commit 214e01ad4ed7158cab66498810094fac5d09b218 upstream.
Calling into kthread unparking unconditionally is mostly harmless when
the kthread is already unparked. The wake up is then simply ignored
because the target is not in TASK_PARKED state.
However if the kthread is per CPU, the wake up is preceded by a call
to kthread_bind() which expects the task to be inactive and in
TASK_PARKED state, which obviously isn't the case if it is unparked.
As a result, calling kthread_stop() on an unparked per-cpu kthread
triggers such a warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at kernel/kthread.c:525 __kthread_bind_mask kernel/kthread.c:525
<TASK>
kthread_stop+0x17a/0x630 kernel/kthread.c:707
destroy_workqueue+0x136/0xc40 kernel/workqueue.c:5810
wg_destruct+0x1e2/0x2e0 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:257
netdev_run_todo+0xe1a/0x1000 net/core/dev.c:10693
default_device_exit_batch+0xa14/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:11769
ops_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:178 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x89d/0xcc0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3231 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Fix this with skipping unecessary unparking while stopping a kthread.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240913214634.12557-1-frederic@kernel.org
Fixes: 5c25b5ff89f0 ("workqueue: Tag bound workers with KTHREAD_IS_PER_CPU")
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+943d34fa3cf2191e3068@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+943d34fa3cf2191e3068@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e16c7b07784f3fb03025939c4590b9a7c64970a7 ]
When analyzing a kernel waring message, Peter pointed out that there is a
race condition when the kworker is being frozen and falls into
try_to_freeze() with TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, which could trigger a
might_sleep() warning in try_to_freeze(). Although the root cause is not
related to freeze()[1], it is still worthy to fix this issue ahead.
One possible race scenario:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
// kthread_worker_fn
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
suspend_freeze_processes()
freeze_processes
static_branch_inc(&freezer_active);
freeze_kernel_threads
pm_nosig_freezing = true;
if (work) { //false
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
} else if (!freezing(current)) //false, been frozen
freezing():
if (static_branch_unlikely(&freezer_active))
if (pm_nosig_freezing)
return true;
schedule()
}
// state is still TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
try_to_freeze()
might_sleep() <--- warning
Fix this by explicitly set the TASK_RUNNING before entering
try_to_freeze().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zs2ZoAcUsZMX2B%2FI@chenyu5-mobl2/ [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240827112308.181081-1-yu.c.chen@intel.com
Fixes: b56c0d8937e6 ("kthread: implement kthread_worker")
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Pull kthread update from Eric Biederman: "Break out of wait loops on kthread_stop() This is a small tweak to kthread_stop so it breaks out of interruptible waits, that don't explicitly test for kthread_stop. These interruptible waits occassionaly occur in kernel threads do to code sharing" * tag 'interrupting_kthread_stop-for-v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: signal: break out of wait loops on kthread_stop()
CONFIG_CFI_CLANG no longer breaks cross-module function address equality, which makes WARN_ON_FUNCTION_MISMATCH unnecessary. Remove the definition and switch back to WARN_ON_ONCE. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-15-samitolvanen@google.com
I was recently surprised to learn that msleep_interruptible(),
wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(), and related functions
simply hung when I called kthread_stop() on kthreads using them. The
solution to fixing the case with msleep_interruptible() was more simply
to move to schedule_timeout_interruptible(). Why?
The reason is that msleep_interruptible(), and many functions just like
it, has a loop like this:
while (timeout && !signal_pending(current))
timeout = schedule_timeout_interruptible(timeout);
The call to kthread_stop() woke up the thread, so schedule_timeout_
interruptible() returned early, but because signal_pending() returned
true, it went back into another timeout, which was never woken up.
This wait loop pattern is common to various pieces of code, and I
suspect that the subtle misuse in a kthread that caused a deadlock in
the code I looked at last week is also found elsewhere.
So this commit causes signal_pending() to return true when
kthread_stop() is called, by setting TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL.
The same also probably applies to the similar kthread_park()
functionality, but that can be addressed later, as its semantics are
slightly different.
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220627120020.608117-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220627145716.641185-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
v3: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220628161441.892925-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
v4: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220711202136.64458-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
v5: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220711232123.136330-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The comments in kernel/kthread.c create a feeling that only SIGKILL is
able to terminate the creation of kernel kthreads by
kthread_create()/_on_node()/_on_cpu() APIs.
In reality, wait_for_completion_killable() might be killed by any fatal
signal that does not have a custom handler:
(!siginmask(signr, SIG_KERNEL_IGNORE_MASK|SIG_KERNEL_STOP_MASK) && \
(t)->sighand->action[(signr)-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL)
static inline void signal_wake_up(struct task_struct *t, bool resume)
{
signal_wake_up_state(t, resume ? TASK_WAKEKILL : 0);
}
static void complete_signal(int sig, struct task_struct *p, enum pid_type type)
{
[...]
/*
* Found a killable thread. If the signal will be fatal,
* then start taking the whole group down immediately.
*/
if (sig_fatal(p, sig) ...) {
if (!sig_kernel_coredump(sig)) {
[...]
do {
task_clear_jobctl_pending(t, JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK);
sigaddset(&t->pending.signal, SIGKILL);
signal_wake_up(t, 1);
} while_each_thread(p, t);
return;
}
}
}
Update the comments in kernel/kthread.c to make this more obvious.
The motivation for this change was debugging why a module initialization
failed. The module was being loaded from initrd. It "magically" failed
when systemd was switching to the real root. The clean up operations sent
SIGTERM to various pending processed that were started from initrd.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220315102444.2380-1-pmladek@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
kthread_blkcg is only used by the built-in blk-cgroup code. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420042723.1010598-16-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Pull asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
"There are three sets of updates for 5.18 in the asm-generic tree:
- The set_fs()/get_fs() infrastructure gets removed for good.
This was already gone from all major architectures, but now we can
finally remove it everywhere, which loses some particularly tricky
and error-prone code. There is a small merge conflict against a
parisc cleanup, the solution is to use their new version.
- The nds32 architecture ends its tenure in the Linux kernel.
The hardware is still used and the code is in reasonable shape, but
the mainline port is not actively maintained any more, as all
remaining users are thought to run vendor kernels that would never
be updated to a future release.
- A series from Masahiro Yamada cleans up some of the uapi header
files to pass the compile-time checks"
* tag 'asm-generic-5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: (27 commits)
nds32: Remove the architecture
uaccess: remove CONFIG_SET_FS
ia64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
sh: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
lib/test_lockup: fix kernel pointer check for separate address spaces
uaccess: generalize access_ok()
uaccess: fix type mismatch warnings from access_ok()
arm64: simplify access_ok()
m68k: fix access_ok for coldfire
MIPS: use simpler access_ok()
MIPS: Handle address errors for accesses above CPU max virtual user address
uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault
nios2: drop access_ok() check from __put_user()
x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
x86: remove __range_not_ok()
sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nofault()
nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user
uaccess: fix nios2 and microblaze get_user_8()
sparc64: fix building assembly files
...
There are no remaining callers of set_fs(), so CONFIG_SET_FS can be removed globally, along with the thread_info field and any references to it. This turns access_ok() into a cheaper check against TASK_SIZE_MAX. As CONFIG_SET_FS is now gone, drop all remaining references to set_fs()/get_fs(), mm_segment_t, user_addr_max() and uaccess_kernel(). Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> # for sparc32 changes Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Tested-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich@synopsys.com> # for arc changes Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> # [openrisc, asm-generic] Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Refer to housekeeping APIs using single feature types instead of flags. This prevents from passing multiple isolation features at once to housekeeping interfaces, which soon won't be possible anymore as each isolation features will have their own cpumask. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220207155910.527133-5-frederic@kernel.org