linux.git/kernel/bpf/btf.c, branch v6.1.168

bpf: Release module BTF IDR before module unload

2026-04-11T12:16:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit 146bd2a87a65aa407bb17fac70d8d583d19aba06 ]

Gregory reported in [0] that the global_map_resize test when run in
repeatedly ends up failing during program load. This stems from the fact
that BTF reference has not dropped to zero after the previous run's
module is unloaded, and the older module's BTF is still discoverable and
visible. Later, in libbpf, load_module_btfs() will find the ID for this
stale BTF, open its fd, and then it will be used during program load
where later steps taking module reference using btf_try_get_module()
fail since the underlying module for the BTF is gone.

Logically, once a module is unloaded, it's associated BTF artifacts
should become hidden. The BTF object inside the kernel may still remain
alive as long its reference counts are alive, but it should no longer be
discoverable.

To fix this, let us call btf_free_id() from the MODULE_STATE_GOING case
for the module unload to free the BTF associated IDR entry, and disable
its discovery once module unload returns to user space. If a race
happens during unload, the outcome is non-deterministic anyway. However,
user space should be able to rely on the guarantee that once it has
synchronously established a successful module unload, no more stale
artifacts associated with this module can be obtained subsequently.

Note that we must be careful to not invoke btf_free_id() in btf_put()
when btf_is_module() is true now. There could be a window where the
module unload drops a non-terminal reference, frees the IDR, but the
same ID gets reused and the second unconditional btf_free_id() ends up
releasing an unrelated entry.

To avoid a special case for btf_is_module() case, set btf->id to zero to
make btf_free_id() idempotent, such that we can unconditionally invoke it
from btf_put(), and also from the MODULE_STATE_GOING case. Since zero is
an invalid IDR, the idr_remove() should be a noop.

Note that we can be sure that by the time we reach final btf_put() for
btf_is_module() case, the btf_free_id() is already done, since the
module itself holds the BTF reference, and it will call this function
for the BTF before dropping its own reference.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/cover.1773170190.git.grbell@redhat.com

Fixes: 36e68442d1af ("bpf: Load and verify kernel module BTFs")
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Reported-by: Gregory Bell 
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis 
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260312205307.1346991-1-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_core_apply

2024-11-01T00:55:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 45126b155e3b5201179cdc038504bf93a8ccd921 ]

We need to free specs properly.

Fixes: 3d2786d65aaa ("bpf: correctly handle malformed BPF_CORE_TYPE_ID_LOCAL relos")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241007160958.607434-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: correctly handle malformed BPF_CORE_TYPE_ID_LOCAL relos

2024-10-17T13:20:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3d2786d65aaa954ebd3fcc033ada433e10da21c4 ]

In case of malformed relocation record of kind BPF_CORE_TYPE_ID_LOCAL
referencing a non-existing BTF type, function bpf_core_calc_relo_insn
would cause a null pointer deference.

Fix this by adding a proper check upper in call stack, as malformed
relocation records could be passed from user space.

Simplest reproducer is a program:

    r0 = 0
    exit

With a single relocation record:

    .insn_off = 0,          /* patch first instruction */
    .type_id = 100500,      /* this type id does not exist */
    .access_str_off = 6,    /* offset of string "0" */
    .kind = BPF_CORE_TYPE_ID_LOCAL,

See the link for original reproducer or next commit for a test case.

Fixes: 74753e1462e7 ("libbpf: Replace btf__type_by_id() with btf_type_by_id().")
Reported-by: Liu RuiTong 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAK55_s6do7C+DVwbwY_7nKfUz0YLDoiA1v6X3Y9+p0sWzipFSA@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822080124.2995724-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Silence a warning in btf_type_id_size()

2024-09-12T09:10:29+00:00

commit e6c2f594ed961273479505b42040782820190305 upstream.

syzbot reported a warning in [1] with the following stacktrace:
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5005 at kernel/bpf/btf.c:1988 btf_type_id_size+0x2d9/0x9d0 kernel/bpf/btf.c:1988
  ...
  RIP: 0010:btf_type_id_size+0x2d9/0x9d0 kernel/bpf/btf.c:1988
  ...
  Call Trace:
   
   map_check_btf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1024 [inline]
   map_create+0x1157/0x1860 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1198
   __sys_bpf+0x127f/0x5420 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5040
   __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5162 [inline]
   __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5160 [inline]
   __x64_sys_bpf+0x79/0xc0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5160
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

With the following btf
  [1] DECL_TAG 'a' type_id=4 component_idx=-1
  [2] PTR '(anon)' type_id=0
  [3] TYPE_TAG 'a' type_id=2
  [4] VAR 'a' type_id=3, linkage=static
and when the bpf_attr.btf_key_type_id = 1 (DECL_TAG),
the following WARN_ON_ONCE in btf_type_id_size() is triggered:
  if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!btf_type_is_modifier(size_type) &&
                   !btf_type_is_var(size_type)))
          return NULL;

Note that 'return NULL' is the correct behavior as we don't want
a DECL_TAG type to be used as a btf_{key,value}_type_id even
for the case like 'DECL_TAG -> STRUCT'. So there
is no correctness issue here, we just want to silence warning.

To silence the warning, I added DECL_TAG as one of kinds in
btf_type_nosize() which will cause btf_type_id_size() returning
NULL earlier without the warning.

  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000e0df8d05fc75ba86@google.com/

Reported-by: syzbot+958967f249155967d42a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230530205029.264910-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Diogo Jahchan Koike 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Eliminate remaining "make W=1" warnings in kernel/bpf/btf.o

2024-08-03T06:49:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2454075f8e2915cebbe52a1195631bc7efe2b7e1 ]

As reported by Mirsad [1] we still see format warnings in kernel/bpf/btf.o
at W=1 warning level:

  CC      kernel/bpf/btf.o
./kernel/bpf/btf.c: In function ‘btf_type_seq_show_flags’:
./kernel/bpf/btf.c:7553:21: warning: assignment left-hand side might be a candidate for a format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format]
 7553 |         sseq.showfn = btf_seq_show;
      |                     ^
./kernel/bpf/btf.c: In function ‘btf_type_snprintf_show’:
./kernel/bpf/btf.c:7604:31: warning: assignment left-hand side might be a candidate for a format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format]
 7604 |         ssnprintf.show.showfn = btf_snprintf_show;
      |                               ^

Combined with CONFIG_WERROR=y these can halt the build.

The fix (annotating the structure field with __printf())
suggested by Mirsad resolves these. Apologies I missed this last time.
No other W=1 warnings were observed in kernel/bpf after this fix.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/92c9d047-f058-400c-9c7d-81d4dc1ef71b@gmail.com/

Fixes: b3470da314fd ("bpf: annotate BTF show functions with __printf")
Reported-by: Mirsad Todorovac 
Suggested-by: Mirsad Todorovac 
Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240712092859.1390960-1-alan.maguire@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: annotate BTF show functions with __printf

2024-08-03T06:49:08+00:00

[ Upstream commit b3470da314fd8018ee237e382000c4154a942420 ]

-Werror=suggest-attribute=format warns about two functions
in kernel/bpf/btf.c [1]; add __printf() annotations to silence
these warnings since for CONFIG_WERROR=y they will trigger
build failures.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/a8b20c72-6631-4404-9e1f-0410642d7d20@gmail.com/

Fixes: 31d0bc81637d ("bpf: Move to generic BTF show support, apply it to seq files/strings")
Reported-by: Mirsad Todorovac 
Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire 
Tested-by: Mirsad Todorovac 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711182321.963667-1-alan.maguire@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix an error in verifying a field in a union

2023-09-13T07:42:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit 33937607efa050d9e237e0c4ac4ada02d961c466 ]

We are utilizing BPF LSM to monitor BPF operations within our container
environment. When we add support for raw_tracepoint, it hits below
error.

; (const void *)attr->raw_tracepoint.name);
27: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r2 +0)
access beyond the end of member map_type (mend:4) in struct (anon) with off 0 size 8

It can be reproduced with below BPF prog.

