linux.git/include/net, branch v5.11.8 Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git Bluetooth: Add new HCI_QUIRK_NO_SUSPEND_NOTIFIER quirk 2021-03-07T11:35:51+00:00 Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com 2021-01-28T16:33:12+00:00 561c2367cf60683de619e8040fe5ab0b9e408ac7 [ Upstream commit 219991e6be7f4a31d471611e265b72f75b2d0538 ] Some devices, e.g. the RTL8723BS bluetooth part, some USB attached devices, completely drop from the bus on a system-suspend. These devices will have their driver unbound and rebound on resume (when the dropping of the bus gets detected) and will show up as a new HCI after resume. These devices do not benefit from the suspend / resume handling work done by the hci_suspend_notifier. At best this unnecessarily adds some time to the suspend/resume time. But this may also actually cause problems, if the code doing the driver unbinding runs after the pm-notifier then the hci_suspend_notifier code will try to talk to a device which is now in an uninitialized state. This commit adds a new HCI_QUIRK_NO_SUSPEND_NOTIFIER quirk which allows drivers to opt-out of the hci_suspend_notifier when they know beforehand that their device will be fully re-initialized / reprobed on resume. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 219991e6be7f4a31d471611e265b72f75b2d0538 ]

Some devices, e.g. the RTL8723BS bluetooth part, some USB attached devices,
completely drop from the bus on a system-suspend. These devices will
have their driver unbound and rebound on resume (when the dropping of
the bus gets detected) and will show up as a new HCI after resume.

These devices do not benefit from the suspend / resume handling work done
by the hci_suspend_notifier. At best this unnecessarily adds some time to
the suspend/resume time. But this may also actually cause problems, if the
code doing the driver unbinding runs after the pm-notifier then the
hci_suspend_notifier code will try to talk to a device which is now in
an uninitialized state.

This commit adds a new HCI_QUIRK_NO_SUSPEND_NOTIFIER quirk which allows
drivers to opt-out of the hci_suspend_notifier when they know beforehand
that their device will be fully re-initialized / reprobed on resume.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net_sched: fix RTNL deadlock again caused by request_module() 2021-03-04T11:15:44+00:00 Cong Wang cong.wang@bytedance.com 2021-01-17T00:56:57+00:00 ad9ed727ac8e78f5e024a6d7b961116955e40056 commit d349f997686887906b1183b5be96933c5452362a upstream. tcf_action_init_1() loads tc action modules automatically with request_module() after parsing the tc action names, and it drops RTNL lock and re-holds it before and after request_module(). This causes a lot of troubles, as discovered by syzbot, because we can be in the middle of batch initializations when we create an array of tc actions. One of the problem is deadlock: CPU 0 CPU 1 rtnl_lock(); for (...) { tcf_action_init_1(); -> rtnl_unlock(); -> request_module(); rtnl_lock(); for (...) { tcf_action_init_1(); -> tcf_idr_check_alloc(); // Insert one action into idr, // but it is not committed until // tcf_idr_insert_many(), then drop // the RTNL lock in the _next_ // iteration -> rtnl_unlock(); -> rtnl_lock(); -> a_o->init(); -> tcf_idr_check_alloc(); // Now waiting for the same index // to be committed -> request_module(); -> rtnl_lock() // Now waiting for RTNL lock } rtnl_unlock(); } rtnl_unlock(); This is not easy to solve, we can move the request_module() before this loop and pre-load all the modules we need for this netlink message and then do the rest initializations. So the loop breaks down to two now: for (i = 1; i <= TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO && tb[i]; i++) { struct tc_action_ops *a_o; a_o = tc_action_load_ops(name, tb[i]...); ops[i - 1] = a_o; } for (i = 1; i <= TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO && tb[i]; i++) { act = tcf_action_init_1(ops[i - 1]...); } Although this looks serious, it only has been reported by syzbot, so it seems hard to trigger this by humans. And given the size of this patch, I'd suggest to make it to net-next and not to backport to stable. This patch has been tested by syzbot and tested with tdc.py by me. Fixes: 0fedc63fadf0 ("net_sched: commit action insertions together") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+82752bc5331601cf4899@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b3b63b6bff456bd95294@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+ba67b12b1ca729912834@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Tested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210117005657.14810-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit d349f997686887906b1183b5be96933c5452362a upstream.

tcf_action_init_1() loads tc action modules automatically with
request_module() after parsing the tc action names, and it drops RTNL
lock and re-holds it before and after request_module(). This causes a
lot of troubles, as discovered by syzbot, because we can be in the
middle of batch initializations when we create an array of tc actions.

One of the problem is deadlock:

CPU 0					CPU 1
rtnl_lock();
for (...) {
  tcf_action_init_1();
    -> rtnl_unlock();
    -> request_module();
				rtnl_lock();
				for (...) {
				  tcf_action_init_1();
				    -> tcf_idr_check_alloc();
				   // Insert one action into idr,
				   // but it is not committed until
				   // tcf_idr_insert_many(), then drop
				   // the RTNL lock in the _next_
				   // iteration
				   -> rtnl_unlock();
    -> rtnl_lock();
    -> a_o->init();
      -> tcf_idr_check_alloc();
      // Now waiting for the same index
      // to be committed
				    -> request_module();
				    -> rtnl_lock()
				    // Now waiting for RTNL lock
				}
				rtnl_unlock();
}
rtnl_unlock();

This is not easy to solve, we can move the request_module() before
this loop and pre-load all the modules we need for this netlink
message and then do the rest initializations. So the loop breaks down
to two now:

        for (i = 1; i <= TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO && tb[i]; i++) {
                struct tc_action_ops *a_o;

                a_o = tc_action_load_ops(name, tb[i]...);
                ops[i - 1] = a_o;
        }

        for (i = 1; i <= TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO && tb[i]; i++) {
                act = tcf_action_init_1(ops[i - 1]...);
        }

Although this looks serious, it only has been reported by syzbot, so it
seems hard to trigger this by humans. And given the size of this patch,
I'd suggest to make it to net-next and not to backport to stable.

This patch has been tested by syzbot and tested with tdc.py by me.

Fixes: 0fedc63fadf0 ("net_sched: commit action insertions together")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+82752bc5331601cf4899@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b3b63b6bff456bd95294@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+ba67b12b1ca729912834@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Tested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210117005657.14810-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: sched: fix police ext initialization 2021-03-04T11:15:44+00:00 Vlad Buslov vladbu@nvidia.com 2021-02-16T16:22:00+00:00 8a0666e14620939a961b4597e60cd6a40efde242 commit 396d7f23adf9e8c436dd81a69488b5b6a865acf8 upstream. When police action is created by cls API tcf_exts_validate() first conditional that calls tcf_action_init_1() directly, the action idr is not updated according to latest changes in action API that require caller to commit newly created action to idr with tcf_idr_insert_many(). This results such action not being accessible through act API and causes crash reported by syzbot: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000010 by task kworker/u4:5/204 CPU: 0 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:400 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x5f/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:179 [inline] check_memory_region+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:185 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline] __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline] tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598 tc_action_net_exit include/net/act_api.h:151 [inline] police_exit_net+0x168/0x360 net/sched/act_police.c:390 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:190 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:604 process_one_work+0x98d/0x15f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2275 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2421 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:296 ================================================================== Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Tainted: G B 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120 panic+0x306/0x73d kernel/panic.c:231 end_report+0x58/0x5e mm/kasan/report.c:100 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:403 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x67/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:179 [inline] check_memory_region+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:185 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline] __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline] tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598 tc_action_net_exit include/net/act_api.h:151 [inline] police_exit_net+0x168/0x360 net/sched/act_police.c:390 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:190 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:604 process_one_work+0x98d/0x15f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2275 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2421 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:296 Kernel Offset: disabled Fix the issue by calling tcf_idr_insert_many() after successful action initialization. Fixes: 0fedc63fadf0 ("net_sched: commit action insertions together") Reported-by: syzbot+151e3e714d34ae4ce7e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 396d7f23adf9e8c436dd81a69488b5b6a865acf8 upstream.

