<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/include, branch v5.13.4</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chang S. Bae</name>
<email>chang.seok.bae@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-18T20:03:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=afb04d0b5543a5bf8e157b9119fbfc52606f4c11'/>
<id>afb04d0b5543a5bf8e157b9119fbfc52606f4c11</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2beb4a53fc3f1081cedc1c1a198c7f56cc4fc60c ]

The kernel pushes context on to the userspace stack to prepare for the
user's signal handler. When the user has supplied an alternate signal
stack, via sigaltstack(2), it is easy for the kernel to verify that the
stack size is sufficient for the current hardware context.

Check if writing the hardware context to the alternate stack will exceed
it's size. If yes, then instead of corrupting user-data and proceeding with
the original signal handler, an immediate SIGSEGV signal is delivered.

Refactor the stack pointer check code from on_sig_stack() and use the new
helper.

While the kernel allows new source code to discover and use a sufficient
alternate signal stack size, this check is still necessary to protect
binaries with insufficient alternate signal stack size from data
corruption.

Fixes: c2bc11f10a39 ("x86, AVX-512: Enable AVX-512 States Context Switch")
Reported-by: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae &lt;chang.seok.bae@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Len Brown &lt;len.brown@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518200320.17239-6-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=153531
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2beb4a53fc3f1081cedc1c1a198c7f56cc4fc60c ]

The kernel pushes context on to the userspace stack to prepare for the
user's signal handler. When the user has supplied an alternate signal
stack, via sigaltstack(2), it is easy for the kernel to verify that the
stack size is sufficient for the current hardware context.

Check if writing the hardware context to the alternate stack will exceed
it's size. If yes, then instead of corrupting user-data and proceeding with
the original signal handler, an immediate SIGSEGV signal is delivered.

Refactor the stack pointer check code from on_sig_stack() and use the new
helper.

While the kernel allows new source code to discover and use a sufficient
alternate signal stack size, this check is still necessary to protect
binaries with insufficient alternate signal stack size from data
corruption.

Fixes: c2bc11f10a39 ("x86, AVX-512: Enable AVX-512 States Context Switch")
Reported-by: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae &lt;chang.seok.bae@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Len Brown &lt;len.brown@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518200320.17239-6-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=153531
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: nfs_find_open_context() may only select open files</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-12T03:41:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c11910b2c2cff64847d438c83d88e6e3c282c91b'/>
<id>c11910b2c2cff64847d438c83d88e6e3c282c91b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e97bc66377bca097e1f3349ca18ca17f202ff659 ]

If a file has already been closed, then it should not be selected to
support further I/O.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
[Trond: Fix an invalid pointer deref reported by Colin Ian King]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e97bc66377bca097e1f3349ca18ca17f202ff659 ]

If a file has already been closed, then it should not be selected to
support further I/O.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
[Trond: Fix an invalid pointer deref reported by Colin Ian King]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virtiofs: propagate sync() to file server</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kurz</name>
<email>groug@kaod.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-20T15:46:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6ba041fc3c441e0cf4762f4baf0166e8d34f6802'/>
<id>6ba041fc3c441e0cf4762f4baf0166e8d34f6802</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d82ab251ef0f6e7716279b04e9b5a01a86ca530 ]

Even if POSIX doesn't mandate it, linux users legitimately expect sync() to
flush all data and metadata to physical storage when it is located on the
same system.  This isn't happening with virtiofs though: sync() inside the
guest returns right away even though data still needs to be flushed from
the host page cache.

This is easily demonstrated by doing the following in the guest:

$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/foo bs=1M count=5K ; strace -T -e sync sync
5120+0 records in
5120+0 records out
5368709120 bytes (5.4 GB, 5.0 GiB) copied, 5.22224 s, 1.0 GB/s
sync()                                  = 0 &lt;0.024068&gt;

and start the following in the host when the 'dd' command completes
in the guest:

$ strace -T -e fsync /usr/bin/sync virtiofs/foo
fsync(3)                                = 0 &lt;10.371640&gt;

There are no good reasons not to honor the expected behavior of sync()
actually: it gives an unrealistic impression that virtiofs is super fast
and that data has safely landed on HW, which isn't the case obviously.

Implement a -&gt;sync_fs() superblock operation that sends a new FUSE_SYNCFS
request type for this purpose.  Provision a 64-bit placeholder for possible
future extensions.  Since the file server cannot handle the wait == 0 case,
we skip it to avoid a gratuitous roundtrip.  Note that this is
per-superblock: a FUSE_SYNCFS is send for the root mount and for each
submount.

Like with FUSE_FSYNC and FUSE_FSYNCDIR, lack of support for FUSE_SYNCFS in
the file server is treated as permanent success.  This ensures
compatibility with older file servers: the client will get the current
behavior of sync() not being propagated to the file server.

Note that such an operation allows the file server to DoS sync().  Since a
typical FUSE file server is an untrusted piece of software running in
userspace, this is disabled by default.  Only enable it with virtiofs for
now since virtiofsd is supposedly trusted by the guest kernel.

Reported-by: Robert Krawitz &lt;rlk@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2d82ab251ef0f6e7716279b04e9b5a01a86ca530 ]

Even if POSIX doesn't mandate it, linux users legitimately expect sync() to
flush all data and metadata to physical storage when it is located on the
same system.  This isn't happening with virtiofs though: sync() inside the
guest returns right away even though data still needs to be flushed from
the host page cache.

This is easily demonstrated by doing the following in the guest:

$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/foo bs=1M count=5K ; strace -T -e sync sync
5120+0 records in
5120+0 records out
5368709120 bytes (5.4 GB, 5.0 GiB) copied, 5.22224 s, 1.0 GB/s
sync()                                  = 0 &lt;0.024068&gt;

and start the following in the host when the 'dd' command completes
in the guest:

$ strace -T -e fsync /usr/bin/sync virtiofs/foo
fsync(3)                                = 0 &lt;10.371640&gt;

There are no good reasons not to honor the expected behavior of sync()
actually: it gives an unrealistic impression that virtiofs is super fast
and that data has safely landed on HW, which isn't the case obviously.

Implement a -&gt;sync_fs() superblock operation that sends a new FUSE_SYNCFS
request type for this purpose.  Provision a 64-bit placeholder for possible
future extensions.  Since the file server cannot handle the wait == 0 case,
we skip it to avoid a gratuitous roundtrip.  Note that this is
per-superblock: a FUSE_SYNCFS is send for the root mount and for each
submount.

Like with FUSE_FSYNC and FUSE_FSYNCDIR, lack of support for FUSE_SYNCFS in
the file server is treated as permanent success.  This ensures
compatibility with older file servers: the client will get the current
behavior of sync() not being propagated to the file server.

Note that such an operation allows the file server to DoS sync().  Since a
typical FUSE file server is an untrusted piece of software running in
userspace, this is disabled by default.  Only enable it with virtiofs for
now since virtiofsd is supposedly trusted by the guest kernel.

Reported-by: Robert Krawitz &lt;rlk@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Dynamically map ECAM regions</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-13T14:18:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a037ebbe72a4f98495b193112e2b2000e5e09eb5'/>
<id>a037ebbe72a4f98495b193112e2b2000e5e09eb5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8fe55ef23387ce3c7488375b1fd539420d7654bb ]

Attempting to boot 32-bit ARM kernels under QEMU's 3.x virt models fails
when we have more than 512M of RAM in the model as we run out of vmalloc
space for the PCI ECAM regions. This failure will be silent when running
libvirt, as the console in that situation is a PCI device.

In this configuration, the kernel maps the whole ECAM, which QEMU sets up
for 256 buses, even when maybe only seven buses are in use.  Each bus uses
1M of ECAM space, and ioremap() adds an additional guard page between
allocations. The kernel vmap allocator will align these regions to 512K,
resulting in each mapping eating 1.5M of vmalloc space. This means we need
384M of vmalloc space just to map all of these, which is very wasteful of
resources.

Fix this by only mapping the ECAM for buses we are going to be using.  In
my setups, this is around seven buses in most guests, which is 10.5M of
vmalloc space - way smaller than the 384M that would otherwise be required.
This also means that the kernel can boot without forcing extra RAM into
highmem with the vmalloc= argument, or decreasing the virtual RAM available
to the guest.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/E1lhCAV-0002yb-50@rmk-PC.armlinux.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8fe55ef23387ce3c7488375b1fd539420d7654bb ]

Attempting to boot 32-bit ARM kernels under QEMU's 3.x virt models fails
when we have more than 512M of RAM in the model as we run out of vmalloc
space for the PCI ECAM regions. This failure will be silent when running
libvirt, as the console in that situation is a PCI device.

In this configuration, the kernel maps the whole ECAM, which QEMU sets up
for 256 buses, even when maybe only seven buses are in use.  Each bus uses
1M of ECAM space, and ioremap() adds an additional guard page between
allocations. The kernel vmap allocator will align these regions to 512K,
resulting in each mapping eating 1.5M of vmalloc space. This means we need
384M of vmalloc space just to map all of these, which is very wasteful of
resources.

Fix this by only mapping the ECAM for buses we are going to be using.  In
my setups, this is around seven buses in most guests, which is 10.5M of
vmalloc space - way smaller than the 384M that would otherwise be required.
This also means that the kernel can boot without forcing extra RAM into
highmem with the vmalloc= argument, or decreasing the virtual RAM available
to the guest.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/E1lhCAV-0002yb-50@rmk-PC.armlinux.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcov: add __no_sanitize_coverage to fix noinstr for all architectures</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marco Elver</name>
<email>elver@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-01T01:56:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=77637270800c7df8d439127854d99506796cd5fa'/>
<id>77637270800c7df8d439127854d99506796cd5fa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 540540d06e9d9b3769b46d88def90f7e7c002322 ]

Until now no compiler supported an attribute to disable coverage
instrumentation as used by KCOV.

To work around this limitation on x86, noinstr functions have their
coverage instrumentation turned into nops by objtool.  However, this
solution doesn't scale automatically to other architectures, such as
arm64, which are migrating to use the generic entry code.

Clang [1] and GCC [2] have added support for the attribute recently.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/280333021e9550d80f5c1152a34e33e81df1e178
[2] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=cec4d4a6782c9bd8d071839c50a239c49caca689
The changes will appear in Clang 13 and GCC 12.

Add __no_sanitize_coverage for both compilers, and add it to noinstr.

Note: In the Clang case, __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) is only true if
the feature is enabled, and therefore we do not require an additional
defined(CONFIG_KCOV) (like in the GCC case where __has_attribute(..) is
always true) to avoid adding redundant attributes to functions if KCOV is
off.  That being said, compilers that support the attribute will not
generate errors/warnings if the attribute is redundantly used; however,
where possible let's avoid it as it reduces preprocessed code size and
associated compile-time overheads.

[elver@google.com: Implement __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) in Clang]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527162655.3246381-1-elver@google.com
[elver@google.com: add comment explaining __has_feature() in Clang]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527194448.3470080-1-elver@google.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210525175819.699786-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck &lt;luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Arvind Sankar &lt;nivedita@alum.mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 540540d06e9d9b3769b46d88def90f7e7c002322 ]

Until now no compiler supported an attribute to disable coverage
instrumentation as used by KCOV.

To work around this limitation on x86, noinstr functions have their
coverage instrumentation turned into nops by objtool.  However, this
solution doesn't scale automatically to other architectures, such as
arm64, which are migrating to use the generic entry code.

Clang [1] and GCC [2] have added support for the attribute recently.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/280333021e9550d80f5c1152a34e33e81df1e178
[2] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=cec4d4a6782c9bd8d071839c50a239c49caca689
The changes will appear in Clang 13 and GCC 12.

Add __no_sanitize_coverage for both compilers, and add it to noinstr.

Note: In the Clang case, __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) is only true if
the feature is enabled, and therefore we do not require an additional
defined(CONFIG_KCOV) (like in the GCC case where __has_attribute(..) is
always true) to avoid adding redundant attributes to functions if KCOV is
off.  That being said, compilers that support the attribute will not
generate errors/warnings if the attribute is redundantly used; however,
where possible let's avoid it as it reduces preprocessed code size and
associated compile-time overheads.

[elver@google.com: Implement __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) in Clang]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527162655.3246381-1-elver@google.com
[elver@google.com: add comment explaining __has_feature() in Clang]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527194448.3470080-1-elver@google.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210525175819.699786-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck &lt;luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Arvind Sankar &lt;nivedita@alum.mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: iscsi: Fix conn use after free during resets</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Christie</name>
<email>michael.christie@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-25T18:18:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=fa9542b35ceb4202e8f8d65f440529a63524dca9'/>
<id>fa9542b35ceb4202e8f8d65f440529a63524dca9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ec29d0ac29be366450a7faffbcf8cba3a6a3b506 ]

If we haven't done a unbind target call we can race where
iscsi_conn_teardown wakes up the EH thread and then frees the conn while
those threads are still accessing the conn ehwait.

We can only do one TMF per session so this just moves the TMF fields from
the conn to the session. We can then rely on the
iscsi_session_teardown-&gt;iscsi_remove_session-&gt;__iscsi_unbind_session call
to remove the target and it's devices, and know after that point there is
no device or scsi-ml callout trying to access the session.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525181821.7617-14-michael.christie@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan &lt;lduncan@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie &lt;michael.christie@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ec29d0ac29be366450a7faffbcf8cba3a6a3b506 ]

If we haven't done a unbind target call we can race where
iscsi_conn_teardown wakes up the EH thread and then frees the conn while
those threads are still accessing the conn ehwait.

We can only do one TMF per session so this just moves the TMF fields from
the conn to the session. We can then rely on the
iscsi_session_teardown-&gt;iscsi_remove_session-&gt;__iscsi_unbind_session call
to remove the target and it's devices, and know after that point there is
no device or scsi-ml callout trying to access the session.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525181821.7617-14-michael.christie@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan &lt;lduncan@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie &lt;michael.christie@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: iscsi: Add iscsi_cls_conn refcount helpers</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Christie</name>
<email>michael.christie@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-25T18:18:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=bf3ce567db5639aab2010a49b4e522830e0887a0'/>
<id>bf3ce567db5639aab2010a49b4e522830e0887a0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b1d19e8c92cfb0ded180ef3376c20e130414e067 ]

There are a couple places where we could free the iscsi_cls_conn while it's
still in use. This adds some helpers to get/put a refcount on the struct
and converts an exiting user. Subsequent commits will then use the helpers
to fix 2 bugs in the eh code.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525181821.7617-11-michael.christie@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan &lt;lduncan@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie &lt;michael.christie@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b1d19e8c92cfb0ded180ef3376c20e130414e067 ]

There are a couple places where we could free the iscsi_cls_conn while it's
still in use. This adds some helpers to get/put a refcount on the struct
and converts an exiting user. Subsequent commits will then use the helpers
to fix 2 bugs in the eh code.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525181821.7617-11-michael.christie@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan &lt;lduncan@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie &lt;michael.christie@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>soundwire: bus: only use CLOCK_STOP_MODE0 and fix confusions</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pierre-Louis Bossart</name>
<email>pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-11T03:00:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=740b019c2eb80642e3a2609bf7450f0b267cf4c4'/>
<id>740b019c2eb80642e3a2609bf7450f0b267cf4c4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 345e9f5ca798600e44c0843646621f2804eb99f4 ]

Existing devices and implementations only support the required
CLOCK_STOP_MODE0. All the code related to CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 has not
been tested and is highly questionable, with a clear confusion between
CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 and the simple clock stop state machine.

This patch removes all usages of CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 - which has no
impact on any solution - and fixes the use of the simple clock stop
state machine. The resulting code should be a lot more symmetrical and
easier to maintain.

Note that CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 is not supported in the SoundWire Device
Class specification so it's rather unlikely that we need to re-add
this mode later.

Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski &lt;guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rander Wang &lt;rander.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bard Liao &lt;yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511030048.25622-2-yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 345e9f5ca798600e44c0843646621f2804eb99f4 ]

Existing devices and implementations only support the required
CLOCK_STOP_MODE0. All the code related to CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 has not
been tested and is highly questionable, with a clear confusion between
CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 and the simple clock stop state machine.

This patch removes all usages of CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 - which has no
impact on any solution - and fixes the use of the simple clock stop
state machine. The resulting code should be a lot more symmetrical and
easier to maintain.

Note that CLOCK_STOP_MODE1 is not supported in the SoundWire Device
Class specification so it's rather unlikely that we need to re-add
this mode later.

Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski &lt;guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rander Wang &lt;rander.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bard Liao &lt;yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511030048.25622-2-yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rcu: Reject RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() false positives</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:00:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-05T16:51:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ee188d0f8dd59c5db9f4ad761c97dd30e9d6361d'/>
<id>ee188d0f8dd59c5db9f4ad761c97dd30e9d6361d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3066820034b5dd4e89bd74a7739c51c2d6f5e554 ]

If another lockdep report runs concurrently with an RCU lockdep report
from RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(), the following sequence of events can occur:

1.	debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() sees that lockdep is enabled
	when called from (say) synchronize_rcu().

2.	Lockdep is disabled by a concurrent lockdep report.

3.	debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() evaluates its lockdep-expression
	argument, for example, lock_is_held(&amp;rcu_bh_lock_map).

4.	Because lockdep is now disabled, lock_is_held() plays it safe and
	returns the constant 1.

5.	But in this case, the constant 1 is not safe, because invoking
	synchronize_rcu() under rcu_read_lock_bh() is disallowed.

6.	debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() wrongly invokes lockdep_rcu_suspicious(),
	resulting in a false-positive splat.

This commit therefore changes RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() to check
debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() after checking the lockdep expression,
so that any "safe" returns from lock_is_held() are rejected by
debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled().  This requires memory ordering, which is
supplied by READ_ONCE(debug_locks).  The resulting volatile accesses
prevent the compiler from reordering and the fact that only one variable
is being accessed prevents the underlying hardware from reordering.
The combination works for IA64, which can reorder reads to the same
location, but this is defeated by the volatile accesses, which compile
to load instructions that provide ordering.

Reported-by: syzbot+dde0cc33951735441301@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+88e4f02896967fe1ab0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3066820034b5dd4e89bd74a7739c51c2d6f5e554 ]

If another lockdep report runs concurrently with an RCU lockdep report
from RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(), the following sequence of events can occur:

1.	debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() sees that lockdep is enabled
	when called from (say) synchronize_rcu().

2.	Lockdep is disabled by a concurrent lockdep report.

3.	debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() evaluates its lockdep-expression
	argument, for example, lock_is_held(&amp;rcu_bh_lock_map).

4.	Because lockdep is now disabled, lock_is_held() plays it safe and
	returns the constant 1.

5.	But in this case, the constant 1 is not safe, because invoking
	synchronize_rcu() under rcu_read_lock_bh() is disallowed.

6.	debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() wrongly invokes lockdep_rcu_suspicious(),
	resulting in a false-positive splat.

This commit therefore changes RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() to check
debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() after checking the lockdep expression,
so that any "safe" returns from lock_is_held() are rejected by
debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled().  This requires memory ordering, which is
supplied by READ_ONCE(debug_locks).  The resulting volatile accesses
prevent the compiler from reordering and the fact that only one variable
is being accessed prevents the underlying hardware from reordering.
The combination works for IA64, which can reorder reads to the same
location, but this is defeated by the volatile accesses, which compile
to load instructions that provide ordering.

Reported-by: syzbot+dde0cc33951735441301@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+88e4f02896967fe1ab0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>media: subdev: disallow ioctl for saa6588/davinci</title>
<updated>2021-07-19T08:04:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-14T10:34:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8b39b430dc0a16062d2c9a40b7be0da9bfd64edf'/>
<id>8b39b430dc0a16062d2c9a40b7be0da9bfd64edf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a7790be182d32b9b332a37cb4206e24fe94b728 upstream.

The saa6588_ioctl() function expects to get called from other kernel
functions with a 'saa6588_command' pointer, but I found nothing stops it
from getting called from user space instead, which seems rather dangerous.

The same thing happens in the davinci vpbe driver with its VENC_GET_FLD
command.

As a quick fix, add a separate .command() callback pointer for this
driver and change the two callers over to that.  This change can easily
get backported to stable kernels if necessary, but since there are only
two drivers, we may want to eventually replace this with a set of more
specialized callbacks in the long run.

Fixes: c3fda7f835b0 ("V4L/DVB (10537): saa6588: convert to v4l2_subdev.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart &lt;laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil &lt;hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0a7790be182d32b9b332a37cb4206e24fe94b728 upstream.

The saa6588_ioctl() function expects to get called from other kernel
functions with a 'saa6588_command' pointer, but I found nothing stops it
from getting called from user space instead, which seems rather dangerous.

The same thing happens in the davinci vpbe driver with its VENC_GET_FLD
command.

As a quick fix, add a separate .command() callback pointer for this
driver and change the two callers over to that.  This change can easily
get backported to stable kernels if necessary, but since there are only
two drivers, we may want to eventually replace this with a set of more
specialized callbacks in the long run.

Fixes: c3fda7f835b0 ("V4L/DVB (10537): saa6588: convert to v4l2_subdev.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart &lt;laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil &lt;hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
