<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/kernel, branch v5.4.228</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>memcg: fix possible use-after-free in memcg_write_event_control()</title>
<updated>2022-12-14T10:30:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-08T02:53:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=35963b31821920908e397146502066f6b032c917'/>
<id>35963b31821920908e397146502066f6b032c917</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4a7ba45b1a435e7097ca0f79a847d0949d0eb088 upstream.

memcg_write_event_control() accesses the dentry-&gt;d_name of the specified
control fd to route the write call.  As a cgroup interface file can't be
renamed, it's safe to access d_name as long as the specified file is a
regular cgroup file.  Also, as these cgroup interface files can't be
removed before the directory, it's safe to access the parent too.

Prior to 347c4a874710 ("memcg: remove cgroup_event-&gt;cft"), there was a
call to __file_cft() which verified that the specified file is a regular
cgroupfs file before further accesses.  The cftype pointer returned from
__file_cft() was no longer necessary and the commit inadvertently dropped
the file type check with it allowing any file to slip through.  With the
invarients broken, the d_name and parent accesses can now race against
renames and removals of arbitrary files and cause use-after-free's.

Fix the bug by resurrecting the file type check in __file_cft().  Now that
cgroupfs is implemented through kernfs, checking the file operations needs
to go through a layer of indirection.  Instead, let's check the superblock
and dentry type.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Y5FRm/cfcKPGzWwl@slm.duckdns.org
Fixes: 347c4a874710 ("memcg: remove cgroup_event-&gt;cft")
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;songmuchun@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[3.14+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4a7ba45b1a435e7097ca0f79a847d0949d0eb088 upstream.

memcg_write_event_control() accesses the dentry-&gt;d_name of the specified
control fd to route the write call.  As a cgroup interface file can't be
renamed, it's safe to access d_name as long as the specified file is a
regular cgroup file.  Also, as these cgroup interface files can't be
removed before the directory, it's safe to access the parent too.

Prior to 347c4a874710 ("memcg: remove cgroup_event-&gt;cft"), there was a
call to __file_cft() which verified that the specified file is a regular
cgroupfs file before further accesses.  The cftype pointer returned from
__file_cft() was no longer necessary and the commit inadvertently dropped
the file type check with it allowing any file to slip through.  With the
invarients broken, the d_name and parent accesses can now race against
renames and removals of arbitrary files and cause use-after-free's.

Fix the bug by resurrecting the file type check in __file_cft().  Now that
cgroupfs is implemented through kernfs, checking the file operations needs
to go through a layer of indirection.  Instead, let's check the superblock
and dentry type.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Y5FRm/cfcKPGzWwl@slm.duckdns.org
Fixes: 347c4a874710 ("memcg: remove cgroup_event-&gt;cft")
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;songmuchun@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[3.14+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: proc_skip_spaces() shouldn't think it is working on C strings</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:23:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-05T20:09:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0390da0565ade35f9c2bedcb57ab64c61b40045b'/>
<id>0390da0565ade35f9c2bedcb57ab64c61b40045b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bce9332220bd677d83b19d21502776ad555a0e73 upstream.

proc_skip_spaces() seems to think it is working on C strings, and ends
up being just a wrapper around skip_spaces() with a really odd calling
convention.

Instead of basing it on skip_spaces(), it should have looked more like
proc_skip_char(), which really is the exact same function (except it
skips a particular character, rather than whitespace).  So use that as
inspiration, odd coding and all.

Now the calling convention actually makes sense and works for the
intended purpose.

Reported-and-tested-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bce9332220bd677d83b19d21502776ad555a0e73 upstream.

proc_skip_spaces() seems to think it is working on C strings, and ends
up being just a wrapper around skip_spaces() with a really odd calling
convention.

Instead of basing it on skip_spaces(), it should have looked more like
proc_skip_char(), which really is the exact same function (except it
skips a particular character, rather than whitespace).  So use that as
inspiration, odd coding and all.

Now the calling convention actually makes sense and works for the
intended purpose.

Reported-and-tested-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: avoid integer type confusion in get_proc_long</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:23:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-05T19:33:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=dd3124a051a1c0397e82bc240f4db9987ef52b3d'/>
<id>dd3124a051a1c0397e82bc240f4db9987ef52b3d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6cfaf34be9fcd1a8285a294e18986bfc41a409c upstream.

proc_get_long() is passed a size_t, but then assigns it to an 'int'
variable for the length.  Let's not do that, even if our IO paths are
limited to MAX_RW_COUNT (exactly because of these kinds of type errors).

So do the proper test in the rigth type.

Reported-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e6cfaf34be9fcd1a8285a294e18986bfc41a409c upstream.

proc_get_long() is passed a size_t, but then assigns it to an 'int'
variable for the length.  Let's not do that, even if our IO paths are
limited to MAX_RW_COUNT (exactly because of these kinds of type errors).

So do the proper test in the rigth type.

Reported-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing/ring-buffer: Have polling block on watermark</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:23:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Google)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-21T03:14:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=e65ac2bdda549dd3411731ad37c17460e4ee1bae'/>
<id>e65ac2bdda549dd3411731ad37c17460e4ee1bae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42fb0a1e84ff525ebe560e2baf9451ab69127e2b upstream.

Currently the way polling works on the ring buffer is broken. It will
return immediately if there's any data in the ring buffer whereas a read
will block until the watermark (defined by the tracefs buffer_percent file)
is hit.

That is, a select() or poll() will return as if there's data available,
but then the following read will block. This is broken for the way
select()s and poll()s are supposed to work.

Have the polling on the ring buffer also block the same way reads and
splice does on the ring buffer.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221020231427.41be3f26@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Linux Trace Kernel &lt;linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Primiano Tucci &lt;primiano@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1e0d6714aceb7 ("ring-buffer: Do not wake up a splice waiter when page is not full")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42fb0a1e84ff525ebe560e2baf9451ab69127e2b upstream.

Currently the way polling works on the ring buffer is broken. It will
return immediately if there's any data in the ring buffer whereas a read
will block until the watermark (defined by the tracefs buffer_percent file)
is hit.

That is, a select() or poll() will return as if there's data available,
but then the following read will block. This is broken for the way
select()s and poll()s are supposed to work.

Have the polling on the ring buffer also block the same way reads and
splice does on the ring buffer.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221020231427.41be3f26@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Linux Trace Kernel &lt;linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Primiano Tucci &lt;primiano@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1e0d6714aceb7 ("ring-buffer: Do not wake up a splice waiter when page is not full")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:23:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Google)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-23T22:14:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1603feac154ff38514e8354e3079a455eb4801e2'/>
<id>1603feac154ff38514e8354e3079a455eb4801e2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4313e5a613049dfc1819a6dfb5f94cf2caff9452 upstream.

After 65536 dynamic events have been added and removed, the "type" field
of the event then uses the first type number that is available (not
currently used by other events). A type number is the identifier of the
binary blobs in the tracing ring buffer (known as events) to map them to
logic that can parse the binary blob.

The issue is that if a dynamic event (like a kprobe event) is traced and
is in the ring buffer, and then that event is removed (because it is
dynamic, which means it can be created and destroyed), if another dynamic
event is created that has the same number that new event's logic on
parsing the binary blob will be used.

To show how this can be an issue, the following can crash the kernel:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 # for i in `seq 65536`; do
     echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 $arg1:u32' &gt; kprobe_events
 # done

For every iteration of the above, the writing to the kprobe_events will
remove the old event and create a new one (with the same format) and
increase the type number to the next available on until the type number
reaches over 65535 which is the max number for the 16 bit type. After it
reaches that number, the logic to allocate a new number simply looks for
the next available number. When an dynamic event is removed, that number
is then available to be reused by the next dynamic event created. That is,
once the above reaches the max number, the number assigned to the event in
that loop will remain the same.

Now that means deleting one dynamic event and created another will reuse
the previous events type number. This is where bad things can happen.
After the above loop finishes, the kprobes/foo event which reads the
do_sys_openat2 function call's first parameter as an integer.

 # echo 1 &gt; kprobes/foo/enable
 # cat /etc/passwd &gt; /dev/null
 # cat trace
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849603: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849620: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849838: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849880: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
 # echo 0 &gt; kprobes/foo/enable

Now if we delete the kprobe and create a new one that reads a string:

 # echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 +0($arg2):string' &gt; kprobe_events

And now we can the trace:

 # cat trace
        sendmail-1942    [002] .....   530.136320: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1=             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.930817: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.930961: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.934278: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.934563: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
            bash-1515    [007] .....   534.299093: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk���������@��4Z����;Y�����U

And dmesg has:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in string+0xd4/0x1c0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88805fdbbfa0 by task cat/2049

 CPU: 0 PID: 2049 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-test+ #641
 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x77
  print_report+0x17f/0x47b
  kasan_report+0xad/0x130
  string+0xd4/0x1c0
  vsnprintf+0x500/0x840
  seq_buf_vprintf+0x62/0xc0
  trace_seq_printf+0x10e/0x1e0
  print_type_string+0x90/0xa0
  print_kprobe_event+0x16b/0x290
  print_trace_line+0x451/0x8e0
  s_show+0x72/0x1f0
  seq_read_iter+0x58e/0x750
  seq_read+0x115/0x160
  vfs_read+0x11d/0x460
  ksys_read+0xa9/0x130
  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
 RIP: 0033:0x7fc2e972ade2
 Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d b2 3f 0a 00 e8 05 f0 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc64e687c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fc2e972ade2
 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fc2e980d000 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00007fc2e980d000 R08: 00007fc2e980c010 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020f00
 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page:ffffea00017f6ec0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x5fdbb
 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
 raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea00017f6ec8 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff88805fdbbe80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ffff88805fdbbf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 &gt;ffff88805fdbbf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                ^
  ffff88805fdbc000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ffff88805fdbc080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ==================================================================

This was found when Zheng Yejian sent a patch to convert the event type
number assignment to use IDA, which gives the next available number, and
this bug showed up in the fuzz testing by Yujie Liu and the kernel test
robot. But after further analysis, I found that this behavior is the same
as when the event type numbers go past the 16bit max (and the above shows
that).

As modules have a similar issue, but is dealt with by setting a
"WAS_ENABLED" flag when a module event is enabled, and when the module is
freed, if any of its events were enabled, the ring buffer that holds that
event is also cleared, to prevent reading stale events. The same can be
done for dynamic events.

If any dynamic event that is being removed was enabled, then make sure the
buffers they were enabled in are now cleared.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221123171434.545706e3@gandalf.local.home
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221110020319.1259291-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Depends-on: e18eb8783ec49 ("tracing: Add tracing_reset_all_online_cpus_unlocked() function")
Depends-on: 5448d44c38557 ("tracing: Add unified dynamic event framework")
Depends-on: 6212dd29683ee ("tracing/kprobes: Use dyn_event framework for kprobe events")
Depends-on: 065e63f951432 ("tracing: Only have rmmod clear buffers that its events were active in")
Depends-on: 575380da8b469 ("tracing: Only clear trace buffer on module unload if event was traced")
Fixes: 77b44d1b7c283 ("tracing/kprobes: Rename Kprobe-tracer to kprobe-event")
Reported-by: Zheng Yejian &lt;zhengyejian1@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yujie Liu &lt;yujie.liu@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;yujie.liu@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4313e5a613049dfc1819a6dfb5f94cf2caff9452 upstream.

After 65536 dynamic events have been added and removed, the "type" field
of the event then uses the first type number that is available (not
currently used by other events). A type number is the identifier of the
binary blobs in the tracing ring buffer (known as events) to map them to
logic that can parse the binary blob.

The issue is that if a dynamic event (like a kprobe event) is traced and
is in the ring buffer, and then that event is removed (because it is
dynamic, which means it can be created and destroyed), if another dynamic
event is created that has the same number that new event's logic on
parsing the binary blob will be used.

To show how this can be an issue, the following can crash the kernel:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 # for i in `seq 65536`; do
     echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 $arg1:u32' &gt; kprobe_events
 # done

For every iteration of the above, the writing to the kprobe_events will
remove the old event and create a new one (with the same format) and
increase the type number to the next available on until the type number
reaches over 65535 which is the max number for the 16 bit type. After it
reaches that number, the logic to allocate a new number simply looks for
the next available number. When an dynamic event is removed, that number
is then available to be reused by the next dynamic event created. That is,
once the above reaches the max number, the number assigned to the event in
that loop will remain the same.

Now that means deleting one dynamic event and created another will reuse
the previous events type number. This is where bad things can happen.
After the above loop finishes, the kprobes/foo event which reads the
do_sys_openat2 function call's first parameter as an integer.

