linux.git/net, branch v3.10.65

mac80211: free management frame keys when removing station

2015-01-08T17:58:16+00:00

commit 28a9bc68124c319b2b3dc861e80828a8865fd1ba upstream.

When writing the code to allow per-station GTKs, I neglected to
take into account the management frame keys (index 4 and 5) when
freeing the station and only added code to free the first four
data frame keys.

Fix this by iterating the array of keys over the right length.

Fixes: e31b82136d1a ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: fix multicast LED blinking and counter

2015-01-08T17:58:16+00:00

commit d025933e29872cb1fe19fc54d80e4dfa4ee5779c upstream.

As multicast-frames can't be fragmented, "dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount"
stopped being incremented after the use-after-free fix. Furthermore, the
RX-LED will be triggered by every multicast frame (which wouldn't happen
before) which wouldn't allow the LED to rest at all.

Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89431 which also had the
patch.

Fixes: b8fff407a180 ("mac80211: fix use-after-free in defragmentation")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Müller 
[rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sctp: use MAX_HEADER for headroom reserve in output path

2014-12-16T17:09:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9772b54c55266ce80c639a80aa68eeb908f8ecf5 ]

To accomodate for enough headroom for tunnels, use MAX_HEADER instead
of LL_MAX_HEADER. Robert reported that he has hit after roughly 40hrs
of trinity an skb_under_panic() via SCTP output path (see reference).
I couldn't reproduce it from here, but not using MAX_HEADER as elsewhere
in other protocols might be one possible cause for this.

In any case, it looks like accounting on chunks themself seems to look
good as the skb already passed the SCTP output path and did not hit
any skb_over_panic(). Given tunneling was enabled in his .config, the
headroom would have been expanded by MAX_HEADER in this case.

Reported-by: Robert Święcki 
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/1/507
Fixes: 594ccc14dfe4d ("[SCTP] Replace incorrect use of dev_alloc_skb with alloc_skb in sctp_packet_transmit().")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Acked-by: Neil Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rtnetlink: release net refcnt on error in do_setlink()

2014-12-16T17:09:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit e0ebde0e131b529fd721b24f62872def5ec3718c ]

rtnl_link_get_net() holds a reference on the 'struct net', we need to release
it in case of error.

CC: Eric W. Biederman 
Fixes: b51642f6d77b ("net: Enable a userns root rtnl calls that are safe for unprivilged users")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel 
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: gre: fix wrong skb->protocol in WCCP

2014-12-16T17:09:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit be6572fdb1bfbe23b2624d477de50af50b02f5d6 ]

When using GRE redirection in WCCP, it sets the wrong skb->protocol,
that is, ETH_P_IP instead of ETH_P_IPV6 for the encapuslated traffic.

Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Cc: Dmitry Kozlov 
Signed-off-by: Yuri Chislov 
Tested-by: Yuri Chislov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipx: fix locking regression in ipx_sendmsg and ipx_recvmsg

2014-12-06T23:05:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit 01462405f0c093b2f8dfddafcadcda6c9e4c5cdf ]

This fixes an old regression introduced by commit
b0d0d915 (ipx: remove the BKL).

When a recvmsg syscall blocks waiting for new data, no data can be sent on the
same socket with sendmsg because ipx_recvmsg() sleeps with the socket locked.

This breaks mars-nwe (NetWare emulator):
- the ncpserv process reads the request using recvmsg
- ncpserv forks and spawns nwconn
- ncpserv calls a (blocking) recvmsg and waits for new requests
- nwconn deadlocks in sendmsg on the same socket

Commit b0d0d915 has simply replaced BKL locking with
lock_sock/release_sock. Unlike now, BKL got unlocked while
sleeping, so a blocking recvmsg did not block a concurrent
sendmsg.

Only keep the socket locked while actually working with the socket data and
release it prior to calling skb_recv_datagram().

Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac 
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: Fix incorrect error code when adding an unreachable route

2014-12-06T23:05:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit 49dd18ba4615eaa72f15c9087dea1c2ab4744cf5 ]

Trying to add an unreachable route incorrectly returns -ESRCH if
if custom FIB rules are present:

[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: Network is unreachable
[root@localhost ~]# ip rule add to 55.66.77.88 table 200
[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: No such process
[root@localhost ~]#

Commit 83886b6b636173b206f475929e58fac75c6f2446 ("[NET]: Change "not found"
return value for rule lookup") changed fib_rules_lookup()
to use -ESRCH as a "not found" code internally, but for user space it
should be translated into -ENETUNREACH. Handle the translation centrally in
ipv4-specific fib_lookup(), leaving the DECnet case alone.

On a related note, commit b7a71b51ee37d919e4098cd961d59a883fd272d8
("ipv4: removed redundant conditional") removed a similar translation from
ip_route_input_slow() prematurely AIUI.

Fixes: b7a71b51ee37 ("ipv4: removed redundant conditional")
Signed-off-by: Panu Matilainen 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks

2014-11-21T17:22:55+00:00

commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 upstream.

Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 
 [] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Acked-by: Neil Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks

2014-11-21T17:22:55+00:00

commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 upstream.

When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->

... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!

The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.

Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():

While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.

Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.

Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing

2014-11-21T17:22:55+00:00

commit 26b87c7881006311828bb0ab271a551a62dcceb4 upstream.

This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
  [...]
  ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>

... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.

We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].

The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.

In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.

One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman