linux.git/kernel/ucount.c, branch v5.10.258

ucount: check for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE using ns_capable_noaudit()

2026-03-04T12:19:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0895a000e4fff9e950a7894210db45973e485c35 ]

The user.* sysctls implement the ctl_table_root::permissions hook and they
override the file access mode based on the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability (at
most rwx if capable, at most r-- if not).  The capability is being checked
unconditionally, so if an LSM denies the capability, an audit record may
be logged even when access is in fact granted.

Given the logic in the set_permissions() function in kernel/ucount.c and
the unfortunate way the permission checking is implemented, it doesn't
seem viable to avoid false positive denials by deferring the capability
check.  Thus, do the same as in net_ctl_permissions() (net/sysctl_net.c) -
switch from ns_capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), so that the check never
logs an audit record.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260122140745.239428-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Fixes: dbec28460a89 ("userns: Add per user namespace sysctls.")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek 
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: Eric Biederman 
Cc: Alexey Gladkov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs

2024-06-21T12:53:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5b8fea65d197f408bb00b251c70d842826d6b70b ]

fanotify has some hardcoded limits. The only APIs to escape those limits
are FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE and FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS.

Allow finer grained tuning of the system limits via sysfs tunables under
/proc/sys/fs/fanotify, similar to tunables under /proc/sys/fs/inotify,
with some minor differences.

- max_queued_events - global system tunable for group queue size limit.
  Like the inotify tunable with the same name, it defaults to 16384 and
  applies on initialization of a new group.

- max_user_marks - user ns tunable for marks limit per user.
  Like the inotify tunable named max_user_watches, on a machine with
  sufficient RAM and it defaults to 1048576 in init userns and can be
  further limited per containing user ns.

- max_user_groups - user ns tunable for number of groups per user.
  Like the inotify tunable named max_user_instances, it defaults to 128
  in init userns and can be further limited per containing user ns.

The slightly different tunable names used for fanotify are derived from
the "group" and "mark" terminology used in the fanotify man pages and
throughout the code.

Considering the fact that the default value for max_user_instances was
increased in kernel v5.10 from 8192 to 1048576, leaving the legacy
fanotify limit of 8192 marks per group in addition to the max_user_marks
limit makes little sense, so the per group marks limit has been removed.

Note that when a group is initialized with FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS, its own
marks are not accounted in the per user marks account, so in effect the
limit of max_user_marks is only for the collection of groups that are
not initialized with FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304112921.3996419-2-amir73il@gmail.com
Suggested-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein 
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Revert "Add a reference to ucounts for each cred"

2021-09-08T06:49:00+00:00

This reverts commit b2c4d9a33cc2dec7466f97eba2c4dd571ad798a5 which is
commit 905ae01c4ae2ae3df05bb141801b1db4b7d83c61 upstream.

This commit should not have been applied to the 5.10.y stable tree, so
revert it.

Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87v93k4bl6.fsf@disp2133
Cc: Alexey Gladkov 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Add a reference to ucounts for each cred

2021-07-14T14:55:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 905ae01c4ae2ae3df05bb141801b1db4b7d83c61 ]

For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the
global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it
in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will
allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for
user in the user_namespace.

Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we
cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function
cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify
cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().

Changelog

v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This
  error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts
  pointer empty.

Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ucount: Make sure ucounts in /proc/sys/user don't regress again

2020-04-07T19:51:27+00:00

Commit 769071ac9f20 "ns: Introduce Time Namespace" broke reporting of
inotify ucounts (max_inotify_instances, max_inotify_watches) in
/proc/sys/user because it has added UCOUNT_TIME_NAMESPACES into enum
ucount_type but didn't properly update reporting in
kernel/ucount.c:setup_userns_sysctls(). This problem got fixed in commit
eeec26d5da82 "time/namespace: Add max_time_namespaces ucount".

Add BUILD_BUG_ON to catch a similar problem in the future.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407154643.10102-1-jack@suse.cz

time/namespace: Add max_time_namespaces ucount

2020-04-07T10:37:21+00:00

Michael noticed that userns limit for number of time namespaces is missing.

Furthermore, time namespace introduced UCOUNT_TIME_NAMESPACES, but didn't
introduce an array member in user_table[]. It would make array's
initialisation OOB write, but by luck the user_table array has an excessive
empty member (all accesses to the array are limited with UCOUNT_COUNTS - so
it silently reuses the last free member.

Fixes user-visible regression: max_inotify_instances by reason of the
missing UCOUNT_ENTRY() has limited max number of namespaces instead of the
number of inotify instances.

Fixes: 769071ac9f20 ("ns: Introduce Time Namespace")
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin 
Acked-by: Vincenzo Frascino 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200406171342.128733-1-dima@arista.com

proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check

2019-07-19T00:08:07+00:00

In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range.  This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.

On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.

The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:

    $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
    248

Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.

This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:

    # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
    add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
    Data                                         old     new   delta
    sysctl_vals                                    -      12     +12
    __kstrtab_sysctl_vals                          -      12     +12
    max                                           14      10      -4
    int_max                                       16       -     -16
    one                                           68       -     -68
    zero                                         128      28    -100
    Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%

[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce 
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441

2019-06-05T15:37:17+00:00

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal 
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel 
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h

2018-04-06T04:36:27+00:00

Currently  #includes  for no obvious
reason.  It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add  to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it.  Also remove  from source
files that do not use it.

This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig.  It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes.  I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.

Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms.  Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).

[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
  right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
  counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
  combine all of those. ]

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap 
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar 
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman 	[2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu 	[2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Wei Yongjun 
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Mimi Zohar 
Cc: John Johansen 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ucount: Remove the atomicity from ucount->count

2017-03-06T21:26:37+00:00

Always increment/decrement ucount->count under the ucounts_lock.  The
increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the
locking logic of the code is simpler.  This simplification in the
locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that
could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then
be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts.

A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and
KASAN.  JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov
spotted the race in the code.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f6b2db1a3e8d ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim 
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"