<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/kernel/events, branch v6.1.168</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:03:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-02T15:36:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9d2fe8bc06b07e3e796693f415d4f5f75ec08cc2'/>
<id>9d2fe8bc06b07e3e796693f415d4f5f75ec08cc2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d55c571e4333fac71826e8db3b9753fadfbead6a ]

This script

	#!/usr/bin/bash

	echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space

	echo 'void main(void) {}' &gt; TEST.c

	# -fcf-protection to ensure that the 1st endbr32 insn can't be emulated
	gcc -m32 -fcf-protection=branch TEST.c -o test

	bpftrace -e 'uprobe:./test:main {}' -c ./test

"hangs", the probed ./test task enters an endless loop.

The problem is that with randomize_va_space == 0
get_unmapped_area(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) called by xol_add_vma() can not
just return the "addr == TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE" hint, this addr is used
by the stack vma.

arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() doesn't take TIF_ADDR32 into account and
in_32bit_syscall() is false, this leads to info.high_limit &gt; TASK_SIZE.
vm_unmapped_area() happily returns the high address &gt; TASK_SIZE and then
get_unmapped_area() returns -ENOMEM after the "if (addr &gt; TASK_SIZE - len)"
check.

handle_swbp() doesn't report this failure (probably it should) and silently
restarts the probed insn. Endless loop.

I think that the right fix should change the x86 get_unmapped_area() paths
to rely on TIF_ADDR32 rather than in_32bit_syscall(). Note also that if
CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y, in_x32_syscall() falsely returns true in this case
because -&gt;orig_ax = -1.

But we need a simple fix for -stable, so this patch just sets TS_COMPAT if
the probed task is 32-bit to make in_ia32_syscall() true.

Fixes: 1b028f784e8c ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()")
Reported-by: Paulo Andrade &lt;pandrade@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aV5uldEvV7pb4RA8@redhat.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aWO7Fdxn39piQnxu@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d55c571e4333fac71826e8db3b9753fadfbead6a ]

This script

	#!/usr/bin/bash

	echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space

	echo 'void main(void) {}' &gt; TEST.c

	# -fcf-protection to ensure that the 1st endbr32 insn can't be emulated
	gcc -m32 -fcf-protection=branch TEST.c -o test

	bpftrace -e 'uprobe:./test:main {}' -c ./test

"hangs", the probed ./test task enters an endless loop.

The problem is that with randomize_va_space == 0
get_unmapped_area(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) called by xol_add_vma() can not
just return the "addr == TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE" hint, this addr is used
by the stack vma.

arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() doesn't take TIF_ADDR32 into account and
in_32bit_syscall() is false, this leads to info.high_limit &gt; TASK_SIZE.
vm_unmapped_area() happily returns the high address &gt; TASK_SIZE and then
get_unmapped_area() returns -ENOMEM after the "if (addr &gt; TASK_SIZE - len)"
check.

handle_swbp() doesn't report this failure (probably it should) and silently
restarts the probed insn. Endless loop.

I think that the right fix should change the x86 get_unmapped_area() paths
to rely on TIF_ADDR32 rather than in_32bit_syscall(). Note also that if
CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y, in_x32_syscall() falsely returns true in this case
because -&gt;orig_ax = -1.

But we need a simple fix for -stable, so this patch just sets TS_COMPAT if
the probed task is 32-bit to make in_ia32_syscall() true.

Fixes: 1b028f784e8c ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()")
Reported-by: Paulo Andrade &lt;pandrade@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aV5uldEvV7pb4RA8@redhat.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aWO7Fdxn39piQnxu@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:02:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-24T12:29:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=4df1a45819e50993cb351682a6ae8e7ed2d233a0'/>
<id>4df1a45819e50993cb351682a6ae8e7ed2d233a0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c9bc1753b3cc41d0e01fbca7f035258b5f4db0ae ]

Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all
possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running
it with only preemption disabled.

This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go
and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like
the BPF program.

Fixes: 592903cdcbf6 ("perf_counter: add an event_list")
Reported-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224122909.GV1395416@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c9bc1753b3cc41d0e01fbca7f035258b5f4db0ae ]

Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all
possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running
it with only preemption disabled.

This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go
and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like
the BPF program.

Fixes: 592903cdcbf6 ("perf_counter: add an event_list")
Reported-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224122909.GV1395416@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uprobe: Do not emulate/sstep original instruction when ip is changed</title>
<updated>2025-12-06T21:12:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-16T21:52:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ee57767d1464e0069c2f724e84f77cbae8ba5a99'/>
<id>ee57767d1464e0069c2f724e84f77cbae8ba5a99</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4363264111e1297fa37aa39b0598faa19298ecca ]

If uprobe handler changes instruction pointer we still execute single
step) or emulate the original instruction and increment the (new) ip
with its length.

This makes the new instruction pointer bogus and application will
likely crash on illegal instruction execution.

If user decided to take execution elsewhere, it makes little sense
to execute the original instruction, so let's skip it.

Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250916215301.664963-3-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4363264111e1297fa37aa39b0598faa19298ecca ]

If uprobe handler changes instruction pointer we still execute single
step) or emulate the original instruction and increment the (new) ip
with its length.

This makes the new instruction pointer bogus and application will
likely crash on illegal instruction execution.

If user decided to take execution elsewhere, it makes little sense
to execute the original instruction, so let's skip it.

Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250916215301.664963-3-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Have get_perf_callchain() return NULL if crosstask and user are set</title>
<updated>2025-12-06T21:12:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-20T18:03:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f077f2b6a9f079bba05d2fe8f568f672af575056'/>
<id>f077f2b6a9f079bba05d2fe8f568f672af575056</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 153f9e74dec230f2e070e16fa061bc7adfd2c450 ]

get_perf_callchain() doesn't support cross-task unwinding for user space
stacks, have it return NULL if both the crosstask and user arguments are
set.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250820180428.426423415@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 153f9e74dec230f2e070e16fa061bc7adfd2c450 ]

get_perf_callchain() doesn't support cross-task unwinding for user space
stacks, have it return NULL if both the crosstask and user arguments are
set.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250820180428.426423415@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Prevent VMA split of buffer mappings</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T10:05:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T21:01:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7b84cb58d1f0aa07656802eae24689566e5f5b1b'/>
<id>7b84cb58d1f0aa07656802eae24689566e5f5b1b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b024d7b56c77191cde544f838debb7f8451cd0d6 upstream.

The perf mmap code is careful about mmap()'ing the user page with the
ringbuffer and additionally the auxiliary buffer, when the event supports
it. Once the first mapping is established, subsequent mapping have to use
the same offset and the same size in both cases. The reference counting for
the ringbuffer and the auxiliary buffer depends on this being correct.

Though perf does not prevent that a related mapping is split via mmap(2),
munmap(2) or mremap(2). A split of a VMA results in perf_mmap_open() calls,
which take reference counts, but then the subsequent perf_mmap_close()
calls are not longer fulfilling the offset and size checks. This leads to
reference count leaks.

As perf already has the requirement for subsequent mappings to match the
initial mapping, the obvious consequence is that VMA splits, caused by
resizing of a mapping or partial unmapping, have to be prevented.

Implement the vm_operations_struct::may_split() callback and return
unconditionally -EINVAL.

That ensures that the mapping offsets and sizes cannot be changed after the
fact. Remapping to a different fixed address with the same size is still
possible as it takes the references for the new mapping and drops those of
the old mapping.

Fixes: 45bfb2e50471 ("perf/core: Add AUX area to ring buffer for raw data streams")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-27504
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b024d7b56c77191cde544f838debb7f8451cd0d6 upstream.

The perf mmap code is careful about mmap()'ing the user page with the
ringbuffer and additionally the auxiliary buffer, when the event supports
it. Once the first mapping is established, subsequent mapping have to use
the same offset and the same size in both cases. The reference counting for
the ringbuffer and the auxiliary buffer depends on this being correct.

Though perf does not prevent that a related mapping is split via mmap(2),
munmap(2) or mremap(2). A split of a VMA results in perf_mmap_open() calls,
which take reference counts, but then the subsequent perf_mmap_close()
calls are not longer fulfilling the offset and size checks. This leads to
reference count leaks.

As perf already has the requirement for subsequent mappings to match the
initial mapping, the obvious consequence is that VMA splits, caused by
resizing of a mapping or partial unmapping, have to be prevented.

Implement the vm_operations_struct::may_split() callback and return
unconditionally -EINVAL.

That ensures that the mapping offsets and sizes cannot be changed after the
fact. Remapping to a different fixed address with the same size is still
possible as it takes the references for the new mapping and drops those of
the old mapping.

Fixes: 45bfb2e50471 ("perf/core: Add AUX area to ring buffer for raw data streams")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-27504
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Exit early on perf_mmap() fail</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T10:05:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-02T10:49:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=27d44145bd576bbef9bf6165bcd78128ec3e6cbd'/>
<id>27d44145bd576bbef9bf6165bcd78128ec3e6cbd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 07091aade394f690e7b655578140ef84d0e8d7b0 upstream.

When perf_mmap() fails to allocate a buffer, it still invokes the
event_mapped() callback of the related event. On X86 this might increase
the perf_rdpmc_allowed reference counter. But nothing undoes this as
perf_mmap_close() is never called in this case, which causes another
reference count leak.

Return early on failure to prevent that.

Fixes: 1e0fb9ec679c ("perf/core: Add pmu callbacks to track event mapping and unmapping")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 07091aade394f690e7b655578140ef84d0e8d7b0 upstream.

When perf_mmap() fails to allocate a buffer, it still invokes the
event_mapped() callback of the related event. On X86 this might increase
the perf_rdpmc_allowed reference counter. But nothing undoes this as
perf_mmap_close() is never called in this case, which causes another
reference count leak.

Return early on failure to prevent that.

Fixes: 1e0fb9ec679c ("perf/core: Add pmu callbacks to track event mapping and unmapping")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Don't leak AUX buffer refcount on allocation failure</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T10:05:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-02T10:39:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f8346dc1222382c88c863f861e8bb53ba32bf0a9'/>
<id>f8346dc1222382c88c863f861e8bb53ba32bf0a9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5468c0fbccbb9d156522c50832244a8b722374fb upstream.

Failure of the AUX buffer allocation leaks the reference count.

Set the reference count to 1 only when the allocation succeeds.

Fixes: 45bfb2e50471 ("perf/core: Add AUX area to ring buffer for raw data streams")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5468c0fbccbb9d156522c50832244a8b722374fb upstream.

Failure of the AUX buffer allocation leaks the reference count.

Set the reference count to 1 only when the allocation succeeds.

Fixes: 45bfb2e50471 ("perf/core: Add AUX area to ring buffer for raw data streams")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Revert to requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes</title>
<updated>2025-07-17T16:32:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-02T16:21:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8e8bf7bc6aa6f583336c2fda280b6cea0aed5612'/>
<id>8e8bf7bc6aa6f583336c2fda280b6cea0aed5612</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ba677dbe77af5ffe6204e0f3f547f3ba059c6302 ]

Jann reports that uprobes can be used destructively when used in the
middle of an instruction. The kernel only verifies there is a valid
instruction at the requested offset, but due to variable instruction
length cannot determine if this is an instruction as seen by the
intended execution stream.

Additionally, Mark Rutland notes that on architectures that mix data
in the text segment (like arm64), a similar things can be done if the
data word is 'mistaken' for an instruction.

As such, require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes.

Fixes: c9e0924e5c2b ("perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process")
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez1n4520sq0XrWYDHKiKxE_+WCfAK+qt9qkY4ZiBGmL-5g@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ba677dbe77af5ffe6204e0f3f547f3ba059c6302 ]

Jann reports that uprobes can be used destructively when used in the
middle of an instruction. The kernel only verifies there is a valid
instruction at the requested offset, but due to variable instruction
length cannot determine if this is an instruction as seen by the
intended execution stream.

Additionally, Mark Rutland notes that on architectures that mix data
in the text segment (like arm64), a similar things can be done if the
data word is 'mistaken' for an instruction.

As such, require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes.

Fixes: c9e0924e5c2b ("perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process")
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez1n4520sq0XrWYDHKiKxE_+WCfAK+qt9qkY4ZiBGmL-5g@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:07:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-05T10:31:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=975ffddfa2e19823c719459d2364fcaa17673964'/>
<id>975ffddfa2e19823c719459d2364fcaa17673964</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4f6fc782128355931527cefe3eb45338abd8ab39 ]

Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.

The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.

It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.

Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().

Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.

Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample")
Reported-by: Baisheng Gao &lt;baisheng.gao@unisoc.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4f6fc782128355931527cefe3eb45338abd8ab39 ]

Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.

The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.

It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.

Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().

Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.

Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample")
Reported-by: Baisheng Gao &lt;baisheng.gao@unisoc.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Ensure bpf_perf_link path is properly serialized</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:07:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-17T09:54:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b859b5f5c39b48e78e8176abfe6ffc17cacd1439'/>
<id>b859b5f5c39b48e78e8176abfe6ffc17cacd1439</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7ed9138a72829d2035ecbd8dbd35b1bc3c137c40 ]

Ravi reported that the bpf_perf_link_attach() usage of
perf_event_set_bpf_prog() is not serialized by ctx-&gt;mutex, unlike the
PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF case.

Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250307193305.486326750@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7ed9138a72829d2035ecbd8dbd35b1bc3c137c40 ]

Ravi reported that the bpf_perf_link_attach() usage of
perf_event_set_bpf_prog() is not serialized by ctx-&gt;mutex, unlike the
PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF case.

Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250307193305.486326750@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
