linux.git/kernel/sys.c, branch v5.15.185

getrusage: use sig->stats_lock rather than lock_task_sighand()

2024-03-15T14:48:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit f7ec1cd5cc7ef3ad964b677ba82b8b77f1c93009 ]

lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call
getrusage() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, spin_lock_irq
will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time.

Change getrusage() to use sig->stats_lock, it was specifically designed
for this type of use. This way it runs lockless in the likely case.

TODO:
	- Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock too, then we can
	  remove spin_lock_irq(siglock) in wait_task_zombie().

	- Turn sig->stats_lock into seqcount_rwlock_t, this way the
	  readers in the slow mode won't exclude each other. See
	  https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230913154907.GA26210@redhat.com/

	- stats_lock has to disable irqs because ->siglock can be taken
	  in irq context, it would be very nice to change __exit_signal()
	  to avoid the siglock->stats_lock dependency.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155053.GA26214@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reported-by: Dylan Hatch 
Tested-by: Dylan Hatch 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

getrusage: use __for_each_thread()

2024-03-15T14:48:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit 13b7bc60b5353371460a203df6c38ccd38ad7a3a ]

do/while_each_thread should be avoided when possible.

Plus this change allows to avoid lock_task_sighand(), we can use rcu
and/or sig->stats_lock instead.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172629.GA20454@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Stable-dep-of: f7ec1cd5cc7e ("getrusage: use sig->stats_lock rather than lock_task_sighand()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

getrusage: move thread_group_cputime_adjusted() outside of lock_task_sighand()

2024-03-15T14:48:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit daa694e4137571b4ebec330f9a9b4d54aa8b8089 ]

Patch series "getrusage: use sig->stats_lock", v2.

This patch (of 2):

thread_group_cputime() does its own locking, we can safely shift
thread_group_cputime_adjusted() which does another for_each_thread loop
outside of ->siglock protected section.

This is also preparation for the next patch which changes getrusage() to
use stats_lock instead of siglock, thread_group_cputime() takes the same
lock.  With the current implementation recursive read_seqbegin_or_lock()
is fine, thread_group_cputime() can't enter the slow mode if the caller
holds stats_lock, yet this looks more safe and better performance-wise.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155023.GA26169@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155050.GA26205@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reported-by: Dylan Hatch 
Tested-by: Dylan Hatch 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

getrusage: add the "signal_struct *sig" local variable

2024-03-15T14:48:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit c7ac8231ace9b07306d0299969e42073b189c70a ]

No functional changes, cleanup/preparation.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172554.GA20441@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Stable-dep-of: daa694e41375 ("getrusage: move thread_group_cputime_adjusted() outside of lock_task_sighand()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in __sys_setres[ug]id()

2023-04-26T11:51:52+00:00

commit 659c0ce1cb9efc7f58d380ca4bb2a51ae9e30553 upstream.

Linux Security Modules (LSMs) that implement the "capable" hook will
usually emit an access denial message to the audit log whenever they
"block" the current task from using the given capability based on their
security policy.

The occurrence of a denial is used as an indication that the given task
has attempted an operation that requires the given access permission, so
the callers of functions that perform LSM permission checks must take care
to avoid calling them too early (before it is decided if the permission is
actually needed to perform the requested operation).

The __sys_setres[ug]id() functions violate this convention by first
calling ns_capable_setid() and only then checking if the operation
requires the capability or not.  It means that any caller that has the
capability granted by DAC (task's capability set) but not by MAC (LSMs)
will generate a "denied" audit record, even if is doing an operation for
which the capability is not required.

Fix this by reordering the checks such that ns_capable_setid() is checked
last and -EPERM is returned immediately if it returns false.

While there, also do two small optimizations:
* move the capability check before prepare_creds() and
* bail out early in case of a no-op.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217162154.837549-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

prlimit: do_prlimit needs to have a speculation check

2023-01-24T06:22:44+00:00

commit 739790605705ddcf18f21782b9c99ad7d53a8c11 upstream.

do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that
will subsequently be dereferenced.  In order to help prevent this
codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be
added after checking the range.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer 
Tested-by: Jordy Zomer 
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ucounts: Move RLIMIT_NPROC handling after set_user

2022-02-23T11:03:20+00:00

commit c923a8e7edb010da67424077cbf1a6f1396ebd2e upstream.

During set*id() which cred->ucounts to charge the the current process
to is not known until after set_cred_ucounts.  So move the
RLIMIT_NPROC checking into a new helper flag_nproc_exceeded and call
flag_nproc_exceeded after set_cred_ucounts.

This is very much an arbitrary subset of the places where we currently
change the RLIMIT_NPROC accounting, designed to preserve the existing
logic.

Fixing the existing logic will be the subject of another series of
changes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-4-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rlimit: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC enforcement failure caused by capability calls in set_user

2022-02-23T11:03:20+00:00

commit c16bdeb5a39ffa3f32b32f812831a2092d2a3061 upstream.

Solar Designer  wrote:
> I'm not aware of anyone actually running into this issue and reporting
> it.  The systems that I personally know use suexec along with rlimits
> still run older/distro kernels, so would not yet be affected.
>
> So my mention was based on my understanding of how suexec works, and
> code review.  Specifically, Apache httpd has the setting RLimitNPROC,
> which makes it set RLIMIT_NPROC:
>
> https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#rlimitnproc
>
> The above documentation for it includes:
>
> "This applies to processes forked from Apache httpd children servicing
> requests, not the Apache httpd children themselves. This includes CGI
> scripts and SSI exec commands, but not any processes forked from the
> Apache httpd parent, such as piped logs."
>
> In code, there are:
>
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgid.c:        ( (cgid_req.limits.limit_nproc_set) && ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgi.c:        ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/filters/mod_ext_filter.c:    rv = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC, conf->limit_nproc);
>
> For example, in mod_cgi.c this is in run_cgi_child().
>
> I think this means an httpd child sets RLIMIT_NPROC shortly before it
> execs suexec, which is a SUID root program.  suexec then switches to the
> target user and execs the CGI script.
>
> Before 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec would set the flag, and the
> target user's process count would be checked against RLIMIT_NPROC on
> execve().  After 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec wouldn't set the
> flag because setuid() is (naturally) called when the process is still
> running as root (thus, has those limits bypass capabilities), and
> accordingly execve() would not check the target user's process count
> against RLIMIT_NPROC.

In commit 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when
rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds") capable calls were added to set_user to
make it more consistent with fork.  Unfortunately because of call site
differences those capable calls were checking the credentials of the
user before set*id() instead of after set*id().

This breaks enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC for applications that set the
rlimit and then call set*id() while holding a full set of
capabilities.  The capabilities are only changed in the new credential
in security_task_fix_setuid().

The code in apache suexec appears to follow this pattern.

Commit 909cc4ae86f3 ("[PATCH] Fix two bugs with process limits
(RLIMIT_NPROC)") where this check was added describes the targes of this
capability check as:

  2/ When a root-owned process (e.g. cgiwrap) sets up process limits and then
      calls setuid, the setuid should fail if the user would then be running
      more than rlim_cur[RLIMIT_NPROC] processes, but it doesn't.  This patch
      adds an appropriate test.  With this patch, and per-user process limit
      imposed in cgiwrap really works.

So the original use case of this check also appears to match the broken
pattern.

Restore the enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC by removing the bad capable
checks added in set_user.  This unfortunately restores the
inconsistent state the code has been in for the last 11 years, but
dealing with the inconsistencies looks like a larger problem.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210907213042.GA22626@openwall.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220212221412.GA29214@openwall.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-1-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds")
History-Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reviewed-by: Solar Designer 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)

2021-09-08T19:55:35+00:00

Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
 "147 patches, based on 7d2a07b769330c34b4deabeed939325c77a7ec2f.

  Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (memory-hotplug, rmap,
  ioremap, highmem, cleanups, secretmem, kfence, damon, and vmscan),
  alpha, percpu, procfs, misc, core-kernel, MAINTAINERS, lib,
  checkpatch, epoll, init, nilfs2, coredump, fork, pids, criu, kconfig,
  selftests, ipc, and scripts"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton : (94 commits)
  scripts: check_extable: fix typo in user error message
  mm/workingset: correct kernel-doc notations
  ipc: replace costly bailout check in sysvipc_find_ipc()
  selftests/memfd: remove unused variable
  Kconfig.debug: drop selecting non-existing HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
  configs: remove the obsolete CONFIG_INPUT_POLLDEV
  prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables
  pid: cleanup the stale comment mentioning pidmap_init().
  kernel/fork.c: unexport get_{mm,task}_exe_file
  coredump: fix memleak in dump_vma_snapshot()
  fs/coredump.c: log if a core dump is aborted due to changed file permissions
  nilfs2: use refcount_dec_and_lock() to fix potential UAF
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_snapshot_group
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_snapshot_group
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_##name##_group
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_##name##_group
  nilfs2: fix NULL pointer in nilfs_##name##_attr_release
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group
  trap: cleanup trap_init()
  init: move usermodehelper_enable() to populate_rootfs()
  ...

prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables

2021-09-08T18:50:28+00:00

Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.

For example a test program shows

 | # ~/t
 |
 | start_code      401000
 | end_code        401a15
 | start_stack     7ffce4577dd0
 | start_data	   403e10
 | end_data        40408c
 | start_brk	   b5b000
 | sbrk(0)         b5b000

and when executed via ld-linux

 | # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
 |
 | start_code      7fc25b0a4000
 | end_code        7fc25b0c4524
 | start_stack     7fffcc6b2400
 | start_data	   7fc25b0ce4c0
 | end_data        7fc25b0cff98
 | start_brk	   55555710c000
 | sbrk(0)         55555710c000

This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs.  Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data.  Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Reported-by: Keno Fischer 
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin 
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin 
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov 
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds