<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/mm/kasan, branch v5.10.258</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm/kasan: fix double free for kasan pXds</title>
<updated>2026-06-01T15:29:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ritesh Harjani (IBM)</name>
<email>ritesh.list@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-24T13:23:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7d7b2d5c107a1f6302cf0006d859985e7c3ddd1c'/>
<id>7d7b2d5c107a1f6302cf0006d859985e7c3ddd1c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 51d8c78be0c27ddb91bc2c0263941d8b30a47d3b upstream.

kasan_free_pxd() assumes the page table is always struct page aligned.
But that's not always the case for all architectures.  E.g.  In case of
powerpc with 64K pagesize, PUD table (of size 4096) comes from slab cache
named pgtable-2^9.  Hence instead of page_to_virt(pxd_page()) let's just
directly pass the start of the pxd table which is passed as the 1st
argument.

This fixes the below double free kasan issue seen with PMEM:

radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000047d10000000-0x0000047f90000000 with 2.00 MiB pages
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: double-free in kasan_remove_zero_shadow+0x9c4/0xa20
Free of addr c0000003c38e0000 by task ndctl/2164

CPU: 34 UID: 0 PID: 2164 Comm: ndctl Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1-00048-gea1013c15392 #157 VOLUNTARY
Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_012) hv:phyp pSeries
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xc4 (unreliable)
 print_report+0x214/0x63c
 kasan_report_invalid_free+0xe4/0x110
 check_slab_allocation+0x100/0x150
 kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x6e0
 kasan_remove_zero_shadow+0x9c4/0xa20
 memunmap_pages+0x2b8/0x5c0
 devm_action_release+0x54/0x70
 release_nodes+0xc8/0x1a0
 devres_release_all+0xe0/0x140
 device_unbind_cleanup+0x30/0x120
 device_release_driver_internal+0x3e4/0x450
 unbind_store+0xfc/0x110
 drv_attr_store+0x78/0xb0
 sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x264/0x3f0
 vfs_write+0x3bc/0x7d0
 ksys_write+0xa4/0x190
 system_call_exception+0x190/0x480
 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
---- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff93b3d3f4
NIP:  00007fff93b3d3f4 LR: 00007fff93b3d3f4 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000003f1b07e80 TRAP: 3000   Not tainted  (6.19.0-rc1-00048-gea1013c15392)
MSR:  800000000280f033 &lt;SF,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE&gt;  CR: 48888208  XER: 00000000
&lt;...&gt;
NIP [00007fff93b3d3f4] 0x7fff93b3d3f4
LR [00007fff93b3d3f4] 0x7fff93b3d3f4
---- interrupt: 3000

 The buggy address belongs to the object at c0000003c38e0000
  which belongs to the cache pgtable-2^9 of size 4096
 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
  4096-byte region [c0000003c38e0000, c0000003c38e1000)

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x3c38c
 head: order:2 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
 memcg:c0000003bfd63e01
 flags: 0x63ffff800000040(head|node=6|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
 page_type: f5(slab)
 raw: 063ffff800000040 c000000140058980 5deadbeef0000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 c0000003bfd63e01
 head: 063ffff800000040 c000000140058980 5deadbeef0000122 0000000000000000
 head: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 c0000003bfd63e01
 head: 063ffff800000002 c00c000000f0e301 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
 head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000004
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  138.953636] [   T2164] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  138.953643] [   T2164]  c0000003c38dff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953652] [   T2164]  c0000003c38dff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953661] [   T2164] &gt;c0000003c38e0000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953669] [   T2164]                    ^
[  138.953675] [   T2164]  c0000003c38e0080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953684] [   T2164]  c0000003c38e0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953692] [   T2164] ==================================================================
[  138.953701] [   T2164] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2f9135c7866c6e0d06e960993b8a5674a9ebc7ec.1771938394.git.ritesh.list@gmail.com
Fixes: 0207df4fa1a8 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) &lt;ritesh.list@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote &lt;venkat88@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" &lt;ritesh.list@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 51d8c78be0c27ddb91bc2c0263941d8b30a47d3b upstream.

kasan_free_pxd() assumes the page table is always struct page aligned.
But that's not always the case for all architectures.  E.g.  In case of
powerpc with 64K pagesize, PUD table (of size 4096) comes from slab cache
named pgtable-2^9.  Hence instead of page_to_virt(pxd_page()) let's just
directly pass the start of the pxd table which is passed as the 1st
argument.

This fixes the below double free kasan issue seen with PMEM:

radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000047d10000000-0x0000047f90000000 with 2.00 MiB pages
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: double-free in kasan_remove_zero_shadow+0x9c4/0xa20
Free of addr c0000003c38e0000 by task ndctl/2164

CPU: 34 UID: 0 PID: 2164 Comm: ndctl Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1-00048-gea1013c15392 #157 VOLUNTARY
Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_012) hv:phyp pSeries
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xc4 (unreliable)
 print_report+0x214/0x63c
 kasan_report_invalid_free+0xe4/0x110
 check_slab_allocation+0x100/0x150
 kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x6e0
 kasan_remove_zero_shadow+0x9c4/0xa20
 memunmap_pages+0x2b8/0x5c0
 devm_action_release+0x54/0x70
 release_nodes+0xc8/0x1a0
 devres_release_all+0xe0/0x140
 device_unbind_cleanup+0x30/0x120
 device_release_driver_internal+0x3e4/0x450
 unbind_store+0xfc/0x110
 drv_attr_store+0x78/0xb0
 sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x264/0x3f0
 vfs_write+0x3bc/0x7d0
 ksys_write+0xa4/0x190
 system_call_exception+0x190/0x480
 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
---- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff93b3d3f4
NIP:  00007fff93b3d3f4 LR: 00007fff93b3d3f4 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000003f1b07e80 TRAP: 3000   Not tainted  (6.19.0-rc1-00048-gea1013c15392)
MSR:  800000000280f033 &lt;SF,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE&gt;  CR: 48888208  XER: 00000000
&lt;...&gt;
NIP [00007fff93b3d3f4] 0x7fff93b3d3f4
LR [00007fff93b3d3f4] 0x7fff93b3d3f4
---- interrupt: 3000

 The buggy address belongs to the object at c0000003c38e0000
  which belongs to the cache pgtable-2^9 of size 4096
 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
  4096-byte region [c0000003c38e0000, c0000003c38e1000)

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x3c38c
 head: order:2 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
 memcg:c0000003bfd63e01
 flags: 0x63ffff800000040(head|node=6|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
 page_type: f5(slab)
 raw: 063ffff800000040 c000000140058980 5deadbeef0000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 c0000003bfd63e01
 head: 063ffff800000040 c000000140058980 5deadbeef0000122 0000000000000000
 head: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 c0000003bfd63e01
 head: 063ffff800000002 c00c000000f0e301 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
 head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000004
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  138.953636] [   T2164] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  138.953643] [   T2164]  c0000003c38dff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953652] [   T2164]  c0000003c38dff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953661] [   T2164] &gt;c0000003c38e0000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953669] [   T2164]                    ^
[  138.953675] [   T2164]  c0000003c38e0080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953684] [   T2164]  c0000003c38e0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  138.953692] [   T2164] ==================================================================
[  138.953701] [   T2164] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2f9135c7866c6e0d06e960993b8a5674a9ebc7ec.1771938394.git.ritesh.list@gmail.com
Fixes: 0207df4fa1a8 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) &lt;ritesh.list@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote &lt;venkat88@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" &lt;ritesh.list@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: print the original fault addr when access invalid shadow</title>
<updated>2023-11-08T16:30:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Haibo Li</name>
<email>haibo.li@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-09T07:37:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=632c2199e52d0e957dd47d4c931d60b82cd5ff29'/>
<id>632c2199e52d0e957dd47d4c931d60b82cd5ff29</id>
<content type='text'>
commit babddbfb7d7d70ae7f10fedd75a45d8ad75fdddf upstream.

when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from
kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table.  Access such shadow
address causes kernel oops.  Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA
39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on:

[ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003,
    pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty #43
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90
lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110
ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa.
The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range.

The generic kasan also has similar oops.

It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not
the original address.

Commit 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE.

This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231009073748.159228-1-haibo.li@mediatek.com
Fixes: 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
Signed-off-by: Haibo Li &lt;haibo.li@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno &lt;angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Haibo Li &lt;haibo.li@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Brugger &lt;matthias.bgg@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit babddbfb7d7d70ae7f10fedd75a45d8ad75fdddf upstream.

when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from
kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table.  Access such shadow
address causes kernel oops.  Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA
39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on:

[ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003,
    pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty #43
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90
lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110
ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa.
The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range.

The generic kasan also has similar oops.

It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not
the original address.

Commit 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE.

This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231009073748.159228-1-haibo.li@mediatek.com
Fixes: 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
Signed-off-by: Haibo Li &lt;haibo.li@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno &lt;angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Haibo Li &lt;haibo.li@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Brugger &lt;matthias.bgg@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:23:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T19:30:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=55eba18262cbc289ded9e7a8fe1b61a92140b59a'/>
<id>55eba18262cbc289ded9e7a8fe1b61a92140b59a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79cc1ba7badf9e7a12af99695a557e9ce27ee967 upstream.

Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
a single location.

Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann &lt;dietmar.eggemann@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Valentin Schneider &lt;vschneid@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79cc1ba7badf9e7a12af99695a557e9ce27ee967 upstream.

Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
a single location.

Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann &lt;dietmar.eggemann@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Valentin Schneider &lt;vschneid@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: no need to unset panic_on_warn in end_report()</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:23:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tiezhu Yang</name>
<email>yangtiezhu@loongson.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T19:29:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=715a63588f5602eae9ee7699ad83863cb500a019'/>
<id>715a63588f5602eae9ee7699ad83863cb500a019</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7ce7500375a63348e1d3a703c8d5003cbe3fea6 upstream.

panic_on_warn is unset inside panic(), so no need to unset it before
calling panic() in end_report().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1644324666-15947-6-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Xuefeng Li &lt;lixuefeng@loongson.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e7ce7500375a63348e1d3a703c8d5003cbe3fea6 upstream.

panic_on_warn is unset inside panic(), so no need to unset it before
calling panic() in end_report().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1644324666-15947-6-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Xuefeng Li &lt;lixuefeng@loongson.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: prevent cpu_quarantine corruption when CPU offline and cache shrink occur at same time</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T07:05:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zqiang</name>
<email>qiang1.zhang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-27T19:41:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=78d4dccf1601fa4ee30d2946fbbba48723b9b3a7'/>
<id>78d4dccf1601fa4ee30d2946fbbba48723b9b3a7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 31fa985b4196f8a66f027672e9bf2b81fea0417c upstream.

kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() is called in kmem_cache_shrink()/
destroy().  The kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() call is protected by
cpuslock in kmem_cache_destroy() to ensure serialization with
kasan_cpu_offline().

However the kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() call is not protected by
cpuslock in kmem_cache_shrink().  When a CPU is going offline and cache
shrink occurs at same time, the cpu_quarantine may be corrupted by
interrupt (per_cpu_remove_cache operation).

So add a cpu_quarantine offline flags check in per_cpu_remove_cache().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment, per Zqiang]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414025925.2423818-1-qiang1.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Zqiang &lt;qiang1.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 31fa985b4196f8a66f027672e9bf2b81fea0417c upstream.

kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() is called in kmem_cache_shrink()/
destroy().  The kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() call is protected by
cpuslock in kmem_cache_destroy() to ensure serialization with
kasan_cpu_offline().

However the kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() call is not protected by
cpuslock in kmem_cache_shrink().  When a CPU is going offline and cache
shrink occurs at same time, the cpu_quarantine may be corrupted by
interrupt (per_cpu_remove_cache operation).

So add a cpu_quarantine offline flags check in per_cpu_remove_cache().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment, per Zqiang]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414025925.2423818-1-qiang1.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Zqiang &lt;qiang1.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: fix incorrect arguments passing in kasan_add_zero_shadow</title>
<updated>2021-01-27T10:55:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lecopzer Chen</name>
<email>lecopzer@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-24T05:01:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=fee5a83dfc4af016b8cd957d8bd4e289954588ef'/>
<id>fee5a83dfc4af016b8cd957d8bd4e289954588ef</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5dabd1712cd056814f9ab15f1d68157ceb04e741 upstream.

kasan_remove_zero_shadow() shall use original virtual address, start and
size, instead of shadow address.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210103063847.5963-1-lecopzer@gmail.com
Fixes: 0207df4fa1a86 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Lecopzer Chen &lt;lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5dabd1712cd056814f9ab15f1d68157ceb04e741 upstream.

kasan_remove_zero_shadow() shall use original virtual address, start and
size, instead of shadow address.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210103063847.5963-1-lecopzer@gmail.com
Fixes: 0207df4fa1a86 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Lecopzer Chen &lt;lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: fix unaligned address is unhandled in kasan_remove_zero_shadow</title>
<updated>2021-01-27T10:55:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lecopzer Chen</name>
<email>lecopzer@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-24T05:01:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ecd63f04e72879b7c85c9e12698d2a3aabe34c94'/>
<id>ecd63f04e72879b7c85c9e12698d2a3aabe34c94</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a11a496ee6e2ab6ed850233c96b94caf042af0b9 upstream.

During testing kasan_populate_early_shadow and kasan_remove_zero_shadow,
if the shadow start and end address in kasan_remove_zero_shadow() is not
aligned to PMD_SIZE, the remain unaligned PTE won't be removed.

In the test case for kasan_remove_zero_shadow():

    shadow_start: 0xffffffb802000000, shadow end: 0xffffffbfbe000000

    3-level page table:
      PUD_SIZE: 0x40000000 PMD_SIZE: 0x200000 PAGE_SIZE: 4K

0xffffffbf80000000 ~ 0xffffffbfbdf80000 will not be removed because in
kasan_remove_pud_table(), kasan_pmd_table(*pud) is true but the next
address is 0xffffffbfbdf80000 which is not aligned to PUD_SIZE.

In the correct condition, this should fallback to the next level
kasan_remove_pmd_table() but the condition flow always continue to skip
the unaligned part.

Fix by correcting the condition when next and addr are neither aligned.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210103135621.83129-1-lecopzer@gmail.com
Fixes: 0207df4fa1a86 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Lecopzer Chen &lt;lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: YJ Chiang &lt;yj.chiang@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a11a496ee6e2ab6ed850233c96b94caf042af0b9 upstream.

During testing kasan_populate_early_shadow and kasan_remove_zero_shadow,
if the shadow start and end address in kasan_remove_zero_shadow() is not
aligned to PMD_SIZE, the remain unaligned PTE won't be removed.

In the test case for kasan_remove_zero_shadow():

    shadow_start: 0xffffffb802000000, shadow end: 0xffffffbfbe000000

    3-level page table:
      PUD_SIZE: 0x40000000 PMD_SIZE: 0x200000 PAGE_SIZE: 4K

0xffffffbf80000000 ~ 0xffffffbfbdf80000 will not be removed because in
kasan_remove_pud_table(), kasan_pmd_table(*pud) is true but the next
address is 0xffffffbfbdf80000 which is not aligned to PUD_SIZE.

In the correct condition, this should fallback to the next level
kasan_remove_pmd_table() but the condition flow always continue to skip
the unaligned part.

Fix by correcting the condition when next and addr are neither aligned.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210103135621.83129-1-lecopzer@gmail.com
Fixes: 0207df4fa1a86 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Lecopzer Chen &lt;lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: YJ Chiang &lt;yj.chiang@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: fix object remaining in offline per-cpu quarantine</title>
<updated>2020-12-11T22:02:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuan-Ying Lee</name>
<email>Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-11T21:36:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6c82d45c7f0348b44e00bd7dcccfc47dec7577d1'/>
<id>6c82d45c7f0348b44e00bd7dcccfc47dec7577d1</id>
<content type='text'>
We hit this issue in our internal test.  When enabling generic kasan, a
kfree()'d object is put into per-cpu quarantine first.  If the cpu goes
offline, object still remains in the per-cpu quarantine.  If we call
kmem_cache_destroy() now, slub will report "Objects remaining" error.

