size in gso_features_check()")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240923212242.15669-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Add netif_get_gro_max_size helper for GRO</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T09:57:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-23T21:22:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=dae9b99bd21f904c98ab0bedea49f3475b07dbf1'/>
<id>dae9b99bd21f904c98ab0bedea49f3475b07dbf1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e8d4d34df715133c319fabcf63fdec684be75ff8 ]

Add a small netif_get_gro_max_size() helper which returns the maximum IPv4
or IPv6 GRO size of the netdevice.

We later add a netif_get_gso_max_size() equivalent as well for GSO, so that
these helpers can be used consistently instead of open-coded checks.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240923212242.15669-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: e609c959a939 ("net: Fix gso_features_check to check for both dev-&gt;gso_{ipv4_,}max_size")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e8d4d34df715133c319fabcf63fdec684be75ff8 ]

Add a small netif_get_gro_max_size() helper which returns the maximum IPv4
or IPv6 GRO size of the netdevice.

We later add a netif_get_gso_max_size() equivalent as well for GSO, so that
these helpers can be used consistently instead of open-coded checks.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240923212242.15669-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: e609c959a939 ("net: Fix gso_features_check to check for both dev-&gt;gso_{ipv4_,}max_size")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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