<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/kernel/cpu.c, branch v4.19.18</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change</title>
<updated>2018-12-05T18:32:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-25T18:33:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f55e301ec4d5a1e53dfc821205362b6438c0fc6d'/>
<id>f55e301ec4d5a1e53dfc821205362b6438c0fc6d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a74cfffb03b73d41e08f84c2e5c87dec0ce3db9f upstream

arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is
changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the
system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline.

To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT
state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled.

Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU
hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a74cfffb03b73d41e08f84c2e5c87dec0ce3db9f upstream

arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is
changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the
system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline.

To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT
state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled.

Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU
hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation</title>
<updated>2018-12-05T18:32:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Kosina</name>
<email>jkosina@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-25T12:38:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b07fc04c94e3ac96437d7b0ae16f70a0ef574b91'/>
<id>b07fc04c94e3ac96437d7b0ae16f70a0ef574b91</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream

STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.

Enable this feature if

- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)

After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.

Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream

STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.

Enable this feature if

- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)

After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.

Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation"</title>
<updated>2018-11-23T07:17:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-21T18:11:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6b188783345f6a8acd1d30f1aa14bfdf43e8aa82'/>
<id>6b188783345f6a8acd1d30f1aa14bfdf43e8aa82</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 233b9d7df0e114c7e7c3674559fb0fc41ada3e8f which is
commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream.

It's not ready for the stable trees as there are major slowdowns
involved with this patch.

Reported-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 233b9d7df0e114c7e7c3674559fb0fc41ada3e8f which is
commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream.

It's not ready for the stable trees as there are major slowdowns
involved with this patch.

Reported-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T19:08:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Kosina</name>
<email>jkosina@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-25T12:38:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=233b9d7df0e114c7e7c3674559fb0fc41ada3e8f'/>
<id>233b9d7df0e114c7e7c3674559fb0fc41ada3e8f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream.

STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.

Enable this feature if

- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)

After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.

Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream.

STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.

Enable this feature if

- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)

After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.

Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Prevent state corruption on error rollback</title>
<updated>2018-09-06T13:21:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-06T13:21:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=69fa6eb7d6a64801ea261025cce9723d9442d773'/>
<id>69fa6eb7d6a64801ea261025cce9723d9442d773</id>
<content type='text'>
When a teardown callback fails, the CPU hotplug code brings the CPU back to
the previous state. The previous state becomes the new target state. The
rollback happens in undo_cpu_down() which increments the state
unconditionally even if the state is already the same as the target.

As a consequence the next CPU hotplug operation will start at the wrong
state. This is easily to observe when __cpu_disable() fails.

Prevent the unconditional undo by checking the state vs. target before
incrementing state and fix up the consequently wrong conditional in the
unplug code which handles the failure of the final CPU take down on the
control CPU side.

Fixes: 4dddfb5faa61 ("smp/hotplug: Rewrite AP state machine core")
Reported-by: Neeraj Upadhyay &lt;neeraju@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla &lt;sudeep.holla@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neeraj Upadhyay &lt;neeraju@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Cc: dzickus@redhat.com
Cc: brendan.jackman@arm.com
Cc: malat@debian.org
Cc: sramana@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1809051419580.1416@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

----
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When a teardown callback fails, the CPU hotplug code brings the CPU back to
the previous state. The previous state becomes the new target state. The
rollback happens in undo_cpu_down() which increments the state
unconditionally even if the state is already the same as the target.

As a consequence the next CPU hotplug operation will start at the wrong
state. This is easily to observe when __cpu_disable() fails.

Prevent the unconditional undo by checking the state vs. target before
incrementing state and fix up the consequently wrong conditional in the
unplug code which handles the failure of the final CPU take down on the
control CPU side.

Fixes: 4dddfb5faa61 ("smp/hotplug: Rewrite AP state machine core")
Reported-by: Neeraj Upadhyay &lt;neeraju@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla &lt;sudeep.holla@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neeraj Upadhyay &lt;neeraju@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Cc: dzickus@redhat.com
Cc: brendan.jackman@arm.com
Cc: malat@debian.org
Cc: sramana@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1809051419580.1416@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

----
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Adjust misplaced smb() in cpuhp_thread_fun()</title>
<updated>2018-09-06T13:21:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neeraj Upadhyay</name>
<email>neeraju@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-05T05:52:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f8b7530aa0a1def79c93101216b5b17cf408a70a'/>
<id>f8b7530aa0a1def79c93101216b5b17cf408a70a</id>
<content type='text'>
The smp_mb() in cpuhp_thread_fun() is misplaced. It needs to be after the
load of st-&gt;should_run to prevent reordering of the later load/stores
w.r.t. the load of st-&gt;should_run.

Fixes: 4dddfb5faa61 ("smp/hotplug: Rewrite AP state machine core")
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay &lt;neeraju@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infraded.org&gt;
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Cc: dzickus@redhat.com
Cc: brendan.jackman@arm.com
Cc: malat@debian.org
Cc: mojha@codeaurora.org
Cc: sramana@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536126727-11629-1-git-send-email-neeraju@codeaurora.org

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The smp_mb() in cpuhp_thread_fun() is misplaced. It needs to be after the
load of st-&gt;should_run to prevent reordering of the later load/stores
w.r.t. the load of st-&gt;should_run.

Fixes: 4dddfb5faa61 ("smp/hotplug: Rewrite AP state machine core")
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay &lt;neeraju@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infraded.org&gt;
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Cc: dzickus@redhat.com
Cc: brendan.jackman@arm.com
Cc: malat@debian.org
Cc: mojha@codeaurora.org
Cc: sramana@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536126727-11629-1-git-send-email-neeraju@codeaurora.org

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Remove skip_onerr field from cpuhp_step structure</title>
<updated>2018-08-31T12:13:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mukesh Ojha</name>
<email>mojha@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-28T06:54:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6fb86d97207880c1286cd4cb3a7e6a598afbc727'/>
<id>6fb86d97207880c1286cd4cb3a7e6a598afbc727</id>
<content type='text'>
When notifiers were there, `skip_onerr` was used to avoid calling
particular step startup/teardown callbacks in the CPU up/down rollback
path, which made the hotplug asymmetric.

As notifiers are gone now after the full state machine conversion, the
`skip_onerr` field is no longer required.

Remove it from the structure and its usage.

Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha &lt;mojha@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535439294-31426-1-git-send-email-mojha@codeaurora.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When notifiers were there, `skip_onerr` was used to avoid calling
particular step startup/teardown callbacks in the CPU up/down rollback
path, which made the hotplug asymmetric.

As notifiers are gone now after the full state machine conversion, the
`skip_onerr` field is no longer required.

Remove it from the structure and its usage.

Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha &lt;mojha@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535439294-31426-1-git-send-email-mojha@codeaurora.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Non-SMP machines do not make use of booted_once</title>
<updated>2018-08-14T22:00:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Abel Vesa</name>
<email>abelvesa@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-14T21:26:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=269777aa530f3438ec1781586cdac0b5fe47b061'/>
<id>269777aa530f3438ec1781586cdac0b5fe47b061</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
breaks non-SMP builds.

[ I suspect the 'bool' fields should just be made to be bitfields and be
  exposed regardless of configuration, but that's a separate cleanup
  that I'll leave to the owners of this file for later.   - Linus ]

Fixes: 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Abel Vesa &lt;abelvesa@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
breaks non-SMP builds.

[ I suspect the 'bool' fields should just be made to be bitfields and be
  exposed regardless of configuration, but that's a separate cleanup
  that I'll leave to the owners of this file for later.   - Linus ]

Fixes: 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Abel Vesa &lt;abelvesa@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'pm-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm</title>
<updated>2018-08-14T20:12:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-14T20:12:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b018fc9800557bd14a40d69501e19c340eb2c521'/>
<id>b018fc9800557bd14a40d69501e19c340eb2c521</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull power management updates from Rafael Wysocki:
 "These add a new framework for CPU idle time injection, to be used by
  all of the idle injection code in the kernel in the future, fix some
  issues and add a number of relatively small extensions in multiple
  places.

  Specifics:

   - Add a new framework for CPU idle time injection (Daniel Lezcano).

   - Add AVS support to the armada-37xx cpufreq driver (Gregory
     CLEMENT).

   - Add support for current CPU frequency reporting to the ACPI CPPC
     cpufreq driver (George Cherian).

   - Rework the cooling device registration in the imx6q/thermal driver
     (Bastian Stender).

   - Make the pcc-cpufreq driver refuse to work with dynamic scaling
     governors on systems with many CPUs to avoid scalability issues
     with it (Rafael Wysocki).

   - Fix the intel_pstate driver to report different maximum CPU
     frequencies on systems where they really are different and to
     ignore the turbo active ratio if hardware-managend P-states (HWP)
     are in use; make it use the match_string() helper (Xie Yisheng,
     Srinivas Pandruvada).

   - Fix a minor deferred probe issue in the qcom-kryo cpufreq driver
     (Niklas Cassel).

   - Add a tracepoint for the tracking of frequency limits changes (from
     Andriod) to the cpufreq core (Ruchi Kandoi).

   - Fix a circular lock dependency between CPU hotplug and sysfs
     locking in the cpufreq core reported by lockdep (Waiman Long).

   - Avoid excessive error reports on driver registration failures in
     the ARM cpuidle driver (Sudeep Holla).

   - Add a new device links flag to the driver core to make links go
     away automatically on supplier driver removal (Vivek Gautam).

   - Eliminate potential race condition between system-wide power
     management transitions and system shutdown (Pingfan Liu).

   - Add a quirk to save NVS memory on system suspend for the ASUS 1025C
     laptop (Willy Tarreau).

   - Make more systems use suspend-to-idle (instead of ACPI S3) by
     default (Tristian Celestin).

   - Get rid of stack VLA usage in the low-level hibernation code on
     64-bit x86 (Kees Cook).

   - Fix error handling in the hibernation core and mark an expected
     fall-through switch in it (Chengguang Xu, Gustavo Silva).

   - Extend the generic power domains (genpd) framework to support
     attaching a device to a power domain by name (Ulf Hansson).

   - Fix device reference counting and user limits initialization in the
     devfreq core (Arvind Yadav, Matthias Kaehlcke).

   - Fix a few issues in the rk3399_dmc devfreq driver and improve its
     documentation (Enric Balletbo i Serra, Lin Huang, Nick Milner).

   - Drop a redundant error message from the exynos-ppmu devfreq driver
     (Markus Elfring)"

* tag 'pm-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (35 commits)
  PM / reboot: Eliminate race between reboot and suspend
  PM / hibernate: Mark expected switch fall-through
  cpufreq: intel_pstate: Ignore turbo active ratio in HWP
  cpufreq: Fix a circular lock dependency problem
  cpu/hotplug: Add a cpus_read_trylock() function
  x86/power/hibernate_64: Remove VLA usage
  cpufreq: trace frequency limits change
  cpufreq: intel_pstate: Show different max frequency with turbo 3 and HWP
  cpufreq: pcc-cpufreq: Disable dynamic scaling on many-CPU systems
  cpufreq: qcom-kryo: Silently error out on EPROBE_DEFER
  cpufreq / CPPC: Add cpuinfo_cur_freq support for CPPC
  cpufreq: armada-37xx: Add AVS support
  dt-bindings: marvell: Add documentation for the Armada 3700 AVS binding
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: Fix duplicated opp table on reload.
  PM / devfreq: Init user limits from OPP limits, not viceversa
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: fix spelling mistakes.
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: do not print error when get supply and clk defer.
  dt-bindings: devfreq: rk3399_dmc: move interrupts to be optional.
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: remove wait for dcf irq event.
  dt-bindings: clock: add rk3399 DDR3 standard speed bins.
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull power management updates from Rafael Wysocki:
 "These add a new framework for CPU idle time injection, to be used by
  all of the idle injection code in the kernel in the future, fix some
  issues and add a number of relatively small extensions in multiple
  places.

  Specifics:

   - Add a new framework for CPU idle time injection (Daniel Lezcano).

   - Add AVS support to the armada-37xx cpufreq driver (Gregory
     CLEMENT).

   - Add support for current CPU frequency reporting to the ACPI CPPC
     cpufreq driver (George Cherian).

   - Rework the cooling device registration in the imx6q/thermal driver
     (Bastian Stender).

   - Make the pcc-cpufreq driver refuse to work with dynamic scaling
     governors on systems with many CPUs to avoid scalability issues
     with it (Rafael Wysocki).

   - Fix the intel_pstate driver to report different maximum CPU
     frequencies on systems where they really are different and to
     ignore the turbo active ratio if hardware-managend P-states (HWP)
     are in use; make it use the match_string() helper (Xie Yisheng,
     Srinivas Pandruvada).

   - Fix a minor deferred probe issue in the qcom-kryo cpufreq driver
     (Niklas Cassel).

   - Add a tracepoint for the tracking of frequency limits changes (from
     Andriod) to the cpufreq core (Ruchi Kandoi).

   - Fix a circular lock dependency between CPU hotplug and sysfs
     locking in the cpufreq core reported by lockdep (Waiman Long).

   - Avoid excessive error reports on driver registration failures in
     the ARM cpuidle driver (Sudeep Holla).

   - Add a new device links flag to the driver core to make links go
     away automatically on supplier driver removal (Vivek Gautam).

   - Eliminate potential race condition between system-wide power
     management transitions and system shutdown (Pingfan Liu).

   - Add a quirk to save NVS memory on system suspend for the ASUS 1025C
     laptop (Willy Tarreau).

   - Make more systems use suspend-to-idle (instead of ACPI S3) by
     default (Tristian Celestin).

   - Get rid of stack VLA usage in the low-level hibernation code on
     64-bit x86 (Kees Cook).

   - Fix error handling in the hibernation core and mark an expected
     fall-through switch in it (Chengguang Xu, Gustavo Silva).

   - Extend the generic power domains (genpd) framework to support
     attaching a device to a power domain by name (Ulf Hansson).

   - Fix device reference counting and user limits initialization in the
     devfreq core (Arvind Yadav, Matthias Kaehlcke).

   - Fix a few issues in the rk3399_dmc devfreq driver and improve its
     documentation (Enric Balletbo i Serra, Lin Huang, Nick Milner).

   - Drop a redundant error message from the exynos-ppmu devfreq driver
     (Markus Elfring)"

* tag 'pm-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (35 commits)
  PM / reboot: Eliminate race between reboot and suspend
  PM / hibernate: Mark expected switch fall-through
  cpufreq: intel_pstate: Ignore turbo active ratio in HWP
  cpufreq: Fix a circular lock dependency problem
  cpu/hotplug: Add a cpus_read_trylock() function
  x86/power/hibernate_64: Remove VLA usage
  cpufreq: trace frequency limits change
  cpufreq: intel_pstate: Show different max frequency with turbo 3 and HWP
  cpufreq: pcc-cpufreq: Disable dynamic scaling on many-CPU systems
  cpufreq: qcom-kryo: Silently error out on EPROBE_DEFER
  cpufreq / CPPC: Add cpuinfo_cur_freq support for CPPC
  cpufreq: armada-37xx: Add AVS support
  dt-bindings: marvell: Add documentation for the Armada 3700 AVS binding
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: Fix duplicated opp table on reload.
  PM / devfreq: Init user limits from OPP limits, not viceversa
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: fix spelling mistakes.
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: do not print error when get supply and clk defer.
  dt-bindings: devfreq: rk3399_dmc: move interrupts to be optional.
  PM / devfreq: rk3399_dmc: remove wait for dcf irq event.
  dt-bindings: clock: add rk3399 DDR3 standard speed bins.
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-08-14T16:46:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-14T16:46:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=958f338e96f874a0d29442396d6adf9c1e17aa2d'/>
<id>958f338e96f874a0d29442396d6adf9c1e17aa2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
  engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
  unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
  Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
  address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
  other reserved bits set.

  If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
  page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
  bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
  the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
  the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
  and accessible.

  While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
  raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
  loading the data and making it available to other speculative
  instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
  unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.

  While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
  allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
  attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
  and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
  bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.

  The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646

  The mitigations provided by this pull request include:

   - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
     present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.

   - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.

   - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
     by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
     the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs

   - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
     and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
     and at runtime via sysfs

   - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
     mitigations.

  Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
  patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
  heated, but at the end constructive discussions.

  There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
  might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
  workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
  complexity and limitations"

* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
  x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
  tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
  x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
  x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
  cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
  KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
  Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
  x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
  x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
  x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
  x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
  cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
  engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
  unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
  Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
  address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
  other reserved bits set.

  If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
  page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
  bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
  the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
  the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
  and accessible.

  While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
  raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
  loading the data and making it available to other speculative
  instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
  unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.

  While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
  allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
  attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
  and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
  bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.

  The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646

  The mitigations provided by this pull request include:

   - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
     present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.

   - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.

   - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
     by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
     the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs

   - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
     and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
     and at runtime via sysfs

   - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
     mitigations.

  Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
  patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
  heated, but at the end constructive discussions.

  There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
  might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
  workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
  complexity and limitations"

* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
  x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
  tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
  x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
  x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
  cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
  KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
  Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
  x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
  x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
  x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
  x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
  cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
