<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/include/net, branch v4.4.187</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tcp: reset sk_send_head in tcp_write_queue_purge</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:35:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Soheil Hassas Yeganeh</name>
<email>soheil@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-29T13:21:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8f0b77b71f3fec09f86f80cd98c36a1a35109499'/>
<id>8f0b77b71f3fec09f86f80cd98c36a1a35109499</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dbbf2d1e4077bab0c65ece2765d3fc69cf7d610f ]

tcp_write_queue_purge clears all the SKBs in the write queue
but does not reset the sk_send_head. As a result, we can have
a NULL pointer dereference anywhere that we use tcp_send_head
instead of the tcp_write_queue_tail.

For example, after a27fd7a8ed38 (tcp: purge write queue upon RST),
we can purge the write queue on RST. Prior to
75c119afe14f (tcp: implement rb-tree based retransmit queue),
tcp_push will only check tcp_send_head and then accesses
tcp_write_queue_tail to send the actual SKB. As a result, it will
dereference a NULL pointer.

This has been reported twice for 4.14 where we don't have
75c119afe14f:

By Timofey Titovets:

[  422.081094] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at 0000000000000038
[  422.081254] IP: tcp_push+0x42/0x110
[  422.081314] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  422.081364] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI

By Yongjian Xu:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
IP: tcp_push+0x48/0x120
PGD 80000007ff77b067 P4D 80000007ff77b067 PUD 7fd989067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#18] SMP PTI
Modules linked in: tcp_diag inet_diag tcp_bbr sch_fq iTCO_wdt
iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr ixgbe mdio i2c_i801 lpc_ich joydev input_leds shpchp
e1000e igb dca ptp pps_core hwmon mei_me mei ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ses
scsi_transport_sas enclosure ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas
wmi ast ttm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax
CPU: 6 PID: 14156 Comm: [ET_NET 6] Tainted: G D 4.14.26-1.el6.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkServer RD440 /ThinkServer RD440, BIOS A0TS80A
09/22/2014
task: ffff8807d78d8140 task.stack: ffffc9000e944000
RIP: 0010:tcp_push+0x48/0x120
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e947a88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000000005b4 RBX: ffff880f7cce9c00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff8807d00f5000
RBP: ffffc9000e947aa8 R08: 0000000000001c84 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8807d00f5158 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8807d00f5000
R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 00000000000256d4 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f5916de9700(0000) GS:ffff88107fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000007f8226004 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x33d/0xe50
tcp_sendmsg+0x37/0x60
inet_sendmsg+0x39/0xc0
sock_sendmsg+0x49/0x60
sock_write_iter+0xb6/0x100
do_iter_readv_writev+0xec/0x130
? rw_verify_area+0x49/0xb0
do_iter_write+0x97/0xd0
vfs_writev+0x7e/0xe0
? __wake_up_common_lock+0x80/0xa0
? __fget_light+0x2c/0x70
? __do_page_fault+0x1e7/0x530
do_writev+0x60/0xf0
? inet_shutdown+0xac/0x110
SyS_writev+0x10/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x8b/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x3135ce0c57
RSP: 002b:00007f5916de4b00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000003135ce0c57
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f5916de4b90 RDI: 000000000000606f
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f5916de8c38
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00000000000464cc
R13: 00007f5916de8c30 R14: 00007f58d8bef080 R15: 0000000000000002
Code: 48 8b 97 60 01 00 00 4c 8d 97 58 01 00 00 41 b9 00 00 00 00 41 89 f3 4c 39
d2 49 0f 44 d1 41 81 e3 00 80 00 00 0f 85 b0 00 00 00 &lt;80&gt; 4a 38 08 44 8b 8f 74
06 00 00 44 89 8f 7c 06 00 00 83 e6 01
RIP: tcp_push+0x48/0x120 RSP: ffffc9000e947a88
CR2: 0000000000000038
---[ end trace 8d545c2e93515549 ]---