When police action is created by cls API tcf_exts_validate() first
conditional that calls tcf_action_init_1() directly, the action idr is not
updated according to latest changes in action API that require caller to
commit newly created action to idr with tcf_idr_insert_many(). This results
such action not being accessible through act API and causes crash reported
by syzbot:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598
Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000010 by task kworker/u4:5/204

CPU: 0 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:400 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x5f/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:179 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:185
 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline]
 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
 __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline]
 tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598
 tc_action_net_exit include/net/act_api.h:151 [inline]
 police_exit_net+0x168/0x360 net/sched/act_police.c:390
 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:190
 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:604
 process_one_work+0x98d/0x15f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2275
 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2421
 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:296
==================================================================
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Tainted: G    B             5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 panic+0x306/0x73d kernel/panic.c:231
 end_report+0x58/0x5e mm/kasan/report.c:100
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:403 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x67/0xd5 mm/kasan/report.c:413
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:179 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:185
 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline]
 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
 __tcf_idr_release net/sched/act_api.c:178 [inline]
 tcf_idrinfo_destroy+0x129/0x1d0 net/sched/act_api.c:598
 tc_action_net_exit include/net/act_api.h:151 [inline]
 police_exit_net+0x168/0x360 net/sched/act_police.c:390
 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:190
 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:604
 process_one_work+0x98d/0x15f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2275
 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2421
 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:296
Kernel Offset: disabled

Fix the issue by calling tcf_idr_insert_many() after successful action
initialization.

Fixes: 0fedc63fadf0 ("net_sched: commit action insertions together")
Reported-by: syzbot+151e3e714d34ae4ce7e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before sending 2021-03-04T11:15:44+00:00 Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com 2021-02-23T13:18:58+00:00 939540ca629211d548ffc22e8ba64c6fbadaf5e7 commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream. The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one reported by a user: panic+0x108/0x2ea __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20 __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0 icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160 In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen in __ip_options_echo. For example: // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes sptr = skb_network_header(skb); // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send dptr = dopt->__data; // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question if (sopt->rr) { optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data // this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over // flowing the stack: memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen); } In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does a bit of bounds checking on the value. This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41, sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89 CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 kasan_report+0x32/0x40 check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0 memcpy+0x39/0x60 __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0 __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700 Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send. This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function. For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward. Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs") Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream.

The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:

    panic+0x108/0x2ea
    __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
    __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
    icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:

    // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
    sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
    // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
    dptr = dopt->__data;
    // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
    if (sopt->rr) {
        optlen  = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
        soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
	// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
	// flowing the stack:
        memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
    }

In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.

This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
    Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
    CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
     __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
     kasan_report+0x32/0x40
     check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
     memcpy+0x39/0x60
     __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
     __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.

Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT related hangs under mem pressure 2021-03-04T11:13:55+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2021-02-12T23:22:13+00:00 ca90ff61d52267f6df337900ff2c4fa925fca56b [ Upstream commit f969dc5a885736842c3511ecdea240fbb02d25d9 ] While commit 24adbc1676af ("tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs") fixed an issue vs too small sk_rcvbuf for given sk_rcvlowat constraint, it missed to address issue caused by memory pressure. 1) If we are under memory pressure and socket receive queue is empty. First incoming packet is allowed to be queued, after commit 76dfa6082032 ("tcp: allow one skb to be received per socket under memory pressure") But we do not send EPOLLIN yet, in case tcp_data_ready() sees sk_rcvlowat is bigger than skb length. 2) Then, when next packet comes, it is dropped, and we directly call sk->sk_data_ready(). 3) If application is using poll(), tcp_poll() will then use tcp_stream_is_readable() and decide the socket receive queue is not yet filled, so nothing will happen. Even when sender retransmits packets, phases 2) & 3) repeat and flow is effectively frozen, until memory pressure is off. Fix is to consider tcp_under_memory_pressure() to take care of global memory pressure or memcg pressure. Fixes: 24adbc1676af ("tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com> Suggested-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f969dc5a885736842c3511ecdea240fbb02d25d9 ]

While commit 24adbc1676af ("tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs")
fixed an issue vs too small sk_rcvbuf for given sk_rcvlowat constraint,
it missed to address issue caused by memory pressure.

1) If we are under memory pressure and socket receive queue is empty.
First incoming packet is allowed to be queued, after commit
76dfa6082032 ("tcp: allow one skb to be received per socket under memory pressure")

But we do not send EPOLLIN yet, in case tcp_data_ready() sees sk_rcvlowat
is bigger than skb length.

2) Then, when next packet comes, it is dropped, and we directly
call sk->sk_data_ready().

3) If application is using poll(), tcp_poll() will then use
tcp_stream_is_readable() and decide the socket receive queue is
not yet filled, so nothing will happen.

Even when sender retransmits packets, phases 2) & 3) repeat
and flow is effectively frozen, until memory pressure is off.

Fix is to consider tcp_under_memory_pressure() to take care
of global memory pressure or memcg pressure.

Fixes: 24adbc1676af ("tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Suggested-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
switchdev: mrp: Remove SWITCHDEV_ATTR_ID_MRP_PORT_STAT 2021-02-09T00:20:57+00:00 Horatiu Vultur horatiu.vultur@microchip.com 2021-02-06T21:47:34+00:00 059d2a1004981dce19f0127dabc1b4ec927d202a Now that MRP started to use also SWITCHDEV_ATTR_ID_PORT_STP_STATE to notify HW, then SWITCHDEV_ATTR_ID_MRP_PORT_STAT is not used anywhere else, therefore we can remove it. Fixes: c284b545900830 ("switchdev: mrp: Extend switchdev API to offload MRP") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
Now that MRP started to use also SWITCHDEV_ATTR_ID_PORT_STP_STATE to
notify HW, then SWITCHDEV_ATTR_ID_MRP_PORT_STAT is not used anywhere
else, therefore we can remove it.

Fixes: c284b545900830 ("switchdev: mrp: Extend switchdev API to offload MRP")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
udp: ipv4: manipulate network header of NATed UDP GRO fraglist 2021-02-02T04:02:16+00:00 Dongseok Yi dseok.yi@samsung.com 2021-01-29T23:13:27+00:00 c3df39ac9b0e3747bf8233ea9ce4ed5ceb3199d3 UDP/IP header of UDP GROed frag_skbs are not updated even after NAT forwarding. Only the header of head_skb from ip_finish_output_gso -> skb_gso_segment is updated but following frag_skbs are not updated. A call path skb_mac_gso_segment -> inet_gso_segment -> udp4_ufo_fragment -> __udp_gso_segment -> __udp_gso_segment_list does not try to update UDP/IP header of the segment list but copy only the MAC header. Update port, addr and check of each skb of the segment list in __udp_gso_segment_list. It covers both SNAT and DNAT. Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 (udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.) Signed-off-by: Dongseok Yi <dseok.yi@samsung.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1611962007-80092-1-git-send-email-dseok.yi@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
UDP/IP header of UDP GROed frag_skbs are not updated even after NAT
forwarding. Only the header of head_skb from ip_finish_output_gso ->
skb_gso_segment is updated but following frag_skbs are not updated.

A call path skb_mac_gso_segment -> inet_gso_segment ->
udp4_ufo_fragment -> __udp_gso_segment -> __udp_gso_segment_list
does not try to update UDP/IP header of the segment list but copy
only the MAC header.

Update port, addr and check of each skb of the segment list in
__udp_gso_segment_list. It covers both SNAT and DNAT.

Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 (udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.)
Signed-off-by: Dongseok Yi <dseok.yi@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1611962007-80092-1-git-send-email-dseok.yi@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net: sched: replaced invalid qdisc tree flush helper in qdisc_replace 2021-02-02T02:40:18+00:00 Alexander Ovechkin ovov@yandex-team.ru 2021-02-01T20:00:49+00:00 938e0fcd3253efdef8924714158911286d08cfe1 Commit e5f0e8f8e456 ("net: sched: introduce and use qdisc tree flush/purge helpers") introduced qdisc tree flush/purge helpers, but erroneously used flush helper instead of purge helper in qdisc_replace function. This issue was found in our CI, that tests various qdisc setups by configuring qdisc and sending data through it. Call of invalid helper sporadically leads to corruption of vt_tree/cf_tree of hfsc_class that causes kernel oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.11.0-8f6859df #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x190 Code: c3 31 c0 c3 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 07 48 85 c0 0f 84 05 01 00 00 48 8b 10 f6 c2 01 0f 85 34 01 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 08 49 89 d0 48 39 c1 74 7d 48 85 c9 74 32 f6 01 01 75 2d RSP: 0018:ffffc900000b8bb0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff8881ef4c38b0 RBX: ffff8881d956e400 RCX: ffff8881ef4c38b0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8881d956f0a8 RDI: ffff8881d956e4b0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000d5c4e249da R09: 1600000000000000 R10: ffffc900000b8be0 R11: ffffc900000b8b28 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 000000000000005a R14: ffff8881f0905000 R15: ffff8881f0387d00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f8b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001f4796004 CR4: 0000000000060ee0 Call Trace: <IRQ> init_vf.isra.19+0xec/0x250 [sch_hfsc] hfsc_enqueue+0x245/0x300 [sch_hfsc] ? fib_rules_lookup+0x12a/0x1d0 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x4b6/0x930 ? hfsc_delete_class+0x250/0x250 [sch_hfsc] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4b6/0x930 ? ip6_finish_output2+0x24d/0x590 ip6_finish_output2+0x24d/0x590 ? ip6_output+0x6c/0x130 ip6_output+0x6c/0x130 ? __ip6_finish_output+0x110/0x110 mld_sendpack+0x224/0x230 mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x186/0x2c0 ? igmp6_group_dropped+0x200/0x200 call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x150 run_timer_softirq+0x20c/0x480 ? tick_sched_do_timer+0x60/0x60 ? tick_sched_timer+0x37/0x70 __do_softirq+0xf7/0x2cb irq_exit+0xa0/0xb0 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x74/0x150 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 </IRQ> Fixes: e5f0e8f8e456 ("net: sched: introduce and use qdisc tree flush/purge helpers") Signed-off-by: Alexander Ovechkin <ovov@yandex-team.ru> Reported-by: Alexander Kuznetsov <wwfq@yandex-team.ru> Acked-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru> Acked-by: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210201200049.299153-1-ovov@yandex-team.ru Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
Commit e5f0e8f8e456 ("net: sched: introduce and use qdisc tree flush/purge helpers")
introduced qdisc tree flush/purge helpers, but erroneously used flush helper
instead of purge helper in qdisc_replace function.
This issue was found in our CI, that tests various qdisc setups by configuring
qdisc and sending data through it. Call of invalid helper sporadically leads
to corruption of vt_tree/cf_tree of hfsc_class that causes kernel oops:

 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.11.0-8f6859df #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x190
 Code: c3 31 c0 c3 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 07 48 85 c0 0f 84 05 01 00 00 48 8b 10 f6 c2 01 0f 85 34 01 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 08 49 89 d0 48 39 c1 74 7d 48 85 c9 74 32 f6 01 01 75 2d
 RSP: 0018:ffffc900000b8bb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: ffff8881ef4c38b0 RBX: ffff8881d956e400 RCX: ffff8881ef4c38b0
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8881d956f0a8 RDI: ffff8881d956e4b0
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000d5c4e249da R09: 1600000000000000
 R10: ffffc900000b8be0 R11: ffffc900000b8b28 R12: 0000000000000001
 R13: 000000000000005a R14: ffff8881f0905000 R15: ffff8881f0387d00
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f8b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001f4796004 CR4: 0000000000060ee0
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  init_vf.isra.19+0xec/0x250 [sch_hfsc]
  hfsc_enqueue+0x245/0x300 [sch_hfsc]
  ? fib_rules_lookup+0x12a/0x1d0
  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x4b6/0x930
  ? hfsc_delete_class+0x250/0x250 [sch_hfsc]
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x4b6/0x930
  ? ip6_finish_output2+0x24d/0x590
  ip6_finish_output2+0x24d/0x590
  ? ip6_output+0x6c/0x130
  ip6_output+0x6c/0x130
  ? __ip6_finish_output+0x110/0x110
  mld_sendpack+0x224/0x230
  mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x186/0x2c0
  ? igmp6_group_dropped+0x200/0x200
  call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x150
  run_timer_softirq+0x20c/0x480
  ? tick_sched_do_timer+0x60/0x60
  ? tick_sched_timer+0x37/0x70
  __do_softirq+0xf7/0x2cb
  irq_exit+0xa0/0xb0
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x74/0x150
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
  </IRQ>

Fixes: e5f0e8f8e456 ("net: sched: introduce and use qdisc tree flush/purge helpers")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Ovechkin <ovov@yandex-team.ru>
Reported-by: Alexander Kuznetsov <wwfq@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210201200049.299153-1-ovov@yandex-team.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf 2021-01-28T01:53:46+00:00 Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org 2021-01-28T01:53:45+00:00 0f764eec3ea23b7b2c64fb54c9a219553921e93a Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net 1) Honor stateful expressions defined in the set from the dynset extension. The set definition provides a stateful expression that must be used by the dynset expression in case it is specified. 2) Missing timeout extension in the set element in the dynset extension leads to inconsistent ruleset listing, not allowing the user to restore timeout and expiration on ruleset reload. 3) Do not dump the stateful expression from the dynset extension if it coming from the set definition. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf: netfilter: nft_dynset: dump expressions when set definition contains no expressions netfilter: nft_dynset: add timeout extension to template netfilter: nft_dynset: honor stateful expressions in set definition ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210127132512.5472-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

1) Honor stateful expressions defined in the set from the dynset
   extension. The set definition provides a stateful expression
   that must be used by the dynset expression in case it is specified.

2) Missing timeout extension in the set element in the dynset
   extension leads to inconsistent ruleset listing, not allowing
   the user to restore timeout and expiration on ruleset reload.

3) Do not dump the stateful expression from the dynset extension
   if it coming from the set definition.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf:
  netfilter: nft_dynset: dump expressions when set definition contains no expressions
  netfilter: nft_dynset: add timeout extension to template
  netfilter: nft_dynset: honor stateful expressions in set definition
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210127132512.5472-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net: lapb: Add locking to the lapb module 2021-01-27T01:53:45+00:00 Xie He xie.he.0141@gmail.com 2021-01-26T04:09:39+00:00 b491e6a7391e3ecdebdd7a097550195cc878924a In the lapb module, the timers may run concurrently with other code in this module, and there is currently no locking to prevent the code from racing on "struct lapb_cb". This patch adds locking to prevent racing. 1. Add "spinlock_t lock" to "struct lapb_cb"; Add "spin_lock_bh" and "spin_unlock_bh" to APIs, timer functions and notifier functions. 2. Add "bool t1timer_stop, t2timer_stop" to "struct lapb_cb" to make us able to ask running timers to abort; Modify "lapb_stop_t1timer" and "lapb_stop_t2timer" to make them able to abort running timers; Modify "lapb_t2timer_expiry" and "lapb_t1timer_expiry" to make them abort after they are stopped by "lapb_stop_t1timer", "lapb_stop_t2timer", and "lapb_start_t1timer", "lapb_start_t2timer". 3. Let lapb_unregister wait for other API functions and running timers to stop. 4. The lapb_device_event function calls lapb_disconnect_request. In order to avoid trying to hold the lock twice, add a new function named "__lapb_disconnect_request" which assumes the lock is held, and make it called by lapb_disconnect_request and lapb_device_event. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de> Signed-off-by: Xie He <xie.he.0141@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210126040939.69995-1-xie.he.0141@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
In the lapb module, the timers may run concurrently with other code in
this module, and there is currently no locking to prevent the code from
racing on "struct lapb_cb". This patch adds locking to prevent racing.

1. Add "spinlock_t lock" to "struct lapb_cb"; Add "spin_lock_bh" and
"spin_unlock_bh" to APIs, timer functions and notifier functions.

2. Add "bool t1timer_stop, t2timer_stop" to "struct lapb_cb" to make us
able to ask running timers to abort; Modify "lapb_stop_t1timer" and
"lapb_stop_t2timer" to make them able to abort running timers;
Modify "lapb_t2timer_expiry" and "lapb_t1timer_expiry" to make them
abort after they are stopped by "lapb_stop_t1timer", "lapb_stop_t2timer",
and "lapb_start_t1timer", "lapb_start_t2timer".

3. Let lapb_unregister wait for other API functions and running timers
to stop.

4. The lapb_device_event function calls lapb_disconnect_request. In
order to avoid trying to hold the lock twice, add a new function named
"__lapb_disconnect_request" which assumes the lock is held, and make
it called by lapb_disconnect_request and lapb_device_event.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
Signed-off-by: Xie He <xie.he.0141@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210126040939.69995-1-xie.he.0141@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>