<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/include/net/netfilter, branch v6.18.21</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>nf_tables: nft_dynset: fix possible stateful expression memleak in error path</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:10:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-12T11:38:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=31641c682db73353e4647e40735c7f2a75ff58ef'/>
<id>31641c682db73353e4647e40735c7f2a75ff58ef</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0548a13b5a145b16e4da0628b5936baf35f51b43 ]

If cloning the second stateful expression in the element via GFP_ATOMIC
fails, then the first stateful expression remains in place without being
released.

   unreferenced object (percpu) 0x607b97e9cab8 (size 16):
     comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294931867
     hex dump (first 16 bytes on cpu 3):
       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     backtrace (crc 0):
       pcpu_alloc_noprof+0x453/0xd80
       nft_counter_clone+0x9c/0x190 [nf_tables]
       nft_expr_clone+0x8f/0x1b0 [nf_tables]
       nft_dynset_new+0x2cb/0x5f0 [nf_tables]
       nft_rhash_update+0x236/0x11c0 [nf_tables]
       nft_dynset_eval+0x11f/0x670 [nf_tables]
       nft_do_chain+0x253/0x1700 [nf_tables]
       nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x18d/0x270 [nf_tables]
       nf_hook_slow+0xaa/0x1e0
       ip_local_deliver+0x209/0x330

Fixes: 563125a73ac3 ("netfilter: nftables: generalize set extension to support for several expressions")
Reported-by: Gurpreet Shergill &lt;giki.shergill@proton.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0548a13b5a145b16e4da0628b5936baf35f51b43 ]

If cloning the second stateful expression in the element via GFP_ATOMIC
fails, then the first stateful expression remains in place without being
released.

   unreferenced object (percpu) 0x607b97e9cab8 (size 16):
     comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294931867
     hex dump (first 16 bytes on cpu 3):
       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     backtrace (crc 0):
       pcpu_alloc_noprof+0x453/0xd80
       nft_counter_clone+0x9c/0x190 [nf_tables]
       nft_expr_clone+0x8f/0x1b0 [nf_tables]
       nft_dynset_new+0x2cb/0x5f0 [nf_tables]
       nft_rhash_update+0x236/0x11c0 [nf_tables]
       nft_dynset_eval+0x11f/0x670 [nf_tables]
       nft_do_chain+0x253/0x1700 [nf_tables]
       nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x18d/0x270 [nf_tables]
       nf_hook_slow+0xaa/0x1e0
       ip_local_deliver+0x209/0x330

Fixes: 563125a73ac3 ("netfilter: nftables: generalize set extension to support for several expressions")
Reported-by: Gurpreet Shergill &lt;giki.shergill@proton.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: split gc into unlink and reclaim phase</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T11:10:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-03T15:31:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=500a50a301ce962b019ab95053ac70264fec2c21'/>
<id>500a50a301ce962b019ab95053ac70264fec2c21</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9df95785d3d8302f7c066050117b04cd3c2048c2 ]

Yiming Qian reports Use-after-free in the pipapo set type:
  Under a large number of expired elements, commit-time GC can run for a very
  long time in a non-preemptible context, triggering soft lockup warnings and
  RCU stall reports (local denial of service).

We must split GC in an unlink and a reclaim phase.

We cannot queue elements for freeing until pointers have been swapped.
Expired elements are still exposed to both the packet path and userspace
dumpers via the live copy of the data structure.

call_rcu() does not protect us: dump operations or element lookups starting
after call_rcu has fired can still observe the free'd element, unless the
commit phase has made enough progress to swap the clone and live pointers
before any new reader has picked up the old version.

This a similar approach as done recently for the rbtree backend in commit
35f83a75529a ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: don't gc elements on insert").

Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges")
Reported-by: Yiming Qian &lt;yimingqian591@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9df95785d3d8302f7c066050117b04cd3c2048c2 ]

Yiming Qian reports Use-after-free in the pipapo set type:
  Under a large number of expired elements, commit-time GC can run for a very
  long time in a non-preemptible context, triggering soft lockup warnings and
  RCU stall reports (local denial of service).

We must split GC in an unlink and a reclaim phase.

We cannot queue elements for freeing until pointers have been swapped.
Expired elements are still exposed to both the packet path and userspace
dumpers via the live copy of the data structure.

call_rcu() does not protect us: dump operations or element lookups starting
after call_rcu has fired can still observe the free'd element, unless the
commit phase has made enough progress to swap the clone and live pointers
before any new reader has picked up the old version.

This a similar approach as done recently for the rbtree backend in commit
35f83a75529a ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: don't gc elements on insert").

Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges")
Reported-by: Yiming Qian &lt;yimingqian591@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: clone set on flush only</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T11:10:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-02T22:28:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9154945a6394029822bd08c24cef5a3f86d0424a'/>
<id>9154945a6394029822bd08c24cef5a3f86d0424a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fb7fb4016300ac622c964069e286dc83166a5d52 ]

Syzbot with fault injection triggered a failing memory allocation with
GFP_KERNEL which results in a WARN splat:

iter.err
WARNING: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845 at nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5992
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5992 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845
Code: 8b 05 86 5a 4e 09 48 3b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 75 62 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 63 6d fa f7 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 43
+80 7c 35 00 00 0f 85 23 fe ff ff e9 26 fe ff ff 89 d9
RSP: 0018:ffffc900045af780 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89ca45bd RBX: 00000000fffffff4 RCX: ffff888028111e40
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff4 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc900045af870 R08: 0000000000400dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d141db R12: ffffc900045af7e0
R13: 1ffff920008b5f24 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc900045af920
FS:  000055557a6a5500(0000) GS:ffff888125496000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb5ea271fc0 CR3: 000000003269e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __nft_release_table+0xceb/0x11f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12115
 nft_rcv_nl_event+0xc25/0xdb0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12187
 notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0x90 kernel/notifier.c:380
 netlink_release+0x123b/0x1ad0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:761
 __sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
 sock_close+0xc3/0x240 net/socket.c:1455

Restrict set clone to the flush set command in the preparation phase.
Add NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE and use it for this purpose, update the rbtree
and pipapo backends to only clone the set when this iteration type is
used.

As for the existing NFT_ITER_UPDATE type, update the pipapo backend to
use the existing set clone if available, otherwise use the existing set
representation. After this update, there is no need to clone a set that
is being deleted, this includes bound anonymous set.

An alternative approach to NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE is to add a .clone
interface and call it from the flush set path.

Reported-by: syzbot+4924a0edc148e8b4b342@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3f1d886cc7c3 ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: move cloning of match info to insert/removal path")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fb7fb4016300ac622c964069e286dc83166a5d52 ]

Syzbot with fault injection triggered a failing memory allocation with
GFP_KERNEL which results in a WARN splat:

iter.err
WARNING: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845 at nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5992
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5992 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845
Code: 8b 05 86 5a 4e 09 48 3b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 75 62 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 63 6d fa f7 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 43
+80 7c 35 00 00 0f 85 23 fe ff ff e9 26 fe ff ff 89 d9
RSP: 0018:ffffc900045af780 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89ca45bd RBX: 00000000fffffff4 RCX: ffff888028111e40
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff4 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc900045af870 R08: 0000000000400dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d141db R12: ffffc900045af7e0
R13: 1ffff920008b5f24 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc900045af920
FS:  000055557a6a5500(0000) GS:ffff888125496000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb5ea271fc0 CR3: 000000003269e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __nft_release_table+0xceb/0x11f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12115
 nft_rcv_nl_event+0xc25/0xdb0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12187
 notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0x90 kernel/notifier.c:380
 netlink_release+0x123b/0x1ad0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:761
 __sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
 sock_close+0xc3/0x240 net/socket.c:1455

Restrict set clone to the flush set command in the preparation phase.
Add NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE and use it for this purpose, update the rbtree
and pipapo backends to only clone the set when this iteration type is
used.

As for the existing NFT_ITER_UPDATE type, update the pipapo backend to
use the existing set clone if available, otherwise use the existing set
representation. After this update, there is no need to clone a set that
is being deleted, this includes bound anonymous set.

An alternative approach to NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE is to add a .clone
interface and call it from the flush set path.

Reported-by: syzbot+4924a0edc148e8b4b342@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3f1d886cc7c3 ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: move cloning of match info to insert/removal path")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: validate open interval overlap"</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T11:09:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-09T13:30:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=54e841a036064fd504eb609d4910b775a92d00cb'/>
<id>54e841a036064fd504eb609d4910b775a92d00cb</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 12b1681793e9b7552495290785a3570c539f409d which is
commit 648946966a08e4cb1a71619e3d1b12bd7642de7b upstream.

It is causing netfilter issues, so revert it for now.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aaeEd8UqYQ33Af7_@chamomile
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 12b1681793e9b7552495290785a3570c539f409d which is
commit 648946966a08e4cb1a71619e3d1b12bd7642de7b upstream.

It is causing netfilter issues, so revert it for now.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aaeEd8UqYQ33Af7_@chamomile
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: add .abort_skip_removal flag for set types</title>
<updated>2026-02-27T21:05:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-21T00:08:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c1f305ac054f2358cf8fa086d15293a680900b7f'/>
<id>c1f305ac054f2358cf8fa086d15293a680900b7f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f175b46d9134f708358b5404730c6dfa200fbf3c upstream.

The pipapo set backend is the only user of the .abort interface so far.
To speed up pipapo abort path, removals are skipped.

The follow up patch updates the rbtree to use to build an array of
ordered elements, then use binary search. This needs a new .abort
interface but, unlike pipapo, it also need to undo/remove elements.

Add a flag and use it from the pipapo set backend.

Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: "Kris Karas (Bug Reporting)" &lt;bugs-a21@moonlit-rail.com&gt;
Cc: Genes Lists &lt;lists@sapience.com&gt;
Cc: Philip Müller &lt;philm@manjaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f175b46d9134f708358b5404730c6dfa200fbf3c upstream.

The pipapo set backend is the only user of the .abort interface so far.
To speed up pipapo abort path, removals are skipped.

The follow up patch updates the rbtree to use to build an array of
ordered elements, then use binary search. This needs a new .abort
interface but, unlike pipapo, it also need to undo/remove elements.

Add a flag and use it from the pipapo set backend.

Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: "Kris Karas (Bug Reporting)" &lt;bugs-a21@moonlit-rail.com&gt;
Cc: Genes Lists &lt;lists@sapience.com&gt;
Cc: Philip Müller &lt;philm@manjaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: validate open interval overlap</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T22:59:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-06T12:33:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=12b1681793e9b7552495290785a3570c539f409d'/>
<id>12b1681793e9b7552495290785a3570c539f409d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 648946966a08e4cb1a71619e3d1b12bd7642de7b ]

Open intervals do not have an end element, in particular an open
interval at the end of the set is hard to validate because of it is
lacking the end element, and interval validation relies on such end
element to perform the checks.

This patch adds a new flag field to struct nft_set_elem, this is not an
issue because this is a temporary object that is allocated in the stack
from the insert/deactivate path. This flag field is used to specify that
this is the last element in this add/delete command.

The last flag is used, in combination with the start element cookie, to
check if there is a partial overlap, eg.

   Already exists:   255.255.255.0-255.255.255.254
   Add interval:     255.255.255.0-255.255.255.255
                     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             start element overlap

Basically, the idea is to check for an existing end element in the set
if there is an overlap with an existing start element.

However, the last open interval can come in any position in the add
command, the corner case can get a bit more complicated:

   Already exists:   255.255.255.0-255.255.255.254
   Add intervals:    255.255.255.0-255.255.255.255,255.255.255.0-255.255.255.254
                     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             start element overlap

To catch this overlap, annotate that the new start element is a possible
overlap, then report the overlap if the next element is another start
element that confirms that previous element in an open interval at the
end of the set.

For deletions, do not update the start cookie when deleting an open
interval, otherwise this can trigger spurious EEXIST when adding new
elements.

Unfortunately, there is no NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_OPEN flag which would
make easier to detect open interval overlaps.

Fixes: 7c84d41416d8 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: Detect partial overlaps on insertion")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 648946966a08e4cb1a71619e3d1b12bd7642de7b ]

Open intervals do not have an end element, in particular an open
interval at the end of the set is hard to validate because of it is
lacking the end element, and interval validation relies on such end
element to perform the checks.

This patch adds a new flag field to struct nft_set_elem, this is not an
issue because this is a temporary object that is allocated in the stack
from the insert/deactivate path. This flag field is used to specify that
this is the last element in this add/delete command.

The last flag is used, in combination with the start element cookie, to
check if there is a partial overlap, eg.

   Already exists:   255.255.255.0-255.255.255.254
   Add interval:     255.255.255.0-255.255.255.255
                     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             start element overlap

Basically, the idea is to check for an existing end element in the set
if there is an overlap with an existing start element.

However, the last open interval can come in any position in the add
command, the corner case can get a bit more complicated:

   Already exists:   255.255.255.0-255.255.255.254
   Add intervals:    255.255.255.0-255.255.255.255,255.255.255.0-255.255.255.254
                     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             start element overlap

To catch this overlap, annotate that the new start element is a possible
overlap, then report the overlap if the next element is another start
element that confirms that previous element in an open interval at the
end of the set.

For deletions, do not update the start cookie when deleting an open
interval, otherwise this can trigger spurious EEXIST when adding new
elements.

Unfortunately, there is no NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_OPEN flag which would
make easier to detect open interval overlaps.

Fixes: 7c84d41416d8 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: Detect partial overlaps on insertion")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: do shared-unconfirmed check before segmentation</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T22:59:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-20T16:17:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=23901aa6b8a2f294c4b774436b4691f3ff863a8f'/>
<id>23901aa6b8a2f294c4b774436b4691f3ff863a8f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 207b3ebacb6113acaaec0d171d5307032c690004 ]

Ulrich reports a regression with nfqueue:

If an application did not set the 'F_GSO' capability flag and a gso
packet with an unconfirmed nf_conn entry is received all packets are
now dropped instead of queued, because the check happens after
skb_gso_segment().  In that case, we did have exclusive ownership
of the skb and its associated conntrack entry.  The elevated use
count is due to skb_clone happening via skb_gso_segment().

Move the check so that its peformed vs. the aggregated packet.

Then, annotate the individual segments except the first one so we
can do a 2nd check at reinject time.

For the normal case, where userspace does in-order reinjects, this avoids
packet drops: first reinjected segment continues traversal and confirms
entry, remaining segments observe the confirmed entry.

While at it, simplify nf_ct_drop_unconfirmed(): We only care about
unconfirmed entries with a refcnt &gt; 1, there is no need to special-case
dying entries.

This only happens with UDP.  With TCP, the only unconfirmed packet will
be the TCP SYN, those aren't aggregated by GRO.

Next patch adds a udpgro test case to cover this scenario.

Reported-by: Ulrich Weber &lt;ulrich.weber@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 7d8dc1c7be8d ("netfilter: nf_queue: drop packets with cloned unconfirmed conntracks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 207b3ebacb6113acaaec0d171d5307032c690004 ]

Ulrich reports a regression with nfqueue:

If an application did not set the 'F_GSO' capability flag and a gso
packet with an unconfirmed nf_conn entry is received all packets are
now dropped instead of queued, because the check happens after
skb_gso_segment().  In that case, we did have exclusive ownership
of the skb and its associated conntrack entry.  The elevated use
count is due to skb_clone happening via skb_gso_segment().

Move the check so that its peformed vs. the aggregated packet.

Then, annotate the individual segments except the first one so we
can do a 2nd check at reinject time.

For the normal case, where userspace does in-order reinjects, this avoids
packet drops: first reinjected segment continues traversal and confirms
entry, remaining segments observe the confirmed entry.

While at it, simplify nf_ct_drop_unconfirmed(): We only care about
unconfirmed entries with a refcnt &gt; 1, there is no need to special-case
dying entries.

This only happens with UDP.  With TCP, the only unconfirmed packet will
be the TCP SYN, those aren't aggregated by GRO.

Next patch adds a udpgro test case to cover this scenario.

Reported-by: Ulrich Weber &lt;ulrich.weber@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 7d8dc1c7be8d ("netfilter: nf_queue: drop packets with cloned unconfirmed conntracks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: optimize verdict lookup with hash table</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T22:59:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Scott Mitchell</name>
<email>scott.k.mitch1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-23T22:09:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=870e3e63da8e88daffe9d692a025c711658018a8'/>
<id>870e3e63da8e88daffe9d692a025c711658018a8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e19079adcd26a25d7d3e586b1837493361fdf8b6 ]

The current implementation uses a linear list to find queued packets by
ID when processing verdicts from userspace. With large queue depths and
out-of-order verdicting, this O(n) lookup becomes a significant
bottleneck, causing userspace verdict processing to dominate CPU time.

Replace the linear search with a hash table for O(1) average-case
packet lookup by ID. A global rhashtable spanning all network
namespaces attributes hash bucket memory to kernel but is subject to
fixed upper bound.

Signed-off-by: Scott Mitchell &lt;scott.k.mitch1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 207b3ebacb61 ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: do shared-unconfirmed check before segmentation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e19079adcd26a25d7d3e586b1837493361fdf8b6 ]

The current implementation uses a linear list to find queued packets by
ID when processing verdicts from userspace. With large queue depths and
out-of-order verdicting, this O(n) lookup becomes a significant
bottleneck, causing userspace verdict processing to dominate CPU time.

Replace the linear search with a hash table for O(1) average-case
packet lookup by ID. A global rhashtable spanning all network
namespaces attributes hash bucket memory to kernel but is subject to
fixed upper bound.

Signed-off-by: Scott Mitchell &lt;scott.k.mitch1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 207b3ebacb61 ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: do shared-unconfirmed check before segmentation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_conncount: increase the connection clean up limit to 64</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T22:59:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fernando Fernandez Mancera</name>
<email>fmancera@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-17T14:46:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6e5fa7add3e76da068a478d905be64be8fa4e80a'/>
<id>6e5fa7add3e76da068a478d905be64be8fa4e80a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 21d033e472735ecec677f1ae46d6740b5e47a4f3 ]

After the optimization to only perform one GC per jiffy, a new problem
was introduced. If more than 8 new connections are tracked per jiffy the
list won't be cleaned up fast enough possibly reaching the limit
wrongly.

In order to prevent this issue, only skip the GC if it was already
triggered during the same jiffy and the increment is lower than the
clean up limit. In addition, increase the clean up limit to 64
connections to avoid triggering GC too often and do more effective GCs.

This has been tested using a HTTP server and several
performance tools while having nft_connlimit/xt_connlimit or OVS limit
configured.

Output of slowhttptest + OVS limit at 52000 connections:

 slow HTTP test status on 340th second:
 initializing:        0
 pending:             432
 connected:           51998
 error:               0
 closed:              0
 service available:   YES

Fixes: d265929930e2 ("netfilter: nf_conncount: reduce unnecessary GC")
Reported-by: Aleksandra Rukomoinikova &lt;ARukomoinikova@k2.cloud&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter/b2064e7b-0776-4e14-adb6-c68080987471@k2.cloud/
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera &lt;fmancera@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 21d033e472735ecec677f1ae46d6740b5e47a4f3 ]

After the optimization to only perform one GC per jiffy, a new problem
was introduced. If more than 8 new connections are tracked per jiffy the
list won't be cleaned up fast enough possibly reaching the limit
wrongly.

In order to prevent this issue, only skip the GC if it was already
triggered during the same jiffy and the increment is lower than the
clean up limit. In addition, increase the clean up limit to 64
connections to avoid triggering GC too often and do more effective GCs.

This has been tested using a HTTP server and several
performance tools while having nft_connlimit/xt_connlimit or OVS limit
configured.

Output of slowhttptest + OVS limit at 52000 connections:

 slow HTTP test status on 340th second:
 initializing:        0
 pending:             432
 connected:           51998
 error:               0
 closed:              0
 service available:   YES

Fixes: d265929930e2 ("netfilter: nf_conncount: reduce unnecessary GC")
Reported-by: Aleksandra Rukomoinikova &lt;ARukomoinikova@k2.cloud&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter/b2064e7b-0776-4e14-adb6-c68080987471@k2.cloud/
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera &lt;fmancera@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible</title>
<updated>2026-01-17T15:35:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-06T23:18:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=09d6074995c186e449979fe6c1b0f1a69cf9bd3b'/>
<id>09d6074995c186e449979fe6c1b0f1a69cf9bd3b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8e1a1bc4f5a42747c08130b8242ebebd1210b32f ]

Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in
nft_chain_validate():

 watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547]
[..]
 RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables]
[..]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables]
  nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables]
  nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables]
[..]

Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting
from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths
(chain jumps).  But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation.

Consider:
1  input -&gt; j2 -&gt; j3
2  input -&gt; j2 -&gt; j3
3  input -&gt; j1 -&gt; j2 -&gt; j3

Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3,
because this was already checked during validation of the first rule.
We need to validate it only for rule 3.

This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed
the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump
might now exceed the allowed stack size.  We also need to update all
reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth.

Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an
issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from
invalid base chains.  For example, the masquerade expression can only be
called from NAT postrouting base chains.

Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type,
hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different
hook location.

Reported-by: Hamza Mahfooz &lt;hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20251118221735.GA5477@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net/
Tested-by: Hamza Mahfooz &lt;hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8e1a1bc4f5a42747c08130b8242ebebd1210b32f ]

Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in
nft_chain_validate():

 watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547]
[..]
 RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables]
[..]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables]
  nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables]
  nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables]
[..]

Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting
from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths
(chain jumps).  But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation.

Consider:
1  input -&gt; j2 -&gt; j3
2  input -&gt; j2 -&gt; j3
3  input -&gt; j1 -&gt; j2 -&gt; j3

Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3,
because this was already checked during validation of the first rule.
We need to validate it only for rule 3.

This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed
the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump
might now exceed the allowed stack size.  We also need to update all
reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth.

Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an
issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from
invalid base chains.  For example, the masquerade expression can only be
called from NAT postrouting base chains.

Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type,
hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different
hook location.

Reported-by: Hamza Mahfooz &lt;hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20251118221735.GA5477@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net/
Tested-by: Hamza Mahfooz &lt;hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
