<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/include, branch v4.14.154</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>kvm: Add helper function for creating VM worker threads</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:19:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junaid Shahid</name>
<email>junaids@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-31T23:14:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=73959112cc8dbd30a09e169a9da868f40e750e2d'/>
<id>73959112cc8dbd30a09e169a9da868f40e750e2d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c57c80467f90e5504c8df9ad3555d2c78800bf94 upstream.

Add a function to create a kernel thread associated with a given VM. In
particular, it ensures that the worker thread inherits the priority and
cgroups of the calling thread.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c57c80467f90e5504c8df9ad3555d2c78800bf94 upstream.

Add a function to create a kernel thread associated with a given VM. In
particular, it ensures that the worker thread inherits the priority and
cgroups of the calling thread.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: Convert kvm_lock to a mutex</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:19:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junaid Shahid</name>
<email>junaids@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-04T01:14:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=05fe997e30d439e3ff0c7e7e46499e9d41d98ba7'/>
<id>05fe997e30d439e3ff0c7e7e46499e9d41d98ba7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0d9ce162cf46c99628cc5da9510b959c7976735b upstream.

It doesn't seem as if there is any particular need for kvm_lock to be a
spinlock, so convert the lock to a mutex so that sleepable functions (in
particular cond_resched()) can be called while holding it.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0d9ce162cf46c99628cc5da9510b959c7976735b upstream.

It doesn't seem as if there is any particular need for kvm_lock to be a
spinlock, so convert the lock to a mutex so that sleepable functions (in
particular cond_resched()) can be called while holding it.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: x86, powerpc: do not allow clearing largepages debugfs entry</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:19:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-11T09:59:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=82e77746f07db70367f66ef272256037d6415353'/>
<id>82e77746f07db70367f66ef272256037d6415353</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 833b45de69a6016c4b0cebe6765d526a31a81580 upstream.

The largepages debugfs entry is incremented/decremented as shadow
pages are created or destroyed.  Clearing it will result in an
underflow, which is harmless to KVM but ugly (and could be
misinterpreted by tools that use debugfs information), so make
this particular statistic read-only.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 833b45de69a6016c4b0cebe6765d526a31a81580 upstream.

The largepages debugfs entry is incremented/decremented as shadow
pages are created or destroyed.  Clearing it will result in an
underflow, which is harmless to KVM but ugly (and could be
misinterpreted by tools that use debugfs information), so make
this particular statistic read-only.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/speculation: Uninline and export CPU mitigations helpers</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:19:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T11:22:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=fa8617fddad51c42f66e56cd14382ee0e9f9782e'/>
<id>fa8617fddad51c42f66e56cd14382ee0e9f9782e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 731dc9df975a5da21237a18c3384f811a7a41cc6 upstream.

A kernel module may need to check the value of the "mitigations=" kernel
command line parameter as part of its setup when the module needs
to perform software mitigations for a CPU flaw.

Uninline and export the helper functions surrounding the cpu_mitigations
enum to allow for their usage from a module.

Lastly, privatize the enum and cpu_mitigations variable since the value of
cpu_mitigations can be checked with the exported helper functions.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 731dc9df975a5da21237a18c3384f811a7a41cc6 upstream.

A kernel module may need to check the value of the "mitigations=" kernel
command line parameter as part of its setup when the module needs
to perform software mitigations for a CPU flaw.

Uninline and export the helper functions surrounding the cpu_mitigations
enum to allow for their usage from a module.

Lastly, privatize the enum and cpu_mitigations variable since the value of
cpu_mitigations can be checked with the exported helper functions.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:19:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineela Tummalapalli</name>
<email>vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T11:22:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=56a0f3867c1bc40c6f155c780a284cc881a89488'/>
<id>56a0f3867c1bc40c6f155c780a284cc881a89488</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae upstream.

Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli &lt;vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae upstream.

Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli &lt;vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:19:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T10:19:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=79373f485f7be07cb097a49aa200f80914407ae9'/>
<id>79373f485f7be07cb097a49aa200f80914407ae9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm/i915: Prevent writing into a read-only object via a GGTT mmap</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:18:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Wilson</name>
<email>chris@chris-wilson.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-12T18:53:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d24b5d0d6d5f0763431350bf7b2b1a256baec692'/>
<id>d24b5d0d6d5f0763431350bf7b2b1a256baec692</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e977ac6179b39faa3c0eda5fce4f00663ae298d upstream.

If the user has created a read-only object, they should not be allowed
to circumvent the write protection by using a GGTT mmapping. Deny it.

Also most machines do not support read-only GGTT PTEs, so again we have
to reject attempted writes. Fortunately, this is known a priori, so we
can at least reject in the call to create the mmap (with a sanity check
in the fault handler).

v2: Check the vma-&gt;vm_flags during mmap() to allow readonly access.
v3: Remove VM_MAYWRITE to curtail mprotect()

Testcase: igt/gem_userptr_blits/readonly_mmap*
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Jon Bloomfield &lt;jon.bloomfield@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen &lt;joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Auld &lt;matthew.william.auld@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Herrmann &lt;dh.herrmann@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld &lt;matthew.william.auld@gmail.com&gt; #v1
Reviewed-by: Jon Bloomfield &lt;jon.bloomfield@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joonas Lahtinen &lt;joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180712185315.3288-4-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi &lt;rodrigo.vivi@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3e977ac6179b39faa3c0eda5fce4f00663ae298d upstream.

If the user has created a read-only object, they should not be allowed
to circumvent the write protection by using a GGTT mmapping. Deny it.

Also most machines do not support read-only GGTT PTEs, so again we have
to reject attempted writes. Fortunately, this is known a priori, so we
can at least reject in the call to create the mmap (with a sanity check
in the fault handler).

v2: Check the vma-&gt;vm_flags during mmap() to allow readonly access.
v3: Remove VM_MAYWRITE to curtail mprotect()

Testcase: igt/gem_userptr_blits/readonly_mmap*
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Jon Bloomfield &lt;jon.bloomfield@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen &lt;joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Auld &lt;matthew.william.auld@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Herrmann &lt;dh.herrmann@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld &lt;matthew.william.auld@gmail.com&gt; #v1
Reviewed-by: Jon Bloomfield &lt;jon.bloomfield@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joonas Lahtinen &lt;joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180712185315.3288-4-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi &lt;rodrigo.vivi@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: prevent load/store tearing on sk-&gt;sk_stamp</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:18:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-05T05:38:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=47598ed4ad3cbf2102fe685e516dba1d61ad252d'/>
<id>47598ed4ad3cbf2102fe685e516dba1d61ad252d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f75359f3ac855940c5718af10ba089b8977bf339 ]

Add a couple of READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to prevent
load-tearing and store-tearing in sock_read_timestamp()
and sock_write_timestamp()

This might prevent another KCSAN report.

Fixes: 3a0ed3e96197 ("sock: Make sock-&gt;sk_stamp thread-safe")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f75359f3ac855940c5718af10ba089b8977bf339 ]

Add a couple of READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to prevent
load-tearing and store-tearing in sock_read_timestamp()
and sock_write_timestamp()

This might prevent another KCSAN report.

Fixes: 3a0ed3e96197 ("sock: Make sock-&gt;sk_stamp thread-safe")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: move old_secure_tcp into struct netns_ipvs</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:18:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T16:53:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=3a0018ef9628b70fdb6d5a30c8d8e17f6ac1f9e2'/>
<id>3a0018ef9628b70fdb6d5a30c8d8e17f6ac1f9e2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c24b75e0f9239e78105f81c5f03a751641eb07ef ]

syzbot reported the following issue :

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in update_defense_level / update_defense_level

read to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 3006 on cpu 1:
 update_defense_level+0x621/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:177
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

write to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 7333 on cpu 0:
 update_defense_level+0xa62/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:205
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 7333 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events defense_work_handler

Indeed, old_secure_tcp is currently a static variable, while it
needs to be a per netns variable.

Fixes: a0840e2e165a ("IPVS: netns, ip_vs_ctl local vars moved to ipvs struct.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c24b75e0f9239e78105f81c5f03a751641eb07ef ]

syzbot reported the following issue :

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in update_defense_level / update_defense_level

read to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 3006 on cpu 1:
 update_defense_level+0x621/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:177
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

write to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 7333 on cpu 0:
 update_defense_level+0xa62/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:205
 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225
 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 7333 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events defense_work_handler

Indeed, old_secure_tcp is currently a static variable, while it
needs to be a per netns variable.

Fixes: a0840e2e165a ("IPVS: netns, ip_vs_ctl local vars moved to ipvs struct.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/uverbs: Prevent potential underflow</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T18:18:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-11T13:34:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8466db95431f39fd8eec0ce057eab5e4711307de'/>
<id>8466db95431f39fd8eec0ce057eab5e4711307de</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a9018adfde809d44e71189b984fa61cc89682b5e ]

The issue is in drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_std_types_cq.c in the
UVERBS_HANDLER(UVERBS_METHOD_CQ_CREATE) function.  We check that:

        if (attr.comp_vector &gt;= attrs-&gt;ufile-&gt;device-&gt;num_comp_vectors) {

But we don't check if "attr.comp_vector" is negative.  It could
potentially lead to an array underflow.  My concern would be where
cq-&gt;vector is used in the create_cq() function from the cxgb4 driver.

And really "attr.comp_vector" is appears as a u32 to user space so that's
the right type to use.

Fixes: 9ee79fce3642 ("IB/core: Add completion queue (cq) object actions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011133419.GA22905@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a9018adfde809d44e71189b984fa61cc89682b5e ]

The issue is in drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_std_types_cq.c in the
UVERBS_HANDLER(UVERBS_METHOD_CQ_CREATE) function.  We check that:

        if (attr.comp_vector &gt;= attrs-&gt;ufile-&gt;device-&gt;num_comp_vectors) {

But we don't check if "attr.comp_vector" is negative.  It could
potentially lead to an array underflow.  My concern would be where
cq-&gt;vector is used in the create_cq() function from the cxgb4 driver.

And really "attr.comp_vector" is appears as a u32 to user space so that's
the right type to use.

Fixes: 9ee79fce3642 ("IB/core: Add completion queue (cq) object actions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011133419.GA22905@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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