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<title>linux.git/kernel/auditsc.c, branch v2.6.22-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Abnormal End of Processes</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Grubb</name>
<email>sgrubb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-04-19T14:28:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41'/>
<id>0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41</id>
<content type='text'>
Hi,

I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
Hi,

I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] match audit name data</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-02-13T19:15:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=5712e88f2b0f626a4857c24128810bbf8ce09537'/>
<id>5712e88f2b0f626a4857c24128810bbf8ce09537</id>
<content type='text'>
Make more effort to detect previously collected names, so we don't log
multiple PATH records for a single filesystem object. Add
audit_inc_name_count() to reduce duplicate code.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make more effort to detect previously collected names, so we don't log
multiple PATH records for a single filesystem object. Add
audit_inc_name_count() to reduce duplicate code.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] complete message queue auditing</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-02-13T19:15:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4fc03b9beb2314f3adb9e72b7935a80c577954d1'/>
<id>4fc03b9beb2314f3adb9e72b7935a80c577954d1</id>
<content type='text'>
Handle the edge cases for POSIX message queue auditing. Collect inode
info when opening an existing mq, and for send/receive operations. Remove
audit_inode_update() as it has really evolved into the equivalent of
audit_inode().

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Handle the edge cases for POSIX message queue auditing. Collect inode
info when opening an existing mq, and for send/receive operations. Remove
audit_inode_update() as it has really evolved into the equivalent of
audit_inode().

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] initialize name osid</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-02-13T19:14:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e41e8bde43026d5d2e41464e6105a50b31e34102'/>
<id>e41e8bde43026d5d2e41464e6105a50b31e34102</id>
<content type='text'>
Audit contexts can be reused, so initialize a name's osid to the
default in audit_getname(). This ensures we don't log a bogus object
label when no inode data is collected for a name.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
Audit contexts can be reused, so initialize a name's osid to the
default in audit_getname(). This ensures we don't log a bogus object
label when no inode data is collected for a name.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] audit signal recipients</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-03-29T22:01:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e54dc2431d740a79a6bd013babade99d71b1714f'/>
<id>e54dc2431d740a79a6bd013babade99d71b1714f</id>
<content type='text'>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] auditing ptrace</title>
<updated>2007-05-11T09:38:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2007-03-20T17:58:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a5cb013da773a67ee48d1c19e96436c22a73a7eb'/>
<id>a5cb013da773a67ee48d1c19e96436c22a73a7eb</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] fix deadlock in audit_log_task_context()</title>
<updated>2007-03-14T22:27:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@ftp.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2007-03-12T16:17:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=c4823bce033be74c0fcfbcae2f1be0854fdc2e18'/>
<id>c4823bce033be74c0fcfbcae2f1be0854fdc2e18</id>
<content type='text'>
GFP_KERNEL allocations in non-blocking context; fixed by killing
an idiotic use of security_getprocattr().

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
GFP_KERNEL allocations in non-blocking context; fixed by killing
an idiotic use of security_getprocattr().

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] AUDIT_FD_PAIR</title>
<updated>2007-02-18T02:30:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2007-02-07T06:48:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=db3495099d3d52854b13874905af6e40a91f4721'/>
<id>db3495099d3d52854b13874905af6e40a91f4721</id>
<content type='text'>
Provide an audit record of the descriptor pair returned by pipe() and
socketpair().  Rewritten from the original posted to linux-audit by
John D. Ramsdell &lt;ramsdell@mitre.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Provide an audit record of the descriptor pair returned by pipe() and
socketpair().  Rewritten from the original posted to linux-audit by
John D. Ramsdell &lt;ramsdell@mitre.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] struct path: convert kernel</title>
<updated>2006-12-08T16:28:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Sipek</name>
<email>jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2006-12-08T10:37:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a7a005fd12b84392becca311f2a20d5bf2a1b7af'/>
<id>a7a005fd12b84392becca311f2a20d5bf2a1b7af</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Josef Sipek &lt;jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Josef Sipek &lt;jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] tty: -&gt;signal-&gt;tty locking</title>
<updated>2006-12-08T16:28:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl</email>
</author>
<published>2006-12-08T10:36:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=24ec839c431eb79bb8f6abc00c4e1eb3b8c4d517'/>
<id>24ec839c431eb79bb8f6abc00c4e1eb3b8c4d517</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix the locking of signal-&gt;tty.

Use -&gt;sighand-&gt;siglock to protect -&gt;signal-&gt;tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of -&gt;signal/-&gt;sighand.  And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need -&gt;siglock to access -&gt;signal anyway.

(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt -&gt;sighand locking rules)

Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid.  Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles.  This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal-&gt;tty (or any other non file related tty access).

It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.

(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
       be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
       it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
       invocations)

[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Acked-by: Alan Cox &lt;alan@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Jeff Dike &lt;jdike@addtoit.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix the locking of signal-&gt;tty.

Use -&gt;sighand-&gt;siglock to protect -&gt;signal-&gt;tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of -&gt;signal/-&gt;sighand.  And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need -&gt;siglock to access -&gt;signal anyway.

(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt -&gt;sighand locking rules)

Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid.  Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles.  This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal-&gt;tty (or any other non file related tty access).

It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.

(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
       be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
       it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
       invocations)

[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Acked-by: Alan Cox &lt;alan@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Jeff Dike &lt;jdike@addtoit.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
