commit af80602799681c78f14fbe20b6185a56020dedee upstream. In order to allow using mm_alloc() much earlier, move initializing mm_cachep into mm_init(). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221025201057.751153381@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3f4c8211d982099be693be9aa7d6fc4607dff290 upstream. Instead of duplicating init_mm, allocate a fresh mm. The advantage is that mm_alloc() has much simpler dependencies. Additionally it makes more conceptual sense, init_mm has no (and must not have) user state to duplicate. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221025201057.816175235@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a1140cb215fa13dcec06d12ba0c3ee105633b7c4 upstream.
Our syzbot instance reported memory leaks in do_seccomp() [0], similar
to the report [1]. It shows that we miss freeing struct seccomp_filter
and some objects included in it.
We can reproduce the issue with the program below [2] which calls one
seccomp() and two clone() syscalls.
The first clone()d child exits earlier than its parent and sends a
signal to kill it during the second clone(), more precisely before the
fatal_signal_pending() test in copy_process(). When the parent receives
the signal, it has to destroy the embryonic process and return -EINTR to
user space. In the failure path, we have to call seccomp_filter_release()
to decrement the filter's refcount.
Initially, we called it in free_task() called from the failure path, but
the commit 3a15fb6ed92c ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully
dead") moved it to release_task() to notify user space as early as possible
that the filter is no longer used.
To keep the change and current seccomp refcount semantics, let's move
copy_seccomp() just after the signal check and add a WARN_ON_ONCE() in
free_task() for future debugging.
[0]:
unreferenced object 0xffff8880063add00 (size 256):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.914s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
backtrace:
do_seccomp (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/seccomp.c:666 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffffc90000035000 (size 4096):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
__vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3226)
__vmalloc_node (mm/vmalloc.c:3261 (discriminator 4))
bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (kernel/bpf/core.c:91)
bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888003fa1000 (size 1024):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/bpf/core.c:95)
bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888006360240 (size 16):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
01 00 37 00 76 65 72 6c e0 83 01 06 80 88 ff ff ..7.verl........
backtrace:
bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1137)
bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428)
do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff8880060183e0 (size 8):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
06 00 00 00 00 00 ff 7f ........
backtrace:
kmemdup (mm/util.c:129)
bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1144)
bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428)
do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=2809bb0ac77ad9aa3f4afe42d6a610aba594a987
[2]:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sched.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
void main(void)
{
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
};
struct sock_fprog fprog = {
.len = sizeof(filter) / sizeof(filter[0]),
.filter = filter,
};
long i, pid;
syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &fprog);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
pid = syscall(__NR_clone, CLONE_NEWNET | SIGKILL, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (pid == 0)
return;
}
}
Fixes: 3a15fb6ed92c ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully dead")
Reported-by: syzbot+ab17848fe269b573eb71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Ayushman Dutta <ayudutta@amazon.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823154532.82913-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a402f1e35313fc7ce2ca60f543c4402c2c7c3544 upstream.
Currently, calling clone3() with CLONE_NEWTIME in clone_args->flags
fails with -EINVAL. This is because CLONE_NEWTIME intersects with
CSIGNAL. However, CSIGNAL was deprecated when clone3 was introduced in
commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add clone3"), allowing re-use of that part
of clone flags.
Fix this by explicitly allowing CLONE_NEWTIME in clone3_args_valid. This
is also in line with the respective check in check_unshare_flags which
allow CLONE_NEWTIME for unshare().
Fixes: 769071ac9f20 ("ns: Introduce Time Namespace")
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
No upstream commit exists. This imports the io_uring codebase from 5.15.85, wholesale. Changes from that code base: - Drop IOCB_ALLOC_CACHE, we don't have that in 5.10. - Drop MKDIRAT/SYMLINKAT/LINKAT. Would require further VFS backports, and we don't support these in 5.10 to begin with. - sock_from_file() old style calling convention. - Use compat_get_bitmap() only for CONFIG_COMPAT=y Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b16b3855d89fba640996fefdd3a113c0aa0e380d ] This is racy - move the blocking into when the task is created and we're marking it as PF_IO_WORKER anyway. The IO threads are now prepared to handle signals like SIGSTOP as well, so clear that from the mask to allow proper stopping of IO threads. Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 66ae0d1e2d9fe6ec70e73fcfdcf4b390e271c1ac ] fork() fails if signal_pending() is true, but there are two conditions that can lead to that: 1) An actual signal is pending. We want fork to fail for that one, like we always have. 2) TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL is pending, because the task has pending task_work. We don't need to make it fail for that case. Allow fork() to proceed if just task_work is pending, by changing the signal_pending() check to task_sigpending(). Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit cc440e8738e5c875297ac0e90316745093be7e28 ] Provide a generic helper for setting up an io_uring worker. Returns a task_struct so that the caller can do whatever setup is needed, then call wake_up_new_task() to kick it into gear. Add a kernel_clone_args member, io_thread, which tells copy_process() to mark the task with PF_IO_WORKER. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 85eaeb5058f0f04dffb124c97c86b4f18db0b833 ]
Fix a nested dead lock as part of ODP flow by using mmput_async().
From the below call trace [1] can see that calling mmput() once we have
the umem_odp->umem_mutex locked as required by
ib_umem_odp_map_dma_and_lock() might trigger in the same task the
exit_mmap()->__mmu_notifier_release()->mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() which
may dead lock when trying to lock the same mutex.
Moving to use mmput_async() will solve the problem as the above
exit_mmap() flow will be called in other task and will be executed once
the lock will be available.
[1]
[64843.077665] task:kworker/u133:2 state:D stack: 0 pid:80906 ppid:
2 flags:0x00004000
[64843.077672] Workqueue: mlx5_ib_page_fault mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077719] Call Trace:
[64843.077722] <TASK>
[64843.077724] __schedule+0x23d/0x590
[64843.077729] schedule+0x4e/0xb0
[64843.077735] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xe/0x10
[64843.077740] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x263/0x490
[64843.077747] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20
[64843.077752] mutex_lock+0x34/0x40
[64843.077758] mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x48/0x270 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077808] __mmu_notifier_release+0x1a4/0x200
[64843.077816] exit_mmap+0x1bc/0x200
[64843.077822] ? walk_page_range+0x9c/0x120
[64843.077828] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[64843.077833] ? mutex_lock+0x13/0x40
[64843.077839] ? uprobe_clear_state+0xac/0x120
[64843.077860] mmput+0x5f/0x140
[64843.077867] ib_umem_odp_map_dma_and_lock+0x21b/0x580 [ib_core]
[64843.077931] pagefault_real_mr+0x9a/0x140 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077962] pagefault_mr+0xb4/0x550 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077992] pagefault_single_data_segment.constprop.0+0x2ac/0x560
[mlx5_ib]
[64843.078022] mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action+0x528/0x780 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.078051] process_one_work+0x22b/0x3d0
[64843.078059] worker_thread+0x53/0x410
[64843.078065] ? process_one_work+0x3d0/0x3d0
[64843.078073] kthread+0x12a/0x150
[64843.078079] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[64843.078085] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[64843.078093] </TASK>
Fixes: 36f30e486dce ("IB/core: Improve ODP to use hmm_range_fault()")
Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/74d93541ea533ef7daec6f126deb1072500aeb16.1661251841.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ddc204b517e60ae64db34f9832dc41dafa77c751 upstream.
I was made aware of the following lockdep splat:
[ 2516.308763] =====================================================
[ 2516.309085] WARNING: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[ 2516.309433] 5.14.0-51.el9.aarch64+debug #1 Not tainted
[ 2516.309703] -----------------------------------------------------
[ 2516.310149] stress-ng/153663 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
[ 2516.310512] ffff0000e422b198 (&newf->file_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: fd_install+0x368/0x4f0
[ 2516.310944]
and this task is already holding:
[ 2516.311248] ffff0000c08140d8 (&sighand->siglock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: copy_process+0x1e2c/0x3e80
[ 2516.311804] which would create a new lock dependency:
[ 2516.312066] (&sighand->siglock){-.-.}-{2:2} -> (&newf->file_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}
[ 2516.312446]
but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock:
[ 2516.312983] (&sighand->siglock){-.-.}-{2:2}
:
[ 2516.330700] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[ 2516.331075] CPU0 CPU1
[ 2516.331328] ---- ----
[ 2516.331580] lock(&newf->file_lock);
[ 2516.331790] local_irq_disable();
[ 2516.332231] lock(&sighand->siglock);
[ 2516.332579] lock(&newf->file_lock);
[ 2516.332922] <Interrupt>
[ 2516.333069] lock(&sighand->siglock);
[ 2516.333291]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 2516.389845]
stack backtrace:
[ 2516.390101] CPU: 3 PID: 153663 Comm: stress-ng Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-51.el9.aarch64+debug #1
[ 2516.390756] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 2516.391155] Call trace:
[ 2516.391302] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3e0
[ 2516.391518] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 2516.391717] dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd8
[ 2516.391938] dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
[ 2516.392247] print_bad_irq_dependency+0x620/0x710
[ 2516.392525] check_irq_usage+0x4fc/0x86c
[ 2516.392756] check_prev_add+0x180/0x1d90
[ 2516.392988] validate_chain+0x8e0/0xee0
[ 2516.393215] __lock_acquire+0x97c/0x1e40
[ 2516.393449] lock_acquire.part.0+0x240/0x570
[ 2516.393814] lock_acquire+0x90/0xb4
[ 2516.394021] _raw_spin_lock+0xe8/0x154
[ 2516.394244] fd_install+0x368/0x4f0
[ 2516.394451] copy_process+0x1f5c/0x3e80
[ 2516.394678] kernel_clone+0x134/0x660
[ 2516.394895] __do_sys_clone3+0x130/0x1f4
[ 2516.395128] __arm64_sys_clone3+0x5c/0x7c
[ 2516.395478] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1f0
[ 2516.395762] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x22c/0x2c4
[ 2516.396050] do_el0_svc+0xb0/0x10c
[ 2516.396252] el0_svc+0x24/0x34
[ 2516.396436] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x12c
[ 2516.396688] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[ 2517.491197] NET: Registered PF_ATMPVC protocol family
[ 2517.491524] NET: Registered PF_ATMSVC protocol family
[ 2591.991877] sched: RT throttling activated
One way to solve this problem is to move the fd_install() call out of
the sighand->siglock critical section.
Before commit 6fd2fe494b17 ("copy_process(): don't use ksys_close()
on cleanups"), the pidfd installation was done without holding both
the task_list lock and the sighand->siglock. Obviously, holding these
two locks are not really needed to protect the fd_install() call.
So move the fd_install() call down to after the releases of both locks.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208163912.1084752-1-longman@redhat.com
Fixes: 6fd2fe494b17 ("copy_process(): don't use ksys_close() on cleanups")
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>