<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/include, branch v3.14.29</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-06T21:00:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=11e4f3bfdfd2d0f4a1104f0cbf19764b387ba4aa'/>
<id>11e4f3bfdfd2d0f4a1104f0cbf19764b387ba4aa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing/sched: Check preempt_count() for current when reading task-&gt;state</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-10T22:31:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=37b2a5a7c849b7242322688ce380d0a1cc1b1d0f'/>
<id>37b2a5a7c849b7242322688ce380d0a1cc1b1d0f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aee4e5f3d3abb7a2239dd02f6d8fb173413fd02f upstream.

When recording the state of a task for the sched_switch tracepoint a check of
task_preempt_count() is performed to see if PREEMPT_ACTIVE is set. This is
because, technically, a task being preempted is really in the TASK_RUNNING
state, and that is what should be recorded when tracing a sched_switch,
even if the task put itself into another state (it hasn't scheduled out
in that state yet).

But with the change to use per_cpu preempt counts, the
task_thread_info(p)-&gt;preempt_count is no longer used, and instead
task_preempt_count(p) is used.

The problem is that this does not use the current preempt count but a stale
one from a previous sched_switch. The task_preempt_count(p) uses
saved_preempt_count and not preempt_count(). But for tracing sched_switch,
if p is current, we really want preempt_count().

I hit this bug when I was tracing sleep and the call from do_nanosleep()
scheduled out in the "RUNNING" state.

           sleep-4290  [000] 537272.259992: sched_switch:         sleep:4290 [120] R ==&gt; swapper/0:0 [120]
           sleep-4290  [000] 537272.260015: kernel_stack:         &lt;stack trace&gt;
=&gt; __schedule (ffffffff8150864a)
=&gt; schedule (ffffffff815089f8)
=&gt; do_nanosleep (ffffffff8150b76c)
=&gt; hrtimer_nanosleep (ffffffff8108d66b)
=&gt; SyS_nanosleep (ffffffff8108d750)
=&gt; return_to_handler (ffffffff8150e8e5)
=&gt; tracesys_phase2 (ffffffff8150c844)

After a bit of hair pulling, I found that the state was really
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, but the saved_preempt_count had an old PREEMPT_ACTIVE
set and caused the sched_switch tracepoint to show it as RUNNING.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141210174428.3cb7542a@gandalf.local.home

Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Fixes: 01028747559a "sched: Create more preempt_count accessors"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aee4e5f3d3abb7a2239dd02f6d8fb173413fd02f upstream.

When recording the state of a task for the sched_switch tracepoint a check of
task_preempt_count() is performed to see if PREEMPT_ACTIVE is set. This is
because, technically, a task being preempted is really in the TASK_RUNNING
state, and that is what should be recorded when tracing a sched_switch,
even if the task put itself into another state (it hasn't scheduled out
in that state yet).

But with the change to use per_cpu preempt counts, the
task_thread_info(p)-&gt;preempt_count is no longer used, and instead
task_preempt_count(p) is used.

The problem is that this does not use the current preempt count but a stale
one from a previous sched_switch. The task_preempt_count(p) uses
saved_preempt_count and not preempt_count(). But for tracing sched_switch,
if p is current, we really want preempt_count().

I hit this bug when I was tracing sleep and the call from do_nanosleep()
scheduled out in the "RUNNING" state.

           sleep-4290  [000] 537272.259992: sched_switch:         sleep:4290 [120] R ==&gt; swapper/0:0 [120]
           sleep-4290  [000] 537272.260015: kernel_stack:         &lt;stack trace&gt;
=&gt; __schedule (ffffffff8150864a)
=&gt; schedule (ffffffff815089f8)
=&gt; do_nanosleep (ffffffff8150b76c)
=&gt; hrtimer_nanosleep (ffffffff8108d66b)
=&gt; SyS_nanosleep (ffffffff8108d750)
=&gt; return_to_handler (ffffffff8150e8e5)
=&gt; tracesys_phase2 (ffffffff8150c844)

After a bit of hair pulling, I found that the state was really
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, but the saved_preempt_count had an old PREEMPT_ACTIVE
set and caused the sched_switch tracepoint to show it as RUNNING.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141210174428.3cb7542a@gandalf.local.home

Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Fixes: 01028747559a "sched: Create more preempt_count accessors"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pstore-ram: Allow optional mapping with pgprot_noncached</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Lindgren</name>
<email>tony@atomide.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-16T20:50:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2e5df19fc0a36c8e1164f82762c2262140d11cb1'/>
<id>2e5df19fc0a36c8e1164f82762c2262140d11cb1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 027bc8b08242c59e19356b4b2c189f2d849ab660 upstream.

On some ARMs the memory can be mapped pgprot_noncached() and still
be working for atomic operations. As pointed out by Colin Cross
&lt;ccross@android.com&gt;, in some cases you do want to use
pgprot_noncached() if the SoC supports it to see a debug printk
just before a write hanging the system.

On ARMs, the atomic operations on strongly ordered memory are
implementation defined. So let's provide an optional kernel parameter
for configuring pgprot_noncached(), and use pgprot_writecombine() by
default.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robherring2@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Anton Vorontsov &lt;anton@enomsg.org&gt;
Cc: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Cc: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 027bc8b08242c59e19356b4b2c189f2d849ab660 upstream.

On some ARMs the memory can be mapped pgprot_noncached() and still
be working for atomic operations. As pointed out by Colin Cross
&lt;ccross@android.com&gt;, in some cases you do want to use
pgprot_noncached() if the SoC supports it to see a debug printk
just before a write hanging the system.

On ARMs, the atomic operations on strongly ordered memory are
implementation defined. So let's provide an optional kernel parameter
for configuring pgprot_noncached(), and use pgprot_writecombine() by
default.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robherring2@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Anton Vorontsov &lt;anton@enomsg.org&gt;
Cc: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Cc: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: restore AUDIT_LOGINUID unset ABI</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:00:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-23T18:02:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1cfececcbcae561716f5996078bbe505ee1b741a'/>
<id>1cfececcbcae561716f5996078bbe505ee1b741a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 041d7b98ffe59c59fdd639931dea7d74f9aa9a59 upstream.

A regression was caused by commit 780a7654cee8:
	 audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
(which in turn attempted to fix a regression caused by e1760bd)

When audit_krule_to_data() fills in the rules to get a listing, there was a
missing clause to convert back from AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET to AUDIT_LOGINUID.

This broke userspace by not returning the same information that was sent and
expected.

The rule:
	auditctl -a exit,never -F auid=-1
gives:
	auditctl -l
		LIST_RULES: exit,never f24=0 syscall=all
when it should give:
		LIST_RULES: exit,never auid=-1 (0xffffffff) syscall=all

Tag it so that it is reported the same way it was set.  Create a new
private flags audit_krule field (pflags) to store it that won't interact with
the public one from the API.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 041d7b98ffe59c59fdd639931dea7d74f9aa9a59 upstream.

A regression was caused by commit 780a7654cee8:
	 audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
(which in turn attempted to fix a regression caused by e1760bd)

When audit_krule_to_data() fills in the rules to get a listing, there was a
missing clause to convert back from AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET to AUDIT_LOGINUID.

This broke userspace by not returning the same information that was sent and
expected.

The rule:
	auditctl -a exit,never -F auid=-1
gives:
	auditctl -l
		LIST_RULES: exit,never f24=0 syscall=all
when it should give:
		LIST_RULES: exit,never auid=-1 (0xffffffff) syscall=all

Tag it so that it is reported the same way it was set.  Create a new
private flags audit_krule field (pflags) to store it that won't interact with
the public one from the API.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:00:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-02T18:27:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=cbc4266efecca3fc3d078d9a28465757b6f629ec'/>
<id>cbc4266efecca3fc3d078d9a28465757b6f629ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/setgroups

  A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
  current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
  future in this user namespace.

  A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
  their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
  not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
  for the user namespace is set.

  This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
  level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
  from a process that already has that ability.

  A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
  creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
  setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
  Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
  is a noop.  Prodcess with privilege become processes without
  privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
  to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
  setgroups.  So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
  without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/setgroups

  A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
  current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
  future in this user namespace.

  A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
  their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
  not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
  for the user namespace is set.

  This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
  level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
  from a process that already has that ability.

  A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
  creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
  setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
  Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
  is a noop.  Prodcess with privilege become processes without
  privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
  to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
  setgroups.  So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
  without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:00:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-06T00:01:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f077e88fc9f0befcf0441be2fed9516881ab02ef'/>
<id>f077e88fc9f0befcf0441be2fed9516881ab02ef</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.

setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.

The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established.  Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.

setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.

The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established.  Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:00:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-05T23:19:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=00fcd1ceab6c42f7facfa0168b207fe70ee198c2'/>
<id>00fcd1ceab6c42f7facfa0168b207fe70ee198c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.

Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their
permission checking has diverged.  Add a common function so that
they may all share the same permission checking code.

This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks
and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.

A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.

Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their
permission checking has diverged.  Add a common function so that
they may all share the same permission checking code.

This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks
and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.

A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bitops: Fix shift overflow in GENMASK macros</title>
<updated>2014-12-06T23:55:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxime COQUELIN</name>
<email>maxime.coquelin@st.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-06T09:54:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=42be4e5c4a5da3f9e27d6e1420612c3aea11f658'/>
<id>42be4e5c4a5da3f9e27d6e1420612c3aea11f658</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 00b4d9a14125f1e51874def2b9de6092e007412d upstream.

On some 32 bits architectures, including x86, GENMASK(31, 0) returns 0
instead of the expected ~0UL.

This is the same on some 64 bits architectures with GENMASK_ULL(63, 0).

This is due to an overflow in the shift operand, 1 &lt;&lt; 32 for GENMASK,
1 &lt;&lt; 64 for GENMASK_ULL.

Reported-by: Eric Paire &lt;eric.paire@st.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin &lt;maxime.coquelin@st.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Cc: gong.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: John Sullivan &lt;jsrhbz@kanargh.force9.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Fixes: 10ef6b0dffe4 ("bitops: Introduce a more generic BITMASK macro")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1415267659-10563-1-git-send-email-maxime.coquelin@st.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 00b4d9a14125f1e51874def2b9de6092e007412d upstream.

On some 32 bits architectures, including x86, GENMASK(31, 0) returns 0
instead of the expected ~0UL.

This is the same on some 64 bits architectures with GENMASK_ULL(63, 0).

This is due to an overflow in the shift operand, 1 &lt;&lt; 32 for GENMASK,
1 &lt;&lt; 64 for GENMASK_ULL.

Reported-by: Eric Paire &lt;eric.paire@st.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin &lt;maxime.coquelin@st.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Cc: gong.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: John Sullivan &lt;jsrhbz@kanargh.force9.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Fixes: 10ef6b0dffe4 ("bitops: Introduce a more generic BITMASK macro")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1415267659-10563-1-git-send-email-maxime.coquelin@st.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iio: Fix IIO_EVENT_CODE_EXTRACT_DIR bit mask</title>
<updated>2014-12-06T23:55:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cristina Ciocan</name>
<email>cristina.ciocan@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-11T14:07:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ecee7138d8589cf2975e35a3ede0a1c19e8f8b76'/>
<id>ecee7138d8589cf2975e35a3ede0a1c19e8f8b76</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ccf54555da9a5e91e454b909ca6a5303c7d6b910 upstream.

The direction field is set on 7 bits, thus we need to AND it with 0111 111 mask
in order to retrieve it, that is 0x7F, not 0xCF as it is now.

Fixes: ade7ef7ba (staging:iio: Differential channel handling)
Signed-off-by: Cristina Ciocan &lt;cristina.ciocan@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ccf54555da9a5e91e454b909ca6a5303c7d6b910 upstream.

The direction field is set on 7 bits, thus we need to AND it with 0111 111 mask
in order to retrieve it, that is 0x7F, not 0xCF as it is now.

Fixes: ade7ef7ba (staging:iio: Differential channel handling)
Signed-off-by: Cristina Ciocan &lt;cristina.ciocan@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASoC: dpcm: Fix race between FE/BE updates and trigger</title>
<updated>2014-12-06T23:55:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-04T15:52:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=05619290c1b31183112b412ea1c940be6151874f'/>
<id>05619290c1b31183112b412ea1c940be6151874f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ea9d0d771fcd32cd56070819749477d511ec9117 upstream.

DPCM can update the FE/BE connection states totally asynchronously
from the FE's PCM state.  Most of FE/BE state changes are protected by
mutex, so that they won't race, but there are still some actions that
are uncovered.  For example, suppose to switch a BE while a FE's
stream is running.  This would call soc_dpcm_runtime_update(), which
sets FE's runtime_update flag, then sets up and starts BEs, and clears
FE's runtime_update flag again.

When a device emits XRUN during this operation, the PCM core triggers
snd_pcm_stop(XRUN).  Since the trigger action is an atomic ops, this
isn't blocked by the mutex, thus it kicks off DPCM's trigger action.
It eventually updates and clears FE's runtime_update flag while
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() is running concurrently, and it results in
confusion.

Usually, for avoiding such a race, we take a lock.  There is a PCM
stream lock for that purpose.  However, as already mentioned, the
trigger action is atomic, and we can't take the lock for the whole
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() or other operations that include the lengthy
jobs like hw_params or prepare.

This patch provides an alternative solution.  This adds a way to defer
the conflicting trigger callback to be executed at the end of FE/BE
state changes.  For doing it, two things are introduced:

- Each runtime_update state change of FEs is protected via PCM stream
  lock.
- The FE's trigger callback checks the runtime_update flag.  If it's
  not set, the trigger action is executed there.  If set, mark the
  pending trigger action and returns immediately.
- At the exit of runtime_update state change, it checks whether the
  pending trigger is present.  If yes, it executes the trigger action
  at this point.

Reported-and-tested-by: Qiao Zhou &lt;zhouqiao@marvell.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood &lt;liam.r.girdwood@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ea9d0d771fcd32cd56070819749477d511ec9117 upstream.

DPCM can update the FE/BE connection states totally asynchronously
from the FE's PCM state.  Most of FE/BE state changes are protected by
mutex, so that they won't race, but there are still some actions that
are uncovered.  For example, suppose to switch a BE while a FE's
stream is running.  This would call soc_dpcm_runtime_update(), which
sets FE's runtime_update flag, then sets up and starts BEs, and clears
FE's runtime_update flag again.

When a device emits XRUN during this operation, the PCM core triggers
snd_pcm_stop(XRUN).  Since the trigger action is an atomic ops, this
isn't blocked by the mutex, thus it kicks off DPCM's trigger action.
It eventually updates and clears FE's runtime_update flag while
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() is running concurrently, and it results in
confusion.

Usually, for avoiding such a race, we take a lock.  There is a PCM
stream lock for that purpose.  However, as already mentioned, the
trigger action is atomic, and we can't take the lock for the whole
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() or other operations that include the lengthy
jobs like hw_params or prepare.

This patch provides an alternative solution.  This adds a way to defer
the conflicting trigger callback to be executed at the end of FE/BE
state changes.  For doing it, two things are introduced:

- Each runtime_update state change of FEs is protected via PCM stream
  lock.
- The FE's trigger callback checks the runtime_update flag.  If it's
  not set, the trigger action is executed there.  If set, mark the
  pending trigger action and returns immediately.
- At the exit of runtime_update state change, it checks whether the
  pending trigger is present.  If yes, it executes the trigger action
  at this point.

Reported-and-tested-by: Qiao Zhou &lt;zhouqiao@marvell.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood &lt;liam.r.girdwood@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
