linux.git/kernel/futex, branch v6.18.21

futex: Fix UaF between futex_key_to_node_opt() and vma_replace_policy()

2026-04-02T11:23:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit 190a8c48ff623c3d67cb295b4536a660db2012aa ]

During futex_key_to_node_opt() execution, vma->vm_policy is read under
speculative mmap lock and RCU. Concurrently, mbind() may call
vma_replace_policy() which frees the old mempolicy immediately via
kmem_cache_free().

This creates a race where __futex_key_to_node() dereferences a freed
mempolicy pointer, causing a use-after-free read of mpol->mode.

[  151.412631] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[  151.414046] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888001c49634 by task e/87

[  151.415969] Call Trace:

[  151.416732]  __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/generic.c:271)
[  151.416777]  __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[  151.416822]  get_futex_key (kernel/futex/core.c:374 kernel/futex/core.c:386 kernel/futex/core.c:593)

Fix by adding rcu to __mpol_put().

Fixes: c042c505210d ("futex: Implement FUTEX2_MPOL")
Reported-by: Hao-Yu Yang 
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Hao-Yu Yang 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324174418.GB1850007@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

futex: Require sys_futex_requeue() to have identical flags

2026-04-02T11:23:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit 19f94b39058681dec64a10ebeb6f23fe7fc3f77a ]

Nicholas reported that his LLM found it was possible to create a UaF
when sys_futex_requeue() is used with different flags. The initial
motivation for allowing different flags was the variable sized futex,
but since that hasn't been merged (yet), simply mandate the flags are
identical, as is the case for the old style sys_futex() requeue
operations.

Fixes: 0f4b5f972216 ("futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()")
Reported-by: Nicholas Carlini 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path

2026-04-02T11:23:22+00:00

commit 210d36d892de5195e6766c45519dfb1e65f3eb83 upstream.

Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:

    WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524

When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY
and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.

After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer
is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a
different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().

  CPU0			     CPU1		       CPU2
  futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
  // acquires the PI futex
  exit()
    futex_cleanup_begin()
      futex_state = EXITING;
			     futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
			       futex_lock_pi_atomic()
				 attach_to_pi_owner()
				   // observes EXITING
				   *exiting = owner;  // takes ref
				   return -EBUSY
			       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner)
				 put_task_struct();   // drops ref
			       // exiting still points to owner
			       goto retry;
			       futex_lock_pi_atomic()
				 lock_pi_update_atomic()
				   cmpxchg(uaddr)
					*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever
				   // value changed
				 return -EAGAIN;
			       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale
				 WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)

Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.

Fixes: 3ef240eaff36 ("futex: Prevent exit livelock")
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326001759.4129680-1-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Optimize per-cpu reference counting

2025-11-06T11:30:54+00:00

Shrikanth noted that the per-cpu reference counter was still some 10%
slower than the old immutable option (which removes the reference
counting entirely).

Further optimize the per-cpu reference counter by:

 - switching from RCU to preempt;
 - using __this_cpu_*() since we now have preempt disabled;
 - switching from smp_load_acquire() to READ_ONCE().

This is all safe because disabling preemption inhibits the RCU grace
period exactly like rcu_read_lock().

Having preemption disabled allows using __this_cpu_*() provided the
only access to the variable is in task context -- which is the case
here.

Furthermore, since we know changing fph->state to FR_ATOMIC demands a
full RCU grace period we can rely on the implied smp_mb() from that to
replace the acquire barrier().

This is very similar to the percpu_down_read_internal() fast-path.

The reason this is significant for PowerPC is that it uses the generic
this_cpu_*() implementation which relies on local_irq_disable() (the
x86 implementation relies on it being a single memop instruction to be
IRQ-safe). Switching to preempt_disable() and __this_cpu*() avoids
this IRQ state swizzling. Also, PowerPC needs LWSYNC for the ACQUIRE
barrier, not having to use explicit barriers safes a bunch.

Combined this reduces the performance gap by half, down to some 5%.

Fixes: 760e6f7befba ("futex: Remove support for IMMUTABLE")
Reported-by: Shrikanth Hegde 
Tested-by: Shrikanth Hegde 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251106092929.GR4067720@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net

Merge tag 'locking-futex-2025-09-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2025-09-30T23:07:10+00:00

Pull futex updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of updates for futexes and related selftests:

   - Plug the ptrace_may_access() race against a concurrent exec() which
     allows to pass the check before the target's process transition in
     exec() by taking a read lock on signal->ext_update_lock.

   - A large set of cleanups and enhancement to the futex selftests. The
     bulk of changes is the conversion to the kselftest harness"

* tag 'locking-futex-2025-09-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (25 commits)
  selftest/futex: Fix spelling mistake "boundarie" -> "boundary"
  selftests/futex: Remove logging.h file
  selftests/futex: Drop logging.h include from futex_numa
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_numa_mpol with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_priv_hash with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_waitv with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_requeue with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_wait with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_wait_private_mapped_file with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_wait_unitialized_heap with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_wait_wouldblock with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_wait_timeout with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_requeue_pi_signal_restart with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_requeue_pi_mismatched_ops with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests/futex: Refactor futex_requeue_pi with kselftest_harness.h
  selftests: kselftest: Create ksft_print_dbg_msg()
  futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
  selftest/futex: Compile also with libnuma < 2.0.16
  selftest/futex: Reintroduce "Memory out of range" numa_mpol's subtest
  selftest/futex: Make the error check more precise for futex_numa_mpol
  ...

futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race

2025-09-20T15:54:01+00:00

sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.

During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.

A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().

For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.

This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.

Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.

Suggested-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/1477863998-3298-5-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net/
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/119

futex: Prevent use-after-free during requeue-PI

2025-09-20T15:40:42+00:00

syzbot managed to trigger the following race:

   T1                               T2

 futex_wait_requeue_pi()
   futex_do_wait()
     schedule()
                               futex_requeue()
                                 futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
                                   futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
                                   requeue_pi_wake_futex()
                                     futex_requeue_pi_complete()
                                      /* preempt */

         * timeout/ signal wakes T1 *

   futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() // Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED
   futex_hash_put()
  // back to userland, on stack futex_q is garbage

                                      /* back */
                                     wake_up_state(q->task, TASK_NORMAL);

In this scenario futex_wait_requeue_pi() is able to leave without using
futex_q::lock_ptr for synchronization.

This can be prevented by reading futex_q::task before updating the
futex_q::requeue_state. A reference on the task_struct is not needed
because requeue_pi_wake_futex() is invoked with a spinlock_t held which
implies a RCU read section.

Even if T1 terminates immediately after, the task_struct will remain valid
during T2's wake_up_state().  A READ_ONCE on futex_q::task before
futex_requeue_pi_complete() is enough because it ensures that the variable
is read before the state is updated.

Read futex_q::task before updating the requeue state, use it for the
following wakeup.

Fixes: 07d91ef510fb1 ("futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT")
Reported-by: syzbot+034246a838a10d181e78@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68b75989.050a0220.3db4df.01dd.GAE@google.com/

futex: Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput()

2025-08-31T09:48:19+00:00

To avoid a memory leak via mm_alloc() + mmdrop() the futex cleanup code
has been moved to __mmdrop(). This resulted in a warnings if the futex
hash table has been allocated via vmalloc() the mmdrop() was invoked
from atomic context.
The free path must stay in __mmput() to ensure it is invoked from
preemptible context.

In order to avoid the memory leak, delay the allocation of
mm_struct::mm->futex_ref to futex_hash_allocate(). This works because
neither the per-CPU counter nor the private hash has been allocated and
therefore
- futex_private_hash() callers (such as exit_pi_state_list()) don't
  acquire reference if there is no private hash yet. There is also no
  reference put.

- Regular callers (futex_hash()) fallback to global hash. No reference
  counting here.

The futex_ref member can be allocated in futex_hash_allocate() before
the private hash itself is allocated. This happens either while the
first thread is created or on request. In both cases the process has
just a single thread so there can be either futex operation in progress
or the request to create a private hash.

Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput();
Move the allocation of mm_struct::futex_ref to futex_hash_allocate().

  [ bp: Fold a follow-up fix to prevent a use-after-free:
    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250830213806.sEKuuGSm@linutronix.de ]

Fixes:  e703b7e247503 ("futex: Move futex cleanup to __mmdrop()")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250821102721.6deae493@kernel.org/
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250822141238.PfnkTjFb@linutronix.de

futex: Use user_write_access_begin/_end() in futex_put_value()

2025-08-11T15:53:21+00:00

Commit cec199c5e39b ("futex: Implement FUTEX2_NUMA") introduced the
futex_put_value() helper to write a value to the given user
address.

However, it uses user_read_access_begin() before the write. For
architectures that differentiate between read and write accesses, like
PowerPC, futex_put_value() fails with -EFAULT.

Fix that by using the user_write_access_begin/user_write_access_end() pair
instead.

Fixes: cec199c5e39b ("futex: Implement FUTEX2_NUMA")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250811141147.322261-1-longman@redhat.com

futex: Remove support for IMMUTABLE

2025-07-11T14:02:01+00:00

The FH_FLAG_IMMUTABLE flag was meant to avoid the reference counting on
the private hash and so to avoid the performance regression on big
machines.
With the switch to per-CPU counter this is no longer needed. That flag
was never useable on any released kernel.

Remove any support for IMMUTABLE while preserve the flags argument and
enforce it to be zero.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710110011.384614-5-bigeasy@linutronix.de