  =============================================================================
  BUG test_module_slab (Not tainted): Objects remaining in test_module_slab on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
  INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=34 used=1 fp=0x(____ptrval____) flags=0x2ffff00000010200
  CPU: 3 PID: 176 Comm: cat Tainted: G    B             5.10.0-rc1-00007-g4525c8781ec0-dirty #10
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
     dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2b0
     show_stack+0x18/0x68
     dump_stack+0xfc/0x168
     slab_err+0xac/0xd4
     __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1e4/0x3c8
     kmem_cache_destroy+0x68/0x130
     test_version_show+0x84/0xf0
     module_attr_show+0x40/0x60
     sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0
     kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8
     seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8
     kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338
     vfs_read+0xe4/0x250
     ksys_read+0xc8/0x180
     __arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58
     el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228
     do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa0
     el0_sync_handler+0x170/0x178
     el0_sync+0x174/0x180
  INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=15848
  INFO: Allocated in test_version_show+0x98/0xf0 age=8188 cpu=6 pid=172
     stack_trace_save+0x9c/0xd0
     set_track+0x64/0xf0
     alloc_debug_processing+0x104/0x1a0
     ___slab_alloc+0x628/0x648
     __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x2c/0x58
     kmem_cache_alloc+0x560/0x588
     test_version_show+0x98/0xf0
     module_attr_show+0x40/0x60
     sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0
     kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8
     seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8
     kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338
     vfs_read+0xe4/0x250
     ksys_read+0xc8/0x180
     __arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58
     el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228
  kmem_cache_destroy test_module_slab: Slab cache still has objects

Register a cpu hotplug function to remove all objects in the offline
per-cpu quarantine when cpu is going offline.  Set a per-cpu variable to
indicate this cpu is offline.

[qiang.zhang@windriver.com: fix slab double free when cpu-hotplug]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201204102206.20237-1-qiang.zhang@windriver.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1606895585-17382-2-git-send-email-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee &lt;Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zqiang &lt;qiang.zhang@windriver.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Guangye Yang &lt;guangye.yang@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Brugger &lt;matthias.bgg@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Tang &lt;nicholas.tang@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Miles Chen &lt;miles.chen@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Qian Cai &lt;qcai@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We hit this issue in our internal test.  When enabling generic kasan, a
kfree()'d object is put into per-cpu quarantine first.  If the cpu goes
offline, object still remains in the per-cpu quarantine.  If we call
kmem_cache_destroy() now, slub will report "Objects remaining" error.

  =============================================================================
  BUG test_module_slab (Not tainted): Objects remaining in test_module_slab on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
  INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=34 used=1 fp=0x(____ptrval____) flags=0x2ffff00000010200
  CPU: 3 PID: 176 Comm: cat Tainted: G    B             5.10.0-rc1-00007-g4525c8781ec0-dirty #10
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
     dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2b0
     show_stack+0x18/0x68
     dump_stack+0xfc/0x168
     slab_err+0xac/0xd4
     __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1e4/0x3c8
     kmem_cache_destroy+0x68/0x130
     test_version_show+0x84/0xf0
     module_attr_show+0x40/0x60
     sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0
     kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8
     seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8
     kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338
     vfs_read+0xe4/0x250
     ksys_read+0xc8/0x180
     __arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58
     el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228
     do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa0
     el0_sync_handler+0x170/0x178
     el0_sync+0x174/0x180
  INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=15848
  INFO: Allocated in test_version_show+0x98/0xf0 age=8188 cpu=6 pid=172
     stack_trace_save+0x9c/0xd0
     set_track+0x64/0xf0
     alloc_debug_processing+0x104/0x1a0
     ___slab_alloc+0x628/0x648
     __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x2c/0x58
     kmem_cache_alloc+0x560/0x588
     test_version_show+0x98/0xf0
     module_attr_show+0x40/0x60
     sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0
     kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8
     seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8
     kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338
     vfs_read+0xe4/0x250
     ksys_read+0xc8/0x180
     __arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58
     el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228
  kmem_cache_destroy test_module_slab: Slab cache still has objects

Register a cpu hotplug function to remove all objects in the offline
per-cpu quarantine when cpu is going offline.  Set a per-cpu variable to
indicate this cpu is offline.

[qiang.zhang@windriver.com: fix slab double free when cpu-hotplug]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201204102206.20237-1-qiang.zhang@windriver.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1606895585-17382-2-git-send-email-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee &lt;Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zqiang &lt;qiang.zhang@windriver.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Guangye Yang &lt;guangye.yang@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Brugger &lt;matthias.bgg@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Tang &lt;nicholas.tang@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Miles Chen &lt;miles.chen@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Qian Cai &lt;qcai@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: kasan: do not panic if both panic_on_warn and kasan_multishot set</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T01:38:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gow</name>
<email>davidgow@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-13T23:55:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=be4f1ae978ffe98cc95ec49ceb95386fb4474974'/>
<id>be4f1ae978ffe98cc95ec49ceb95386fb4474974</id>
<content type='text'>
KASAN errors will currently trigger a panic when panic_on_warn is set.
This renders kasan_multishot useless, as further KASAN errors won't be
reported if the kernel has already paniced.  By making kasan_multishot
disable this behaviour for KASAN errors, we can still have the benefits of
panic_on_warn for non-KASAN warnings, yet be able to use kasan_multishot.

This is particularly important when running KASAN tests, which need to
trigger multiple KASAN errors: previously these would panic the system if
panic_on_warn was set, now they can run (and will panic the system should
non-KASAN warnings show up).

Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Patricia Alfonso &lt;trishalfonso@google.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915035828.570483-6-davidgow@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910070331.3358048-6-davidgow@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
KASAN errors will currently trigger a panic when panic_on_warn is set.
This renders kasan_multishot useless, as further KASAN errors won't be
reported if the kernel has already paniced.  By making kasan_multishot
disable this behaviour for KASAN errors, we can still have the benefits of
panic_on_warn for non-KASAN warnings, yet be able to use kasan_multishot.

This is particularly important when running KASAN tests, which need to
trigger multiple KASAN errors: previously these would panic the system if
panic_on_warn was set, now they can run (and will panic the system should
non-KASAN warnings show up).

Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Patricia Alfonso &lt;trishalfonso@google.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915035828.570483-6-davidgow@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910070331.3358048-6-davidgow@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KUnit: KASAN Integration</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T01:38:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patricia Alfonso</name>
<email>trishalfonso@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-13T23:55:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=83c4e7a0363bdb8104f510370907161623e31086'/>
<id>83c4e7a0363bdb8104f510370907161623e31086</id>
<content type='text'>
Integrate KASAN into KUnit testing framework.

        - Fail tests when KASAN reports an error that is not expected
        - Use KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL to expect a KASAN error in KASAN
	  tests
        - Expected KASAN reports pass tests and are still printed when run
          without kunit_tool (kunit_tool still bypasses the report due to the
          test passing)
	- KUnit struct in current task used to keep track of the current
	  test from KASAN code

Make use of "[PATCH v3 kunit-next 1/2] kunit: generalize kunit_resource
API beyond allocated resources" and "[PATCH v3 kunit-next 2/2] kunit: add
support for named resources" from Alan Maguire [1]

        - A named resource is added to a test when a KASAN report is
          expected
        - This resource contains a struct for kasan_data containing
          booleans representing if a KASAN report is expected and if a
          KASAN report is found

[1] (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kselftest/1583251361-12748-1-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com/T/#t)

Signed-off-by: Patricia Alfonso &lt;trishalfonso@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915035828.570483-3-davidgow@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910070331.3358048-3-davidgow@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Integrate KASAN into KUnit testing framework.

        - Fail tests when KASAN reports an error that is not expected
        - Use KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL to expect a KASAN error in KASAN
	  tests
        - Expected KASAN reports pass tests and are still printed when run
          without kunit_tool (kunit_tool still bypasses the report due to the
          test passing)
	- KUnit struct in current task used to keep track of the current
	  test from KASAN code

Make use of "[PATCH v3 kunit-next 1/2] kunit: generalize kunit_resource
API beyond allocated resources" and "[PATCH v3 kunit-next 2/2] kunit: add
support for named resources" from Alan Maguire [1]

        - A named resource is added to a test when a KASAN report is
          expected
        - This resource contains a struct for kasan_data containing
          booleans representing if a KASAN report is expected and if a
          KASAN report is found

[1] (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kselftest/1583251361-12748-1-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com/T/#t)

Signed-off-by: Patricia Alfonso &lt;trishalfonso@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915035828.570483-3-davidgow@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910070331.3358048-3-davidgow@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