 # echo 1 &gt; kprobes/foo/enable
 # cat /etc/passwd &gt; /dev/null
 # cat trace
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849603: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849620: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849838: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
             cat-2211    [005] ....  2007.849880: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
 # echo 0 &gt; kprobes/foo/enable

Now if we delete the kprobe and create a new one that reads a string:

 # echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 +0($arg2):string' &gt; kprobe_events

And now we can the trace:

 # cat trace
        sendmail-1942    [002] .....   530.136320: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1=             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.930817: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.930961: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.934278: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
             cat-2046    [004] .....   530.934563: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������"
            bash-1515    [007] .....   534.299093: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk���������@��4Z����;Y�����U

And dmesg has:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in string+0xd4/0x1c0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88805fdbbfa0 by task cat/2049

 CPU: 0 PID: 2049 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-test+ #641
 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x77
  print_report+0x17f/0x47b
  kasan_report+0xad/0x130
  string+0xd4/0x1c0
  vsnprintf+0x500/0x840
  seq_buf_vprintf+0x62/0xc0
  trace_seq_printf+0x10e/0x1e0
  print_type_string+0x90/0xa0
  print_kprobe_event+0x16b/0x290
  print_trace_line+0x451/0x8e0
  s_show+0x72/0x1f0
  seq_read_iter+0x58e/0x750
  seq_read+0x115/0x160
  vfs_read+0x11d/0x460
  ksys_read+0xa9/0x130
  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
 RIP: 0033:0x7fc2e972ade2
 Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d b2 3f 0a 00 e8 05 f0 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc64e687c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fc2e972ade2
 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fc2e980d000 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00007fc2e980d000 R08: 00007fc2e980c010 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020f00
 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page:ffffea00017f6ec0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x5fdbb
 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
 raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea00017f6ec8 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff88805fdbbe80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ffff88805fdbbf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 &gt;ffff88805fdbbf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                ^
  ffff88805fdbc000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ffff88805fdbc080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ==================================================================

This was found when Zheng Yejian sent a patch to convert the event type
number assignment to use IDA, which gives the next available number, and
this bug showed up in the fuzz testing by Yujie Liu and the kernel test
robot. But after further analysis, I found that this behavior is the same
as when the event type numbers go past the 16bit max (and the above shows
that).

As modules have a similar issue, but is dealt with by setting a
"WAS_ENABLED" flag when a module event is enabled, and when the module is
freed, if any of its events were enabled, the ring buffer that holds that
event is also cleared, to prevent reading stale events. The same can be
done for dynamic events.

If any dynamic event that is being removed was enabled, then make sure the
buffers they were enabled in are now cleared.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221123171434.545706e3@gandalf.local.home
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221110020319.1259291-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Depends-on: e18eb8783ec49 ("tracing: Add tracing_reset_all_online_cpus_unlocked() function")
Depends-on: 5448d44c38557 ("tracing: Add unified dynamic event framework")
Depends-on: 6212dd29683ee ("tracing/kprobes: Use dyn_event framework for kprobe events")
Depends-on: 065e63f951432 ("tracing: Only have rmmod clear buffers that its events were active in")
Depends-on: 575380da8b469 ("tracing: Only clear trace buffer on module unload if event was traced")
Fixes: 77b44d1b7c283 ("tracing/kprobes: Rename Kprobe-tracer to kprobe-event")
Reported-by: Zheng Yejian &lt;zhengyejian1@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yujie Liu &lt;yujie.liu@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;yujie.liu@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gcov: clang: fix the buffer overflow issue</title>
<updated>2022-12-08T10:23:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mukesh Ojha</name>
<email>quic_mojha@quicinc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-09T19:01:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=47b4949335cba7fcce6b3fcf573534d147ac520e'/>
<id>47b4949335cba7fcce6b3fcf573534d147ac520e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a6f810efabfd789d3bbafeacb4502958ec56c5ce upstream.

Currently, in clang version of gcov code when module is getting removed
gcov_info_add() incorrectly adds the sfn_ptr-&gt;counter to all the
dst-&gt;functions and it result in the kernel panic in below crash report.
Fix this by properly handling it.

[    8.899094][  T599] Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffffff80461cc000
[    8.899100][  T599] Mem abort info:
[    8.899102][  T599]   ESR = 0x9600004f
[    8.899103][  T599]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    8.899105][  T599]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    8.899107][  T599]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    8.899108][  T599]   FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault
[    8.899110][  T599] Data abort info:
[    8.899111][  T599]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f
[    8.899113][  T599]   CM = 0, WnR = 1
[    8.899114][  T599] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000ab8de000
[    8.899116][  T599] [ffffff80461cc000] pgd=18000009ffcde003, p4d=18000009ffcde003, pud=18000009ffcde003, pmd=18000009ffcad003, pte=00600000c61cc787
[    8.899124][  T599] Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    8.899265][  T599] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0
....
..,
[    8.899544][  T599] CPU: 7 PID: 599 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G S         OE     5.15.41-android13-8-g38e9b1af6bce #1
[    8.899547][  T599] Hardware name: XXX (DT)
[    8.899549][  T599] pstate: 82400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[    8.899551][  T599] pc : gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
[    8.899557][  T599] lr : gcov_event+0x28c/0x6b8
[    8.899559][  T599] sp : ffffffc00e733b00
[    8.899560][  T599] x29: ffffffc00e733b00 x28: ffffffc00e733d30 x27: ffffffe8dc297470
[    8.899563][  T599] x26: ffffffe8dc297000 x25: ffffffe8dc297000 x24: ffffffe8dc297000
[    8.899566][  T599] x23: ffffffe8dc0a6200 x22: ffffff880f68bf20 x21: 0000000000000000
[    8.899569][  T599] x20: ffffff880f68bf00 x19: ffffff8801babc00 x18: ffffffc00d7f9058
[    8.899572][  T599] x17: 0000000000088793 x16: ffffff80461cbe00 x15: 9100052952800785
[    8.899575][  T599] x14: 0000000000000200 x13: 0000000000000041 x12: 9100052952800785
[    8.899577][  T599] x11: ffffffe8dc297000 x10: ffffffe8dc297000 x9 : ffffff80461cbc80
[    8.899580][  T599] x8 : ffffff8801babe80 x7 : ffffffe8dc2ec000 x6 : ffffffe8dc2ed000
[    8.899583][  T599] x5 : 000000008020001f x4 : fffffffe2006eae0 x3 : 000000008020001f
[    8.899586][  T599] x2 : ffffff8027c49200 x1 : ffffff8801babc20 x0 : ffffff80461cb3a0
[    8.899589][  T599] Call trace:
[    8.899590][  T599]  gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
[    8.899592][  T599]  gcov_module_notifier+0xbc/0x120
[    8.899595][  T599]  blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xa0/0x11c
[    8.899598][  T599]  do_init_module+0x2a8/0x33c
[    8.899600][  T599]  load_module+0x23cc/0x261c
[    8.899602][  T599]  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x158/0x194
[    8.899604][  T599]  invoke_syscall+0x94/0x2bc
[    8.899607][  T599]  el0_svc_common+0x1d8/0x34c
[    8.899609][  T599]  do_el0_svc+0x40/0x54
[    8.899611][  T599]  el0_svc+0x94/0x2f0
[    8.899613][  T599]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
[    8.899615][  T599]  el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
[    8.899618][  T599] Code: f905f56c f86e69ec f86e6a0f 8b0c01ec (f82e6a0c)
[    8.899620][  T599] ---[ end trace ed5218e9e5b6e2e6 ]---

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1668020497-13142-1-git-send-email-quic_mojha@quicinc.com
Fixes: e178a5beb369 ("gcov: clang support")
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha &lt;quic_mojha@quicinc.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter &lt;oberpar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Peter Oberparleiter &lt;oberpar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.2+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a6f810efabfd789d3bbafeacb4502958ec56c5ce upstream.

Currently, in clang version of gcov code when module is getting removed
gcov_info_add() incorrectly adds the sfn_ptr-&gt;counter to all the
dst-&gt;functions and it result in the kernel panic in below crash report.
Fix this by properly handling it.

[    8.899094][  T599] Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffffff80461cc000
[    8.899100][  T599] Mem abort info:
[    8.899102][  T599]   ESR = 0x9600004f
[    8.899103][  T599]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    8.899105][  T599]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    8.899107][  T599]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    8.899108][  T599]   FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault
[    8.899110][  T599] Data abort info:
[    8.899111][  T599]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f
[    8.899113][  T599]   CM = 0, WnR = 1
[    8.899114][  T599] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000ab8de000
[    8.899116][  T599] [ffffff80461cc000] pgd=18000009ffcde003, p4d=18000009ffcde003, pud=18000009ffcde003, pmd=18000009ffcad003, pte=00600000c61cc787
[    8.899124][  T599] Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    8.899265][  T599] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0
....
..,
[    8.899544][  T599] CPU: 7 PID: 599 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G S         OE     5.15.41-android13-8-g38e9b1af6bce #1
[    8.899547][  T599] Hardware name: XXX (DT)
[    8.899549][  T599] pstate: 82400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[    8.899551][  T599] pc : gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
[    8.899557][  T599] lr : gcov_event+0x28c/0x6b8
[    8.899559][  T599] sp : ffffffc00e733b00
[    8.899560][  T599] x29: ffffffc00e733b00 x28: ffffffc00e733d30 x27: ffffffe8dc297470
[    8.899563][  T599] x26: ffffffe8dc297000 x25: ffffffe8dc297000 x24: ffffffe8dc297000
[    8.899566][  T599] x23: ffffffe8dc0a6200 x22: ffffff880f68bf20 x21: 0000000000000000
[    8.899569][  T599] x20: ffffff880f68bf00 x19: ffffff8801babc00 x18: ffffffc00d7f9058
[    8.899572][  T599] x17: 0000000000088793 x16: ffffff80461cbe00 x15: 9100052952800785
[    8.899575][  T599] x14: 0000000000000200 x13: 0000000000000041 x12: 9100052952800785
[    8.899577][  T599] x11: ffffffe8dc297000 x10: ffffffe8dc297000 x9 : ffffff80461cbc80
[    8.899580][  T599] x8 : ffffff8801babe80 x7 : ffffffe8dc2ec000 x6 : ffffffe8dc2ed000
[    8.899583][  T599] x5 : 000000008020001f x4 : fffffffe2006eae0 x3 : 000000008020001f
[    8.899586][  T599] x2 : ffffff8027c49200 x1 : ffffff8801babc20 x0 : ffffff80461cb3a0
[    8.899589][  T599] Call trace:
[    8.899590][  T599]  gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
[    8.899592][  T599]  gcov_module_notifier+0xbc/0x120
[    8.899595][  T599]  blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xa0/0x11c
[    8.899598][  T599]  do_init_module+0x2a8/0x33c
[    8.899600][  T599]  load_module+0x23cc/0x261c
[    8.899602][  T599]  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x158/0x194
[    8.899604][  T599]  invoke_syscall+0x94/0x2bc
[    8.899607][  T599]  el0_svc_common+0x1d8/0x34c
[    8.899609][  T599]  do_el0_svc+0x40/0x54
[    8.899611][  T599]  el0_svc+0x94/0x2f0
[    8.899613][  T599]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
[    8.899615][  T599]  el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
[    8.899618][  T599] Code: f905f56c f86e69ec f86e6a0f 8b0c01ec (f82e6a0c)
[    8.899620][  T599] ---[ end trace ed5218e9e5b6e2e6 ]---

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1668020497-13142-1-git-send-email-quic_mojha@quicinc.com
Fixes: e178a5beb369 ("gcov: clang support")
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha &lt;quic_mojha@quicinc.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter &lt;oberpar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Peter Oberparleiter &lt;oberpar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.2+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes: Skip clearing aggrprobe's post_handler in kprobe-on-ftrace case</title>
<updated>2022-11-25T16:42:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Huafei</name>
<email>lihuafei1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-18T01:15:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7b0007b28dd970176f2e297c06ae63eea2447127'/>
<id>7b0007b28dd970176f2e297c06ae63eea2447127</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5dd7caf0bdc5d0bae7cf9776b4d739fb09bd5ebb ]

In __unregister_kprobe_top(), if the currently unregistered probe has
post_handler but other child probes of the aggrprobe do not have
post_handler, the post_handler of the aggrprobe is cleared. If this is
a ftrace-based probe, there is a problem. In later calls to
disarm_kprobe(), we will use kprobe_ftrace_ops because post_handler is
NULL. But we're armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This triggers a WARN in
__disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and may even cause use-after-free:

  Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at kernel_clone+0x0/0x3c0 (error -2)
  WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 137 at kernel/kprobes.c:1135 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.21+0xcf/0xe0
  Modules linked in: testKprobe_007(-)
  CPU: 5 PID: 137 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-dirty #18
  [...]
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   __disable_kprobe+0xcd/0xe0
   __unregister_kprobe_top+0x12/0x150
   ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30
   unregister_kprobes.part.23+0x31/0xa0
   unregister_kprobe+0x32/0x40
   __x64_sys_delete_module+0x15e/0x260
   ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2cd/0x6b0
   do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   [...]

For the kprobe-on-ftrace case, we keep the post_handler setting to
identify this aggrprobe armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This way we
can disarm it correctly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221112070000.35299-1-lihuafei1@huawei.com/

Fixes: 0bc11ed5ab60 ("kprobes: Allow kprobes coexist with livepatch")
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi &lt;zhaogongyi@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei &lt;lihuafei1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5dd7caf0bdc5d0bae7cf9776b4d739fb09bd5ebb ]

In __unregister_kprobe_top(), if the currently unregistered probe has
post_handler but other child probes of the aggrprobe do not have
post_handler, the post_handler of the aggrprobe is cleared. If this is
a ftrace-based probe, there is a problem. In later calls to
disarm_kprobe(), we will use kprobe_ftrace_ops because post_handler is
NULL. But we're armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This triggers a WARN in
__disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and may even cause use-after-free:

  Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at kernel_clone+0x0/0x3c0 (error -2)
  WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 137 at kernel/kprobes.c:1135 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.21+0xcf/0xe0
  Modules linked in: testKprobe_007(-)
  CPU: 5 PID: 137 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-dirty #18
  [...]
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   __disable_kprobe+0xcd/0xe0
   __unregister_kprobe_top+0x12/0x150
   ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30
   unregister_kprobes.part.23+0x31/0xa0
   unregister_kprobe+0x32/0x40
   __x64_sys_delete_module+0x15e/0x260
   ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2cd/0x6b0
   do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   [...]

For the kprobe-on-ftrace case, we keep the post_handler setting to
identify this aggrprobe armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This way we
can disarm it correctly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221112070000.35299-1-lihuafei1@huawei.com/

Fixes: 0bc11ed5ab60 ("kprobes: Allow kprobes coexist with livepatch")
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi &lt;zhaogongyi@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei &lt;lihuafei1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring-buffer: Include dropped pages in counting dirty patches</title>
<updated>2022-11-25T16:42:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Google)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-21T16:30:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ec59a1325230a9179f4595f410b0d6a56ab53380'/>
<id>ec59a1325230a9179f4595f410b0d6a56ab53380</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 31029a8b2c7e656a0289194ef16415050ae4c4ac ]

The function ring_buffer_nr_dirty_pages() was created to find out how many
pages are filled in the ring buffer. There's two running counters. One is
incremented whenever a new page is touched (pages_touched) and the other
is whenever a page is read (pages_read). The dirty count is the number
touched minus the number read. This is used to determine if a blocked task
should be woken up if the percentage of the ring buffer it is waiting for
is hit.

The problem is that it does not take into account dropped pages (when the
new writes overwrite pages that were not read). And then the dirty pages
will always be greater than the percentage.

This makes the "buffer_percent" file inaccurate, as the number of dirty
pages end up always being larger than the percentage, event when it's not
and this causes user space to be woken up more than it wants to be.

Add a new counter to keep track of lost pages, and include that in the
accounting of dirty pages so that it is actually accurate.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221021123013.55fb6055@gandalf.local.home

Fixes: 2c2b0a78b3739 ("ring-buffer: Add percentage of ring buffer full to wake up reader")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 31029a8b2c7e656a0289194ef16415050ae4c4ac ]

The function ring_buffer_nr_dirty_pages() was created to find out how many
pages are filled in the ring buffer. There's two running counters. One is
incremented whenever a new page is touched (pages_touched) and the other
is whenever a page is read (pages_read). The dirty count is the number
touched minus the number read. This is used to determine if a blocked task
should be woken up if the percentage of the ring buffer it is waiting for
is hit.

The problem is that it does not take into account dropped pages (when the
new writes overwrite pages that were not read). And then the dirty pages
will always be greater than the percentage.

This makes the "buffer_percent" file inaccurate, as the number of dirty
pages end up always being larger than the percentage, event when it's not
and this causes user space to be woken up more than it wants to be.

Add a new counter to keep track of lost pages, and include that in the
accounting of dirty pages so that it is actually accurate.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221021123013.55fb6055@gandalf.local.home

Fixes: 2c2b0a78b3739 ("ring-buffer: Add percentage of ring buffer full to wake up reader")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring_buffer: Do not deactivate non-existant pages</title>
<updated>2022-11-25T16:42:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniil Tatianin</name>
<email>d-tatianin@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-14T14:31:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=72c2ea34faa1254ccd0b9d47708fa0ab8b72a017'/>
<id>72c2ea34faa1254ccd0b9d47708fa0ab8b72a017</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 56f4ca0a79a9f1af98f26c54b9b89ba1f9bcc6bd upstream.

rb_head_page_deactivate() expects cpu_buffer to contain a valid list of
-&gt;pages, so verify that the list is actually present before calling it.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE
static analysis tool.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114143129.3534443-1-d-tatianin@yandex-team.ru

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 77ae365eca895 ("ring-buffer: make lockless")
Signed-off-by: Daniil Tatianin &lt;d-tatianin@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 56f4ca0a79a9f1af98f26c54b9b89ba1f9bcc6bd upstream.

rb_head_page_deactivate() expects cpu_buffer to contain a valid list of
-&gt;pages, so verify that the list is actually present before calling it.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE
static analysis tool.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114143129.3534443-1-d-tatianin@yandex-team.ru

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 77ae365eca895 ("ring-buffer: make lockless")
Signed-off-by: Daniil Tatianin &lt;d-tatianin@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Fix null pointer dereference in ftrace_add_mod()</title>
<updated>2022-11-25T16:42:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiu Jianfeng</name>
<email>xiujianfeng@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-16T01:52:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f715f31559b82e3f75ce047fa476de63d8107584'/>
<id>f715f31559b82e3f75ce047fa476de63d8107584</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 19ba6c8af9382c4c05dc6a0a79af3013b9a35cd0 upstream.

The @ftrace_mod is allocated by kzalloc(), so both the members {prev,next}
of @ftrace_mode-&gt;list are NULL, it's not a valid state to call list_del().
If kstrdup() for @ftrace_mod-&gt;{func|module} fails, it goes to @out_free
tag and calls free_ftrace_mod() to destroy @ftrace_mod, then list_del()
will write prev-&gt;next and next-&gt;prev, where null pointer dereference
happens.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ftrace_mod_callback+0x20d/0x220
 ? do_filp_open+0xd9/0x140
 ftrace_process_regex.isra.51+0xbf/0x130
 ftrace_regex_write.isra.52.part.53+0x6e/0x90
 vfs_write+0xee/0x3a0
 ? __audit_filter_op+0xb1/0x100
 ? auditd_test_task+0x38/0x50
 ksys_write+0xa5/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

So call INIT_LIST_HEAD() to initialize the list member to fix this issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221116015207.30858-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 673feb9d76ab ("ftrace: Add :mod: caching infrastructure to trace_array")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 19ba6c8af9382c4c05dc6a0a79af3013b9a35cd0 upstream.

The @ftrace_mod is allocated by kzalloc(), so both the members {prev,next}
of @ftrace_mode-&gt;list are NULL, it's not a valid state to call list_del().
If kstrdup() for @ftrace_mod-&gt;{func|module} fails, it goes to @out_free
tag and calls free_ftrace_mod() to destroy @ftrace_mod, then list_del()
will write prev-&gt;next and next-&gt;prev, where null pointer dereference
happens.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ftrace_mod_callback+0x20d/0x220
 ? do_filp_open+0xd9/0x140
 ftrace_process_regex.isra.51+0xbf/0x130
 ftrace_regex_write.isra.52.part.53+0x6e/0x90
 vfs_write+0xee/0x3a0
 ? __audit_filter_op+0xb1/0x100
 ? auditd_test_task+0x38/0x50
 ksys_write+0xa5/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

So call INIT_LIST_HEAD() to initialize the list member to fix this issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221116015207.30858-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 673feb9d76ab ("ftrace: Add :mod: caching infrastructure to trace_array")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
