linux.git/include/net, branch v4.4.279 Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git net: llc: fix skb_over_panic 2021-08-04T09:56:46+00:00 Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com 2021-07-24T21:11:59+00:00 84dd119010202f29385e9d26fb25e36a436ba9e3 [ Upstream commit c7c9d2102c9c098916ab9e0ab248006107d00d6c ] Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations. Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is doing following steps: 1. skb allocation with size = len + header size len is passed from userpace and header size is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set. 2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3 3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg() Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be filled. Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3 bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons: 1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function was overwriting payload. 2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704) So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after all steps we just transmit buffer. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5e5a981ad7cc54c4b2b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit c7c9d2102c9c098916ab9e0ab248006107d00d6c ]

Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The
problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations.

Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is
doing following steps:

	1. skb allocation with size = len + header size
		len is passed from userpace and header size
		is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set.

	2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3
	3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg()

Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be
filled.

Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3
bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes
llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU
header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons:

	1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function
	   was overwriting payload.

	2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since
	   all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can
	   happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC
	   header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704)

So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID
and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve
header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by
llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally
I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd().

This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after
all steps we just transmit buffer.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5e5a981ad7cc54c4b2b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope 2021-08-04T09:56:45+00:00 Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com 2021-06-30T03:34:08+00:00 615595faefb2bda6fc23546ef075a8597cc13050 [ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ] The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be allowed to use in SCTP. As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope. Reported-by: Sérgio <surkamp@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ]

The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses
was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be
allowed to use in SCTP.

As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from
unusable to private scope.

Reported-by: Sérgio <surkamp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files 2021-08-04T09:56:44+00:00 Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk 2019-02-08T16:01:44+00:00 661ba488360b398df82800008bf68e903442480c commit f4e65870e5cede5ca1ec0006b6c9803994e5f7b8 upstream. We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is m/y. No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> [ backported to older kernels to get access to unix_gc_lock - gregkh ] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f4e65870e5cede5ca1ec0006b6c9803994e5f7b8 upstream.

We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but
we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers
to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is
m/y.

No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[ backported to older kernels to get access to unix_gc_lock - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: validate lwtstate->data before returning from skb_tunnel_info() 2021-07-28T07:12:34+00:00 Taehee Yoo ap420073@gmail.com 2021-07-09T17:35:18+00:00 e7f3c9df40515a6c6b46f36c4c94cf48a043f887 commit 67a9c94317402b826fc3db32afc8f39336803d97 upstream. skb_tunnel_info() returns pointer of lwtstate->data as ip_tunnel_info type without validation. lwtstate->data can have various types such as mpls_iptunnel_encap, etc and these are not compatible. So skb_tunnel_info() should validate before returning that pointer. Splat looks like: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888106ec2698 by task ping/811 CPU: 1 PID: 811 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.13.0+ #1195 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b print_address_description.constprop.8.cold.13+0x13/0x2ee ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan] ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan] kasan_report.cold.14+0x83/0xdf ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan] vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan] [ ... ] vxlan_xmit_one+0x148b/0x32b0 [vxlan] [ ... ] vxlan_xmit+0x25c5/0x4780 [vxlan] [ ... ] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1ae/0x6e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f39/0x31a0 [ ... ] neigh_xmit+0x2f9/0x940 mpls_xmit+0x911/0x1600 [mpls_iptunnel] lwtunnel_xmit+0x18f/0x450 ip_finish_output2+0x867/0x2040 [ ... ] Fixes: 61adedf3e3f1 ("route: move lwtunnel state to dst_entry") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 67a9c94317402b826fc3db32afc8f39336803d97 upstream.

skb_tunnel_info() returns pointer of lwtstate->data as ip_tunnel_info
type without validation. lwtstate->data can have various types such as
mpls_iptunnel_encap, etc and these are not compatible.
So skb_tunnel_info() should validate before returning that pointer.

Splat looks like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888106ec2698 by task ping/811

CPU: 1 PID: 811 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.13.0+ #1195
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b
 print_address_description.constprop.8.cold.13+0x13/0x2ee
 ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 kasan_report.cold.14+0x83/0xdf
 ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 [ ... ]
 vxlan_xmit_one+0x148b/0x32b0 [vxlan]
 [ ... ]
 vxlan_xmit+0x25c5/0x4780 [vxlan]
 [ ... ]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1ae/0x6e0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f39/0x31a0
 [ ... ]
 neigh_xmit+0x2f9/0x940
 mpls_xmit+0x911/0x1600 [mpls_iptunnel]
 lwtunnel_xmit+0x18f/0x450
 ip_finish_output2+0x867/0x2040
 [ ... ]

Fixes: 61adedf3e3f1 ("route: move lwtunnel state to dst_entry")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: ipv6: fix return value of ip6_skb_dst_mtu 2021-07-28T07:12:34+00:00 Vadim Fedorenko vfedorenko@novek.ru 2021-07-01T23:47:00+00:00 6afc5fc7114e80e453bf156fb4bf4d1dc1a31d3a commit 40fc3054b45820c28ea3c65e2c86d041dc244a8a upstream. Commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE") introduced ip6_skb_dst_mtu with return value of signed int which is inconsistent with actually returned values. Also 2 users of this function actually assign its value to unsigned int variable and only __xfrm6_output assigns result of this function to signed variable but actually uses as unsigned in further comparisons and calls. Change this function to return unsigned int value. Fixes: 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE") Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 40fc3054b45820c28ea3c65e2c86d041dc244a8a upstream.

Commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE") introduced
ip6_skb_dst_mtu with return value of signed int which is inconsistent
with actually returned values. Also 2 users of this function actually
assign its value to unsigned int variable and only __xfrm6_output
assigns result of this function to signed variable but actually uses
as unsigned in further comparisons and calls. Change this function
to return unsigned int value.

Fixes: 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE")
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
inet: annotate date races around sk->sk_txhash 2021-06-30T12:49:37+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2021-06-10T14:44:11+00:00 333afa6d5e273af8969df1f805ae88a9816db1b4 [ Upstream commit b71eaed8c04f72a919a9c44e83e4ee254e69e7f3 ] UDP sendmsg() path can be lockless, it is possible for another thread to re-connect an change sk->sk_txhash under us. There is no serious impact, but we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pair to document the race. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / skb_set_owner_w write to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 30997 on cpu 1: sk_set_txhash include/net/sock.h:1937 [inline] __ip4_datagram_connect+0x69e/0x710 net/ipv4/datagram.c:75 __ip6_datagram_connect+0x551/0x840 net/ipv6/datagram.c:189 ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272 inet_dgram_connect+0xfd/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:580 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1837 [inline] __sys_connect+0x245/0x280 net/socket.c:1854 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1864 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1861 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1861 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 31039 on cpu 0: skb_set_hash_from_sk include/net/sock.h:2211 [inline] skb_set_owner_w+0x118/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2101 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x452/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2359 sock_alloc_send_skb+0x2d/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2373 __ip6_append_data+0x1743/0x21a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1621 ip6_make_skb+0x258/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983 udpv6_sendmsg+0x160a/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1527 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xbca3c43d -> 0xfdb309e0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 31039 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit b71eaed8c04f72a919a9c44e83e4ee254e69e7f3 ]

UDP sendmsg() path can be lockless, it is possible for another
thread to re-connect an change sk->sk_txhash under us.

There is no serious impact, but we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
pair to document the race.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / skb_set_owner_w

write to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 30997 on cpu 1:
 sk_set_txhash include/net/sock.h:1937 [inline]
 __ip4_datagram_connect+0x69e/0x710 net/ipv4/datagram.c:75
 __ip6_datagram_connect+0x551/0x840 net/ipv6/datagram.c:189
 ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
 inet_dgram_connect+0xfd/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:580
 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1837 [inline]
 __sys_connect+0x245/0x280 net/socket.c:1854
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1864 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1861 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1861
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 31039 on cpu 0:
 skb_set_hash_from_sk include/net/sock.h:2211 [inline]
 skb_set_owner_w+0x118/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2101
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x452/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2359
 sock_alloc_send_skb+0x2d/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2373
 __ip6_append_data+0x1743/0x21a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1621
 ip6_make_skb+0x258/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x160a/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1527
 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0xbca3c43d -> 0xfdb309e0

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 31039 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net: caif: add proper error handling 2021-06-10T10:41:35+00:00 Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com 2021-06-03T16:38:51+00:00 a3536dce5895f714d9eead8afb92629a3fb5875b commit a2805dca5107d5603f4bbc027e81e20d93476e96 upstream. caif_enroll_dev() can fail in some cases. Ingnoring these cases can lead to memory leak due to not assigning link_support pointer to anywhere. Fixes: 7c18d2205ea7 ("caif: Restructure how link caif link layer enroll") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a2805dca5107d5603f4bbc027e81e20d93476e96 upstream.

caif_enroll_dev() can fail in some cases. Ingnoring
these cases can lead to memory leak due to not assigning
link_support pointer to anywhere.

Fixes: 7c18d2205ea7 ("caif: Restructure how link caif link layer enroll")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: caif: added cfserl_release function 2021-06-10T10:41:35+00:00 Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com 2021-06-03T16:38:12+00:00 b1f2f8952b14e118c6be35b2be2bd24dc0d95272 commit bce130e7f392ddde8cfcb09927808ebd5f9c8669 upstream. Added cfserl_release() function. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit bce130e7f392ddde8cfcb09927808ebd5f9c8669 upstream.

Added cfserl_release() function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
NFC: nci: fix memory leak in nci_allocate_device 2021-06-03T06:22:04+00:00 Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com 2021-05-14T23:29:06+00:00 448a1cb12977f52142e6feb12022c59662d88dc1 commit e0652f8bb44d6294eeeac06d703185357f25d50b upstream. nfcmrvl_disconnect fails to free the hci_dev field in struct nci_dev. Fix this by freeing hci_dev in nci_free_device. BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888111ea6800 (size 1024): comm "kworker/1:0", pid 19, jiffies 4294942308 (age 13.580s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 fd 0c 81 88 ff ff .........`...... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000004bc25d43>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] [<000000004bc25d43>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:682 [inline] [<000000004bc25d43>] nci_hci_allocate+0x21/0xd0 net/nfc/nci/hci.c:784 [<00000000c59cff92>] nci_allocate_device net/nfc/nci/core.c:1170 [inline] [<00000000c59cff92>] nci_allocate_device+0x10b/0x160 net/nfc/nci/core.c:1132 [<00000000006e0a8e>] nfcmrvl_nci_register_dev+0x10a/0x1c0 drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/main.c:153 [<000000004da1b57e>] nfcmrvl_probe+0x223/0x290 drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c:345 [<00000000d506aed9>] usb_probe_interface+0x177/0x370 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 [<00000000bc632c92>] really_probe+0x159/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:554 [<00000000f5009125>] driver_probe_device+0x84/0x100 drivers/base/dd.c:740 [<000000000ce658ca>] __device_attach_driver+0xee/0x110 drivers/base/dd.c:846 [<000000007067d05f>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb7/0x100 drivers/base/bus.c:431 [<00000000f8e13372>] __device_attach+0x122/0x250 drivers/base/dd.c:914 [<000000009cf68860>] bus_probe_device+0xc6/0xe0 drivers/base/bus.c:491 [<00000000359c965a>] device_add+0x5be/0xc30 drivers/base/core.c:3109 [<00000000086e4bd3>] usb_set_configuration+0x9d9/0xb90 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2164 [<00000000ca036872>] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x8c/0xc0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238 [<00000000d40d36f6>] usb_probe_device+0x5c/0x140 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293 [<00000000bc632c92>] really_probe+0x159/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:554 Reported-by: syzbot+19bcfc64a8df1318d1c3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 11f54f228643 ("NFC: nci: Add HCI over NCI protocol support") Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit e0652f8bb44d6294eeeac06d703185357f25d50b upstream.

nfcmrvl_disconnect fails to free the hci_dev field in struct nci_dev.
Fix this by freeing hci_dev in nci_free_device.

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888111ea6800 (size 1024):
  comm "kworker/1:0", pid 19, jiffies 4294942308 (age 13.580s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 fd 0c 81 88 ff ff  .........`......
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<000000004bc25d43>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline]
    [<000000004bc25d43>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:682 [inline]
    [<000000004bc25d43>] nci_hci_allocate+0x21/0xd0 net/nfc/nci/hci.c:784
    [<00000000c59cff92>] nci_allocate_device net/nfc/nci/core.c:1170 [inline]
    [<00000000c59cff92>] nci_allocate_device+0x10b/0x160 net/nfc/nci/core.c:1132
    [<00000000006e0a8e>] nfcmrvl_nci_register_dev+0x10a/0x1c0 drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/main.c:153
    [<000000004da1b57e>] nfcmrvl_probe+0x223/0x290 drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c:345
    [<00000000d506aed9>] usb_probe_interface+0x177/0x370 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
    [<00000000bc632c92>] really_probe+0x159/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:554
    [<00000000f5009125>] driver_probe_device+0x84/0x100 drivers/base/dd.c:740
    [<000000000ce658ca>] __device_attach_driver+0xee/0x110 drivers/base/dd.c:846
    [<000000007067d05f>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb7/0x100 drivers/base/bus.c:431
    [<00000000f8e13372>] __device_attach+0x122/0x250 drivers/base/dd.c:914
    [<000000009cf68860>] bus_probe_device+0xc6/0xe0 drivers/base/bus.c:491
    [<00000000359c965a>] device_add+0x5be/0xc30 drivers/base/core.c:3109
    [<00000000086e4bd3>] usb_set_configuration+0x9d9/0xb90 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2164
    [<00000000ca036872>] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x8c/0xc0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
    [<00000000d40d36f6>] usb_probe_device+0x5c/0x140 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293
    [<00000000bc632c92>] really_probe+0x159/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:554