There is other scenario which found in stable 4.4:
Allocated:
 [&lt;ffffffff82f380a6&gt;] __alloc_skb+0xe6/0x600 net/core/skbuff.c:218
 [&lt;ffffffff832466c3&gt;] alloc_skb_fclone include/linux/skbuff.h:856 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff832466c3&gt;] sk_stream_alloc_skb+0xa3/0x5d0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:833
 [&lt;ffffffff83249164&gt;] tcp_sendmsg+0xd34/0x2b00 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1178
 [&lt;ffffffff83300ef3&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x203/0x4d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:755
Freed:
 [&lt;ffffffff82f372fd&gt;] __kfree_skb+0x1d/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:676
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] sk_wmem_free_skb include/net/sock.h:1447 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] tcp_write_queue_purge include/net/tcp.h:1460 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] tcp_connect_init net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3122 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] tcp_connect+0xb24/0x30c0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3261
 [&lt;ffffffff8329b991&gt;] tcp_v4_connect+0xf31/0x1890 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:246

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_skb_pcount include/net/tcp.h:796 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_init_tso_segs net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1619 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_write_xmit+0x3fc2/0x4cb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2056
 [&lt;ffffffff81515cd5&gt;] kasan_report.cold.7+0x175/0x2f7 mm/kasan/report.c:408
 [&lt;ffffffff814f9784&gt;] __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
 [&lt;ffffffff83286582&gt;] tcp_skb_pcount include/net/tcp.h:796 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83286582&gt;] tcp_init_tso_segs net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1619 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83286582&gt;] tcp_write_xmit+0x3fc2/0x4cb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2056
 [&lt;ffffffff83287a40&gt;] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0xa0/0x290 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2307

stable 4.4 and stable 4.9 don't have the commit abb4a8b870b5 ("tcp: purge write queue upon RST")
which is referred in dbbf2d1e4077,
in tcp_connect_init, it calls tcp_write_queue_purge, and does not reset sk_send_head, then UAF.

stable 4.14 have the commit abb4a8b870b5 ("tcp: purge write queue upon RST"),
in tcp_reset, it calls tcp_write_queue_purge(sk), and does not reset sk_send_head, then UAF.

So this patch can be used to fix stable 4.4 and 4.9.

Fixes: a27fd7a8ed38 (tcp: purge write queue upon RST)
Reported-by: Timofey Titovets &lt;nefelim4ag@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yongjian Xu &lt;yongjianchn@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yongjian Xu &lt;yongjianchn@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan &lt;maowenan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit dbbf2d1e4077bab0c65ece2765d3fc69cf7d610f ]

tcp_write_queue_purge clears all the SKBs in the write queue
but does not reset the sk_send_head. As a result, we can have
a NULL pointer dereference anywhere that we use tcp_send_head
instead of the tcp_write_queue_tail.

For example, after a27fd7a8ed38 (tcp: purge write queue upon RST),
we can purge the write queue on RST. Prior to
75c119afe14f (tcp: implement rb-tree based retransmit queue),
tcp_push will only check tcp_send_head and then accesses
tcp_write_queue_tail to send the actual SKB. As a result, it will
dereference a NULL pointer.

This has been reported twice for 4.14 where we don't have
75c119afe14f:

By Timofey Titovets:

[  422.081094] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at 0000000000000038
[  422.081254] IP: tcp_push+0x42/0x110
[  422.081314] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  422.081364] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI

By Yongjian Xu:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038
IP: tcp_push+0x48/0x120
PGD 80000007ff77b067 P4D 80000007ff77b067 PUD 7fd989067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#18] SMP PTI
Modules linked in: tcp_diag inet_diag tcp_bbr sch_fq iTCO_wdt
iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr ixgbe mdio i2c_i801 lpc_ich joydev input_leds shpchp
e1000e igb dca ptp pps_core hwmon mei_me mei ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ses
scsi_transport_sas enclosure ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas
wmi ast ttm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax
CPU: 6 PID: 14156 Comm: [ET_NET 6] Tainted: G D 4.14.26-1.el6.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkServer RD440 /ThinkServer RD440, BIOS A0TS80A
09/22/2014
task: ffff8807d78d8140 task.stack: ffffc9000e944000
RIP: 0010:tcp_push+0x48/0x120
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e947a88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000000005b4 RBX: ffff880f7cce9c00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff8807d00f5000
RBP: ffffc9000e947aa8 R08: 0000000000001c84 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8807d00f5158 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8807d00f5000
R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 00000000000256d4 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f5916de9700(0000) GS:ffff88107fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000007f8226004 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x33d/0xe50
tcp_sendmsg+0x37/0x60
inet_sendmsg+0x39/0xc0
sock_sendmsg+0x49/0x60
sock_write_iter+0xb6/0x100
do_iter_readv_writev+0xec/0x130
? rw_verify_area+0x49/0xb0
do_iter_write+0x97/0xd0
vfs_writev+0x7e/0xe0
? __wake_up_common_lock+0x80/0xa0
? __fget_light+0x2c/0x70
? __do_page_fault+0x1e7/0x530
do_writev+0x60/0xf0
? inet_shutdown+0xac/0x110
SyS_writev+0x10/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x8b/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x3135ce0c57
RSP: 002b:00007f5916de4b00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000003135ce0c57
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f5916de4b90 RDI: 000000000000606f
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f5916de8c38
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00000000000464cc
R13: 00007f5916de8c30 R14: 00007f58d8bef080 R15: 0000000000000002
Code: 48 8b 97 60 01 00 00 4c 8d 97 58 01 00 00 41 b9 00 00 00 00 41 89 f3 4c 39
d2 49 0f 44 d1 41 81 e3 00 80 00 00 0f 85 b0 00 00 00 &lt;80&gt; 4a 38 08 44 8b 8f 74
06 00 00 44 89 8f 7c 06 00 00 83 e6 01
RIP: tcp_push+0x48/0x120 RSP: ffffc9000e947a88
CR2: 0000000000000038
---[ end trace 8d545c2e93515549 ]---

There is other scenario which found in stable 4.4:
Allocated:
 [&lt;ffffffff82f380a6&gt;] __alloc_skb+0xe6/0x600 net/core/skbuff.c:218
 [&lt;ffffffff832466c3&gt;] alloc_skb_fclone include/linux/skbuff.h:856 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff832466c3&gt;] sk_stream_alloc_skb+0xa3/0x5d0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:833
 [&lt;ffffffff83249164&gt;] tcp_sendmsg+0xd34/0x2b00 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1178
 [&lt;ffffffff83300ef3&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x203/0x4d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:755
Freed:
 [&lt;ffffffff82f372fd&gt;] __kfree_skb+0x1d/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:676
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] sk_wmem_free_skb include/net/sock.h:1447 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] tcp_write_queue_purge include/net/tcp.h:1460 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] tcp_connect_init net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3122 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83288834&gt;] tcp_connect+0xb24/0x30c0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3261
 [&lt;ffffffff8329b991&gt;] tcp_v4_connect+0xf31/0x1890 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:246

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_skb_pcount include/net/tcp.h:796 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_init_tso_segs net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1619 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_write_xmit+0x3fc2/0x4cb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2056
 [&lt;ffffffff81515cd5&gt;] kasan_report.cold.7+0x175/0x2f7 mm/kasan/report.c:408
 [&lt;ffffffff814f9784&gt;] __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
 [&lt;ffffffff83286582&gt;] tcp_skb_pcount include/net/tcp.h:796 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83286582&gt;] tcp_init_tso_segs net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1619 [inline]
 [&lt;ffffffff83286582&gt;] tcp_write_xmit+0x3fc2/0x4cb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2056
 [&lt;ffffffff83287a40&gt;] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0xa0/0x290 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2307

stable 4.4 and stable 4.9 don't have the commit abb4a8b870b5 ("tcp: purge write queue upon RST")
which is referred in dbbf2d1e4077,
in tcp_connect_init, it calls tcp_write_queue_purge, and does not reset sk_send_head, then UAF.

stable 4.14 have the commit abb4a8b870b5 ("tcp: purge write queue upon RST"),
in tcp_reset, it calls tcp_write_queue_purge(sk), and does not reset sk_send_head, then UAF.

So this patch can be used to fix stable 4.4 and 4.9.

Fixes: a27fd7a8ed38 (tcp: purge write queue upon RST)
Reported-by: Timofey Titovets &lt;nefelim4ag@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yongjian Xu &lt;yongjianchn@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yongjian Xu &lt;yongjianchn@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan &lt;maowenan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: check before dereferencing netdev_ops during busy poll</title>
<updated>2019-07-10T07:56:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Elsasser</name>
<email>jelsasser@appneta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-01T23:48:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b3c963d51a02153ffd7c2c41ed4a9287c9d25da2'/>
<id>b3c963d51a02153ffd7c2c41ed4a9287c9d25da2</id>
<content type='text'>
init_dummy_netdev() leaves its netdev_ops pointer zeroed. This leads
to a NULL pointer dereference when sk_busy_loop fires against an iwlwifi
wireless adapter and checks napi-&gt;dev-&gt;netdev_ops-&gt;ndo_busy_poll.

Avoid this by ensuring napi-&gt;dev-&gt;netdev_ops is valid before following
the pointer, avoiding the following panic when busy polling on a dummy
netdev:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c8
  IP: [&lt;ffffffff817b4b72&gt;] sk_busy_loop+0x92/0x2f0
  Call Trace:
   [&lt;ffffffff815a3134&gt;] ? uart_write_room+0x74/0xf0
   [&lt;ffffffff817964a9&gt;] sock_poll+0x99/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff81223142&gt;] do_sys_poll+0x2e2/0x520
   [&lt;ffffffff8118d3fc&gt;] ? get_page_from_freelist+0x3bc/0xa30
   [&lt;ffffffff810ada22&gt;] ? update_curr+0x62/0x140
   [&lt;ffffffff811ea671&gt;] ? __slab_free+0xa1/0x2a0
   [&lt;ffffffff811ea671&gt;] ? __slab_free+0xa1/0x2a0
   [&lt;ffffffff8179dbb1&gt;] ? skb_free_head+0x21/0x30
   [&lt;ffffffff81221bd0&gt;] ? poll_initwait+0x50/0x50
   [&lt;ffffffff811eaa36&gt;] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c6/0x1e0
   [&lt;ffffffff815a4884&gt;] ? uart_write+0x124/0x1d0
   [&lt;ffffffff810bd1cd&gt;] ? remove_wait_queue+0x4d/0x60
   [&lt;ffffffff810bd224&gt;] ? __wake_up+0x44/0x50
   [&lt;ffffffff81582731&gt;] ? tty_write_unlock+0x31/0x40
   [&lt;ffffffff8158c5c6&gt;] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x16/0x20
   [&lt;ffffffff81584820&gt;] ? tty_write+0x1e0/0x2f0
   [&lt;ffffffff81587e50&gt;] ? process_echoes+0x80/0x80
   [&lt;ffffffff8120c17b&gt;] ? __vfs_write+0x2b/0x130
   [&lt;ffffffff8120d09a&gt;] ? vfs_write+0x15a/0x1a0
   [&lt;ffffffff81223455&gt;] SyS_poll+0x75/0x100
   [&lt;ffffffff819a6524&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x24/0xcf

Commit 79e7fff47b7b ("net: remove support for per driver ndo_busy_poll()")
indirectly fixed this upstream in linux-4.11 by removing the offending
pointer usage. No other users of napi-&gt;dev touch its netdev_ops.

Fixes: 8b80cda536ea ("net: rename include/net/ll_poll.h to include/net/busy_poll.h") # 4.4.y
Signed-off-by: Josh Elsasser &lt;jelsasser@appneta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
init_dummy_netdev() leaves its netdev_ops pointer zeroed. This leads
to a NULL pointer dereference when sk_busy_loop fires against an iwlwifi
wireless adapter and checks napi-&gt;dev-&gt;netdev_ops-&gt;ndo_busy_poll.

Avoid this by ensuring napi-&gt;dev-&gt;netdev_ops is valid before following
the pointer, avoiding the following panic when busy polling on a dummy
netdev:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c8
  IP: [&lt;ffffffff817b4b72&gt;] sk_busy_loop+0x92/0x2f0
  Call Trace:
   [&lt;ffffffff815a3134&gt;] ? uart_write_room+0x74/0xf0
   [&lt;ffffffff817964a9&gt;] sock_poll+0x99/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff81223142&gt;] do_sys_poll+0x2e2/0x520
   [&lt;ffffffff8118d3fc&gt;] ? get_page_from_freelist+0x3bc/0xa30
   [&lt;ffffffff810ada22&gt;] ? update_curr+0x62/0x140
   [&lt;ffffffff811ea671&gt;] ? __slab_free+0xa1/0x2a0
   [&lt;ffffffff811ea671&gt;] ? __slab_free+0xa1/0x2a0
   [&lt;ffffffff8179dbb1&gt;] ? skb_free_head+0x21/0x30
   [&lt;ffffffff81221bd0&gt;] ? poll_initwait+0x50/0x50
   [&lt;ffffffff811eaa36&gt;] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c6/0x1e0
   [&lt;ffffffff815a4884&gt;] ? uart_write+0x124/0x1d0
   [&lt;ffffffff810bd1cd&gt;] ? remove_wait_queue+0x4d/0x60
   [&lt;ffffffff810bd224&gt;] ? __wake_up+0x44/0x50
   [&lt;ffffffff81582731&gt;] ? tty_write_unlock+0x31/0x40
   [&lt;ffffffff8158c5c6&gt;] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x16/0x20
   [&lt;ffffffff81584820&gt;] ? tty_write+0x1e0/0x2f0
   [&lt;ffffffff81587e50&gt;] ? process_echoes+0x80/0x80
   [&lt;ffffffff8120c17b&gt;] ? __vfs_write+0x2b/0x130
   [&lt;ffffffff8120d09a&gt;] ? vfs_write+0x15a/0x1a0
   [&lt;ffffffff81223455&gt;] SyS_poll+0x75/0x100
   [&lt;ffffffff819a6524&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x24/0xcf

Commit 79e7fff47b7b ("net: remove support for per driver ndo_busy_poll()")
indirectly fixed this upstream in linux-4.11 by removing the offending
pointer usage. No other users of napi-&gt;dev touch its netdev_ops.

Fixes: 8b80cda536ea ("net: rename include/net/ll_poll.h to include/net/busy_poll.h") # 4.4.y
Signed-off-by: Josh Elsasser &lt;jelsasser@appneta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections</title>
<updated>2019-07-10T07:56:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcel Holtmann</name>
<email>marcel@holtmann.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T20:19:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=75de0ddd3100466b9f2dfcb496bc6a060b8aad01'/>
<id>75de0ddd3100466b9f2dfcb496bc6a060b8aad01</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections"</title>
<updated>2019-06-22T06:18:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T07:28:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4282a0b1db65996ec8231cc8807fe04c9113876e'/>
<id>4282a0b1db65996ec8231cc8807fe04c9113876e</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit d016dc1bd29a2cfb0707fc6fb290ccd21f3b139c which is
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does
not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon,
revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines
working properly again.

Reported-by: Vasily Khoruzhick &lt;anarsoul@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hdegoede@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Cline &lt;jeremy@jcline.org&gt;
Cc: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit d016dc1bd29a2cfb0707fc6fb290ccd21f3b139c which is
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does
not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon,
revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines
working properly again.

Reported-by: Vasily Khoruzhick &lt;anarsoul@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hdegoede@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Cline &lt;jeremy@jcline.org&gt;
Cc: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:54:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-16T00:44:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e757d052f3b8ce739d068a1e890643376c16b7a9'/>
<id>e757d052f3b8ce739d068a1e890643376c16b7a9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.

Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.

This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.

Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.

In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.

We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.

Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.

We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.

CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.

Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.

This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.

Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.

In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.

We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.

Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.

We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.

CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs</title>
<updated>2019-06-17T17:54:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-16T00:31:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4657ee0fe05e15ab572b157f13a82e080d4b7d73'/>
<id>4657ee0fe05e15ab572b157f13a82e080d4b7d73</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) &lt; pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs

Backport notes, provided by Joao Martins &lt;joao.m.martins@oracle.com&gt;

v4.15 or since commit 737ff314563 ("tcp: use sequence distance to
detect reordering") had switched from the packet-based FACK tracking and
switched to sequence-based.

v4.14 and older still have the old logic and hence on
tcp_skb_shift_data() needs to retain its original logic and have
@fack_count in sync. In other words, we keep the increment of pcount with
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) to later used that to update fack_count. To make it
more explicit we track the new skb that gets incremented to pcount in
@next_pcount, and we get to avoid the constant invocation of
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) all together.

Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) &lt; pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;tcp_gso_segs

Backport notes, provided by Joao Martins &lt;joao.m.martins@oracle.com&gt;

v4.15 or since commit 737ff314563 ("tcp: use sequence distance to
detect reordering") had switched from the packet-based FACK tracking and
switched to sequence-based.

v4.14 and older still have the old logic and hence on
tcp_skb_shift_data() needs to retain its original logic and have
@fack_count in sync. In other words, we keep the increment of pcount with
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) to later used that to update fack_count. To make it
more explicit we track the new skb that gets incremented to pcount in
@next_pcount, and we get to avoid the constant invocation of
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) all together.

Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bruce Curtis &lt;brucec@netflix.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref when CONFIG_INET is disabled</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:24:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Ahern</name>
<email>dsahern@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-05T18:16:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=647f72b0d75c9faeec36b88fc051339e73008435'/>
<id>647f72b0d75c9faeec36b88fc051339e73008435</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9b3040a6aafd7898ece7fc7efcbca71e42aa8069 upstream.

Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref to return NULL when CONFIG_INET is disabled.

Fixes: 4b2a2bfeb3f0 ("neighbor: Call __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref in neigh_xmit")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu &lt;nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9b3040a6aafd7898ece7fc7efcbca71e42aa8069 upstream.

Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref to return NULL when CONFIG_INET is disabled.

Fixes: 4b2a2bfeb3f0 ("neighbor: Call __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref in neigh_xmit")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu &lt;nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix a potential deadlock in do_ipv6_setsockopt()</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:45:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>WANG Cong</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-20T06:35:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=faf458605614d2be3186c82e788640fa6aa3ce93'/>
<id>faf458605614d2be3186c82e788640fa6aa3ce93</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8651be8f14a12d24f203f283601d9b0418c389ff upstream.

Baozeng reported this deadlock case:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
                               lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);
                               lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
  lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);

Similar to commit 87e9f0315952
("ipv4: fix a potential deadlock in mcast getsockopt() path")
this is due to we still have a case, ipv6_sock_mc_close(),
where we acquire sk_lock before rtnl_lock. Close this deadlock
with the similar solution, that is always acquire rtnl lock first.

Fixes: baf606d9c9b1 ("ipv4,ipv6: grab rtnl before locking the socket")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8651be8f14a12d24f203f283601d9b0418c389ff upstream.

Baozeng reported this deadlock case:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
                               lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);
                               lock([  165.136033] sk_lock-AF_INET6);
  lock([  165.136033] rtnl_mutex);

Similar to commit 87e9f0315952
("ipv4: fix a potential deadlock in mcast getsockopt() path")
this is due to we still have a case, ipv6_sock_mc_close(),
where we acquire sk_lock before rtnl_lock. Close this deadlock
with the similar solution, that is always acquire rtnl lock first.

Fixes: baf606d9c9b1 ("ipv4,ipv6: grab rtnl before locking the socket")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:45:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcel Holtmann</name>
<email>marcel@holtmann.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T20:19:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d016dc1bd29a2cfb0707fc6fb290ccd21f3b139c'/>
<id>d016dc1bd29a2cfb0707fc6fb290ccd21f3b139c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()</title>
<updated>2019-04-27T07:33:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-27T15:21:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0ede14314f6d9e6a172eb4c4b6b9fe5477aa70bc'/>
<id>0ede14314f6d9e6a172eb4c4b6b9fe5477aa70bc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ]

net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &amp;init_net is
not dynamically allocated)

I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.

Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.

Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas &lt;benny@pinkas.net&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ]

net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &amp;init_net is
not dynamically allocated)

I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.

Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.

Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas &lt;benny@pinkas.net&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
