<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/kernel/fork.c, branch v4.14.82</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fork: don't copy inconsistent signal handler state to child</title>
<updated>2018-09-15T07:45:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T05:00:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f552f8c28d34ffea62dec915c0a63d900464504b'/>
<id>f552f8c28d34ffea62dec915c0a63d900464504b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 06e62a46bbba20aa5286102016a04214bb446141 ]

Before this change, if a multithreaded process forks while one of its
threads is changing a signal handler using sigaction(), the memcpy() in
copy_sighand() can race with the struct assignment in do_sigaction().  It
isn't clear whether this can cause corruption of the userspace signal
handler pointer, but it definitely can cause inconsistency between
different fields of struct sigaction.

Take the appropriate spinlock to avoid this.

I have tested that this patch prevents inconsistency between sa_sigaction
and sa_flags, which is possible before this patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702145108.73189-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 06e62a46bbba20aa5286102016a04214bb446141 ]

Before this change, if a multithreaded process forks while one of its
threads is changing a signal handler using sigaction(), the memcpy() in
copy_sighand() can race with the struct assignment in do_sigaction().  It
isn't clear whether this can cause corruption of the userspace signal
handler pointer, but it definitely can cause inconsistency between
different fields of struct sigaction.

Take the appropriate spinlock to avoid this.

I have tested that this patch prevents inconsistency between sa_sigaction
and sa_flags, which is possible before this patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702145108.73189-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T05:50:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T21:55:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2d5fc7ffa84bfa0d778c30b96072295ad36a1030'/>
<id>2d5fc7ffa84bfa0d778c30b96072295ad36a1030</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e01e80634ecdde1dd113ac43b3adad21b47f3957 upstream.

One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e01e80634ecdde1dd113ac43b3adad21b47f3957 upstream.

One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmemcheck: stop using GFP_NOTRACK and SLAB_NOTRACK</title>
<updated>2018-02-22T14:42:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)</name>
<email>alexander.levin@verizon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-16T01:35:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ae63fd26b2d81eaaf3cf35693dc01c0148bd7a9b'/>
<id>ae63fd26b2d81eaaf3cf35693dc01c0148bd7a9b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 75f296d93bcebcfe375884ddac79e30263a31766 upstream.

Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tim Hansen &lt;devtimhansen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegardno@ifi.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 75f296d93bcebcfe375884ddac79e30263a31766 upstream.

Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tim Hansen &lt;devtimhansen@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegardno@ifi.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch, mm: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail</title>
<updated>2017-12-29T16:53:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-14T11:27:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ee8e8b2df6d3f2a4ce25182d18964f891760ac65'/>
<id>ee8e8b2df6d3f2a4ce25182d18964f891760ac65</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c10e83f598d08046dd1ebc8360d4bb12d802d51b upstream.

In order to sanitize the LDT initialization on x86 arch_dup_mmap() must be
allowed to fail. Fix up all instances.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c10e83f598d08046dd1ebc8360d4bb12d802d51b upstream.

In order to sanitize the LDT initialization on x86 arch_dup_mmap() must be
allowed to fail. Fix up all instances.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmemleak: clear stale pointers from task stacks</title>
<updated>2017-10-13T23:18:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-13T22:58:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ca182551857cc2c1e6a2b7f1e72090a137a15008'/>
<id>ca182551857cc2c1e6a2b7f1e72090a137a15008</id>
<content type='text'>
Kmemleak considers any pointers on task stacks as references.  This
patch clears newly allocated and reused vmap stacks.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150728990124.744199.8403409836394318684.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Kmemleak considers any pointers on task stacks as references.  This
patch clears newly allocated and reused vmap stacks.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150728990124.744199.8403409836394318684.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>android: binder: drop lru lock in isolate callback</title>
<updated>2017-10-04T00:54:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sherry Yang</name>
<email>sherryy@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-03T23:15:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a1b2289cef92ef0e9a92afcd2e1ea71d5bcaaf64'/>
<id>a1b2289cef92ef0e9a92afcd2e1ea71d5bcaaf64</id>
<content type='text'>
Drop the global lru lock in isolate callback before calling
zap_page_range which calls cond_resched, and re-acquire the global lru
lock before returning.  Also change return code to LRU_REMOVED_RETRY.

Use mmput_async when fail to acquire mmap sem in an atomic context.

Fix "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context"
errors when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled.

Also restore mmput_async, which was initially introduced in commit
ec8d7c14ea14 ("mm, oom_reaper: do not mmput synchronously from the oom
reaper context"), and was removed in commit 212925802454 ("mm: oom: let
oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently").

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170914182231.90908-1-sherryy@android.com
Fixes: f2517eb76f1f2 ("android: binder: Add global lru shrinker to binder")
Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang &lt;sherryy@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kyle Yan &lt;kyan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@google.com&gt;
Cc: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Cc: Riley Andrews &lt;riandrews@android.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;hdanton@sina.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hoeun Ryu &lt;hoeun.ryu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christopher Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Drop the global lru lock in isolate callback before calling
zap_page_range which calls cond_resched, and re-acquire the global lru
lock before returning.  Also change return code to LRU_REMOVED_RETRY.

Use mmput_async when fail to acquire mmap sem in an atomic context.

Fix "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context"
errors when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled.

Also restore mmput_async, which was initially introduced in commit
ec8d7c14ea14 ("mm, oom_reaper: do not mmput synchronously from the oom
reaper context"), and was removed in commit 212925802454 ("mm: oom: let
oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently").

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170914182231.90908-1-sherryy@android.com
Fixes: f2517eb76f1f2 ("android: binder: Add global lru shrinker to binder")
Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang &lt;sherryy@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kyle Yan &lt;kyan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@google.com&gt;
Cc: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Cc: Riley Andrews &lt;riandrews@android.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;hdanton@sina.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hoeun Ryu &lt;hoeun.ryu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christopher Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2017-09-12T20:21:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-12T20:21:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7f85565a3f7194b966de71926471d69788b6b9c3'/>
<id>7f85565a3f7194b966de71926471d69788b6b9c3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
  having any substantive changes.

  These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
  handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
  AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
  administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
  explosion in the diffstat).

  Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"

[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
  Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
  updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]

* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
  selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
  lsm_audit: update my email address
  selinux: update my email address
  MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
  selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
  selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
  selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
  selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
  credits: update Paul Moore's info
  selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
  tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
  LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
  having any substantive changes.

  These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
  handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
  AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
  administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
  explosion in the diffstat).

  Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"

[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
  Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
  updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]

* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
  selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
  lsm_audit: update my email address
  selinux: update my email address
  MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
  selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
  selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
  selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
  selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
  credits: update Paul Moore's info
  selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
  tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
  LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>locking/rtmutex: replace top-waiter and pi_waiters leftmost caching</title>
<updated>2017-09-09T01:26:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-08T23:15:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=a23ba907d5e65d6aeea3e59c82fda9cd206a7aad'/>
<id>a23ba907d5e65d6aeea3e59c82fda9cd206a7aad</id>
<content type='text'>
... with the generic rbtree flavor instead. No changes
in semantics whatsoever.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719014603.19029-10-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
... with the generic rbtree flavor instead. No changes
in semantics whatsoever.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719014603.19029-10-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/hmm: heterogeneous memory management (HMM for short)</title>
<updated>2017-09-09T01:26:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jérôme Glisse</name>
<email>jglisse@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-08T23:11:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=133ff0eac95b7dc6edf89dc51bd139a0630bbae7'/>
<id>133ff0eac95b7dc6edf89dc51bd139a0630bbae7</id>
<content type='text'>
HMM provides 3 separate types of functionality:
    - Mirroring: synchronize CPU page table and device page table
    - Device memory: allocating struct page for device memory
    - Migration: migrating regular memory to device memory

This patch introduces some common helpers and definitions to all of
those 3 functionality.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170817000548.32038-3-jglisse@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse &lt;jglisse@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Baskakov &lt;ebaskakov@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard &lt;jhubbard@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Hairgrove &lt;mhairgrove@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sherry Cheung &lt;SCheung@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Subhash Gutti &lt;sgutti@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Aneesh Kumar &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Nellans &lt;dnellans@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Bob Liu &lt;liubo95@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
HMM provides 3 separate types of functionality:
    - Mirroring: synchronize CPU page table and device page table
    - Device memory: allocating struct page for device memory
    - Migration: migrating regular memory to device memory

This patch introduces some common helpers and definitions to all of
those 3 functionality.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170817000548.32038-3-jglisse@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse &lt;jglisse@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Baskakov &lt;ebaskakov@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard &lt;jhubbard@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Hairgrove &lt;mhairgrove@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sherry Cheung &lt;SCheung@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Subhash Gutti &lt;sgutti@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Aneesh Kumar &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Nellans &lt;dnellans@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Bob Liu &lt;liubo95@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm,fork: introduce MADV_WIPEONFORK</title>
<updated>2017-09-07T00:27:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rik van Riel</name>
<email>riel@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-06T23:25:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d2cd9ede6e193dd7d88b6d27399e96229a551b19'/>
<id>d2cd9ede6e193dd7d88b6d27399e96229a551b19</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce MADV_WIPEONFORK semantics, which result in a VMA being empty
in the child process after fork.  This differs from MADV_DONTFORK in one
important way.

If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_WIPEONFORK, it will get
zeroes.  The address ranges are still valid, they are just empty.

If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_DONTFORK, it will get a
segmentation fault, since those address ranges are no longer valid in
the child after fork.

Since MADV_DONTFORK also seems to be used to allow very large programs
to fork in systems with strict memory overcommit restrictions, changing
the semantics of MADV_DONTFORK might break existing programs.

MADV_WIPEONFORK only works on private, anonymous VMAs.

The use case is libraries that store or cache information, and want to
know that they need to regenerate it in the child process after fork.

Examples of this would be:
 - systemd/pulseaudio API checks (fail after fork) (replacing a getpid
   check, which is too slow without a PID cache)
 - PKCS#11 API reinitialization check (mandated by specification)
 - glibc's upcoming PRNG (reseed after fork)
 - OpenSSL PRNG (reseed after fork)

The security benefits of a forking server having a re-inialized PRNG in
every child process are pretty obvious.  However, due to libraries
having all kinds of internal state, and programs getting compiled with
many different versions of each library, it is unreasonable to expect
calling programs to re-initialize everything manually after fork.

A further complication is the proliferation of clone flags, programs
bypassing glibc's functions to call clone directly, and programs calling
unshare, causing the glibc pthread_atfork hook to not get called.

It would be better to have the kernel take care of this automatically.

The patch also adds MADV_KEEPONFORK, to undo the effects of a prior
MADV_WIPEONFORK.

This is similar to the OpenBSD minherit syscall with MAP_INHERIT_ZERO:

    https://man.openbsd.org/minherit.2

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: numerically order arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h #defines]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170811212829.29186-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Colm MacCártaigh &lt;colm@allcosts.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-api@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce MADV_WIPEONFORK semantics, which result in a VMA being empty
in the child process after fork.  This differs from MADV_DONTFORK in one
important way.

If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_WIPEONFORK, it will get
zeroes.  The address ranges are still valid, they are just empty.

If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_DONTFORK, it will get a
segmentation fault, since those address ranges are no longer valid in
the child after fork.

Since MADV_DONTFORK also seems to be used to allow very large programs
to fork in systems with strict memory overcommit restrictions, changing
the semantics of MADV_DONTFORK might break existing programs.

MADV_WIPEONFORK only works on private, anonymous VMAs.

The use case is libraries that store or cache information, and want to
know that they need to regenerate it in the child process after fork.

Examples of this would be:
 - systemd/pulseaudio API checks (fail after fork) (replacing a getpid
   check, which is too slow without a PID cache)
 - PKCS#11 API reinitialization check (mandated by specification)
 - glibc's upcoming PRNG (reseed after fork)
 - OpenSSL PRNG (reseed after fork)

The security benefits of a forking server having a re-inialized PRNG in
every child process are pretty obvious.  However, due to libraries
having all kinds of internal state, and programs getting compiled with
many different versions of each library, it is unreasonable to expect
calling programs to re-initialize everything manually after fork.

A further complication is the proliferation of clone flags, programs
bypassing glibc's functions to call clone directly, and programs calling
unshare, causing the glibc pthread_atfork hook to not get called.

It would be better to have the kernel take care of this automatically.

The patch also adds MADV_KEEPONFORK, to undo the effects of a prior
MADV_WIPEONFORK.

This is similar to the OpenBSD minherit syscall with MAP_INHERIT_ZERO:

    https://man.openbsd.org/minherit.2

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: numerically order arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h #defines]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170811212829.29186-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Colm MacCártaigh &lt;colm@allcosts.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-api@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