Reported-by: syzbot+19bcfc64a8df1318d1c3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 11f54f228643 ("NFC: nci: Add HCI over NCI protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: verify AMP hci_chan before amp_destroy 2021-05-22T08:38:20+00:00 Archie Pusaka apusaka@chromium.org 2021-03-22T06:03:11+00:00 b27a218d166b7f07cd5616fb90e727b6ed662b1a commit 5c4c8c9544099bb9043a10a5318130a943e32fc3 upstream. hci_chan can be created in 2 places: hci_loglink_complete_evt() if it is an AMP hci_chan, or l2cap_conn_add() otherwise. In theory, Only AMP hci_chan should be removed by a call to hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt(). However, the controller might mess up, call that function, and destroy an hci_chan which is not initiated by hci_loglink_complete_evt(). This patch adds a verification that the destroyed hci_chan must have been init'd by hci_loglink_complete_evt(). Example crash call trace: Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xe3/0x144 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x67/0x22a mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline] kasan_report+0x251/0x28f mm/kasan/report.c:396 hci_send_acl+0x3b/0x56e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4072 l2cap_send_cmd+0x5af/0x5c2 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:877 l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm_icid+0x8e/0xb1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4661 l2cap_move_fail net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5146 [inline] l2cap_move_channel_rsp net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5185 [inline] l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5464 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5799 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0x1d12/0x51aa net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7023 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x2ea/0x693 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7596 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4606 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x2bd/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4796 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 Allocated by task 38: set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0x8d/0x9a mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x102/0x129 mm/slub.c:2787 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline] hci_chan_create+0x86/0x26d net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1674 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1c/0x814 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7062 l2cap_conn_add net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7059 [inline] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x134/0x852 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7381 hci_connect_cfm+0x9d/0x122 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1404 hci_remote_ext_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4161 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x463f/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5981 hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 Freed by task 1732: set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x128 mm/kasan/kasan.c:493 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xaa/0xf6 mm/slub.c:1436 slab_free mm/slub.c:3009 [inline] kfree+0x182/0x21e mm/slub.c:3972 hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4891 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x6a1c/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6050 hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d7af9180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff8881d7af9180, ffff8881d7af9200) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00075ebe40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da403200 index:0x0 flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab) raw: 8000000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881da403200 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881d7af9080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881d7af9100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8881d7af9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881d7af9200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881d7af9280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org> Reported-by: syzbot+98228e7407314d2d4ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 5c4c8c9544099bb9043a10a5318130a943e32fc3 upstream.

hci_chan can be created in 2 places: hci_loglink_complete_evt() if
it is an AMP hci_chan, or l2cap_conn_add() otherwise. In theory,
Only AMP hci_chan should be removed by a call to
hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt(). However, the controller might mess
up, call that function, and destroy an hci_chan which is not initiated
by hci_loglink_complete_evt().

This patch adds a verification that the destroyed hci_chan must have
been init'd by hci_loglink_complete_evt().

Example crash call trace:
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xe3/0x144 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x67/0x22a mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x251/0x28f mm/kasan/report.c:396
 hci_send_acl+0x3b/0x56e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4072
 l2cap_send_cmd+0x5af/0x5c2 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:877
 l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm_icid+0x8e/0xb1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4661
 l2cap_move_fail net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5146 [inline]
 l2cap_move_channel_rsp net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5185 [inline]
 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5464 [inline]
 l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5799 [inline]
 l2cap_recv_frame+0x1d12/0x51aa net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7023
 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x2ea/0x693 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7596
 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4606 [inline]
 hci_rx_work+0x2bd/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4796
 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415

Allocated by task 38:
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 kasan_kmalloc+0x8d/0x9a mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x102/0x129 mm/slub.c:2787
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline]
 hci_chan_create+0x86/0x26d net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1674
 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1c/0x814 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7062
 l2cap_conn_add net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7059 [inline]
 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x134/0x852 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7381
 hci_connect_cfm+0x9d/0x122 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1404
 hci_remote_ext_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4161 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0x463f/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5981
 hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791
 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415

Freed by task 1732:
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x128 mm/kasan/kasan.c:493
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xaa/0xf6 mm/slub.c:1436
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3009 [inline]
 kfree+0x182/0x21e mm/slub.c:3972
 hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4891 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0x6a1c/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6050
 hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791
 process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
 worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
 kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d7af9180
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
 128-byte region [ffff8881d7af9180, ffff8881d7af9200)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00075ebe40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da403200 index:0x0
flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab)
raw: 8000000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881da403200
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8881d7af9080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8881d7af9100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8881d7af9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                            ^
 ffff8881d7af9200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8881d7af9280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+98228e7407314d2d4ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>