linux.git/kernel/bpf, branch v5.4.63

bpf: sockmap: Require attach_bpf_fd when detaching a program

2020-08-07T07:34:02+00:00

commit bb0de3131f4c60a9bf976681e0fe4d1e55c7a821 upstream.

The sockmap code currently ignores the value of attach_bpf_fd when
detaching a program. This is contrary to the usual behaviour of
checking that attach_bpf_fd represents the currently attached
program.

Ensure that attach_bpf_fd is indeed the currently attached
program. It turns out that all sockmap selftests already do this,
which indicates that this is unlikely to cause breakage.

Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200629095630.7933-5-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Fix map leak in HASH_OF_MAPS map

2020-08-05T07:59:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1d4e1eab456e1ee92a94987499b211db05f900ea ]

Fix HASH_OF_MAPS bug of not putting inner map pointer on bpf_map_elem_update()
operation. This is due to per-cpu extra_elems optimization, which bypassed
free_htab_elem() logic doing proper clean ups. Make sure that inner map is put
properly in optimized case as well.

Fixes: 8c290e60fa2a ("bpf: fix hashmap extra_elems logic")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Song Liu 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200729040913.2815687-1-andriin@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Check correct cred for CAP_SYSLOG in bpf_dump_raw_ok()

2020-07-16T06:16:45+00:00

commit 63960260457a02af2a6cb35d75e6bdb17299c882 upstream.

When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at
open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's
case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated
file->f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that
kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred.

Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7105e828c087 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Don't return EINVAL from {get,set}sockopt when optlen > PAGE_SIZE

2020-06-30T19:36:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit d8fe449a9c51a37d844ab607e14e2f5c657d3cf2 ]

Attaching to these hooks can break iptables because its optval is
usually quite big, or at least bigger than the current PAGE_SIZE limit.
David also mentioned some SCTP options can be big (around 256k).

For such optvals we expose only the first PAGE_SIZE bytes to
the BPF program. BPF program has two options:
1. Set ctx->optlen to 0 to indicate that the BPF's optval
   should be ignored and the kernel should use original userspace
   value.
2. Set ctx->optlen to something that's smaller than the PAGE_SIZE.

v5:
* use ctx->optlen == 0 with trimmed buffer (Alexei Starovoitov)
* update the docs accordingly

v4:
* use temporary buffer to avoid optval == optval_end == NULL;
  this removes the corner case in the verifier that might assume
  non-zero PTR_TO_PACKET/PTR_TO_PACKET_END.

v3:
* don't increase the limit, bypass the argument

v2:
* proper comments formatting (Jakub Kicinski)

Fixes: 0d01da6afc54 ("bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks")
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: David Laight 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200617010416.93086-1-sdf@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

devmap: Use bpf_map_area_alloc() for allocating hash buckets

2020-06-30T19:36:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 99c51064fb06146b3d494b745c947e438a10aaa7 ]

Syzkaller discovered that creating a hash of type devmap_hash with a large
number of entries can hit the memory allocator limit for allocating
contiguous memory regions. There's really no reason to use kmalloc_array()
directly in the devmap code, so just switch it to the existing
bpf_map_area_alloc() function that is used elsewhere.

Fixes: 6f9d451ab1a3 ("xdp: Add devmap_hash map type for looking up devices by hashed index")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu 
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: John Fastabend 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200616142829.114173-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix map permissions check

2020-06-22T07:31:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1ea0f9120c8ce105ca181b070561df5cbd6bc049 ]

The map_lookup_and_delete_elem() function should check for both FMODE_CAN_WRITE
and FMODE_CAN_READ permissions because it returns a map element to user space.

Fixes: bd513cd08f10 ("bpf: add MAP_LOOKUP_AND_DELETE_ELEM syscall")
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200527185700.14658-5-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Support llvm-objcopy for vmlinux BTF

2020-06-17T14:40:20+00:00

commit 90ceddcb495008ac8ba7a3dce297841efcd7d584 upstream.

Simplify gen_btf logic to make it work with llvm-objcopy. The existing
'file format' and 'architecture' parsing logic is brittle and does not
work with llvm-objcopy/llvm-objdump.

'file format' output of llvm-objdump>=11 will match GNU objdump, but
'architecture' (bfdarch) may not.

.BTF in .tmp_vmlinux.btf is non-SHF_ALLOC. Add the SHF_ALLOC flag
because it is part of vmlinux image used for introspection. C code
can reference the section via linker script defined __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF. This fixes a small problem that previous .BTF had the
SHF_WRITE flag (objcopy -I binary -O elf* synthesized .data).

Additionally, `objcopy -I binary` synthesized symbols
_binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_start and _binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_stop (not
used elsewhere) are replaced with more commonplace __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF.

Add 2>/dev/null because GNU objcopy (but not llvm-objcopy) warns
"empty loadable segment detected at vaddr=0xffffffff81000000, is this intentional?"

We use a dd command to change the e_type field in the ELF header from
ET_EXEC to ET_REL so that lld will accept .btf.vmlinux.bin.o.  Accepting
ET_EXEC as an input file is an extremely rare GNU ld feature that lld
does not intend to support, because this is error-prone.

The output section description .BTF in include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
avoids potential subtle orphan section placement issues and suppresses
--orphan-handling=warn warnings.

Fixes: df786c9b9476 ("bpf: Force .BTF section start to zero when dumping from vmlinux")
Fixes: cb0cc635c7a9 ("powerpc: Include .BTF section")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor 
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Tested-by: Stanislav Fomichev 
Tested-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman  (powerpc)
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/871
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200318222746.173648-1-maskray@google.com
Signed-off-by: Maria Teguiani 
Tested-by: Matthias Maennich 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Fix error return code in map_lookup_and_delete_elem()

2020-05-20T06:20:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7f645462ca01d01abb94d75e6768c8b3ed3a188b ]

Fix to return negative error code -EFAULT from the copy_to_user() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: bd513cd08f10 ("bpf: add MAP_LOOKUP_AND_DELETE_ELEM syscall")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200430081851.166996-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

cpumap: Avoid warning when CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS is enabled

2020-05-02T06:48:51+00:00

commit bc23d0e3f717ced21fbfacab3ab887d55e5ba367 upstream.

When the kernel is built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS, the cpumap code
can trigger a spurious warning if CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is also set. This
happens because in this configuration, NR_CPUS can be larger than
nr_cpumask_bits, so the initial check in cpu_map_alloc() is not sufficient
to guard against hitting the warning in cpumask_check().

Fix this by explicitly checking the supplied key against the
nr_cpumask_bits variable before calling cpu_possible().

Fixes: 6710e1126934 ("bpf: introduce new bpf cpu map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu 
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu 
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer 
Acked-by: Song Liu 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200416083120.453718-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged users

2020-05-02T06:48:46+00:00

commit 6e7e63cbb023976d828cdb22422606bf77baa8a9 upstream.

When check_xadd() verifies an XADD operation on a pointer to a stack slot
containing a spilled pointer, check_stack_read() verifies that the read,
which is part of XADD, is valid. However, since the placeholder value -1 is
passed as `value_regno`, check_stack_read() can only return a binary
decision and can't return the type of the value that was read. The intent
here is to verify whether the value read from the stack slot may be used as
a SCALAR_VALUE; but since check_stack_read() doesn't check the type, and
the type information is lost when check_stack_read() returns, this is not
enforced, and a malicious user can abuse XADD to leak spilled kernel
pointers.

Fix it by letting check_stack_read() verify that the value is usable as a
SCALAR_VALUE if no type information is passed to the caller.

To be able to use __is_pointer_value() in check_stack_read(), move it up.

Fix up the expected unprivileged error message for a BPF selftest that,
until now, assumed that unprivileged users can use XADD on stack-spilled
pointers. This also gives us a test for the behavior introduced in this
patch for free.

In theory, this could also be fixed by forbidding XADD on stack spills
entirely, since XADD is a locked operation (for operations on memory with
concurrency) and there can't be any concurrency on the BPF stack; but
Alexei has said that he wants to keep XADD on stack slots working to avoid
changes to the test suite [1].

The following BPF program demonstrates how to leak a BPF map pointer as an
unprivileged user using this bug:

    // r7 = map_pointer
    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_7, small_map),
    // r8 = launder(map_pointer)
    BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_7, -8),
    BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
    ((struct bpf_insn) {
      .code  = BPF_STX | BPF_DW | BPF_XADD,
      .dst_reg = BPF_REG_FP,
      .src_reg = BPF_REG_1,
      .off = -8
    }),
    BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_FP, -8),

    // store r8 into map
    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG1, BPF_REG_7),
    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG2, BPF_REG_FP),
    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_ARG2, -4),
    BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_ARG2, 0, 0),
    BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
    BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
    BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
    BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0),

    BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
    BPF_EXIT_INSN()

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200416211116.qxqcza5vo2ddnkdq@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200417000007.10734-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman