<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/kernel, branch v4.4.114</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>hrtimer: Reset hrtimer cpu base proper on CPU hotplug</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-26T13:54:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=360496cab53af2f1dd77dbe353b7b665bcfdc1e3'/>
<id>360496cab53af2f1dd77dbe353b7b665bcfdc1e3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d5421ea43d30701e03cadc56a38854c36a8b4433 upstream.

The hrtimer interrupt code contains a hang detection and mitigation
mechanism, which prevents that a long delayed hrtimer interrupt causes a
continous retriggering of interrupts which prevent the system from making
progress. If a hang is detected then the timer hardware is programmed with
a certain delay into the future and a flag is set in the hrtimer cpu base
which prevents newly enqueued timers from reprogramming the timer hardware
prior to the chosen delay. The subsequent hrtimer interrupt after the delay
clears the flag and resumes normal operation.

If such a hang happens in the last hrtimer interrupt before a CPU is
unplugged then the hang_detected flag is set and stays that way when the
CPU is plugged in again. At that point the timer hardware is not armed and
it cannot be armed because the hang_detected flag is still active, so
nothing clears that flag. As a consequence the CPU does not receive hrtimer
interrupts and no timers expire on that CPU which results in RCU stalls and
other malfunctions.

Clear the flag along with some other less critical members of the hrtimer
cpu base to ensure starting from a clean state when a CPU is plugged in.

Thanks to Paul, Sebastian and Anna-Maria for their help to get down to the
root cause of that hard to reproduce heisenbug. Once understood it's
trivial and certainly justifies a brown paperbag.

Fixes: 41d2e4949377 ("hrtimer: Tune hrtimer_interrupt hang logic")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Sewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner &lt;anna-maria@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801261447590.2067@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d5421ea43d30701e03cadc56a38854c36a8b4433 upstream.

The hrtimer interrupt code contains a hang detection and mitigation
mechanism, which prevents that a long delayed hrtimer interrupt causes a
continous retriggering of interrupts which prevent the system from making
progress. If a hang is detected then the timer hardware is programmed with
a certain delay into the future and a flag is set in the hrtimer cpu base
which prevents newly enqueued timers from reprogramming the timer hardware
prior to the chosen delay. The subsequent hrtimer interrupt after the delay
clears the flag and resumes normal operation.

If such a hang happens in the last hrtimer interrupt before a CPU is
unplugged then the hang_detected flag is set and stays that way when the
CPU is plugged in again. At that point the timer hardware is not armed and
it cannot be armed because the hang_detected flag is still active, so
nothing clears that flag. As a consequence the CPU does not receive hrtimer
interrupts and no timers expire on that CPU which results in RCU stalls and
other malfunctions.

Clear the flag along with some other less critical members of the hrtimer
cpu base to ensure starting from a clean state when a CPU is plugged in.

Thanks to Paul, Sebastian and Anna-Maria for their help to get down to the
root cause of that hard to reproduce heisenbug. Once understood it's
trivial and certainly justifies a brown paperbag.

Fixes: 41d2e4949377 ("hrtimer: Tune hrtimer_interrupt hang logic")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Sewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner &lt;anna-maria@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801261447590.2067@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>timers: Plug locking race vs. timer migration</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-24T09:41:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=839003061aa9362f23866614862b49b57bfdd6ce'/>
<id>839003061aa9362f23866614862b49b57bfdd6ce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b831275a3553c32091222ac619cfddd73a5553fb upstream.

Linus noticed that lock_timer_base() lacks a READ_ONCE() for accessing the
timer flags. As a consequence the compiler is allowed to reload the flags
between the initial check for TIMER_MIGRATION and the following timer base
computation and the spin lock of the base.

While this has not been observed (yet), we need to make sure that it never
happens.

Fixes: 0eeda71bc30d ("timer: Replace timer base by a cpu index")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1610241711220.4983@nanos
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;mgalbraith@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b831275a3553c32091222ac619cfddd73a5553fb upstream.

Linus noticed that lock_timer_base() lacks a READ_ONCE() for accessing the
timer flags. As a consequence the compiler is allowed to reload the flags
between the initial check for TIMER_MIGRATION and the following timer base
computation and the spin lock of the base.

While this has not been observed (yet), we need to make sure that it never
happens.

Fixes: 0eeda71bc30d ("timer: Replace timer base by a cpu index")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1610241711220.4983@nanos
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;mgalbraith@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: Avoid undefined behaviour in ktime_add_safe()</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vegard Nossum</name>
<email>vegard.nossum@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-12T23:37:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=08b1cf4964d526cf3c2ea9e36ffd752752543ef3'/>
<id>08b1cf4964d526cf3c2ea9e36ffd752752543ef3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 979515c5645830465739254abc1b1648ada41518 upstream.

I ran into this:

    ================================================================================
    UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/hrtimer.c:310:16
    signed integer overflow:
    9223372036854775807 + 50000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
    CPU: 2 PID: 4798 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #91
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
     0000000000000000 ffff88010ce6fb88 ffffffff82344740 0000000041b58ab3
     ffffffff84f97a20 ffffffff82344694 ffff88010ce6fbb0 ffff88010ce6fb60
     000000000000c350 ffff88010ce6f968 dffffc0000000000 ffffffff857bc320
    Call Trace:
     [&lt;ffffffff82344740&gt;] dump_stack+0xac/0xfc
     [&lt;ffffffff82344694&gt;] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0xc4/0xc4
     [&lt;ffffffff8242df78&gt;] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x8a
     [&lt;ffffffff8242e6b4&gt;] handle_overflow+0x202/0x23d
     [&lt;ffffffff8242e4b2&gt;] ? val_to_string.constprop.6+0x11e/0x11e
     [&lt;ffffffff8236df71&gt;] ? timerqueue_add+0x151/0x410
     [&lt;ffffffff81485c48&gt;] ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x3b8/0x1380
     [&lt;ffffffff81795631&gt;] ? memset+0x31/0x40
     [&lt;ffffffff8242e6fd&gt;] __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0xe/0x10
     [&lt;ffffffff81488ac9&gt;] hrtimer_nanosleep+0x5d9/0x790
     [&lt;ffffffff814884f0&gt;] ? hrtimer_init_sleeper+0x80/0x80
     [&lt;ffffffff813a9ffb&gt;] ? __might_sleep+0x5b/0x260
     [&lt;ffffffff8148be10&gt;] common_nsleep+0x20/0x30
     [&lt;ffffffff814906c7&gt;] SyS_clock_nanosleep+0x197/0x210
     [&lt;ffffffff81490530&gt;] ? SyS_clock_getres+0x150/0x150
     [&lt;ffffffff823c7113&gt;] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
     [&lt;ffffffff8162ef60&gt;] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.3+0x30/0x1b0
     [&lt;ffffffff81490530&gt;] ? SyS_clock_getres+0x150/0x150
     [&lt;ffffffff81007bd3&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
     [&lt;ffffffff845f85aa&gt;] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    ================================================================================

Add a new ktime_add_unsafe() helper which doesn't check for overflow, but
doesn't throw a UBSAN warning when it does overflow either.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Richard Cochran &lt;richardcochran@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 979515c5645830465739254abc1b1648ada41518 upstream.

I ran into this:

    ================================================================================
    UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/hrtimer.c:310:16
    signed integer overflow:
    9223372036854775807 + 50000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
    CPU: 2 PID: 4798 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #91
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
     0000000000000000 ffff88010ce6fb88 ffffffff82344740 0000000041b58ab3
     ffffffff84f97a20 ffffffff82344694 ffff88010ce6fbb0 ffff88010ce6fb60
     000000000000c350 ffff88010ce6f968 dffffc0000000000 ffffffff857bc320
    Call Trace:
     [&lt;ffffffff82344740&gt;] dump_stack+0xac/0xfc
     [&lt;ffffffff82344694&gt;] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0xc4/0xc4
     [&lt;ffffffff8242df78&gt;] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x8a
     [&lt;ffffffff8242e6b4&gt;] handle_overflow+0x202/0x23d
     [&lt;ffffffff8242e4b2&gt;] ? val_to_string.constprop.6+0x11e/0x11e
     [&lt;ffffffff8236df71&gt;] ? timerqueue_add+0x151/0x410
     [&lt;ffffffff81485c48&gt;] ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x3b8/0x1380
     [&lt;ffffffff81795631&gt;] ? memset+0x31/0x40
     [&lt;ffffffff8242e6fd&gt;] __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0xe/0x10
     [&lt;ffffffff81488ac9&gt;] hrtimer_nanosleep+0x5d9/0x790
     [&lt;ffffffff814884f0&gt;] ? hrtimer_init_sleeper+0x80/0x80
     [&lt;ffffffff813a9ffb&gt;] ? __might_sleep+0x5b/0x260
     [&lt;ffffffff8148be10&gt;] common_nsleep+0x20/0x30
     [&lt;ffffffff814906c7&gt;] SyS_clock_nanosleep+0x197/0x210
     [&lt;ffffffff81490530&gt;] ? SyS_clock_getres+0x150/0x150
     [&lt;ffffffff823c7113&gt;] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
     [&lt;ffffffff8162ef60&gt;] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.3+0x30/0x1b0
     [&lt;ffffffff81490530&gt;] ? SyS_clock_getres+0x150/0x150
     [&lt;ffffffff81007bd3&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
     [&lt;ffffffff845f85aa&gt;] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    ================================================================================

Add a new ktime_add_unsafe() helper which doesn't check for overflow, but
doesn't throw a UBSAN warning when it does overflow either.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Richard Cochran &lt;richardcochran@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/deadline: Use the revised wakeup rule for suspending constrained dl tasks</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Bristot de Oliveira</name>
<email>bristot@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-29T14:24:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1d00e3d9b7ed8fbf6729b7c5a8aae9f2711d2655'/>
<id>1d00e3d9b7ed8fbf6729b7c5a8aae9f2711d2655</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3effcb4247e74a51f5d8b775a1ee4abf87cc089a upstream.

We have been facing some problems with self-suspending constrained
deadline tasks. The main reason is that the original CBS was not
designed for such sort of tasks.

One problem reported by Xunlei Pang takes place when a task
suspends, and then is awakened before the deadline, but so close
to the deadline that its remaining runtime can cause the task
to have an absolute density higher than allowed. In such situation,
the original CBS assumes that the task is facing an early activation,
and so it replenishes the task and set another deadline, one deadline
in the future. This rule works fine for implicit deadline tasks.
Moreover, it allows the system to adapt the period of a task in which
the external event source suffered from a clock drift.

However, this opens the window for bandwidth leakage for constrained
deadline tasks. For instance, a task with the following parameters:

  runtime   = 5 ms
  deadline  = 7 ms
  [density] = 5 / 7 = 0.71
  period    = 1000 ms

If the task runs for 1 ms, and then suspends for another 1ms,
it will be awakened with the following parameters:

  remaining runtime = 4
  laxity = 5

presenting a absolute density of 4 / 5 = 0.80.

In this case, the original CBS would assume the task had an early
wakeup. Then, CBS will reset the runtime, and the absolute deadline will
be postponed by one relative deadline, allowing the task to run.

The problem is that, if the task runs this pattern forever, it will keep
receiving bandwidth, being able to run 1ms every 2ms. Following this
behavior, the task would be able to run 500 ms in 1 sec. Thus running
more than the 5 ms / 1 sec the admission control allowed it to run.

Trying to address the self-suspending case, Luca Abeni, Giuseppe
Lipari, and Juri Lelli [1] revisited the CBS in order to deal with
self-suspending tasks. In the new approach, rather than
replenishing/postponing the absolute deadline, the revised wakeup rule
adjusts the remaining runtime, reducing it to fit into the allowed
density.

A revised version of the idea is:

At a given time t, the maximum absolute density of a task cannot be
higher than its relative density, that is:

  runtime / (deadline - t) &lt;= dl_runtime / dl_deadline

Knowing the laxity of a task (deadline - t), it is possible to move
it to the other side of the equality, thus enabling to define max
remaining runtime a task can use within the absolute deadline, without
over-running the allowed density:

  runtime = (dl_runtime / dl_deadline) * (deadline - t)

For instance, in our previous example, the task could still run:

  runtime = ( 5 / 7 ) * 5
  runtime = 3.57 ms

Without causing damage for other deadline tasks. It is note worthy
that the laxity cannot be negative because that would cause a negative
runtime. Thus, this patch depends on the patch:

  df8eac8cafce ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline")

Which throttles a constrained deadline task activated after the
deadline.

Finally, it is also possible to use the revised wakeup rule for
all other tasks, but that would require some more discussions
about pros and cons.

[The main difference from the original commit is that
 the BW_SHIFT define was not present yet. As BW_SHIFT was
 introduced in a new feature, I just used the value (20),
 likewise we used to use before the #define.
 Other changes were required because of comments. - bistrot]

Reported-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xpang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
[peterz: replaced dl_is_constrained with dl_is_implicit]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Luca Abeni &lt;luca.abeni@santannapisa.it&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira &lt;romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta &lt;tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c800ab3a74a168a84ee5f3f84d12a02e11383be.1495803804.git.bristot@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3effcb4247e74a51f5d8b775a1ee4abf87cc089a upstream.

We have been facing some problems with self-suspending constrained
deadline tasks. The main reason is that the original CBS was not
designed for such sort of tasks.

One problem reported by Xunlei Pang takes place when a task
suspends, and then is awakened before the deadline, but so close
to the deadline that its remaining runtime can cause the task
to have an absolute density higher than allowed. In such situation,
the original CBS assumes that the task is facing an early activation,
and so it replenishes the task and set another deadline, one deadline
in the future. This rule works fine for implicit deadline tasks.
Moreover, it allows the system to adapt the period of a task in which
the external event source suffered from a clock drift.

However, this opens the window for bandwidth leakage for constrained
deadline tasks. For instance, a task with the following parameters:

  runtime   = 5 ms
  deadline  = 7 ms
  [density] = 5 / 7 = 0.71
  period    = 1000 ms

If the task runs for 1 ms, and then suspends for another 1ms,
it will be awakened with the following parameters:

  remaining runtime = 4
  laxity = 5

presenting a absolute density of 4 / 5 = 0.80.

In this case, the original CBS would assume the task had an early
wakeup. Then, CBS will reset the runtime, and the absolute deadline will
be postponed by one relative deadline, allowing the task to run.

The problem is that, if the task runs this pattern forever, it will keep
receiving bandwidth, being able to run 1ms every 2ms. Following this
behavior, the task would be able to run 500 ms in 1 sec. Thus running
more than the 5 ms / 1 sec the admission control allowed it to run.

Trying to address the self-suspending case, Luca Abeni, Giuseppe
Lipari, and Juri Lelli [1] revisited the CBS in order to deal with
self-suspending tasks. In the new approach, rather than
replenishing/postponing the absolute deadline, the revised wakeup rule
adjusts the remaining runtime, reducing it to fit into the allowed
density.

A revised version of the idea is:

At a given time t, the maximum absolute density of a task cannot be
higher than its relative density, that is:

  runtime / (deadline - t) &lt;= dl_runtime / dl_deadline

Knowing the laxity of a task (deadline - t), it is possible to move
it to the other side of the equality, thus enabling to define max
remaining runtime a task can use within the absolute deadline, without
over-running the allowed density:

  runtime = (dl_runtime / dl_deadline) * (deadline - t)

For instance, in our previous example, the task could still run:

  runtime = ( 5 / 7 ) * 5
  runtime = 3.57 ms

Without causing damage for other deadline tasks. It is note worthy
that the laxity cannot be negative because that would cause a negative
runtime. Thus, this patch depends on the patch:

  df8eac8cafce ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline")

Which throttles a constrained deadline task activated after the
deadline.

Finally, it is also possible to use the revised wakeup rule for
all other tasks, but that would require some more discussions
about pros and cons.

[The main difference from the original commit is that
 the BW_SHIFT define was not present yet. As BW_SHIFT was
 introduced in a new feature, I just used the value (20),
 likewise we used to use before the #define.
 Other changes were required because of comments. - bistrot]

Reported-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xpang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
[peterz: replaced dl_is_constrained with dl_is_implicit]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Luca Abeni &lt;luca.abeni@santannapisa.it&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira &lt;romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta &lt;tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c800ab3a74a168a84ee5f3f84d12a02e11383be.1495803804.git.bristot@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix converting enum's from the map in trace_event_eval_update()</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:50:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-18T20:53:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=cf3625004e6c9093dcaa233c6f553b7eba269b50'/>
<id>cf3625004e6c9093dcaa233c6f553b7eba269b50</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ebe1eaf2f02784921759992ae1fde1a9bec8fd0 upstream.

Since enums do not get converted by the TRACE_EVENT macro into their values,
the event format displaces the enum name and not the value. This breaks
tools like perf and trace-cmd that need to interpret the raw binary data. To
solve this, an enum map was created to convert these enums into their actual
numbers on boot up. This is done by TRACE_EVENTS() adding a
TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro.

Some enums were not being converted. This was caused by an optization that
had a bug in it.

All calls get checked against this enum map to see if it should be converted
or not, and it compares the call's system to the system that the enum map
was created under. If they match, then they call is processed.

To cut down on the number of iterations needed to find the maps with a
matching system, since calls and maps are grouped by system, when a match is
made, the index into the map array is saved, so that the next call, if it
belongs to the same system as the previous call, could start right at that
array index and not have to scan all the previous arrays.

The problem was, the saved index was used as the variable to know if this is
a call in a new system or not. If the index was zero, it was assumed that
the call is in a new system and would keep incrementing the saved index
until it found a matching system. The issue arises when the first matching
system was at index zero. The next map, if it belonged to the same system,
would then think it was the first match and increment the index to one. If
the next call belong to the same system, it would begin its search of the
maps off by one, and miss the first enum that should be converted. This left
a single enum not converted properly.

Also add a comment to describe exactly what that index was for. It took me a
bit too long to figure out what I was thinking when debugging this issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/717BE572-2070-4C1E-9902-9F2E0FEDA4F8@oracle.com

Fixes: 0c564a538aa93 ("tracing: Add TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro to map enums to their values")
Reported-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Teste-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1ebe1eaf2f02784921759992ae1fde1a9bec8fd0 upstream.

Since enums do not get converted by the TRACE_EVENT macro into their values,
the event format displaces the enum name and not the value. This breaks
tools like perf and trace-cmd that need to interpret the raw binary data. To
solve this, an enum map was created to convert these enums into their actual
numbers on boot up. This is done by TRACE_EVENTS() adding a
TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro.

Some enums were not being converted. This was caused by an optization that
had a bug in it.

All calls get checked against this enum map to see if it should be converted
or not, and it compares the call's system to the system that the enum map
was created under. If they match, then they call is processed.

To cut down on the number of iterations needed to find the maps with a
matching system, since calls and maps are grouped by system, when a match is
made, the index into the map array is saved, so that the next call, if it
belongs to the same system as the previous call, could start right at that
array index and not have to scan all the previous arrays.

The problem was, the saved index was used as the variable to know if this is
a call in a new system or not. If the index was zero, it was assumed that
the call is in a new system and would keep incrementing the saved index
until it found a matching system. The issue arises when the first matching
system was at index zero. The next map, if it belonged to the same system,
would then think it was the first match and increment the index to one. If
the next call belong to the same system, it would begin its search of the
maps off by one, and miss the first enum that should be converted. This left
a single enum not converted properly.

Also add a comment to describe exactly what that index was for. It took me a
bit too long to figure out what I was thinking when debugging this issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/717BE572-2070-4C1E-9902-9F2E0FEDA4F8@oracle.com

Fixes: 0c564a538aa93 ("tracing: Add TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro to map enums to their values")
Reported-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Teste-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/deadline: Zero out positive runtime after throttling constrained tasks</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:50:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xunlei Pang</name>
<email>xlpang@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-10T13:03:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8bd58b61d2faacdacd05287a3bbb32ad226b5428'/>
<id>8bd58b61d2faacdacd05287a3bbb32ad226b5428</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ae83b56a56f8d9643dedbee86b457fa1c5d42f59 upstream.

When a contrained task is throttled by dl_check_constrained_dl(),
it may carry the remaining positive runtime, as a result when
dl_task_timer() fires and calls replenish_dl_entity(), it will
not be replenished correctly due to the positive dl_se-&gt;runtime.

This patch assigns its runtime to 0 if positive after throttling.

Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xlpang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Luca Abeni &lt;luca.abeni@santannapisa.it&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: df8eac8cafce ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494421417-27550-1-git-send-email-xlpang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ae83b56a56f8d9643dedbee86b457fa1c5d42f59 upstream.

When a contrained task is throttled by dl_check_constrained_dl(),
it may carry the remaining positive runtime, as a result when
dl_task_timer() fires and calls replenish_dl_entity(), it will
not be replenished correctly due to the positive dl_se-&gt;runtime.

This patch assigns its runtime to 0 if positive after throttling.

Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xlpang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Luca Abeni &lt;luca.abeni@santannapisa.it&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: df8eac8cafce ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494421417-27550-1-git-send-email-xlpang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:50:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Jinyue</name>
<email>lijinyue@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-14T09:04:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=58c82be944f58561e77eb9db5039a4b0eca96ac5'/>
<id>58c82be944f58561e77eb9db5039a4b0eca96ac5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a upstream.

UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:

 UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
 signed integer overflow:
 0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'

Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.

Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue &lt;lijinyue@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a upstream.

UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:

 UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
 signed integer overflow:
 0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'

Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.

Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue &lt;lijinyue@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gcov: disable for COMPILE_TEST</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:50:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-25T15:35:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e6c591e7a430197777a6456a3cd2db38fffd7647'/>
<id>e6c591e7a430197777a6456a3cd2db38fffd7647</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cc622420798c4bcf093785d872525087a7798db9 upstream.

Enabling gcov is counterproductive to compile testing: it significantly
increases the kernel image size, compile time, and it produces lots
of false positive "may be used uninitialized" warnings as the result
of missed optimizations.

This is in line with how UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL and PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES
work, both of which have similar problems.

With an ARM allmodconfig kernel, I see the build time drop from
283 minutes CPU time to 225 minutes, and the vmlinux size drops
from 43MB to 26MB.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Oberparleiter &lt;oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cc622420798c4bcf093785d872525087a7798db9 upstream.

Enabling gcov is counterproductive to compile testing: it significantly
increases the kernel image size, compile time, and it produces lots
of false positive "may be used uninitialized" warnings as the result
of missed optimizations.

This is in line with how UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL and PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES
work, both of which have similar problems.

With an ARM allmodconfig kernel, I see the build time drop from
283 minutes CPU time to 225 minutes, and the vmlinux size drops
from 43MB to 26MB.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Oberparleiter &lt;oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T08:35:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-12T16:58:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=095b0ba360ff9a86c592c1293602d42a9297e047'/>
<id>095b0ba360ff9a86c592c1293602d42a9297e047</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.

syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.

However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr-&gt;max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.

Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL &lt;&lt; 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.

This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.

Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.

syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.

However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr-&gt;max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.

Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL &lt;&lt; 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.

This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.

Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T08:35:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-08T01:33:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9a7fad4c0e215fb1c256fee27c45f9f8bc4364c5'/>
<id>9a7fad4c0e215fb1c256fee27c45f9f8bc4364c5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.

Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.

To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.

Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index &amp; index_mask' operation.

If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
  if (index &gt;= max_entries) {
    index &amp;= map-&gt;index_mask;
    bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
  }
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index &gt;= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.

Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.

That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.

v2-&gt;v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.

Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.

To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.

Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index &amp; index_mask' operation.

If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
  if (index &gt;= max_entries) {
    index &amp;= map-&gt;index_mask;
    bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
  }
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index &gt;= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.

Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.

That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.

v2-&gt;v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