SEC("lsm/bpf")
int BPF_PROG(bpf_audit, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
{
	switch (cmd) {
	case BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN:
		bpf_printk("raw_tracepoint is %s", attr->raw_tracepoint.name);
		break;
	default:
		break;
	}
	return 0;
}

The reason is that when accessing a field in a union, such as bpf_attr,
if the field is located within a nested struct that is not the first
member of the union, it can result in incorrect field verification.

  union bpf_attr {
      struct {
          __u32 map_type; <<<< Actually it will find that field.
          __u32 key_size;
          __u32 value_size;
         ...
      };
      ...
      struct {
          __u64 name;    <<<< We want to verify this field.
          __u32 prog_fd;
      } raw_tracepoint;
  };

Considering the potential deep nesting levels, finding a perfect
solution to address this issue has proven challenging. Therefore, I
propose a solution where we simply skip the verification process if the
field in question is located within a union.

Fixes: 7e3617a72df3 ("bpf: Add array support to btf_struct_access")
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230713025642.27477-4-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, btf: Warn but return no error for NULL btf from __register_btf_kfunc_id_set()

2023-07-19T14:22:05+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3de4d22cc9ac7c9f38e10edcf54f9a8891a9c2aa ]

__register_btf_kfunc_id_set() assumes .BTF to be part of the module's .ko
file if CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is enabled. If that's not the case, the
function prints an error message and return an error. As a result, such
modules cannot be loaded.

However, the section could be stripped out during a build process. It would
be better to let the modules loaded, because their basic functionalities
have no problem [0], though the BTF functionalities will not be supported.
Make the function to lower the level of the message from error to warn, and
return no error.

  [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220219082037.ow2kbq5brktf4f2u@apollo.legion

Fixes: c446fdacb10d ("bpf: fix register_btf_kfunc_id_set for !CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF")
Reported-by: Alexander Egorenkov 
Suggested-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi 
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/87y228q66f.fsf@oc8242746057.ibm.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220219082037.ow2kbq5brktf4f2u@apollo.legion
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230701171447.56464-1-sj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf/btf: Accept function names that contain dots

2023-06-28T09:12:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9724160b3942b0a967b91a59f81da5593f28b8ba ]

When building a kernel with LLVM=1, LLVM_IAS=0 and CONFIG_KASAN=y, LLVM
leaves DWARF tags for the "asan.module_ctor" & co symbols. In turn,
pahole creates BTF_KIND_FUNC entries for these and this makes the BTF
metadata validation fail because they contain a dot.

In a dramatic turn of event, this BTF verification failure can cause
the netfilter_bpf initialization to fail, causing netfilter_core to
free the netfilter_helper hashmap and netfilter_ftp to trigger a
use-after-free. The risk of u-a-f in netfilter will be addressed
separately but the existence of "asan.module_ctor" debug info under some
build conditions sounds like a good enough reason to accept functions
that contain dots in BTF.

Although using only LLVM=1 is the recommended way to compile clang-based
kernels, users can certainly do LLVM=1, LLVM_IAS=0 as well and we still
try to support that combination according to Nick. To clarify:

  - > v5.10 kernel, LLVM=1 (LLVM_IAS=0 is not the default) is recommended,
    but user can still have LLVM=1, LLVM_IAS=0 to trigger the issue

  - <= 5.10 kernel, LLVM=1 (LLVM_IAS=0 is the default) is recommended in
    which case GNU as will be used

Fixes: 1dc92851849c ("bpf: kernel side support for BTF Var and DataSec")
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Cc: Yonghong Song 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230615145607.3469985-1-revest@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix race between btf_put and btf_idr walk.

2023-05-11T14:03:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit acf1c3d68e9a31f10d92bc67ad4673cdae5e8d92 ]

Florian and Eduard reported hard dead lock:
[   58.433327]  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x40/0x50
[   58.433334]  btf_put+0x43/0x90
[   58.433338]  bpf_find_btf_id+0x157/0x240
[   58.433353]  btf_parse_fields+0x921/0x11c0

This happens since btf->refcount can be 1 at the time of btf_put() and
btf_put() will call btf_free_id() which will try to grab btf_idr_lock
and will dead lock.
Avoid the issue by doing btf_put() without locking.

Fixes: 3d78417b60fb ("bpf: Add bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind() helper.")
Fixes: 1e89106da253 ("bpf: Add bpf_core_add_cands() and wire it into bpf_core_apply_relo_insn().")
Reported-by: Florian Westphal 
Reported-by: Eduard Zingerman 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Tested-by: Eduard Zingerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230421014901.70908-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin