linux.git/include/net, branch v4.19.56 Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git {nl,mac}80211: allow 4addr AP operation on crypto controlled devices 2019-06-25T03:36:01+00:00 Manikanta Pubbisetty mpubbise@codeaurora.org 2019-05-08T09:25:33+00:00 ccf6a155844bd7aad395f0c755b879fec870b7e0 commit 33d915d9e8ce811d8958915ccd18d71a66c7c495 upstream. As per the current design, in the case of sw crypto controlled devices, it is the device which advertises the support for AP/VLAN iftype based on it's ability to tranmsit packets encrypted in software (In VLAN functionality, group traffic generated for a specific VLAN group is always encrypted in software). Commit db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices") has introduced this change. Since 4addr AP operation also uses AP/VLAN iftype, this conditional way of advertising AP/VLAN support has broken 4addr AP mode operation on crypto controlled devices which do not support VLAN functionality. In the case of ath10k driver, not all firmwares have support for VLAN functionality but all can support 4addr AP operation. Because AP/VLAN support is not advertised for these devices, 4addr AP operations are also blocked. Fix this by allowing 4addr operation on devices which do not support AP/VLAN iftype but can support 4addr AP operation (decision is based on the wiphy flag WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices") Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 33d915d9e8ce811d8958915ccd18d71a66c7c495 upstream.

As per the current design, in the case of sw crypto controlled devices,
it is the device which advertises the support for AP/VLAN iftype based
on it's ability to tranmsit packets encrypted in software
(In VLAN functionality, group traffic generated for a specific
VLAN group is always encrypted in software). Commit db3bdcb9c3ff
("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
has introduced this change.

Since 4addr AP operation also uses AP/VLAN iftype, this conditional
way of advertising AP/VLAN support has broken 4addr AP mode operation on
crypto controlled devices which do not support VLAN functionality.

In the case of ath10k driver, not all firmwares have support for VLAN
functionality but all can support 4addr AP operation. Because AP/VLAN
support is not advertised for these devices, 4addr AP operations are
also blocked.

Fix this by allowing 4addr operation on devices which do not support
AP/VLAN iftype but can support 4addr AP operation (decision is based on
the wiphy flag WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections 2019-06-25T03:36:01+00:00 Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org 2019-04-24T20:19:17+00:00 5e9a6c68de0fd1ce37380e4947941bcd587d6b57 commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream. The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for BR/EDR connections as well. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl 2019-06-17T17:51:56+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2019-06-06T16:15:31+00:00 7f9f8a37e563c67b24ccd57da1d541a95538e8d9 commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream. Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or SYN/ACK messages. This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu overhead. Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40 bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload. In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value to a saner value. We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility reasons. Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.") from 64 to 88. We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS. CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.

Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.

This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.

Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.

In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.

We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.

Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.

We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.

CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs 2019-06-17T17:51:56+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2019-05-18T00:17:22+00:00 c09be31461ed140976c60a87364415454a2c3d42 commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream. Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash in tcp_shifted_skb() : BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount); This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48 An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC. This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs can overflow. Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled. SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity. CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs

Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Revert "Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections" 2019-06-15T09:54:11+00:00 Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org 2019-06-13T07:28:42+00:00 8e5483aeae0df86346f975a06c5a381bc4dd97e7 This reverts commit 38f092c41cebaff589e88cc22686b289a6840559 which is commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream. Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon, revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines working properly again. Reported-by: Vasily Khoruzhick <anarsoul@gmail.com> Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
This reverts commit 38f092c41cebaff589e88cc22686b289a6840559 which is
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does
not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon,
revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines
working properly again.

Reported-by: Vasily Khoruzhick <anarsoul@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv4: Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref when CONFIG_INET is disabled 2019-06-11T10:20:57+00:00 David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com 2019-05-05T18:16:20+00:00 645fa685bb20e8386e1d9283e95cb14fdf079b85 commit 9b3040a6aafd7898ece7fc7efcbca71e42aa8069 upstream. Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref to return NULL when CONFIG_INET is disabled. Fixes: 4b2a2bfeb3f0 ("neighbor: Call __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref in neigh_xmit") Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 9b3040a6aafd7898ece7fc7efcbca71e42aa8069 upstream.

Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref to return NULL when CONFIG_INET is disabled.

Fixes: 4b2a2bfeb3f0 ("neighbor: Call __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref in neigh_xmit")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net/tls: replace the sleeping lock around RX resync with a bit lock 2019-06-11T10:20:49+00:00 Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com 2019-06-04T19:00:12+00:00 be0343af1291c4f8b4a75e32de2eab827e4121ff [ Upstream commit e52972c11d6b1262964db96d65934196db621685 ] Commit 38030d7cb779 ("net/tls: avoid NULL-deref on resync during device removal") tried to fix a potential NULL-dereference by taking the context rwsem. Unfortunately the RX resync may get called from soft IRQ, so we can't use the rwsem to protect from the device disappearing. Because we are guaranteed there can be only one resync at a time (it's called from strparser) use a bit to indicate resync is busy and make device removal wait for the bit to get cleared. Note that there is a leftover "flags" field in struct tls_context already. Fixes: 4799ac81e52a ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit e52972c11d6b1262964db96d65934196db621685 ]

Commit 38030d7cb779 ("net/tls: avoid NULL-deref on resync during device removal")
tried to fix a potential NULL-dereference by taking the
context rwsem.  Unfortunately the RX resync may get called
from soft IRQ, so we can't use the rwsem to protect from
the device disappearing.  Because we are guaranteed there
can be only one resync at a time (it's called from strparser)
use a bit to indicate resync is busy and make device
removal wait for the bit to get cleared.

Note that there is a leftover "flags" field in struct
tls_context already.

Fixes: 4799ac81e52a ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: fix the check before getting the cookie in rt6_get_cookie 2019-06-11T10:20:48+00:00 Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com 2019-06-02T11:10:46+00:00 9fd19a3b4f6146806d43625e5726ad39653cef07 [ Upstream commit b7999b07726c16974ba9ca3bb9fe98ecbec5f81c ] In Jianlin's testing, netperf was broken with 'Connection reset by peer', as the cookie check failed in rt6_check() and ip6_dst_check() always returned NULL. It's caused by Commit 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes"), where the cookie can be got only when 'c1'(see below) for setting dst_cookie whereas rt6_check() is called when !'c1' for checking dst_cookie, as we can see in ip6_dst_check(). Since in ip6_dst_check() both rt6_dst_from_check() (c1) and rt6_check() (!c1) will check the 'from' cookie, this patch is to remove the c1 check in rt6_get_cookie(), so that the dst_cookie can always be set properly. c1: (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || unlikely(!list_empty(&rt->rt6i_uncached))) Fixes: 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit b7999b07726c16974ba9ca3bb9fe98ecbec5f81c ]

In Jianlin's testing, netperf was broken with 'Connection reset by peer',
as the cookie check failed in rt6_check() and ip6_dst_check() always
returned NULL.

It's caused by Commit 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB
entries from dst based routes"), where the cookie can be got only when
'c1'(see below) for setting dst_cookie whereas rt6_check() is called
when !'c1' for checking dst_cookie, as we can see in ip6_dst_check().

Since in ip6_dst_check() both rt6_dst_from_check() (c1) and rt6_check()
(!c1) will check the 'from' cookie, this patch is to remove the c1 check
in rt6_get_cookie(), so that the dst_cookie can always be set properly.

c1:
  (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || unlikely(!list_empty(&rt->rt6i_uncached)))

Fixes: 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash 2019-06-04T06:02:30+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2019-03-27T19:40:33+00:00 07480da0c8a1979e0973d6dd783b6aed966dccf6 [ Upstream commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 ] According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak and might be used by attackers. Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()) having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky. It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 ]

According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.

Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.

It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: Ignore CC events not matching the last HCI command 2019-05-31T13:46:09+00:00 João Paulo Rechi Vita jprvita@gmail.com 2019-05-02T02:01:52+00:00 8603d49906b231bbcd9141db7d096fa1041bc379 [ Upstream commit f80c5dad7b6467b884c445ffea45985793b4b2d0 ] This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers (seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI command to the controller. The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure, where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device found events are sent to userspace. This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp 27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow. Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50 = Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64) 0.352340 = Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22 0.352343 = New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0) [hci0] 0.352344 = Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 [hci0] 0.352345 = Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm) [hci0] 0.352346 @ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0001} 0.352347 @ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0002} 0.352366 @ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0003} 27.302164 @ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #1 [hci0] 27.302496 Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #2 [hci0] 27.419117 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #3 [hci0] 27.419244 Type: Active (0x01) Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012) Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #4 [hci0] 27.420131 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #5 [hci0] 27.420259 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #6 [hci0] 27.420969 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #7 [hci0] 27.421983 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) @ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059 Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1 Status: Success (0x00) Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random @ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random Discovery: Enabled (0x01) @ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random Discovery: Enabled (0x01) @ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random Discovery: Enabled (0x01) Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita <jprvita@endlessm.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f80c5dad7b6467b884c445ffea45985793b4b2d0 ]

This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until
a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the
controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers
(seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event
for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI
command to the controller.

The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure,
where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR
command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the
command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and
ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being
performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning
procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device
found events are sent to userspace.

This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected
controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp
27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow.

Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50
= Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64)                                  0.352340
= Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22                               0.352343
= New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0)               [hci0] 0.352344
= Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84                                 [hci0] 0.352345
= Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm)                      [hci0] 0.352346
@ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14             {0x0001} 0.352347
@ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14                  {0x0002} 0.352366
@ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14                {0x0003} 27.302164
@ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1       {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
< HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6   #1 [hci0] 27.302496
        Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #2 [hci0] 27.419117
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7  #3 [hci0] 27.419244
        Type: Active (0x01)
        Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Own address type: Random (0x01)
        Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #4 [hci0] 27.420131
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2      #5 [hci0] 27.420259
        Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
        Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #6 [hci0] 27.420969
      LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #7 [hci0] 27.421983
      LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
@ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4        {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059
      Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)

Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita <jprvita@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>